stating that "where a plaintiff has been injured by fraud and remains in ignorance of it without any fault or want of diligence or care on his part, the bar of the statute does not begin to run until the fraud is discovered, though there be no special circumstances or efforts on the part of the party committing the fraud to conceal it from the knowledge of the other party."
How later courts described this case
- stating that "where a plaintiff has been injured by fraud and remains in ignorance of it without any fault or want of diligence or care on his part, the bar of the statute does not begin to run until the fraud is discovered, though there be no special circumstances or efforts on the part of the party committing the fraud to conceal it from the knowledge of the other party."
- holding that an issue not raised before the IJ or ruled on by the IJ was not properly before the BIA
- noting that fraudulent concealment requires the claimant be misled “without any fault or want of diligence”
- holding that while state law determines limitations period when no federal limitations period is provided, federal law determines date on which limitations period begins to run
Written by the judges who cited it.
Later courts went against this
Questioned by Ashafa v. City of Chicago, 146 F.3d 459 (1998)
The Court has not addressed the continued validity of Holmberg in light of cases such as Hardin.
Distinguished
Distinguished by Feldman v. First National City Bank, 368 F. Supp. 1333 (1974)
The rule enunciated in Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327 U.S. 392, 66 S.Ct. 582, 90 L.Ed. 743 (1946), that state statutes of limitations are inapplicable to actions in federal court to enforce federally-created equitable rights, does not govern suits brought under § 70 because the rights sued upon are state, not federal creations.
The opinion
Mr. Justice Rutledge,
concurring.
I agree with the result and with the opinion,'reserving however any intimation, explicit or implied, as to the full scope to which the doctrine of Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U. S. 99 , may be applied in diversity cases. Many of the considerations now stated by the Court for refusing to extend that doctrine to cases concerning federally created rights, relating to the flexibility of remedies in equity either to cut down or to extend the state statutory period of limitations, seemed to me to be applicable whenever a federal court might be asked to extend the aid of its equity arm, whether in its diversity jurisdiction or other. The ruling in the York case however may be accepted generally for diversity cases and, moreover, rejected for extension to cases of this sort, without indicating that there may not be some cases even of diversity jurisdiction to which federal courts may not be required to apply it. With this reservation I join in the Court’s action.