holding that federal proceedings should have been dismissed where the subject matter of the lawsuit in the federal district court in volved the review of oil drilling permits by a state agency, because the state had established its own review system for the permits and a federal court ruling would have an impermissibly disruptive affect on state policy for management of the oil fields
How later courts described this case
- holding that federal proceedings should have been dismissed where the subject matter of the lawsuit in the federal district court in volved the review of oil drilling permits by a state agency, because the state had established its own review system for the permits and a federal court ruling would have an impermissibly disruptive affect on state policy for management of the oil fields
- explaining in the context of “the general regulatory system devised for the conservation of oil and gas in Texas” that it “is in the public interest that federal courts of equity should exercise their discretionary power with proper regard for the rightful independence of state governments in carrying out their domestic policy” (citation omitted)
- holding that state court review was adequate because Commission orders could be appealed to the state district court in Travis County, Texas, and could then be reviewed by the Texas Court of Civil Appeals, and then to the Texas Supreme Court, and could still *211be reviewed by the U.S. Supreme Court via writ of certiorari
- holding that a federal court may abstain from exercising its equity jurisdiction where doing so would “be prejudicial to the public interest” or would “so clearly involve[] basic problems of [State] policy” (quoting United States ex rel. Greathouse v. Dern, 289 U.S. 352, 360 (1933))
Written by the judges who cited it.
Later courts went against this
Questioned by Richardson v. Lloyds of London, 896 F. Supp. 428 (1995)
A subsequent Court of Appeals decision casts doubt on the availability of Burford abstention in cases seeking legal relief but appears to uphold the propriety of such abstention in cases seeking declaratory relief because such relief is quite similar to injunctive relief.
Distinguished
Distinguished by In re Pa., Dep't of Transp., 351 F. Supp. 3d 943 (2018)
Second, Merritts similarly argues that Burford is inapplicable to cases where the federal-court plaintiff seeks only legal relief, instead of equitable relief.
Distinguished by S.C. Elec. & Gas Co. v. Whitfield, 329 F. Supp. 3d 191 (2018)
However, the case law supporting abstention under the Younger , Burford , and Pullman doctrines is distinguishable because in the present case, an appeal is not currently available, and Act 287 and Resolution 285 prevent SCE & G from raising constitutional challenges in a state court proceeding at this time.
Distinguished by Jill Stein v. Christopher Thomas, 672 F. App'x 565 (2016)
Because we did not decide any state law questions, Pullman and Burford are inapposite.
Distinguished by Maine Municipal Ass'n v. Mayhew, 64 F. Supp. 3d 251 (2014)
They argue that Younger and Burford are inapplicable, and that Plaintiffs have not
The opinion
Me. Justice Douglas,
concurring:
I agree with the opinion of the Court and join in it. But there are observations in the dissenting opinion which impel me to add a few words. If the issues in this case were framed as the dissenting opinion frames them, I would agree that we should reach the merits and not direct a dismissal of the complaint. But the opinion of the Court as I read it does not hold or even fairly imply that “the enforcement of state rights created by state legislation and affecting state policies is limited to the state courts.” Any such holding would result in a drastic inroad on diversity jurisdiction — a limitation which I agree might be desirable but which Congress, not this Court, should make. The holding in these cases, however, goes to no such length.
This decision is but an application of the principle expressed in Pennsylvania v. Williams, 294 U. S. 176, 185 , that “federal courts of equity should exercise their discretionary power with proper regard for the rightful inde *335 pendence of state governments in carrying out their domestic policy.” That case, like the present one, was in the federal court by the diversity of citizenship route. It involved a receivership of an insolvent Pennsylvania corporation. Though the federal proceeding was first in time, this Court held that the federal court should stay its hand and turn over the assets of the corporation to the state administrative agency charged by state law with the responsibility of supervision and liquidation. In that case federal action would have preempted the field and excluded the assertion of state authority. In these cases the result of federal action would be potentially much more serious in terms of federal-state relations, as the opinion of the Court makes plain.
The Texas statute which governs suits to set aside these orders of the Railroad Commission has been construed by the Texas courts to give to the supervising courts a large measure of control over the administrative process. That control is much greater, for example, than the control exercised by federal Circuit Courts of Appeals over the orders of such agencies as the National Labor Relations Board. The opinion of the Court calls the Railroad Commission and the Texas courts “working partners.” But as its review of Texas decisions shows, the courts may at times be the senior and dominant member of that partnership if they perform the functions which Texas law places on them. The courts do not sit merely to enforce rights based on orders of the state administrative agency. They sit in judgment on that agency. That, to me, is the crux of the matter. If the federal courts undertook to sit in review, so to speak, of this state administrative agency, they would in effect actively participate in the fashioning of the state’s domestic policy. That interference would be a continuing one, as the opinion of the Court points out. Moreover, divided authority would result. Divided authority breeds friction — friction potentially more serious *336 than would have obtained in Pennsylvania v. Williams , if the administration of the affairs of that insolvent corporation had been left in the federal court to the exclusion of the state administrative agency.
Mr. Justice Murphy joins in this opinion.