explaining that “[t]o the extent that the district court rewarded plaintiffs’ counsel with an enhancement for obtaining better results than the class would have received had the case been resolved on the merits, that is plainly wrong,” because “the fee-shifting statutes are not designed to provide representation that will win plaintiffs more than a correct application of substantive and remedial law entitles them to receive”
How later courts described this case
- explaining that “[t]o the extent that the district court rewarded plaintiffs’ counsel with an enhancement for obtaining better results than the class would have received had the case been resolved on the merits, that is plainly wrong,” because “the fee-shifting statutes are not designed to provide representation that will win plaintiffs more than a correct application of substantive and remedial law entitles them to receive”
- relying on Pennsylvania v. Del. Valley Citizens’ Council for Clean Air, 478 U.S. 546 , 106 S. Ct. 3088 , 92 L. Ed. 2d 439 (1986), and City of Burlington v. Dague, 505 U.S. 557 , 112 S. Ct. 2638 , 120 L. Ed. 2d 449 (1992)
- noting that representing children in foster care “brings professional accolades and enhances one’s standing in the community”
- noting that fee award should be “adequate to attract competent counsel, but which do not produce windfalls to attorneys”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
HILL, Circuit Judge,
concurring:
I concur in the judgment. The enhancement by the district court is due to be affirmed because we are bound by the prior cases of our court, NAACP v. City of Evergreen, 812 F.2d 1332 (11th Cir.1987), and Norman v. Housing Authority of Montgomery, 836 F.2d 1292 (11th Cir.1988).
I do not add anything to my colleagues’ discussions of the holding and opinions in those cases other than to acknowledge that they are scholarly and well done.
No doubt these additional writings will be of interest to jurists who might wish to pursue the matter in further proceedings, should any arise.