The opinion
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD
LARRY SQUIRES, DOCKET NUMBER
Appellant, DE-3330-17-0172-I-1
v.
DEPARTMENT OF DATE: July 19, 2023
TRANSPORTATION,
Agency.
THIS FINAL ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1
Larry Squires, Golden, Colorado, pro se.
Kyle Fields, Linda Martin, and Elizabeth A. Sorrells, Esquire, Washington,
D.C., for the agency.
BEFORE
Cathy A. Harris, Vice Chairman
Raymond A. Limon, Member
FINAL ORDER
¶1 The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which
denied his request for corrective action under the Veterans Employment
Opportunities Act of 1998 (VEOA). Generally, we grant petitions such as this
one only in the following circumstances: the initial decision contains erroneous
1
A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add
significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders,
but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not
required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a
precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board
as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c).
2
findings of material fact; the initial decision is based on an erroneous
interpretation of statute or regulation or the erroneous application of the law to
the facts of the case; the administrative judge’s rulings during either the course of
the appeal or the initial decision were not consistent with required procedures or
involved an abuse of discretion, and the resulting error affected the outcome of
the case; or new and material evidence or legal argument is available that, despite
the petitioner’s due diligence, was not available when the record closed. Title 5
of the Code of Federal Regulations, section 1201.115 ( 5 C.F.R. § 1201.115).
After fully considering the filings in this appeal, we conclude that the petitioner
has not established any basis under section 1201.115 for granting the petition for
review. Therefore, we DENY the petition for review. Except as expressly
MODIFIED to clarify (1) the appropriate standard for the disposition of this
matter without a hearing, and (2) why the appellant is not entitled to corrective
action on his claim of denial of an opportunity to compete under 5 U.S.C.
§ 3304(f)(1), we AFFIRM the initial decision.
BACKGROUND
¶2 The appellant is a preference-eligible veteran who applied for an
Environmental Protection Specialist position with the Federal Railroad
Administration, an administration within the Department of Transportation
(DOT), sometime in June or July 2016. Initial Appeal File (IAF), Tab 7 at 22,
28-30; see 49 U.S.C. § 103(a). The vacancy announcement for the position states
that only “[c]urrent DOT employees with status” may apply. IAF, Tab 7 at 30.
Since 2008, the appellant has been an employee of the Federal Transit
Administration, another administration within the DOT. IAF, Tab 1 at 24 -25,
Tab 11 at 145; see 49 U.S.C. § 107(a). On September 16, 2016, the agency
informed the appellant that he had been tentatively selected for the position . IAF,
Tab 7 at 19-23. On November 22, 2016, the agency rescinded the tentative job
offer. Id. at 13-14. On December 16, 2016, the appellant filed a VEOA
3
complaint with the Department of Labor (DOL) regarding his nonselection.
IAF, Tab 1 at 22-28.
¶3 After receiving a close-out letter from DOL on January 31, 2017, the
appellant filed a Board appeal on February 8, 2017, and did not request a hearing.
IAF, Tab 1 at 1-6, 28-29, Tab 7 at 5. He asserted that the agency violated his
right to compete for the position under 5 U.S.C. § 3304(f)(1) and failed to provide
him with a career or career-conditional appointment under 5 U.S.C. § 3304(f)(2).
IAF, Tab 1 at 5, Tab 7 at 4-5, 7-9. In addition, he raised claims of prohibited
personnel practices and violations of merit system principles. IAF, Tab 1 at 5,
Tab 7 at 7-9. In an Order to Show Cause, the administrative judge found that the
Board has jurisdiction over the appeal and informed the parties that
section 3304(f)(1) may not apply to this selection process because the vacancy
was open only to agency employees, not external candidates. IAF, Tab 12. The
administrative judge provided the appellant with an opportunity to state a claim
upon which relief can be granted under VEOA. Id. Both parties responded. IAF,
Tabs 14, 16.
¶4 Based on the written record, the administrative judge issued an initial
decision denying both the appellant’s request for a hearing 2 and his request for
corrective action under VEOA because he failed to state a claim entitling him to
relief. IAF, Tab 17, Initial Decision (ID) at 1-2, 5. Specifically, the
administrative judge found that the appeal was timely filed and is within the
Board’s jurisdiction. 3 ID at 1, 3. He further found that 5 U.S.C. § 3304(f)(1) did
2
Insofar as the appellant does not appear to have requested a hearing, the initial
decision contained a misstatement. IAF, Tab 1 at 2, Tab 12 at 3 -4, Tab 16, Tab 17,
Initial Decision at 1. As set forth herein, however, this misstatement did not prejudice
the appellant’s substantive rights. See Panter v. Department of the Air Force,
22 M.S.P.R. 281, 282 (1984) (explaining that an adjudicatory error that is not
prejudicial to a party’s substantive rights provides no basis for reversal of an initial
decision).
3
The parties do not dispute, and we find no reason to disturb, the administrative judge’s
finding that the appellant timely filed this VEOA appeal within 15 days of his receipt of
4
not apply because the vacancy was open only to DOT employees. ID at 3-4. In
addition, the administrative judge found that the Board lacks the authority to
decide the appellant’s prohibited personnel practice claims . ID at 4-5.
¶5 The appellant has filed a petition for review. Petition for Review (PFR)
File, Tab 2. 4 The agency has filed a response. PFR File, Tab 4.
DISCUSSION OF ARGUMENTS ON REVIEW
The Board has jurisdiction over this appeal under VEOA.
¶6 A nonselection generally is not an action directly appealable to the Board;
however, it may be appealable under VEOA. Dale v. Department of Veterans
Affairs, 102 M.S.P.R. 646, ¶ 7 (2006). To establish the Board’s jurisdiction over
a VEOA appeal based on an alleged violation of veterans’ preference rights, an
appellant must show that he exhausted his remedy with DOL and make
nonfrivolous allegations that he is a preference eligible within the meaning of
VEOA, the action at issue took place on or after the October 30, 1998 enactment
of VEOA, and the agency violated his rights under a statute or regulation relating
to veterans’ preference. Lis v. U.S. Postal Service, 113 M.S.P.R. 415, ¶ 8 (2010);
see 5 U.S.C. § 3330a(a)(1)(A). 5 Here, the parties do not dispute, and we find no
DOL’s close-out letter. ID at 1, 3; IAF, Tab 7 at 5; see 5 U.S.C. § 3330a(d)(1)(B);
5 C.F.R. § 1208.22(b).
4
With his petition for review, the appellant provides a copy of the vacancy
announcement for the Environmental Protection Specialist position. PFR File, Tab 2
at 7-11. This announcement, however, was part of the record before the administrative
judge. Compare id., with IAF, Tab 7 at 30-34; see Meier v. Department of the Interior,
3 M.S.P.R. 247, 256 (1980) (explaining that evidence that is already a part of the record
is not new).
5
Because the appellant is both a preference eligible and a veteran who separated from
the U.S. Marine Corps under honorable conditions after more than 3 years of active
service, and the nonselection at issue took place in 2016, after the enactment of both
VEOA and the Veterans Benefits Improvement Act of 2004, the Board has jurisdiction
over this matter under 5 U.S.C. § 3330a(a)(1)(A) and (a)(1)(B). IAF, Tab 1 at 16, 22;
see Montgomery v. Department of Health and Human Services, 123 M.S.P.R. 216,
¶¶ 4-5 & nn.1-2 (2016). Analyzed under either subpart, the outcome on the merits is
the same.
5
reason to disturb, the administrative judge’s finding that the Board has
jurisdiction over this appeal. ID at 1, 3.
We modify the initial decision to clarify the legal standard for deciding the merits
of a VEOA appeal absent a hearing.
¶7 In deciding this matter without a hearing, the administrative judge
seemingly reasoned that the appellant had failed to state a claim upon which relief
could be granted under VEOA. 6 ID at 3-5. This analysis was imprecise; indeed,
the Board has the authority to decide the merits of a VEOA appeal without a
hearing when there is no genuine dispute of material fact and one party must
prevail as a matter of law. Haasz v. Department of Veterans Affairs,
108 M.S.P.R. 349, ¶ 9 (2008). Dismissing an appeal for failure to state a claim
upon which relief can be granted is appropriate only if, taking the appellant’s
allegations as true and drawing all reasonable inferences in his favor, he cannot
prevail as a matter of law. Id., ¶ 8. Here, the administrative judge relied on
documentary evidence in finding that the appellant failed to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted under VEOA. ID at 3-4. Thus, it was inappropriate
to deny the appellant’s request for corrective action based on that finding. ID
at 1-2, 5; see Haasz, 108 M.S.P.R. 349, ¶ 8. We therefore modify the initial
decision to clarify that the appropriate standard was whether there was a genuine
dispute of material fact. See Haasz, ¶¶ 9-10. For the reasons set forth herein,
however, we find that no such dispute existed.
We agree with the administrative judge’s conclusion that the appellant was not
entitled to any corrective action under VEOA; however, we modify the initial
decision to clarify the legal basis for this determination.
¶8 To prevail on the merits of a VEOA appeal involving a veterans’ preference
claim, an appellant must prove the jurisdictional elements by preponderant
6
Although the administrative judge initially set forth a different legal standard, ID
at 1‑2, it does not appear that he applied this standard; rather, he ostensibly concluded
that a hearing was unnecessary because the appellant had failed to “state a claim” that
would entitle him to any relief, ID at 3-5.
6
evidence. See Isabella v. Department of State, 106 M.S.P.R. 333, ¶¶ 21-22
(2007) (analyzing the appellant’s burden of proving the merits of his VEOA
appeal involving a veterans’ preference claim), aff’d on recons., 109 M.S.P.R.
453 (2008). Here, the parties do not dispute, and we find no reason to disturb, the
administrative judge’s findings that the appellant exhausted his remedy with
DOL, he is a preference eligible, and the nonselection took place after VEOA’s
enactment. ID at 3; IAF, Tab 7 at 11-14, 28-29; see 5 U.S.C. § 2108(3) (defining
“preference eligible” for purposes of Title 5). Therefore, the remaining issue is
whether the agency’s action violated one or more of the appellant’s statutory or
regulatory veterans’ preference rights. See Isabella, 106 M.S.P.R. 333, ¶ 22.
¶9 As stated, the administrative judge concluded that the agency could not
have violated the appellant’s statutory veterans’ preference rights under 5 U.S.C.
§ 3304(f)(1) because the vacancy announcement for the Environmental Protection
Specialist position was open only to DOT employees . ID at 3-4. Under 5 U.S.C.
§ 3304(f)(1), preference eligibles and certain veterans “ may not be denied the
opportunity to compete for vacant positions for which the agency making the
announcement will accept applications from individuals outside its own
workforce under merit promotion procedures.” 7 The administrative judge
reasoned that the right-to-compete provision set forth in this section would have
applied to the appellant only if the agency had accepted applications from
external applicants, i.e., from non-DOT employees, which it had not. ID at 3-4.
On review, the appellant challenges this conclusion and argues that language in
the vacancy announcement indicates that the agency accepted applications for the
position from individuals outside its own workforce under merit promotion
procedures, including VEOA eligibles. PFR File, Tab 2 at 5. We find this
7
The Board has found that 5 U.S.C. § 3304(f)(1) is a statute relating to veterans’
preference for which VEOA provides a remedy. Walker v. Department of the Army,
104 M.S.P.R. 96, ¶ 16 (2006).
7
distinction immaterial and we modify the initial decision to clarify why 5 U.S.C.
§ 3304(f) is inapplicable here.
¶10 In Oram v. Department of the Navy, 2022 MSPB 30, ¶ 17, the Board found
that, as a matter of law, current Federal employees are not entitled to corrective
action based on a claim of denial of an opportunity to compete under 5 U.S.C.
§ 3304(f)(1). In reaching this decision, the Board relied on the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit’s decision in Kerner v. Department of the
Interior, 778 F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2015). In Kerner, after reviewing the text and
legislative history of the VEOA and its precursor, the Veterans’ Preference Act,
the Federal Circuit reasoned that nothing in the statutory language, the legislati ve
history, or case law supported a presumption that the “opportunity to compete”
provision in 5 U.S.C. § 3304(f) applies in instances in which an applicant is
already employed in the Federal civil service. Kerner, 778 F.3d at 1338. The
Federal Circuit reasoned that the intent of the subject provision was to assist
veterans in obtaining an initial appointment to the Federal service , not subsequent
promotions or other intra-agency movement. Id. The court concluded that,
because veterans currently employed in a competitive service position are already
“eligible to apply” to merit promotion vacancies, such applicants could not have
been the intended beneficiaries of section 3304(f). Id. at 1338-39. Here, because
it is undisputed that the appellant was already a Federal employee, 5 U.S.C.
§ 3304(f) was necessarily inapplicable to him regardless of whether the subject
vacancy announcement was open to external candidates. See Oram, 2022 MSPB
30, ¶ 17.
¶11 Accordingly, we affirm as modified the denial of the appellant’s request for
corrective action under VEOA.
8
NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS 8
The initial decision, as supplemented by this Final Order, constitutes the
Board’s final decision in this matter. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.113. You may obtain
review of this final decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(a)(1). By statute, the nature of
your claims determines the time limit for seeking such review and the appropriate
forum with which to file. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b). Although we offer the following
summary of available appeal rights, the Merit Systems Protection Board does not
provide legal advice on which option is most appropriate for your situation and
the rights described below do not represent a statement of how courts will rule
regarding which cases fall within their jurisdiction. If you wish to seek review of
this final decision, you should immediately review th e law applicable to your
claims and carefully follow all filing time limits and requirements. Failure to file
within the applicable time limit may result in the dismissal of your case by your
chosen forum.
Please read carefully each of the three main possible choices of review
below to decide which one applies to your particular case. If you have questions
about whether a particular forum is the appropriate one to review your case, you
should contact that forum for more information.
(1) Judicial review in general. As a general rule, an appellant seeking
judicial review of a final Board order must file a petition for review with the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which must be received by the court
within 60 calendar days of the date of issuance of this decision. 5 U.S.C.
§ 7703(b)(1)(A).
8
Since the issuance of the initial decision in this matter, the Board may have updated
the notice of review rights included in final decisions. As indicated in the notice, the
Board cannot advise which option is most appropriate in any matter.
9
If you submit a petition for review to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit, you must submit your petition to the court at the
following address:
U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit
717 Madison Place, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20439
Additional information about the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit is available at the court’s website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov . Of particular
relevance is the court’s “Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants,” which is
contained within the court’s Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6, 10, and 11.
If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for an appeal to
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you may visit our website at
http://www.mspb.gov/probono for information regarding pro bono representation
for Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the Federal Circuit. The
Board neither endorses the services provided by any attorney nor warrants that
any attorney will accept representation in a given case.
(2) Judicial or EEOC review of cases involving a claim of
discrimination. This option applies to you only if you have claimed that you
were affected by an action that is appealable to the Board and that such action
was based, in whole or in part, on unlawful discrimination. If so, you may obtain
judicial review of this decision—including a disposition of your discrimination
claims—by filing a civil action with an appropriate U.S. district court (not the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit), within 30 calendar days after you
receive this decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(2); see Perry v. Merit Systems
Protection Board, 582 U.S. 420 (2017). If you have a representative in this case,
and your representative receives this decision before you do, then you must file
with the district court no later than 30 calendar days after your representative
receives this decision. If the action involves a claim of discrimination based on
10
race, color, religion, sex, national origin, or a disabling condition, you may be
entitled to representation by a court‑appointed lawyer and to waiver of any
requirement of prepayment of fees, costs, or other security. See 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-5(f) and 29 U.S.C. § 794a.
Contact information for U.S. district courts can be found at their respective
websites, which can be accessed through the link below:
http://www.uscourts.gov/Court_Locator/CourtWebsites.aspx.
Alternatively, you may request review by the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) of your discrimination claims only, excluding
all other issues. 5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(1). You must file any such request with the
EEOC’s Office of Federal Operations within 30 calendar days after you receive
this decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(1). If you have a representative in this case,
and your representative receives this decision before you do, then you must file
with the EEOC no later than 30 calendar days after your representative receives
this decision.
If you submit a request for review to the EEOC by regular U.S. mail, the
address of the EEOC is:
Office of Federal Operations
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
P.O. Box 77960
Washington, D.C. 20013
If you submit a request for review to the EEOC via commercial delivery or
by a method requiring a signature, it must be addressed to:
Office of Federal Operations
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
131 M Street, N.E.
Suite 5SW12G
Washington, D.C. 20507
11
(3) Judicial review pursuant to the Whistleblower Protection
Enhancement Act of 2012. This option applies to you only if you have raised
claims of reprisal for whistleblowing disclosures under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8) or
other protected activities listed in 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9)(A)(i), (B), (C), or (D).
If so, and your judicial petition for review “raises no challenge to the Board’s
disposition of allegations of a prohibited personnel practice described in
section 2302(b) other than practices described in section 2302(b)(8), or
2302(b)(9)(A)(i), (B), (C), or (D),” then you may file a petition for judicial
review either with the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit or any court
of appeals of competent jurisdiction. 9 The court of appeals must receive your
petition for review within 60 days of the date of issuance of this decision.
5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(1)(B).
If you submit a petition for judicial review to the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit, you must submit your petition to the court at the
following address:
U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit
717 Madison Place, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20439
Additional information about the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit is available at the court’s website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov. Of particular
relevance is the court’s “Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants,” which is
contained within the court’s Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6, 10, and 11.
9
The original statutory provision that provided for judicial review of certain
whistleblower claims by any court of appeals of competent jurisdiction expired on
December 27, 2017. The All Circuit Review Act, signed into law by the President on
July 7, 2018, permanently allows appellants to file petitions for judicial review of
MSPB decisions in certain whistleblower reprisal cases with the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit or any other circuit court of appeals of competent jurisdiction.
The All Circuit Review Act is retroactive to November 26, 2017. Pub. L. No. 115 -195,
132 Stat. 1510.
12
If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for an appeal to
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you may visit our website at
http://www.mspb.gov/probono for information regarding pro bono representation
for Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the Federal Circuit. The
Board neither endorses the services provided by any attorney nor warrants that
any attorney will accept representation in a given case.
Contact information for the courts of appeals can be found at their
respective websites, which can be accessed through the link below:
http://www.uscourts.gov/Court_Locator/CourtWebsites.aspx.
FOR THE BOARD: /s/ for
Jennifer Everling
Acting Clerk of the Board
Washington, D.C.