holding that when a seller of real property “transfers subject to the mortgage, the benefit to him is as real and substantial as if the mortgage were discharged, or as if a personal debt in an equal amount had been assumed by another.”
How later courts described this case
- holding that when a seller of real property “transfers subject to the mortgage, the benefit to him is as real and substantial as if the mortgage were discharged, or as if a personal debt in an equal amount had been assumed by another.”
- stating that “words of statutes—including revenue acts^—should be interpreted where possible in their ordinary, everyday senses.”
- noting that, in some circumstances, a seller who has not actually received funds will be treated as having had the money “‘paid [to] it and then paid over by it to its creditors’”
- “if the value of the property is less than the amount of the mortgage, ... a different problem might be encountered”
Written by the judges who cited it.
Later courts went against this
Limited by John F. Tufts and Mary A. Tufts v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 651 F.2d 1058 (1981)
Because, as indicated above, we have serious reservations about the Crane decision, we decline to extend it beyond the facts of that case, and we therefore conclude that the fair market value limitation so “[o]bvi-ously” anticipated by footnote 37 is warranted.
The opinion
Mr. Justice Jackson,
dissenting.
The Tax Court concluded that this taxpayer acquired only an equity worth nothing. The mortgage was in default, the mortgage debt was equal to the value of the property, any possession by the taxpayer was forfeited and terminable immediately by foreclosure, and perhaps by a receiver pendente lite. Arguments can be advanced to support the theory that the taxpayer received the whole property and thereupon came to owe the whole debt. Likewise it is argued that when she sold she transferred the entire value of the property and received release from the whole debt. But we think these arguments are not so conclusive that it was not within the province of the Tax Court to find that she received an equity which at that time had a zero value. Dobson v. Commissioner, 320 U. S. 489 ; Commissioner v. Scottish American Investment Co., Ltd., 323 U. S. 119 . The taxpayer never became personally liable for the debt, and hence when she sold she was released from no debt. The mortgage debt was simply a subtraction from the value of what she did receive, and from what she sold. The subtraction left her nothing when she acquired it and a small margin when she sold it. She acquired a property right equivalent to an equity of redemption and sold the same thing. It was the “property” bought and sold as the Tax Court considered it to be under the Revenue Laws. We are not required in this case to decide whether depreciation was properly taken, for there is no issue about it here.
*17 We would reverse the Court of Appeals and sustain the decision of the Tax Court.
Mr. Justice Frankfurter and Mr. Justice Douglas join in this opinion.