Opinion

Merck & Co. v. Reynolds

  • 559 U.S. 633
  • 22 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. S 263
  • 78 U.S.L.W. 4319
  • 130 S. Ct. 1784
  • 176 L. Ed. 2d 582
Court
Supreme Court of the United States
Filed
Apr 27, 2010
Status
Published
Author
Stevens
On the bench
Scalia, Breyer, Roberts, Kennedy, Ginsburg, Auto, Sotomayor, Stevens, Thomas
Cited by
431 cases

holding that the statute of limitations does not begin to run until a reasonable plaintiff would have discovered defendant’s intent, and, in response to defendant’s “fears that this requirement will give life to stale claims or subject defendants to liability for acts taken long ago,” stating that the statute of repose is an “unqualified bar on actions ... giving defendants total repose after five years”

How later courts described this case

  • holding that the statute of limitations does not begin to run until a reasonable plaintiff would have discovered defendant’s intent, and, in response to defendant’s “fears that this requirement will give life to stale claims or subject defendants to liability for acts taken long ago,” stating that the statute of repose is an “unqualified bar on actions ... giving defendants total repose after five years”
  • holding that a warning letter released to the public and pleadings in a prior lawsuit did not trigger limitations period because they raised only the possibility of fraud in general terms and did not contain “any specific information suggesting the fraud”
  • holding that a cause of action accrues in a private securities action “(1) when the plaintiff did in fact discover, or (2) when a reasonably diligent plaintiff would have discovered, ‘the facts constituting the violation’ — whichever comes first”
  • holding that a cause of action accrues "when the plaintiff did in fact -49- discover," or "when a reasonably diligent plaintiff would have discovered, 'the facts constituting the violation' -- whichever comes first." (emphasis added)

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

*655 Justice Stevens,

concurring in part and concurring in the judgment.

In my opinion the Court’s explanation of why the complaint was timely filed is convincing and correct. Ante, at 648-654. In this case there is no difference between the time when the plaintiffs actually discovered the factual basis for their claim and the time when reasonably diligent plaintiffs should have discovered those facts. For that reason, much of the discussion in Part II of the Court’s opinion, see ante, at 644-648, is not necessary to support the Court's judgment. Until a case arises in which the difference between an actual discovery rule and a constructive discovery rule would affect the outcome, I would reserve decision on the merits of Justice Scalia’s argument, post, this page (opinion concurring in part and concurring in judgment). With this reservation, I join the Court’s excellent opinion.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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