Opinion

In re Jenkins

Court
District of Columbia Court of Appeals
Filed
Jul 27, 2023
Status
Published
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 23.7%

“Courts should not decide more than the occasion demands.” (quoting District of Columbia v. Wical Ltd. P’ship, 630 A.2d 174, 182 (D.C. 1993))

How later courts described this case

  • “Courts should not decide more than the occasion demands.” (quoting District of Columbia v. Wical Ltd. P’ship, 630 A.2d 174, 182 (D.C. 1993))
  • imposing a 30-day suspension on an attorney who made three misrepresentations to the court and previously had been reprimanded for misrepresentation

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

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to press.

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA COURT OF APPEALS

No. 23-BG-0545

IN RE MARYLIN JENKINS, RESPONDENT.

An Administratively Suspended Member of the

Bar of the District of Columbia Court of Appeals

(Bar Registration No. 390626)

On Report and Recommendation of the Board on Professional

Responsibility Ad Hoc Hearing Committee

Approving Petition for Negotiated Discipline

(Disciplinary Docket No. 2022-D094)

(Board Docket No. 23-ND-002)

(Decided: July 27, 2023)

Before HOWARD and ALIKHAN, Associate Judges, and FISHER, Senior Judge.

PER CURIAM: This decision is non-precedential. Please refer to D.C. Bar

R. XI, § 12.1(d) regarding the appropriate citation of this opinion.

In this matter, the Hearing Committee recommends approval of a petition for

negotiated attorney discipline. See D.C. Bar R. XI, § 12.1(c). Respondent Marylin

Jenkins voluntarily acknowledged that, in connection with applying for a job in

California, she concealed her prior discipline in this jurisdiction (a 2016 reprimand

2

for a violation of D.C. R. Prof. Conduct 8.4(c)), her prior employment out of which

that 8.4(c) violation arose, and even her admission to the D.C. Bar. As a result,

Ms. Jenkins admits that she (again) violated D.C. R. Prof. Conduct 8.4(c) (conduct

involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation), as well as the

corresponding and substantially similar Cal. R. Prof. Conduct 8.4(c) (conduct

involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or reckless or intentional misrepresentation).

The proposed discipline consists of a 30-day suspension.

Having reviewed the Hearing Committee’s recommendation in accordance

with our procedures in uncontested disciplinary cases, see D.C. Bar R. XI, § 12.1(d),

we agree that this case is appropriate for negotiated discipline and that “the agreed-

upon sanction is ‘justified,’” In re Mensah, 262 A.3d 1100, 1104 (D.C. 2021) (per

curiam) (quoting D.C. Bar R. XI, § 12.1(c)(3)), given the sanctions we have

previously imposed for similar violations, see, e.g., In re Rosen, 481 A.2d 451, 455

(D.C. 1984) (imposing a 30-day suspension on an attorney who made three

misrepresentations to the court and previously had been reprimanded for

misrepresentation). We also agree with the Hearing Committee that, in these

circumstances, there is no need to decide whether our rules or California’s rules

apply to respondent’s misconduct. See D.C. R. Prof. Conduct 8.5(b)(2)(ii) (“If the

lawyer is licensed to practice in this and another jurisdiction, the rules to be applied

3

shall be the rules of the admitting jurisdiction in which the lawyer principally

practices; provided, however, that if particular conduct clearly has its predominant

effect in another jurisdiction in which the lawyer is licensed to practice, the rules of

that jurisdiction shall be applied to that conduct.”); In re Tun, 286 A.3d 538, 543

(D.C. 2022) (explaining that even when we evaluate an attorney’s misconduct under

another jurisdiction’s rules, we follow District of Columbia law when determining

the appropriate sanction); In re Cooper, 936 A.2d 832, 835 (D.C. 2007) (“Courts

should not decide more than the occasion demands.” (quoting District of Columbia

v. Wical Ltd. P’ship, 630 A.2d 174, 182 (D.C. 1993))). Accordingly, it is

ORDERED that respondent Marylin Jenkins is hereby suspended from the

practice of law in the District of Columbia for 30 days. We direct respondent’s

attention to D.C. Bar R. XI, § 14(g), which requires the filing of an affidavit with

this court for purposes of reinstatement in accordance with D.C. Bar R. XI, § 16, and

Board Prof. Resp. R. 9.

So ordered.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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