holding that no pre-deprivation 3 hearing was required before seizing malnourished horses because “the state’s interest in 4 preventing the inhumane treatment of animals is undeniably substantial and would be 5 significantly compromised if the state were to require a hearing before impounding malnourished 6 equines”
How later courts described this case
- holding that no pre-deprivation 3 hearing was required before seizing malnourished horses because “the state’s interest in 4 preventing the inhumane treatment of animals is undeniably substantial and would be 5 significantly compromised if the state were to require a hearing before impounding malnourished 6 equines”
- finding that statutory notice satisfied due process where plaintiff had “thirty days from the time of the impoundment to request a hearing . . . . this was ample time for [plaintiff] to consult publicly available documents, discover her right to a hearing, and exercise that right.”
- holding that “the risk of an erroneous deprivation ... was relatively low” when a veterinarian and trained inspec tors observed conditions at a farm, concluded that donkeys and horses were in unsafe conditions, and removed the animals without a prior hearing
- affirming the district court’s dismissal of procedural due process claims on the basis that post-deprivation judicial review in state court served as a "judicial safety valve,” foreclosing any procedural constitutional challenges
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
BARKETT, Circuit Judge,
concurring specially:
I concur in the district court’s conclusion that summary judgment was appropriate for the defendants in this case. I agree that the district court was correct in finding that due process was satisfied by the availability of both administrative and state-court review. Because there is no constitutional violation in this case, those defendants sued in their individual capacities are also entitled to qualified immunity.