holding that it is the “deprivation of the former owner rather than the accretion of a right or interest to the sovereign [that] constitutes the taking. Governmental action short of acquisition of title or occupancy has been held, if its effects are so complete, as to deprive the owner of all or most of his interest in the subject matter, to amount to a taking”
How later courts described this case
- holding that it is the “deprivation of the former owner rather than the accretion of a right or interest to the sovereign [that] constitutes the taking. Governmental action short of acquisition of title or occupancy has been held, if its effects are so complete, as to deprive the owner of all or most of his interest in the subject matter, to amount to a taking”
- holding that a tenant was entitled to compensation for being required to give up tenancy of property even beyond the fair market rental value because “[t]he right to occupy, for a day, a month, a year, or a series of years, in and of itself and without reference to the actual use, needs, or collateral arrangements of the occupier, has a value.”
- holding that just compensation does not include “future loss of profits, the expense of moving removable fixtures and personal property from the premises, the loss of good-will which inheres in the location of the land, or other like consequential losses which would ensue the sale of the property to someone other than the sovereign”
- holding that the Fifth Amendment protects rights to possess, use, and dispose of physical property
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
Mr. Justice Douglas,
concurring in part.
I agree that respondent is entitled to compensation for fixtures and permanent equipment destroyed or depreciated in value by the taking. I likewise agree that, re *385 spondent is entitled to a further increase in its award. The award granted is less than the rental which it is under a continuing obligation to pay the lessor. The United States is. occupying the premises and paying about 40$ a square foot while respondent continues to pay 42$ to the landlord. In these special circumstances it is difficult to see how a lessee receives that just compensation to which he is entitled unless the United States pays the full rental. It would indeed be a novel rule of law which’allowed the Government to oust a person from a portion of his leasehold, occupy the premises, but pay only a part of the rent, leaving the balance to be paid by him who though ousted holds’ the balance of the term. But I do not believe we should allow the cost of removing personal property from the premises to be reflected in the award. If this were a fee interest which was being condemned, we would exclude all such expenses from the award. Consequential losses or injuries resulting from the taking are not compensable under the Fifth Amendment. Mitchell v. United States, 267 U. S. 341 ; United States v. Miller, 317 U. S. 369, 376 ; United States v. Powelson, 319 U. S. 266, 281-283 . It takes an Act of Congress to make them so. We should adhere to that rule. If we allow consequential damages to be shown here, I do not see how we can refuse such an offer of proof when a 10-year lease, a 99-year lease, or a fee interest is condemned. If cost of moving is relevant to market price in one case, I cannot say it is irrelevant in the other. And if one type of consequential damage is relevant to market price, I do not see why almost any type may not be. If we allow the offer of proof in the present case, the result will be to let consequential damages in under a new guise. . If we take that step' we demonstrate that hard cases do indeed make bad law. We give the Constitution an interpretation which promises swollen verdicts which no Act of Congress can cure.
Mk. Justice Black joins in this opinion.