affirming conviction of gas station owner based in part on his production of gasoline ration coupons that failed to cover amount of gasoline sold, in violation of federal gas rationing provisions that required the receipt and retention of coupons for all sales
How later courts described this case
- affirming conviction of gas station owner based in part on his production of gasoline ration coupons that failed to cover amount of gasoline sold, in violation of federal gas rationing provisions that required the receipt and retention of coupons for all sales
- noting, in distinguishing between private property and public documents, that at common law a rightful claim of ownership would justify even a trespass by the owner to regain possession
- indicating that there was a statute that specified that the gasoline coupons at issue were government property subject to inspection and recall by the government
- holding search with consent of suspect is an exception
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
Mr. Justice Rutledge,
dissenting.
I am substantially in accord with the views expressed by Mr. Justice Frankfurter in his exhaustive opinion as to the controlling principles which should govern in the disposition of this case. Perhaps it should be added that the evidence does not clearly show that the officer who flashed the light into the window was in fact attempting to open it by force or to do more than observe the interior. But the situation was such that his action clearly created in Davis’ mind the impression that he either was entering by force or intended to do so. It therefore must be taken, I think, that Davis’ so-called consent was induced by this apparent compulsion, the very kind of thing the Fourth Amendment was designed to prevent. There was no such consent as would legalize the entry and search.
Moreover, whatever may be the scope of search incident to lawful arrest for a misdemeanor, I know of no decision which goes so far as to rule that this right of search extends to breaking and entering locked premises by force. That was not done here. But the search followed on consent given in the reasonable belief that it was necessary to avoid the breaking and entry. I think it was therefore in no better case legally than if in fact the breaking and forceable entry had occurred. The search was justified neither by consent nor by the doctrine of reasonable search as incident to a lawful arrest.