explaining that “no specific date of contact with the substance can be charged with being the date of injury, inasmuch as the injurious consequences of the exposure are the product of a period of time rather than a point of time; consequently the afflicted employee can be held to be ‘injured’ only when the accumulated effects of the deleterious substance manifest themselves”
How later courts described this case
- explaining that “no specific date of contact with the substance can be charged with being the date of injury, inasmuch as the injurious consequences of the exposure are the product of a period of time rather than a point of time; consequently the afflicted employee can be held to be ‘injured’ only when the accumulated effects of the deleterious substance manifest themselves”
- holding that the LIA covers claims relating to railroad employees’ health, including diseases as well as accidents
- holding that an employee exposed to a toxic substance is injured for purposes of the personal injury statute of limitations when the effects of the exposure manifest themselves
- stating that negligence under the FELA will attach if the railroad carrier “knew, or by the exercise of due care should have known, that prevalent standards of conduct were inadequate to protect [the injured employee] and similarly situated employees”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
Mr. Justice Frankfurter,
concurring in part.
At the risk of wearisome reiteration it is relevant to say again that the common-law concept of negligence is ait antiquated and uncivilized basis for working out rights and duties for disabilities and deaths inevitably due to the conduct of modern industry. In the conscious or unconscious endeavor not to have the human cost of industry fall with cruel injustice upon workers and their families, the law of negligence gives rise to endless casuistry. So long as the gamble of an occasional heavy verdict is not replaced by the security of a modern system of .insurance, courts must continue to apply the notion of pegligence in situations for which it was never intended. Therefore,' if a claim is made that an injury is causally related to a carrier’s failure to maintain standards of care appropriate for employment on.a railroad, the Federal Employers’ Liability Act entitles an employee to establish that claim to a jury s satisfaction. Damages are re *197 coverable under that Act for suffering “injury.” That term, it seems to me, is sufficiently broad to include bodily injury which nowadays is more specifically characterised as “occupational disease.” Accordingly, I agree that recovery may be had under the Federal Employers’ Liability Act for silicosis, where the facts, sustain such a claim, as is illustrated by the case of Sadowski v. Long Island R. Co., 292 N. Y. 448 , 55 N. E. 2d 497 .
On the other hand, I agree with the Missouri Supreme Court that occupational diseases cannot be fitted into the category of “accidents” for which the Boiler Inspection Act devised.a scheme of regulation and a basis of liability. 36 Stat. 913 , as amended, 45 U. S. C. §§ 22-34 . I ‘think I appreciate the humane impulse which seeks to bring occupational diseases within such a regime. But due regard for the limits of judicial interpretation precludes such free-handed application of. a statute to situations outside its language and its purpose. To do so, moreover, is, I believe, .a disservice to the humane ends which are sought to be promoted. Legislation is needed which will effectively meet the social obligations which underlie the incidence of occupational disease. See National Insurance (Industrial Injuries) Act, 1946, .9 & 10 Geo. 6, 488, particularly Part IY. The need for such legislation becomes obscured and the drive for it retarded if encouragement is given to the thought that there are now adequate remedies for occupational diseases in callings subject to Congressional control. The result of the present decision is to secure for this petitioner the' judgment which the jury awarded him. It does not secure a proper system for dealing with occupational diseases.
I would reverse this judgment and remand the case to the Supreme Court of Missouri for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Mr.'; Justice Reed, Mr. Justice Jackson, and Mr. Justice Burton join in this opinion.