holding that, “while an individual may lawfully refuse to answer incriminating questions unless protected by an immunity statute, it does not follow that a corporation, vested with special privileges and franchises, may refuse to show its hand when charged with an abuse of such privileges”
How later courts described this case
- holding that, “while an individual may lawfully refuse to answer incriminating questions unless protected by an immunity statute, it does not follow that a corporation, vested with special privileges and franchises, may refuse to show its hand when charged with an abuse of such privileges”
- holding that while a grand jury subpoena for the production of books and papers may implicate the Fourth Amendment, when presented with a challenge to such a subpoena a court need only determine whether the request is “far too sweeping in its terms to be regarded as reasonable.”
- finding that the “extent of this immunity [required to satisfy the Fifth Amendment] was fully considered by this court in Counselman . . .,” leading to the passage of the immunity statute upheld in Brown v. Walker, supra
- explaining presentments — charges made by a Grand Jury from it’s own knowledge or observations without any accusation from the prosecutor — have largely fallen into disuse in this country
Written by the judges who cited it.
Later courts went against this
Reported overruled in part, on other grounds by Murphy v. Waterfront Commission of New York Harbor, 378 U.S. 52 (1964) — not on the Supreme Court's list
201 U.S. 43, 59-60, 65 (1906), overruled on other grounds by Murphy v. Waterfront Comm’n of N.Y. Harbor, 378 U.S. 52
Supreme Court of the United StatesJun 15, 196416 citing opinionsother groundsin partunconfirmed confidenceRead it
The opinion
Mr. Justice Harlan,
concurring.
I concur entirely in what is said in the opinion of the court *78 in reference to the powers and functions of the grand jury and as to the scope .of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution. ■ I concur also in the'affirmance of the judgment, but must withhold my assent to some of the views expressed in the opinion. It seems to me that the witness was not entitled to assert, as a reason for not obeying .the order of the court, that the subpoena dunces-tecum, was an infringement of the Fourth Amendment, which declares that “the right of the People to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. ” It may be, I am inclined to think as a matter of procedure and practice, that the subpoena duces tecum was too broad and indefinite. But the action of the court in that regard was, at the utmost, only error, and that error did not affect its jurisdiction to make the order, nor authorize the witness — whose personal rights, let it be observed; were in no wise involved in the pending inquiry — to refuse compliance with the subpoena, upon the ground that it involved an unreasonable search and seizure of the books, papers and records of the corporation whose conduct, so far as it related to the Sherman Anti Trust Act, was the subject of examination. It was not his privilege to stand between the .corporation and the Government in the investigation before the grand jury. In my opinion, a corporation — “an artificial being, invisible, intangible and existing only in' contemplation of law” — cannot claim the immunity given by the Fourth Amendment; for, it is not a part of the “People, ” within the meaning of that'Amendment. Nor is it embraced by the word “persons” in the Amendment. If-a contrary view obtains, the ■ power of the Government by its representatives to'look into the books, records and papers of a corporation, of its own creation, to ascertain whether that corporation has obeyed or is defying the law, will be greatly curtailed, if not destroyed. If a corporation, when its affairs are under examination by a grand jury *79 proceeding in its work under the orders of the court, can plead the immunity given .by the Fourth Amendment against unreasonable searches and seizures, may it not equally rely upon that Amendment to protect it even against a statute authorizing or directing the examination by the agents of the Government creating it, of its papers, documents and records,. unless- they specify the particular papers, documents and records to be examined? If the order of the court below is to be deemed invalid as an unreasonable search and seizure of the papers, books and records of the corporation, could it be deemed valid if made under the express authority of an act of Congress? Congress could not, any more than a court, authorize an unreasonable seizure or search in violation of the Fourth Amendment. ..In my judgment when a grand jury seeking, in the discharge of its public duties, to ascertain whether-a corporation has violated the law in any particular, requires the production of the books, papers and records of such corporation, no officer of that corporation can rightfully refuse, when ordered to do so by the court, to produce such books, papers and records in his official custody, upon the ground simply that the order was, as to the corporation, an unreasonable search and seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.