explaining that “[j]urisdiction . . . is not defeated . . . by the possibility that the averments might fail to state a cause of action on which petitioners could actually recover[, f]or it is well settled that the failure to state a proper cause of action calls for a judgment on the merits and not for a dismissal for want of jurisdiction”
How later courts described this case
- explaining that “[j]urisdiction . . . is not defeated . . . by the possibility that the averments might fail to state a cause of action on which petitioners could actually recover[, f]or it is well settled that the failure to state a proper cause of action calls for a judgment on the merits and not for a dismissal for want of jurisdiction”
- stating that jurisdiction “is not defeated . . . by the possibility that the averments might fail to state a cause of action on which petitioners could actually recover” because “the failure to state a proper cause of action calls for a judgment on the merits and not for a dismissal for want of jurisdiction.”
- holding that a case is subject to dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction “where the alleged claim under the Constitution or federal statutes clearly appears to be immaterial and made solely for the purpose of obtaining jurisdiction or where such a claim is wholly insubstantial and frivolous.”
- holding that “[j]urisdiction is not defeated by the possibility that the allegations might fail to state a cause of action on which a party could actually recover. . . . [t]he failure to state a proper cause of action calls for judgment on the merits and not a dismissal for want of jurisdiction”
Written by the judges who cited it.
Later courts went against this
Questioned by Rosenthal v. Board Of Education Of Central High School District No. 3, 497 F.2d 726 (1974)
'The substantiality doctrine as a statement of jurisdictional principles affecting the power of a federal court to adjudicate constitutional claims has been questioned, Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 683, 66 S.Ct. 773, 776, 90 L.Ed. 939 (1946), and characterized as 'more ancient than analytically sound.' Rosado v. Wyman, supra, 397 U.S. at 404, 90 S.Ct., at 1214.
Questioned by Martin v. Wilkes-Barre Publishing Co., 567 F. Supp. 304 (1983)
While the substantiality doctrine as a statement of jurisdictional principles affecting the power of a federal court to adjudicate constitutional claims has been questioned, see Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S. 397, 404, 90 S.Ct. 1207, 1213, 25 L.Ed.2d 442 (1970); Bell v. Hood, 327 *308 U.S. 678, 683, 66 S.Ct. 773, 776, 90 L.Ed. 939 (1946), nevertheless, “it remains the federal rule.
Questioned by Sims v. Waln, 388 F. Supp. 543 (1974)
The substantiality doctrine as a statement of jurisdictional principles affecting the power of a federal court to adjudicate constitutional claims has been questioned, Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 683 [66 S.Ct. 773, 776, 90 L.Ed. 939] (1946), and characterized as “more ancient than analytically sound,” Rosado v. Wyman,
Questioned by James L. Lewis v. United States, 70 F.3d 597 (1995)
327 U.S. at 683, 66 S.Ct. at 776 (“The accuracy of calling these dismissals jurisdictional has been questioned.”);
Questioned by Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528 (1974)
The substantiality doctrine as a statement of jurisdictional principles affecting the power of a federal court to adjudicate constitutional claims has been questioned, Bell v. Hood, 327 U. S. 678, 683 (1946), and characterized as “more ancient than analytically sound,” Rosado v. Wyman, supra, at 404.
Distinguished
Distinguished by Orff v. United States, 358 F.3d 1137 (2004)
Bell is inapposite because the jurisdictional defect in our case does not arise from "the nonexistence of a cause of action.
Distinguished by Marshall v. Gibson's Products, Inc. of Plano, 584 F.2d 668 (1978)
But the Bell analysis is inapposite here, where Congress impliedly precludes federal jurisdiction.
Distinguished by William Dinneen v. Robert E. Williams, 219 F.2d 428 (1955)
See Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 66 S.Ct. 773, 90 L.Ed. 939, which is also distinguishable upon the ground that there was considerable factual background in the complaint.
The opinion
Mr. Chief Justice Stone and Mr. Justice Burton
dissenting.
The district court is without jurisdiction as a federal court unless the complaint states a cause of action arising under the Constitution or laws of the United States. Whether the complaint states such a cause of action is for the court, not the pleader, to say. When the provision of the Constitution or federal statute affords a remedy which may in some circumstances be availed of by a plaintiff, the fact that his pleading does not bring him within that class as one entitled to the remedy, goes to the sufficiency of the pleading and not to the jurisdiction. The Fair v. Kohler Die Co., 228 U. S. 22, 25 ; Binderup v. Pathe Exchange. 263 U. S. 291, 306-308 , and cases cited. But where, as here, neither the constitutional provision nor *686 any act of Congress affords a remedy to any person, the mere assertion by a plaintiff that he is entitled to such a remedy cannot be said to satisfy jurisdictional requirements. Hence we think that the courts below rightly decided that the district court was without jurisdiction because no cause of action under the Constitution or laws of the United States was stated.
The only effect of holding, as the Court does, that jurisdiction is conferred by the pleader’s unfounded assertion that he is one who can have a remedy for damages arising under the Fourth and Fifth Amendments is to transfer to the federal court the trial of the allegations of trespass to person and property, which is a cause of action arising wholly under state law. For even though it be decided that petitioners have no right to damages under the Constitution, the district court will be required to pass upon the question whether the facts stated by petitioners give rise to a cause of action for trespass under state law. See Hurn v. Oursler, 289 U. S. 238 .