holding that statutory authoriza- tion of writs "necessary" for the exercise of jurisdiction does not require that use of the writ be essential, but only that it be reasonably necessary in the interest of justice (internal quotation marks omitted)
How later courts described this case
- holding that statutory authoriza- tion of writs "necessary" for the exercise of jurisdiction does not require that use of the writ be essential, but only that it be reasonably necessary in the interest of justice (internal quotation marks omitted)
- holding that courts have the discretion to decide whether or not to issue a writ precisely because prisoners do not have the absolute right to be argue their own appeals or be present at proceedings in an appellate court
- holding an incarcerated pro se civil litigant’s physical presence is not necessarily required, even at the trial stage
- holding that this right is “‘qualified and restricted’”
Written by the judges who cited it.
Later courts went against this
Reported overruled on other grounds by McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467 (1991) — not on the Supreme Court's list
334 U.S. 266, 285 (1948), overruled on other grounds by McClesky v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467
Supreme Court of the United StatesApr 16, 199129 citing opinionsother groundsunconfirmed confidenceRead it
The opinion
Mr. Justice Frankfurter,
dissenting.
I agree with the views of Mr. Justice Jackson that, in the light of all the long-drawn-out prior proceedings, the two lower courts justifiably found the fourth petition for habeas corpus in this case without merit on its face. It is not too much to ask the petitioner to state, however informally, that his fourth petition is based on newly discovered matter, or, in any event, on a claim that he could not fairly have been asked to bring to the court’s attention in his three prior petitions. Such a requirement certainly does not narrow the broad protection which the writ of habeas corpus serves. I also agree with his general attitude against a prisoner being brought from Alcatraz — or any other federal prison — to argue his own case *295 on appeal. My difference with him is that I would not bolt the door to such an undesirable practice, as a matter of law, but merely leave it as a rigorous rule of practice. The power to depart from this rule ought not to be wholly foreclosed, even though opportunity for its exercise is left for contingencies not easily foreseeable.
The office of the writ of habeas corpus precludes definitive formulation of its limitations precisely because it is the prerogative writ available for vindicating liberties. See Sunal v. Large, 332 U. S. 174, 184, 187 . Therefore, I would not preclude the use of the writ to bring a convict before a circuit court of appeals where circumstances in the interests of justice make his presence compelling. See Adams v. United States ex rel. McCann, 317 U. S. 269, 272-75 . It is a very different thing to judge the use of the writ for the purpose of having an incarcerated petitioner argue his own case on appeal by the ordinary standards of judicial discretion. To acknowledge such power in the circuit courts of appeals implies too broad an authority, in that the abuse of its exercise in granting the writ is too narrow a basis for review. A general rule should preclude the use of the writ for the purpose of taking a prisoner out of confinement merely to argue his own case on appeal from dismissal of a petition for habeas corpus after conviction. Every legitimate right of such a prisoner can be safeguarded by means much more consonant with the fair and seemly and wise administration of justice.
The Chief Justice and MR. Justice Reed join in this dissent.