holding that the state court reasonably concluded that the defendant was not prejudiced by counsel's failure to present evidence of "`chaotic, violence-filled childhood'" because the evidence "likely would have had little mitigating effect against the aggravating evidence concerning the brutal, premeditated murder . . ., [his] prior criminal history, and the fact that [he] hid [evidence]"
How later courts described this case
- holding that the state court reasonably concluded that the defendant was not prejudiced by counsel's failure to present evidence of "`chaotic, violence-filled childhood'" because the evidence "likely would have had little mitigating effect against the aggravating evidence concerning the brutal, premeditated murder . . ., [his] prior criminal history, and the fact that [he] hid [evidence]"
- holding that "the relevant date for determining the applicability of the AEDPA to habeas corpus petitions is the date that the actual habeas corpus petition is filed”
- finding that failure to present mitigating lay testimony from family and friends does not constitute deficient performance if the attorney could have concluded, for tactical reasons, that attempting to present such evidence would be unwise
- finding no prejudice where counsel did not present evidence of defendant’s troubled family history, including verbal and physical abuse, because it was unlikely to have a mitigating effect against the aggravating evidence, which included the brutality of the murder, his prior criminal history, the fact he hid evidence and the fact he initially lied to police
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
BENAVIDES, Circuit Judge,
concurring in the judgment of the court:
Although I concur in the judgment of the court, I write separately to emphasize what we do not decide today — i.e., whether a federal habeas court can conduct harmless error analysis when reviewing a death sentence from a weighing state. Although I recognize that this court has implicitly held that a federal habeas court cannot conduct such an analysis, see Wiley v. Puckett, 969 F.2d 86, 94 (5th Cir.1992), this court has not revisited the issue since the Supreme Court’s decision in Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 637 , 113 S.Ct. 1710, 1722 , 123 L.Ed.2d 353 (1993). In Brecht , the Supreme Court held that a federal court can grant a writ of habeas corpus only if it finds that the alleged constitutional error “ ‘had a substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict.’ ” 507 U.S. at 637 , 113 S.Ct. at 1722 (quoting Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 776 , 66 S.Ct. 1239, 1253 , 90 L.Ed. 1557 (1946)). Although this court has not revisited the issue, at least three courts of appeals have interpreted Brecht as authorizing federal habeas courts to conduct harmless error analysis when reviewing a death sentence from a weighing state. See, e.g., Davis v. Executive Director of Dep’t of Corrections, 100 F.3d 750 , 768 n. 18 (10th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 117 S.Ct. 1703 , 137 L.Ed.2d 828 (1997); Williams v. Clarke, 40 F.3d 1529, 1539-40 (8th Cir.1994); Smith v. Dixon, 14 F.3d 956 (4th Cir.1994) (en banc). The facts of this ease, however, do not require that we revisit Wiley either explicitly or implicitly. Accordingly, I note that the majority’s statement that “[i]n a ‘weighing state’ the jury’s consideration of an unconstitutionally vague factor at the final stage of death penalty proceedings violates the defendant’s constitutional rights under the Fourteenth Amendment and requires that a resulting death penalty be vacated, unless a state appellate court has cured the defect by reweighing the valid factors or conducting a harmless error analysis,” Maj. Op. at 281 (emphasis added), is not necessary to the decision before the court.