holding that in federal civil rights cases punitive damages may be awarded even without an award of compensatory damages
How later courts described this case
- holding that in federal civil rights cases punitive damages may be awarded even without an award of compensatory damages
- stating that parks “have immemorially been held in trust for use of the public and, time out of mind, have been used for purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts between citizens, and discussing public questions.”
- affirming facial invalidation of ordinance that did not "make comfort or convenience in the use of streets or parks the standard of official action" but enabled the licensor "to refuse a permit on his mere opinion that such refusal [would] prevent 'riots, disturbances or disorderly assemblage' "
- noting that parks, as well as streets, “have immemorially been held in trust for the use of the public and, time out of mind, have been'used for purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts between citizens, and discussing public, questions”
Written by the judges who cited it.
Later courts went against this
Questioned by Walinsky v. Kennedy, 94 Misc. 2d 121 (1977)
The foregoing, in addition to the increased emphasis placed on the right of privacy calls into question some of the broad sweeping language of the Hague and Thornhill cases.
Questioned by Johnson v. Harder, 438 F.2d 7 (1971)
We realize that questions may be raised as to whether the expansion of the Stone formula to include all welfare cases is justifiable while upholding the continuing validity of Hague.
The opinion
By leave of Court, the Committee on the Bill of Rights of the American Bar Association, filed a brief, as amid curiae, discussing the right of assembly. See p. 678.
Mr. Justice Butler,
presiding in the absence of the Chief Justice and Mr. Justice McReynolds:
The judgment of the eoúrt in this case is that the decree is modified and as modified affirmed. Mr. Justice Eéankfurter and Mr. Justice Douglas took no part in the consideration or decision of the case. Mr. Justice Roberts has an opinion in which Mr. Justice Black concurs, and Mr. Justice Stone an opinion in which Mr. Justice Reed concurs. The Chief Justice concurs in an opinion. Mr. Justice McReynolds and Mr. Justice Butler dissent for reasons stated in opinions by-them respectively.