stating that "the use of evidence of private telephone conversations between the defendants and others, intercepted by means of wire tapping" did not amount to a violation of the Fourth Amendment because "[t]here was no searching. There was no seizure. The evidence was secured by the use of the sense of hearing and that only. There was no entry of the houses or offices of the defendants."
How later courts described this case
- stating that "the use of evidence of private telephone conversations between the defendants and others, intercepted by means of wire tapping" did not amount to a violation of the Fourth Amendment because "[t]here was no searching. There was no seizure. The evidence was secured by the use of the sense of hearing and that only. There was no entry of the houses or offices of the defendants."
- arguing that the Constitution protects "the right to be let alone--the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men. To protect that right, every unjustifiable intrusion by the government upon the privacy of the individual, whatever the means employed, must be deemed a violation of the Fourth Amendment."
- propounding that the Constitution confers upon individuals a privacy right against the government “to be let alone — the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men,” a right that must be protected against “every unjustifiable intrusion by the Government upon the privacy of the individual”
- holding, in a search and seizure case, that we cannot ignore constitutional commands even if they pose difficulties for law enforcement
Written by the judges who cited it.
Later courts went against this
Overruled by Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967)
Listed in the Constitution Annotated's table of Supreme Court decisions overruled by subsequent decision (entry 123, expressly overruled).
Overruled in part by Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967)
Listed in the Constitution Annotated's table of Supreme Court decisions overruled by subsequent decision (entry 122).
Limited by United States v. Lane, 230 F. Supp. 950 (1964)
In Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 463, 48 S.Ct. 564, 72 L.Ed. 944 (1928), Gouled was limited to its facts.
The opinion
Mr. Justice Stone,
dissenting.
I concur in the opinions of Mr. Justice Holmes and Mr. Justice Brandéis. I agree also with that of Mr. Justice Butler so far as it deals with the merits. The effect of the order granting certiorari was to limit the argument to a single question, but I do not understand that it restrains the Court from a consideration of any question which we find to be presented by the record, for, under Jud. Code, § 240(a), this Court determines a case here on certiorari “with the same power and authority, and with like effect, as if the cause' had been brought [here] by unrestricted writ of error or appeal.”