Opinion

Craig v. Harney

  • 331 U.S. 367
  • 67 S. Ct. 1249
  • 91 L. Ed. 1546
  • 1947 U.S. LEXIS 2266
Court
Supreme Court of the United States
Filed
Oct 15, 1947
Status
Published
Author
Murphy
On the bench
Douglas, Murphy, Frankfurter, Jackson, Reed
Cited by
557 cases

holding that a publisher, a writer, and a reporter could not be held in contempt for printing accounts of proceedings in a civil trial, because “[a] trial is a public event [and] [w]hat transpires in the court room is public property5’

How later courts described this case

  • holding that a publisher, a writer, and a reporter could not be held in contempt for printing accounts of proceedings in a civil trial, because “[a] trial is a public event [and] [w]hat transpires in the court room is public property5’
  • holding judge may not hold individual in contempt simply for using “strong language” or “intemperate language”
  • contempt conviction of a publisher and reporter based upon newspaper articles characterizing a judge’s directed verdict in a landlord-tenant controversy as a “travesty on justice”
  • "[R]obust debate among people with different viewpoints * * * is a vital part of our democracy * * *."

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

Mr. Justice Murphy,

concurring.

While joining in the opinion of the Court, I believe that the importance of the problem raised by this case cannot be overemphasized. A free press lies at the heart of our democracy and its preservation is essential to the survival of liberty. Any inroad made upon the constitutional protection of a free press tends to undermine the freedom of all men to print and to read the truth.

In my view, the Constitution forbids a judge from summarily punishing a newspaper editor for printing an unjust attack upon him or his method of dispensing justice. The only possible exception is in the rare instance where the attack might reasonably cause a real impediment to the administration of justice. Unscrupulous and vindictive criticism of the judiciary is regrettable. But judges must not retaliate by a summary suppression of such criticism for they are bound by the command of the First Amendment. Any summary suppression of unjust criticism carries with it an ominous threat of summary suppression of all criticism. It is to avoid that threat that the First Amendment, as I view it, outlaws the summary contempt method of suppression.

Silence and a steady devotion to duty are the best answers to irresponsible criticism; and those judges who feel the need for giving a more visible demonstration of *384 their feelings may take advantage of various laws passed for that purpose which do not impinge upon a free press. The liberties guaranteed by the First Amendment, however, are too highly prized to be subjected to the hazards of summary contempt procedure.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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