Kelly Martin v. Jordan Turner

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eighth Circuit

___________________________

No. 22-1449

___________________________

Kelly Martin

Plaintiff - Appellee

v.

Jordan Turner, Individually and in his official capacity

Defendant - Appellant

Shawn Stephens, Independence County Sheriff, Individually and in his official

capacity; Jacob McLaughlin, Individually and in his official capacity;

Independence County, Arkansas; John Doe

Defendants

____________

Appeal from United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Arkansas - Northern

____________

Submitted: April 12, 2023

Filed: July 21, 2023

____________

Before COLLOTON, WOLLMAN, and GRUENDER, Circuit Judges.

____________

GRUENDER, Circuit Judge.

Kelly Martin sued Independence County Sheriff’s Deputy Jordan Turner for

his alleged deliberate indifference to her seizure condition after she was arrested for

driving while intoxicated. Deputy Turner asserted qualified immunity in his motion

for summary judgment, which the district court denied. We reverse.

I.

In the summer of 2017, Deputy Turner responded to a one-car accident near

Batesville, Arkansas. He found a vehicle on the side of the road and its driver, Kelly

Martin. Deputy Turner began investigating and asked Martin several questions

about the accident. Her confused, at times “incoherent,” answers, slurred speech,

and general demeanor indicated to Deputy Turner that she was likely impaired by

drugs. She told him that she was not hurt and had no medical problems. Turner

checked Martin’s driver’s license (which noted no medical restrictions) and searched

her purse and found various pills, including a medication sometimes used to treat

seizure disorders. When asked whether she took any medications, Martin responded

that she had a “patch,” an apparent reference to her pain medication. At this point,

Deputy Turner noticed that Martin’s demeanor was improving. Emergency medical

personnel on the scene observed Martin and told Deputy Turner that Martin had

refused further treatment and transport to the hospital.

Deputy Turner then arrested Martin for driving while intoxicated. As he

placed Martin in his patrol car, her boyfriend, John Reynolds, arrived. Reynolds

claims that he told Deputy Turner that Martin was driving to a hospital because she

had run out of her pain medicine and that she “might have had a seizure” at the time

of the accident. As it turns out, Martin suffers from an unspecified seizure disorder.

Deputy Turner, however, says that Reynolds mentioned nothing about Martin’s

condition, her medication, or a possible seizure. In the end, Deputy Turner took

Martin (along with her medications) to jail, where she was booked by a jail official

-2-

and detained until the next day. Martin alleges that she suffered multiple seizures

during her detention that caused serious injuries.

Martin sued Deputy Turner (in his official and individual capacities) and

others under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Arkansas Civil Rights Act, Ark. Code § 16-

123-101 et seq., alleging deliberate indifference to her seizure condition,

specifically, the seizure she claims to have suffered around the time of her arrest.

All defendants moved for summary judgment, and the individual defendants invoked

qualified immunity. The district court granted summary judgment to all defendants

on all claims except the individual-capacity claims against Deputy Turner. The

district court ruled that “[w]hether Deputy Turner was aware of Martin’s seizure

disorder or medication are disputed material facts that must be decided by a jury”

and concluded that Deputy Turner was not entitled to summary judgment based on

qualified immunity. Turner appeals.

II.

We have jurisdiction to review the district court’s order denying qualified

immunity, which we review de novo. Barton v. Taber, 908 F.3d 1119, 1123 (8th

Cir. 2018) (Barton II). In this interlocutory posture, we take as true the facts that the

district court assumed, or likely assumed, in its denial of summary judgment.

Johnson v. Jones, 515 U.S. 304, 318 (1995). “[W]e determine the facts that it likely

assumed by viewing the record favorably to the plaintiff as in any other summary

judgment motion.” Livers v. Schenck, 700 F.3d 340, 350 (8th Cir. 2012).

Martin and Deputy Turner agree that, to establish a violation of her rights, she

must show that she suffered from an objectively serious medical need and that

Deputy Turner had actual knowledge of that need but deliberately disregarded it.

See Barton II, 908 F.3d at 1124; Grayson v. Ross, 253 S.W.3d 428, 433 (Ark. 2007).

Because qualified immunity “protects government officials ‘from liability for civil

damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or

constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known,’” Martin also

-3-

must show that it was clearly established that Deputy Turner’s conduct violated her

rights. See Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009) (quoting Harlow v.

Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)); Est. of Walker v. Wallace, 881 F.3d 1056,

1060 (8th Cir. 2018) (“The plaintiffs have the burden of showing that the law was

clearly established.”). Though a court may address these questions in any order, it

may not deny qualified immunity without answering them both in the plaintiff’s

favor. Watson v. Boyd, 2 F.4th 1106, 1112 (8th Cir. 2021).

When considering whether a right is clearly established, “[w]e do not require

a case directly on point, but existing precedent must have placed the statutory or

constitutional question beyond debate.” Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 741

(2011). “This generally requires a plaintiff to point to existing circuit precedent that

involves sufficiently similar facts to squarely govern the officer[’s] conduct in the

specific circumstances at issue.” Graham v. Barnette, 5 F.4th 872, 887 (8th Cir.

2021) (internal quotation marks omitted). “The dispositive question is whether the

violative nature of particular conduct is clearly established.” Mullenix v. Luna, 577

U.S. 7, 12 (2015) (per curiam) (internal quotation marks omitted). “This inquiry

must be undertaken in light of the specific context of the case, not as a broad general

proposition,” and we keep in mind that “qualified immunity protects all but the

plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.” Id. (internal quotation

marks omitted); see Kisela v. Hughes, 584 U.S. ---, 138 S. Ct. 1148, 1152 (2018)

(per curiam) (“[T]he focus is on whether the officer had fair notice that her conduct

was unlawful . . . .”). These principles apply equally to claims under § 1983 and the

Arkansas Civil Rights Act. Hudson v. Norris, 227 F.3d 1047, 1054 (8th Cir. 2000).

Martin offers five cases that she argues clearly establish a civil-rights violation

under circumstances sufficiently similar to those presented here: Foulks v. Cole

County, 991 F.2d 454 (8th Cir. 1993); Camberos v. Branstad, 73 F.3d 174 (8th Cir.

1995); Coleman v. Rahija, 114 F.3d 778 (8th Cir. 1997); Phillips v. Jasper County

Jail, 437 F.3d 791 (8th Cir. 2006); and Barton v. Taber, 820 F.3d 958 (8th Cir. 2016)

(Barton I). Assuming without deciding that decisions of the Eighth Circuit may

constitute clearly established law for qualified-immunity purposes, cf. City of

-4-

Escondido v. Emmons, 586 U.S. ---, 139 S. Ct. 500, 503 (2019) (per curiam),

Martin’s cases do not involve sufficiently similar facts to “squarely govern” Deputy

Turner’s conduct here, see Graham, 5 F.4th at 887.

The first four cases have nothing to do with the conduct of an arresting officer.

Foulks affirmed the denial of a motion to dismiss a complaint that alleged jailors had

ignored an inmate’s severe head injury even though the inmate had arrived at the jail

from the hospital with instructions for his care. See 991 F.2d at 457. Camberos is

not a qualified-immunity case, involves no discussion of clearly established rights,

and merely held that certain prison nurses were not deliberately indifferent to an

inmate’s shoulder problems because they referred him to a physician assistant

numerous times. See 73 F.3d at 177. Coleman affirmed a district court’s conclusion

that prison medical staff’s unreasonable delay in treating a pregnant inmate’s

preterm labor constituted deliberate indifference. See 114 F.3d at 786. And Phillips

held that jail staff’s “knowing failure to administer prescribed medicine can itself

constitute deliberate indifference”—a proposition inapplicable here. See 437 F.3d

at 796. These cases are therefore inapposite.

Barton I, however, did involve a deliberate-indifference claim against an

arresting officer. 820 F.3d at 964. After officers arrived at the scene of Barton’s

single-car accident, all signs pointed to his severe impairment. Id. at 962. He nearly

fell several times and had a blood-alcohol concentration well over the legal limit.

Id. As officers arrested and searched Barton, he fell to the ground unresponsive. Id.

Barton could not stand on his own, so officers lifted him into a patrol car and took

him to jail where he later died from a heart condition. Id. at 962-63. At no point

was Barton evaluated by a medical professional. Id. Under these circumstances, we

held that a reasonable officer would have understood that failing to seek medical

care for a post-car-accident arrestee who exhibited Barton’s severe symptoms

violates the arrestee’s rights. Id. at 966-67.

The facts of this case are quite different from Barton I. Viewing them in the

light most favorable to Martin, we assume, as the district court likely did, that the

-5-

conversation with Reynolds made Deputy Turner aware of Martin’s seizure disorder

and the reason Martin needed her medications. But unlike in Barton I, Deputy

Turner promptly attended to Martin and asked her whether she was hurt or suffered

from medical problems. She said no and did not advise him of her seizure disorder.

Emergency medical personnel also observed Martin and were content not to take her

to the hospital, advising Deputy Turner that she had refused further treatment. He

then took Martin and her medications to jail. Barton I did not provide Deputy Turner

fair notice that his failure to seek further medical treatment for Martin or to speak

with the jailors about what Reynolds told him constituted deliberate indifference.

See Kisela, 138 S. Ct. at 1152. Thus, Martin failed to show that clearly established

law prohibited Deputy Turner’s conduct, and Deputy Turner is entitled to qualified

immunity.

III.

For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the district court’s denial of Deputy

Turner’s motion for summary judgment and remand for entry of judgment in his

favor.

______________________________

-6-