holding that personal jurisdiction in Texas was established where an attorney in Louisiana gave allegedly negligent advice in person at his Louisiana office to clients who resided in Texas regarding various tax laws because the attorney “purposely availed himself of Texas law when he gave tax advice that he knew would be received by a Texas client,” thus establishing minimum contacts, and noting that most of the malpractice occurred during a mediation that took place in Texas, so that traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice were satisfied
How later courts described this case
- holding that personal jurisdiction in Texas was established where an attorney in Louisiana gave allegedly negligent advice in person at his Louisiana office to clients who resided in Texas regarding various tax laws because the attorney “purposely availed himself of Texas law when he gave tax advice that he knew would be received by a Texas client,” thus establishing minimum contacts, and noting that most of the malpractice occurred during a mediation that took place in Texas, so that traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice were satisfied
- holding expert testimony on causation not required when expert testified that attorney’s tax advice was incorrect, thus establishing negligence and breach, and client testified that attorney’s advice not to settle tax dispute caused her specific financial losses
- holding that traditional notions of fair play and justice were not offended by requiring non-resident defendant to defend suit in Texas when defendant knew that his clienVplaintiff was Texas resident and that lawsuit arose out of defendant’s contacts with Texas
- concluding that Louisiana attorney “ ‘purposefully availed’ himself of Texas laws when he gave tax advice that he knew would be received by a Texas client, ... and thus had ‘minimum contacts’ ” with Texas
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
*741 EDITH H. JONES, Circuit Judge,
concurring:
I concur in this good opinion, emphasizing only the narrowness of our holding on DTPA liability. First, the statute was significantly amended with respect to attorneys after the events before us occurred; our opinion doesn’t bear on the amended law. Second, there was sufficient, if not overwhelming, evidence for the jury to find that actual misrepresentations not amounting to mere statements of legal opinion were made to the plaintiff. Third, I would not rely on the alleged undisclosed conflict of interest between the lawyers’ desire to capitalize on the mother’s lawsuit against Parker and the presumably less-legally-remunerative attempt by the daughters to make Parker pay their taxes. Not only were the clients fully aware of Parker’s financial condition, it also seems evident that mother and daughters were presenting a united front against Parker. There was no conflict of interest from the attorneys’ standpoint, rather, a misguided attempt at a pincer strategy.