How later courts described this case
- holding that “[i]n the absence of an established scientific connection between exposure and illness, or compelling circumstances such as those discussed in Cavallo, the temporal connection between exposure to chemicals and an onset of symptoms, standing alone, is entitled to little weight”
- holding that the “district court was entitled to conclude” that an expert’s opinion was “inadequate under Daubert” when the expert “had no information on the level of exposure necessary for a 44 Id. at 57-58. 45 Id. at 36. person to sustain the [relevant] injuries”
- holding that the “district court was entitled to 46 Id. 47 Id. at 65. conclude” that an expert’s opinion was “inadequate under Daubert” when the expert “had no information on the level of exposure necessary for a person to sustain the [relevant] injuries”
- holding that, absent a “compelling” situation such as the Cavallo example above, a temporal relationship is to be given little weight when there are few scientific studies supporting a medical expert’s specific causation diagnosis
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
BENAVIDES, Circuit Judge,
specially concurring:
Although I join both the reasoning and result of the majority opinion, I write separately to reiterate that, under General Electric Co. v. Joiner, — U.S. -, 118 S.Ct. 512 , 139 L.Ed.2d 508 (1997), the issue before us is whether the magistrate judge abused her discretion in excluding the testimony of Dr. Jenkins. While I believe this case to be a close one, I must agree that the magistrate judge acted within her discretion in excluding Dr. Jenkins’s proffered testimony. It does not follow from this, however, that she would have abused her discretion by admitting the proffered testimony. On the contrary, had she admitted the testimony, I would likewise be of the opinion that she acted within her discretion. I do not read the majority opinion to require otherwise.