holding that when "a statute is susceptible of two construc- tions, by one of which grave and doubtful constitutional questions arise and by the other of which such questions are avoided, our duty is to adopt the latter"
How later courts described this case
- holding that when "a statute is susceptible of two construc- tions, by one of which grave and doubtful constitutional questions arise and by the other of which such questions are avoided, our duty is to adopt the latter"
- explaining that constitutional avoidance canon applies only if “grave and doubtful constitutional questions arise” from a particular statutory construction
- stating that court should interpret statutes so as to avoid constitutional questions
- prohibiting the application of the canon of constitutional avoidance when a statute is unambiguous and the unambiguous interpretation results in the unconstitutionality of the statute
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
Mb. J üstíce Harlan,
dissenting.
As these cases have been determined wholly on the construction of those parts of the Hepburn Act which are here in ques *419 tion, and as Congress, if it sees fit, may meet that construction by additional legislation, I deem it unnecessary to enter upon an extended discussion of the various questions arising upon the record, and will content myself simply with an expression of my non-concurrence in the view taken by the court as to the meaning and scope of certain provisions of the act. In my judgment the act, reasonably and properly construed, according to its language, includes within its prohibitions a railroad company transporting coal, if, at the time, it is the owner, legally or equitably, of stock — certainly, if it owns a majority or all the stock — in the company which mined, manufactured or produced, and then owns, the coal which is being transported by such railroad company. Any other view of the act will enable the transporting railroad company, by one device or another, to defeat , altogether the purpose which Congress had in view, which was to divorce, in a real, substantial sense, production and transportation, and thereby to prevent the transporting company from doing injustice to other owners of coal.