finding that time spent by iron ore miners traveling underground in mines to and from the site where the miners drilled and loaded ore constituted work because “the travel time is spent for the benefit of [the employers] and their iron ore mining operations”
How later courts described this case
- finding that time spent by iron ore miners traveling underground in mines to and from the site where the miners drilled and loaded ore constituted work because “the travel time is spent for the benefit of [the employers] and their iron ore mining operations”
- stating that the travel at issue took place on the employer’s property and “[bore] no relation whatever to [the employees ’{needs or to the distance between their homes and the mines.”
- concluding in a Fair Labor Standards Act case that the words "work" and "employment" mean "physical or mental exertion (whether burdensome or not
- explaining that no “custom or contract” to pay a person covered by the FLSA an amount less than the minimum wage can be used to deprive the person of those statutory wage rights
Written by the judges who cited it.
Later courts went against this
Reported superseded by statute, as recognized in Ford v. Houston Independent School District — not on the Supreme Court's list
See Tenn. Coal, Iron & R. Co. v. Muscoda Local No. 123, 321 U.S. 590, 599 (1944) (stating that the travel at issue took place on the employer’s property and “[bore] no relation whatever to [the employees ’{needs or to the distance between their homes and the mines.”), superseded by statute as stated in Ford v. Houston Indep. Sch. Dist.,___F. Supp. 3d___, 2015 WL 1246780; Jewell Ridge Coal Corp. v. Local No. 6167, Uni…
The opinion
Mr. Justice Frankfurter,
concurring:
The legal question on the record before us lies within a narrow compass. Section 7 of the Fair Labor Standards Act commands the payment of compensation at a rate of not less than one and one-half times the regular rate for every employee under the statute who is engaged “for a workweek” longer than forty-four or forty-two hours during the first or the second year, respectively, after the effective date of the section and forty hours thereafter. 52 Stat. 1060 , 1063, 29 U. S. C. § 207 . Congress did not explicitly define “workweek” and there is nothing in the available materials pertinent to construction that warrants a finding that “workweek,” as applied to the workers in the iron ore industry, had so settled a *604 meaning at the time of the enactment of the Fair Labor Standards Act as to be deemed incorporated by reference. As a result, “workweek” in this statute, as applied to workers in this industry and on this record, has no technical meaning, that is, a meaning so well known to those in this particular industry as to be applied by courts in enforcing the statute when invoked by men in the industry. For purposes of this case, in any event, when Congress used the word “workweek,” it used it colloquially— the term carries merely the meaning of common understanding.
An administrative agency for preliminary adjudication of issues arising under the Wages and Hours Law, like that established by the National Labor Relations Act, was not provided by Congress. And so, the application of this colloquial concept “workweek” to the multifarious situations in American industry was left by Congress for ascertainment by judicial proceedings. These facts are to be found either by a jury or, as in this case, by a judge sitting without a jury. And so here it was the judge’s duty to determine what time and energy on the part of the employees involved in this suit constituted a “workweek” of these employees of the petitioners. After a trial which lasted for about three weeks, during which testimony covering 2,643 pages was heard and voluminous exhibits were introduced, the District Court made its findings of fact. A judgment for the employees based on these findings was affirmed by the Circuit Court of Appeals. 40 F. Supp.4; 135 F. 2d 320 .
We have then a judgment of two courts based on findings with ample evidence to warrant such findings. Affirmance by this Court is therefore demanded.