suggesting that regulation of the employment relations of railroad employees "actually engaged in an operation of interstate commerce" is permissible under the Commerce Clause but that regulation of a railroad company's clerical force is not
How later courts described this case
- suggesting that regulation of the employment relations of railroad employees "actually engaged in an operation of interstate commerce" is permissible under the Commerce Clause but that regulation of a railroad company's clerical force is not
- invalidating statute creating negligence action against common carriers for personal injuries of employees sustained in the course of employment, because the statute "regulates the persons because they engage in interstate commerce and does not alone regulate the business of interstate commerce"
- holding unconstitutional jurisdictional provision in Federal Employers Liability Act (FELA) covering the employees of "every common carrier engaged in trade or commerce"
- "There is nothing in the words of the grant [of commerce power to Congress] that permits the belief that the power is not coextensive over foreign, interstate, and Indian trade, or is anything less than the whole power which any government may properly exercise over either_”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
Mr. Justice Holmes,
dissenting.
I must admit that I think there are strong reasons in favor of the interpretation of the statute adopted by a majority of the court. But, as it is possible to read the words in such a way' as to save the constitutionality of the act, I think' they should be taken in that narrower sense. The phrase “every common carrier engaged in trade or commerce” may be construed to mean “while engaged in trade or commerce” without violence to the habits of English speech, and to govern all that follows. The statute then will regulate all common carriers while so engaged in the District of Columbia or in any Territory, thus covering the whole ground as to them; and it will regulate carriers elsewhere while engaged in commerce between the States, etc., thus limiting its scope where it is necessary to limit it. So construed I think the act valid in its main features under the Constitution of the United Statés. In view of the circumstances I do not'discuss details.