The opinion
FILED
Aug 01, 2023
02:39 PM(CT)
TENNESSEE
WORKERS' COMPENSATION
APPEALS BOARD
TENNESSEE BUREAU OF WORKERS’ COMPENSATION
WORKERS’ COMPENSATION APPEALS BOARD
Robert Bragg ) Docket No. 2020-07-0020
)
v. ) State File No. 10723-2018
)
Premium Services, LLC, et al. )
)
)
Appeal from the Court of Workers’ ) Heard June 26, 2023
Compensation Claims ) via Microsoft Teams
Allen Phillips, Judge )
Affirmed and Certified as Final
In this appeal, the employer asserts the trial court erred by failing to address in its
compensation order the employer’s potential entitlement to an offset against permanent
partial disability payments arising from the employee’s anticipated future social security
benefits. The employee was not receiving social security benefits at the time of
maximum medical improvement or as of the date of trial. In addition, the employee
asserts the trial court erred by limiting the employer’s liability for unpaid medical
expenses to the amounts mandated by Tennessee’s medical fee schedule and by not
awarding attorneys’ fees on the amount of unpaid medical expenses to be paid by the
employer. After careful consideration, we conclude the issue of a potential social
security offset is not ripe for adjudication, and we affirm the trial court’s order in all other
respects and certify it as final.
Judge Pele I. Godkin delivered the opinion of the Appeals Board in which Presiding
Judge Timothy W. Conner and Judge Meredith B. Weaver joined.
Neil M. McIntire, Nashville, Tennessee, for the employer-appellant, Premium Services,
LLC
Jeffrey P. Boyd, Jackson, Tennessee, for the employee-appellee, Robert Bragg
Factual and Procedural Background
The underlying facts of this case are largely undisputed for purposes of this
appeal. On January 11, 2018, Robert Bragg (“Employee”) was injured while “using a
vice [sic] to manually bend 3/4 [inch] steel into customer specifications” in the course
1
and scope of his employment with Premium Services, LLC (“Employer”). He
complained of pain in his right elbow, right arm, and right shoulder and reported the
incident to Employer. Employee received medical treatment for his right elbow with his
authorized physician, Dr. Nicholas Vance, who performed a lateral epicondylitis release.
He also received medical treatment for his right shoulder, including surgery, with his
authorized physician, Dr. Adam Smith. Following his shoulder surgery, Employee began
to complain of neck pain, and Dr. Smith recommended diagnostic testing, which
Employer authorized to determine whether Employee’s cervical complaints were causally
related to his 2018 work incident. Upon review of Employee’s diagnostic studies, Dr.
Smith determined he could not conclude that Employee’s cervical symptoms were
directly related to the January 2018 incident. He placed Employee at maximum medical
improvement on October 15, 2019, assigned a 2% impairment rating to the whole body,
and stated, “I do not believe I can directly attribute his arm and numbness and tingling
and his cervical degenerative change to his elbow or his shoulder based on our findings.”
Subsequently, Dr. Smith referred Employee to a pain specialist “outside of Worker’s
Compensation.”
In December 2019, Dr. Smith responded to an inquiry from Employee’s counsel in
which he opined that Employee’s cervical symptoms were related to his January 2018
work incident. Employee filed a petition for benefit determination on January 9, 2020,
requesting medical treatment for his neck. Employer provided a panel from which
Employee selected neurosurgeon Dr. Fereidoon Parsioon. Prior to his appointment with
Dr. Parsioon, Employee chose to see orthopedic surgeon Dr. Patrick Curlee on his own.
In his records, Dr. Curlee noted that he was seeing Employee based on a referral from Dr.
Smith and documented a “two-year history” of neck and arm pain with some numbness
and tingling in his arms and hands. Based upon his review of the cervical MRI, Dr.
Curlee diagnosed Employee with severe degenerative disc disease. He recommended a
cervical spine fusion at three levels and opined that Employee’s work injury had
aggravated or exacerbated his cervical pathology, resulting in the need for surgery. In
June 2020, Employee saw Dr. Parsioon, who agreed that Employee had degenerative disc
disease but did not agree that the condition or the need for surgery were work related.
Dr. Parsioon offered to perform the surgery under Employee’s personal insurance, and
Employer denied Employee’s neck claim based on Dr. Parsioon’s opinion. Eventually,
Dr. Curlee performed the cervical spine surgery under Employee’s private insurance.
At the March 2, 2023 trial, all four doctors’ depositions were entered into
evidence, and Employee testified live. On March 14, the trial court issued an order
finding by a preponderance of the evidence that Employee injured his neck while turning
the vise at work. In doing so, the court attached greater weight to Dr. Curlee’s opinions. 1
1
Employer argued that Dr. Parsioon’s opinion should be presumed correct because he was chosen from a
panel. The trial court determined that even if Dr. Parsioon had been entitled to a presumption of
correctness, Dr. Curlee’s opinion was sufficient to rebut any presumption that would have attached.
2
Thus, the court determined that Employee had sustained a twenty-three percent
permanent partial disability and applied enhancement factors of 1.35 for Employee’s not
having returned to work, 1.2 for his being over the age of 40, and 1.45 for his lacking a
high school diploma or its equivalent. Based on a compensation rate of $419.19 per
week, Employee’s award of permanent partial disability benefits totaled $101,914.09.
The parties agreed that Employee reached maximum medical improvement on
January 21, 2021, and that the accrued benefits from that date to March 2, 2023, the date
of trial, were payable in a lump sum. The court noted that Employee’s counsel was
entitled to a fee of twenty percent of the recovery, payable in lump sum, and that the
remainder of Employee’s permanent partial disability award was payable to Employee in
periodic payments until paid in full. The trial court also ordered Employer to “pay the
medical bills for treatment of [Employee’s] neck injury pursuant to the fee schedule.” It
further noted that, pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-226(a)(1),
Employee’s attorneys’ fees are to be paid by Employee as a percentage of his recovery,
as he was the party who employed the attorney. The court concluded that Employee was
entitled to reasonable and necessary future medical treatment for his elbow, shoulder, and
neck under Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-204(a)(1)(A) and designated Dr.
Vance as the treating physician for the elbow, Dr. Smith for the shoulder, and Dr. Curlee
for the neck.
On March 16, Employee filed a Rule 59 Motion to Alter or Amend the Judgment
or in the Alternative Rule 60.04 Motion to Clarify Clerical Mistake. In its motion,
Employee requested that the court clarify the procedure by which it had ordered the
reimbursement of the medical expenses already paid by BlueCross/BlueShield (“BCBS”)
and attorneys’ fees to be paid based on those medical expenses. On April 18, the trial
court issued an order denying Employee’s motion to alter or amend, referencing its
March 14 order instructing Employer to pay the disputed medical bills pursuant to the
applicable fee schedule. In doing so, the court noted that Tennessee Code Annotated
section 50-6-204(a)(3)(A)(iii) provides that “[t]he liability of the employer for the
services provided to the employee shall be limited to the maximum allowable fees” under
the fee schedule. The court also relied on Tenn. Comp. R. and Regs. 0800-02-18-.15(1),
which states that “providers shall not accept[,] and employers shall not pay” any bill for
medical services that exceed the maximum allowable payment under the fee schedule.
As such, the court reiterated the terms of its March 14 order: Employer was to pay the
disputed medical bills to the providers pursuant to the fee schedule, and Employee’s
attorney was entitled to an attorney’s fee, paid by Employee, not to exceed 20% of the
total recovery, including the amount attributable to the unpaid medical expenses. Both
Employee and Employer appealed.
3
Standard of Review
The standard we apply in reviewing a trial court’s decision presumes that the
court’s factual findings are correct unless the preponderance of the evidence is otherwise.
See Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-239(c)(7) (2022). When the trial judge has had the
opportunity to observe a witness’s demeanor and to hear in-court testimony, we give
considerable deference to factual findings made by the trial court. Madden v. Holland
Grp. of Tenn., Inc., 277 S.W.3d 896, 898 (Tenn. 2009). However, “[n]o similar
deference need be afforded the trial court’s findings based upon documentary evidence.”
Goodman v. Schwarz Paper Co., No. W2016-02594-SC-R3-WC, 2018 Tenn. LEXIS 8, at
*6 (Tenn. Workers’ Comp. Panel Jan. 18, 2018). Similarly, the interpretation and
application of statutes and regulations are questions of law that are reviewed de novo with
no presumption of correctness afforded the trial court’s conclusions. See Mansell v.
Bridgestone Firestone N. Am. Tire, LLC, 417 S.W.3d 393, 399 (Tenn. 2013). We are
also mindful of our obligation to construe the workers’ compensation statutes “fairly,
impartially, and in accordance with basic principles of statutory construction” and in a
way that does not favor either the employee or the employer. Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-
116 (2022).
Analysis
Employer identifies three issues in its notice of appeal, which we restate as
follows: (1) whether Employee established medical causation of the cervical spine
condition by a preponderance of the evidence; (2) whether Employer is entitled to an
offset or credit for a portion of Employee’s social security retirement benefits he may
receive in the future against future payments of permanent partial disability benefits; and
(3) whether Employee’s attorney is entitled to a fee related to the court’s award of
medical benefits and, if so, who is responsible for payment of the fees and in what
amount. The issues raised by Employee on appeal are whether the trial court erred in
finding that Employer is only responsible for paying disputed medical expenses pursuant
to the medical fee schedule and whether counsel for Employee is entitled to an attorneys’
fee associated with his asserted protection of BCBS’s subrogation interest in those
medical bills to be paid by the Employer.
With respect to Employer’s first issue, we note that Employer did not address the
issue of medical causation in its brief on appeal or during oral argument. Accordingly,
we treat that issue as having been waived. See Moore & Seiferth v. Ingles Markets, Inc.,
No. 2015-02-0193, 2015 TN Wrk. Comp. App. Bd. LEXIS 54, at *4 (Tenn. Workers’
Comp. App. Bd. Nov. 4, 2015).
4
Social Security Offset
Employer asserts it is entitled to an offset or credit against future periodic
payments of Employee’s permanent partial disability benefits beginning March 22, 2023,
equal to fifty percent of Employee’s old age social security benefits. See, e.g., McCoy v.
T.T.C., Illinois, Inc., 14 S.W.3d 734, 738 (Tenn. 2000). It is requesting modification of
the trial court’s order or, alternatively, that we remand the matter to the trial court with
instructions that the court include language addressing Employer’s entitlement to the
offset in its order. As an initial matter, we note that we were not provided with a
transcript of the compensation hearing, and, thus, we cannot know the extent and
substance of the discussion or any testimony regarding this issue. Further, when
questioned during oral argument as to whether the issue of an offset was raised at trial,
counsel for Employer stated there was “general discussion,” but he could not recall “if
the offset was specifically addressed in terms of whether there was a dispute about it.”
Employer also acknowledged it did not obtain evidence regarding the amount of
Employee’s anticipated monthly social security benefit because Employee was not
eligible for those benefits until March 22, 2023. It further noted that the trial court had
not yet made a determination as to compensability of the claim at the time of trial.
Conversely, counsel for Employee argued that, to the best of his recollection, the issue
was not raised at trial “because [Employee] was not eligible for social security benefits at
that time.” Further, Employee claimed that even if the matter had been raised, the trial
court would have been unable to calculate the offset at the time of the hearing.
Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-207(4)(A)(i), the relevant statute
concerning the social security offset, provides:
For permanent total disability as defined in subdivision (4)(B), [the
employee is entitled to] sixty-six and two-thirds percent (66 ⅔%) of the
wages received at the time of the injury, subject to the maximum weekly
benefit and minimum weekly benefit . . . . This compensation shall be paid
during the period of the permanent total disability until the employee is, by
age, eligible for full benefits in the Old Age Insurance Benefit Program
under the Social Security Act . . .; provided, that with respect to disabilities
resulting from injuries that occur less than five (5) years before the date
when the employee is eligible for full benefits in the Old Age Insurance
Benefit Program as referenced previously . . . or after the employee is
eligible for such benefits, permanent total disability benefits are payable for
a period of two hundred sixty (260) weeks. The compensation payments
shall be reduced by the amount of any old age insurance benefit payments
attributable to employer contributions . . . .
(Emphasis added.) Employer relies on McCoy in support of its contention that the social
security offset language applies to all injuries to the body as a whole, even if the
5
permanent disability is not total. Employer further contends the trial court erred by
omitting the statutory offset language in its compensation order and by failing to instruct
Employer to “pay those 105.96 [weeks of] periodic payments for permanent partial
disability benefits subject to the offset provided for in [Tennessee Code Annotated
section] 50-6-207(4)(A)(i).” In McCoy, the Tennessee Supreme Court held that the social
security offset contained in Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-207(4)(A)(i) applies
to workers over the age of sixty who suffer injuries to the body as a whole regardless of
whether the injury rendered the injured worker totally or partially disabled. Id. at *13.
Employer also referenced Cummings v. Express Courier International, Inc., No.
E2020-00548-SC-R3-WC, 2021 Tenn. LEXIS 55 (Tenn. Workers’ Comp. Panel Feb. 17,
2021), noting that the employee in that case was 62 years old when she reached
maximum medical improvement but was 69 at the time of trial. In Cummings, the trial
court found the employee permanently and totally disabled and concluded the employer
was entitled to an offset. Id. at *7. On appeal, the result was affirmed by the Tennessee
Supreme Court. Id. Employer argues that binding precedent and the unambiguous
language of the statute clearly establish that Employer is entitled to an offset and that it
should be applied regardless of whether the issue was raised at trial because it is simply a
mathematical calculation to be performed when the trial court enters its order.
Conversely, Employee asserts that the trial court did not err because he was not
eligible for social security retirement benefits and was not drawing those benefits on his
date of injury or on the date Employee was found to have reached maximum medical
improvement. Further, Employee argues that McCoy was statutorily overruled by the
passage of the 2013 Workers’ Compensation Reform Act because the legislature did not
include language addressing the social security offset in Tennessee Code Annotated
section 50-6-207(3), the section that deals with permanent partial disability. Employee
contends that the legislature was aware that McCoy had expanded the entitlement to an
offset in cases of permanent partial disability and intentionally chose not to change or
move the language to adopt it statutorily with respect to permanent partial disability
benefits. Therefore, Employee argues McCoy is no longer good law. Finally, Employee
asserts Employer should not be entitled to disturb the trial court’s judgment because
parties will be incentivized to engage in gamesmanship with respect to the timing of
claims.
We first note that it is undisputed that Employee was not eligible for social
security retirement benefits at the time of his injury, at the time he reached maximum
medical improvement, or at the time of his compensation hearing. The compensation
hearing was held on March 2, 2023, and the trial court’s order was issued on March 14,
2023. The record indicates that Employee was born on November 22, 1956, and,
6
apparently, became eligible for Social Security old age benefits on March 22, 2023. 2
After the trial court entered its compensation order, Employer did not file a Rule 59
Motion to Alter or Amend the Judgment once Employee became eligible for social
security benefits. 3 As noted previously, the parties did not file a transcript of the hearing,
so we are unable to determine whether and to what extent the social security offset was
discussed at trial or whether Employer elicited any testimony or presented other evidence
regarding the extent of the offset. Nevertheless, it is clear the trial court was not afforded
an opportunity to address this issue prior to this appeal. Accordingly, we discern no error
by the trial court because this issue was not ripe for adjudication at the time of the
compensation hearing.
Despite Employer not filing a motion to alter or amend after Employee became
eligible for social security old age benefits, Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-
229(c) provides another mechanism for the modification of any award payable
periodically:
(c) All amounts paid by the employer and received by the employee or
the employee’s dependents, by lump sum payments, shall be final,
but the amount of any award payable periodically for more than
twenty-six (26) weeks may be modified as follows:
(1) At any time by agreement of the parties and approval
by the court; or
(2) If the parties do not agree, then at any time after
twenty-six (26) weeks from the date of the award,
either party may file an application to the court of
workers’ compensation claims, on the ground of
increase or decrease of incapacity due solely to the
injury.
Thus, there are statutory mechanisms for modification of disability awards to be paid
periodically for more than twenty-six weeks. Employer can seek modification of the
award pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotation section 50-6-229(c)(1). 4
2
For persons born in 1956, the “normal retirement age” is at 66 years and 4 months. See
https://www.ssa.gov/oact/progdata/nra.html (last visited July 26, 2023).
3
As noted previously, following the trial court’s order, Employee filed a Rule 59 Motion to Alter or
Amend the Judgment or in the Alternative Rule 60.04 Motion to Clarify Clerical Mistake.
4
Employer could also seek modification of the award at any time after twenty-six (26) weeks from the
date of the award pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotation section 50-6-229(c)(2) if there is a factual basis
for such a motion.
7
Moreover, Employer can seek relief from the trial court’s judgment or order via
Rule 60.02 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides that, “[o]n motion
and upon such terms as are just, the court may relieve a party . . . from a final judgment,
order or proceeding” for certain reasons, including “any other reason justifying relief
from the operation of the judgment.” Tenn. R. Civ. P. 60.02. The motion must be made
within a “reasonable time” and “not more than one year after the judgment, order[,] or
proceeding was entered or taken.” Rule 60.02 also “does not limit the power of a court to
entertain an independent action to relieve a party from a judgment, order[,] or
proceeding.”
Thus, we conclude that, as of the date the trial court’s compensation order was
filed, the issue of a potential social security offset was not ripe for adjudication, and the
issue is not ripe for appeal. See, e.g., Foriest v. United Parcel Service, Inc., No. 2017-06-
0413, 2018 TN Wrk. Comp. App. Bd. LEXIS 39, at *6-8 (Tenn. Workers’ Comp. App.
Bd. Aug. 10, 2018) (“The central concern of the ripeness doctrine is whether the case
involves uncertain or contingent future events that may or may not occur as anticipated
or, indeed, may not occur at all.”). This, however, does not prevent Employer from
seeking relief pursuant to any applicable statute or rule.
With respect to Employee’s argument regarding the continued viability of the
Supreme Court’s holding in McCoy, we disagree that it has been statutorily overruled.
The relevant statute at issue in McCoy, Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-
207(4)(A)(i), was unaltered by the 2013 reforms. That same language, which remains in
the Law presently, has been interpreted by the Tennessee Supreme Court to apply both to
permanent total and permanent partial disability benefits. One principle of statutory
construction states that a legislature is deemed to be aware of judicial interpretations of
statutes and, absent specific action to alter or amend the statute in question, is presumed
to have acquiesced in that judicial interpretation. See, e.g., Coffee Cty Bd. of Educ. v.
City of Tullahoma, 574 S.W.3d 832, 847 (Tenn. 2019). Employee has cited no legislative
action since the adoption of the Reform Act that limited, modified, or otherwise
abrogated this language. Accordingly, we conclude Employee’s argument is without
merit.
Medical Expenses and Attorneys’ Fees
Employee argues on appeal that the trial court erred in finding Employer was not
responsible for reimbursing BCBS the full amount of medical expenses it paid for
Employee’s work-related treatment. Employee also contends the court erred in not
ordering Employer to pay an attorneys’ fee equal to twenty percent of the full amount of
medical expenses paid by BCBS as a result of his attorney’s efforts to protect BCBS’s
subrogation interest. In support of its position, Employee relies on Reatherford v.
Lincoln Brass Works, No. 01S01-9707-CV-00145, 1998 Tenn. LEXIS 33 (Tenn.
8
Workers’ Comp. Panel Jan. 26, 1998). In Reatherford, which is an unpublished opinion,
the employee’s recovery as awarded by the trial court included “all medical expenses,”
which totaled $11,438 for treatment provided by the Department of Veterans Affairs
(“VA”). In a prior appeal, the Supreme Court had affirmed the trial court’s judgment. 5
Thereafter, the employee filed a motion in the trial court seeking “judicial coercion” for
the employer to pay the benefits that were awarded, including interest on the judgment.
1998 Tenn. LEXIS 33, at *2. The employer responded by stating that the interest had
been paid and that, with respect to the medical expenses, the VA agreed to accept $7,625
to fully resolve its subrogation lien. Id. The trial court ruled that the VA had a
subrogation interest in the total amount of $11,438 for the medical treatment it provided,
but that the “VA has compromised its subrogation interest to $7,625.00[,] which has been
paid in full.” Id. at *2-3. The court awarded the employee’s attorney a fee based on the
full subrogation lien for representing the VA “with such payment to be made by the
[employer].” Id. at *3.
The employer appealed again, questioning the award of attorneys’ fees. The
Supreme Court’s Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel affirmed the trial
court’s order, noting that the initial judgment directed the employer to pay “‘all medical
expenses,’ as contrasted to specific amounts to named providers.” Id. at *4. The Panel
affirmed the trial court’s order requiring the employer pay attorneys’ fees based on that
attorney’s representation of the VA’s subrogation interest, stating “[w]e know of no
authority, and none has been cited to us, for the proposition that under the circumstances
of this case the [employer] should be allowed to defeat the attorney[s’] fee in the manner
fashioned.” Id. at *5.
There are several critical differences between the circumstances of Reatherford
and the present case. First, it is important to note that the Panel issued its opinion in
Reatherford prior to Tennessee’s adoption of a medical fee schedule for workers’
compensation cases. Second, the General Assembly enacted a statute that requires
employers to pay medical expenses for work-related injuries pursuant to the terms of that
fee schedule. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-204(a)(3)(A)(iii) (“[t]he liability of the
employer for the services provided to the employee shall be limited to the maximum
allowable fees” under the fee schedule); see also Tenn. Comp. R. & Regs. 0800-02-18-
.01 et seq. In fact, employers are prohibited from paying any medical bill for a covered
injury outside the fee schedule. Tenn. Comp. R. & Regs. 0800-02-18-.15(1). Those
requirements did not exist when Reatherford was decided.
Third, unlike in Reatherford, the court here did not order Employer to pay “all”
medical expenses but rather, relying on Bowlin v. Servall, LLC, No. 2017-07-0224, 2020
TN Work. Comp. App. Bd. LEXIS 70, at *16 (Tenn. Workers’ Comp. App. Bd. Nov. 25,
5
Reatherford v. Lincoln Brass Works, No. 01S01-9504-CV-00058, 1996 Tenn. LEXIS 313 (Tenn.
Workers’ Comp. Panel May 17, 1996).
9
2020), ordered Employer to “pay the medical bills for treatment of [Employee’s] neck
injury pursuant to the fee schedule.” (Emphasis added.) 6 Fourth, there is no proof in the
record that BCBS retained counsel to protect its subrogation interest or that Employee’s
counsel had an attorney-client relationship with BCBS. Accordingly, we discern no error
with the trial court’s order requiring Employer to pay medical expenses to Employee’s
medical providers in amounts allowable under the applicable fee schedule. 7
Finally, as we have previously observed, the Tennessee Supreme Court has held
that contested medical expenses are part of the “recovery or award” upon which
attorneys’ fees may be based. See Langford v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 854 S.W.2d 100,
102 (Tenn. 1993). Here, the trial court noted that Tennessee allows an award of
attorneys’ fees for the recovery of disputed medical expenses and that, pursuant to
Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-226(a)(1), this fee is to be paid by the party
employing the attorney from “the amount of the recovery.” Employee has cited no
statutory authority or binding precedent supporting the proposition that a trial court can
compel Employer to pay twenty percent of the amount of unpaid medical expenses to
Employee’s attorney as a fee separate and apart from its payment of medical bills to the
providers in accordance with the applicable fee schedule. Thus, we affirm the trial
court’s order regarding the award of attorneys’ fees.
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm and certify as final the trial court’s March 14,
2023 order in all respects. Each party shall pay its own costs on appeal.
6
Our opinion in Bowlin was affirmed and adopted by the Tennessee Supreme Court’s Special Workers’
Compensation Appeals Panel in Bowlin v. Servall, LLC, No. W2020-01708-SC-R3-WC, 2021 Tenn.
LEXIS 532 (Tenn. Workers’ Comp. Panel Aug. 13, 2021), which was, in turn, accepted and approved by
the Tennessee Supreme Court. Bowlin v. Servall, LLC, No. W2020-01708-SC-R3-WC, 2021 Tenn.
LEXIS 533 (Tenn. Aug. 13, 2021).
7
Thus, Employer is obligated by the terms of the trial court’s order to pay the providers pursuant to the
fee schedule, and BCBS’s claim for reimbursement would then be against the providers, not Employer.
10
TENNESSEE BUREAU OF WORKERS’ COMPENSATION
WORKERS’ COMPENSATION APPEALS BOARD
Robert Bragg ) Docket No. 2020-07-0020
)
v. ) State File No. 10723-2018
)
Premium Services, LLC, et al. )
)
)
Appeal from the Court of Workers’ )
Compensation Claims )
Allen Phillips, Judge )
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the Appeals Board’s decision in the referenced
case was sent to the following recipients by the following methods of service on this the 1st day
of August, 2023.
Name Certified First Class Via Via Sent to:
Mail Mail Fax Email
Neil M. McIntire X nmcintire@howell-fisher.com
Jeffrey P. Boyd X jboyd@borenandboyd.com
scallison@borenandboyd.com
dmyles@borenandboyd.com
Allen Phillips, Judge X Via Electronic Mail
Kenneth M. Switzer, Chief Judge X Via Electronic Mail
Penny Shrum, Clerk, Court of X penny.patterson-shrum@tn.gov
Workers’ Compensation Claims
Matthew Keene
Acting Clerk, Workers’ Compensation Appeals Board
220 French Landing Dr., Ste. 1-B
Nashville, TN 37243
Telephone: 615-532-1564
Electronic Mail: WCAppeals.Clerk@tn.gov