Opinion

Anthony Davis v. Department of Justice

Court
Merit Systems Protection Board
Filed
Jun 30, 2023
Status
Unpublished
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 23.6%

The opinion

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

ANTHONY DAVIS, DOCKET NUMBER

Appellant, AT-1221-16-0393-W-1

v.

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, DATE: June 30, 2023

Agency.

THIS FINAL ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1

Anthony Davis, Columbia, South Carolina, pro se.

Marie Clarke, Washington, D.C., for the agency.

BEFORE

Cathy A. Harris, Vice Chairman

Raymond A. Limon, Member

FINAL ORDER

¶1 The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which

dismissed his appeal for lack of jurisdiction. The appellant’s petition for review

is DISMISSED as untimely filed without good cause shown. 5 C.F.R.

§ 1201.114(e), (g). However, we VACATE the initial decision and DISMISS the

appeal for lack of jurisdiction for the reasons set forth in this Final Order.

1

A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add

significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders,

but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not

required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a

precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board

as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c).

2

BACKGROUND

¶2 At all times relevant to the present appeal, the appellant was a Correctional

Officer with the agency’s Bureau of Prisons. Initial Appeal File (IAF), Tab 1

at 1. The appellant filed an appeal via e-Appeal Online on March 13, 2016,

alleging “nepotism” at the Federal correctional facility. Id. at 3, 5. Specifically,

he alleged that the agency named an individual as the Supervisory Correctional

Specialist in the same department as his wife and that individual was now his

wife’s “immediate supervisor.” Id. at 5. The appellant alleged that such

nepotism violated unspecified Federal regulations and the terms of the governing

master collective bargaining agreement. Id. He claimed that agency officials

were “going to promote” the individual’s wife to a vacant Procurement Property

Specialist position to “correct their mistake,” a position for which the appellant

applied. Id. The appellant stated that he filed a whistleblower reprisal complaint

with the Office of Special Counsel (OSC) on September 11, 2015, but that he did

not receive written notice that OSC made a decision or terminated its

investigation. Id. at 4.

¶3 The appellant filed 45 pages of supporting documentation, including

excerpts from a collective bargaining agreement. IAF, Tab 2. He also submitted

memoranda and intra-agency email correspondence between August 2015 and

February 2016, regarding the alleged nepotism concerns of the individual’s

appointment to the Supervisory Correctional Specialist position in that

individual’s wife’s supervisory chain of command. Id. The documentation

included a February 29, 2016 memorandum regarding the chain of command for

the correctional facility referencing an OSC case number. Id. at 1. However, the

appellant provided neither a copy of any complaint he submitted to OSC nor a

statement of whether he provided the 45 pages he filed with the Board to OSC

with his complaint.

¶4 The administrative judge issued an order explaining the Board’s

jurisdictional limitations in individual right of action (IRA) appeals and

3

instructed the appellant to meet his jurisdictional burden. IAF, Tab 4. The

appellant did not respond to the order. The administrative judge issued a decision

on April 5, 2016, dismissing the appeal for lack of jurisdiction, without holding

the requested hearing. IAF, Tab 7, Initial Decision (ID). He explained that the

Board generally lacks jurisdiction over a nonselection appeal such as the

appellant’s apparent claim that his anticipated nonselection for a certain position

was “proximately caused by nepotism.” ID at 2. To the extent that the

appellant’s claim constituted an IRA appeal of whistleblower reprisal, the

administrative judge found that the appellant failed to establish that he exhausted

remedies for corrective action with OSC. ID at 2-3.

¶5 The appellant filed a petition for review on or about June 30, 2017, more

than 1 year after the initial decision was issued. Petition for Review (PFR) File,

Tab 1. The Office of the Clerk of the Board issued a notice to the appellant

informing him that his petition was untimely filed because it was not filed on or

before May 10, 2016. PFR File, Tab 2 at 1. The Office of the Clerk of the Board

instructed the appellant how to file a motion to accept the petition as timely or to

waive the time limit for good cause. Id. at 2. The appellant did not file any such

motion. The agency filed a response opposing the petition for review as untimely

filed. PFR File, Tab 5.

DISCUSSION OF ARGUMENTS ON REVIEW

The appellant has not established good cause for his untimely filed petition for

review.

¶6 A petition for review generally must be filed within 35 days after the date

of the issuance of the initial decision or, if the party filing the petition shows that

the initial decision was received more than 5 days after it was issued, within

30 days after the party received the initial decision. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.114(e). The

Board will waive the time limit for filing a petition for review only upon a

showing of good cause for the delay in filing. 5 C.F.R. §§ 1201.113(d),

1201.114(f). The party who submits an untimely petition for review has the

4

burden of establishing good cause for the untimely filing by showing that he

exercised due diligence or ordinary prudence under the particular circumstances

of the case. Sanders v. Department of the Treasury, 88 M.S.P.R. 370, ¶ 5 (2001).

To determine whether a party has shown good cause, the Board will consider the

length of the delay, the reasonableness of the party’s excuse and his showing of

due diligence, whether he is proceeding pro se, and whether he has presented

evidence of the existence of circumstances beyond his control that affected his

ability to comply with the time limits or of unavoidable casualty or misfortune

which similarly shows a causal relationship to his inability to timely file his

petition. Moorman v. Department of the Army, 68 M.S.P.R. 60, 62-63 (1995),

aff’d, 79 F.3d 1167 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (Table).

¶7 As a preliminary matter, the appellant has not filed a motion regarding the

timeliness of his petition for review, despite receiving notice from the Office of

the Clerk of the Board regarding the necessary requirements and the opportunity

to file such a motion. PFR File, Tab 2; see 5 C.F.R. § 1201.114(g). Further, we

find that his assertions in his petition for review fail to establish that his petition

was timely filed or that good cause exists for the filing delay.

¶8 The appellant argues that he did not receive the April 5, 2016 initial

decision until June 8, 2017, and he submits a photocopy of an envelope from the

Board’s Atlanta Regional Office postmarked June 5, 2017, which purportedly

contained a paper copy of the initial decision. PFR File, Tab 1 at 2-3. He asserts

that his email address has not changed during the course of his appeal, but he

argues that the agency “erased” and “tampered with” his emails. Id. at 2. The

appellant’s registration as an e-filer, IAF, Tab 1 at 2, constituted consent to

accept electronic service of pleadings filed by other registered e -filers and

documents issued by the Board, see 5 C.F.R. § 1201.14(e)(1). The Board’s

e-Appeal Online logs and the certificate of service accompanying the initial

decision indicate that a notification with a link to the e-Appeal Online Repository

was sent to the appellant’s email address of record on April 5, 2016, and he

5

received the document electronically on that date. IAF, Tab 8; see 5 C.F.R.

§ 1201.14(j)(1), (m)(2). As an e-filer, the appellant was responsible for ensuring

that filters did not block the Board’s emails and for monitoring case activity in

the Repository to ensure that he had received all case-related documents.

5 C.F.R. § 1201.14(j)(2)-(3). If he was concerned about the security of his

Federal email account, he could have changed his method of service to regular

mail or changed his email address of record. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.14(e)(4), (6)

(permitting withdrawal of registration as an e-filer and outlining the process for

changing the email address of record). Thus, we find that the appellant timely

received notice of the initial decision on April 5, 2016, and he filed his petition

for review more than 1 year late. His petition for review does not articulate or

establish good cause for this delay. Accordingly, we dismiss the petition for

review as untimely filed with no good cause shown.

Although the administrative judge erroneously found that the appellant had not

filed a complaint with OSC, the Board lacks jurisdiction over this matter as an

IRA appeal for other reasons.

¶9 Although we have dismissed the appellant’s petition for review as untimely,

the issue of the Board’s jurisdiction is always before the Board and may be raised

sua sponte by the Board at any time during a Board proceeding. E.g., Francis v.

Department of the Air Force, 120 M.S.P.R. 138, ¶ 8 (2013). As the

administrative judge correctly recognized, a nonselection is not an appealable

adverse action pursuant to 5 U.S.C. chapter 75. 5 U.S.C. §§ 7512, 7513(d);

Prewitt v. Merit Systems Protection Board, 133 F.3d 885, 886 (Fed. Cir. 1998).

However, the Board may address a nonselection in some other conte xts.

Becker v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 107 M.S.P.R. 327, ¶ 5 (2007). Most

relevant to this appeal, the Board may address a nonselection in an IRA appeal.

Id. To establish the Board’s jurisdiction over an IRA appeal, an appellant must

have exhausted his administrative remedies before OSC and made nonfrivolous

6

allegations 2 of the following: (1) he made a protected disclosu re described under

5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8) or engaged in protected activity as specified in 5 U.S.C.

§ 2302(b)(9)(A)(i), (B), (C), or (D); and (2) the disclosure or protected activity

was a contributing factor in the agency’s decision to take or fail to take a

personnel action as defined by 5 U.S.C. § 2302(a)(2)(A). 5 U.S.C. §§ 1214(a)(3),

1221(a), (e)(1); Salerno v. Department of the Interior, 123 M.S.P.R. 230, ¶ 5

(2016); see Yunus v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 242 F.3d 1367, 1371 (Fed.

Cir. 2001). 3 An appellant filing an IRA appeal has not exhausted his OSC remedy

unless he has filed a whistleblower reprisal complaint with OSC and either OSC

has notified him that it was terminating its investigation of his allegations or

120 calendar days have passed since he first sought corrective action. 5 U.S.C.

§ 1214(a)(3); Simnitt v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 113 M.S.P.R. 313, ¶ 8

(2010); 5 C.F.R. § 1209.5(a). Moreover, the Board only may consider those

disclosures of information and personnel actions that the appellant raised before

OSC. Mason v. Department of Homeland Security, 116 M.S.P.R. 135, ¶ 8 (2011).

¶10 The appellant’s primary assertion in his initial appeal and supporting

documentation is that the agency engaged in prohibited nepotism by allowing the

individual who became the Supervisory Correctional Specialist to become his

wife’s supervisor. IAF, Tab 1 at 5, Tab 2. Although nepotism is a prohibited

personnel practice (PPP) outlined in 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(7), an assertion of such a

PPP does not provide an independent basis for finding Board jurisdiction. See

Wren v. Department of the Army, 2 M.S.P.R. 1, 2 (1980), aff’d, 681 F.2d 867,

871-73 (D.C. Cir. 1982); see also 5 U.S.C. § 1221(a) (limiting IRA appeals to

2

A nonfrivolous allegation is an assertion that, if proven, could establish the matter at

issue. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.4(s). The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has

found that, in the context of an IRA appeal, a nonfrivolous allegation is an allegation of

“sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim that is plausible on its face.”

Hessami v. Merit Systems Protection Board, 979 F.3d 1362, 1364, 1369 (Fed. Cir.

2020).

3

We have reviewed the relevant legislation enacted during the pendency of this appeal

and have concluded that it does not affect the outcome of the appeal.

7

allegations of a PPP described in 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8) or (b)(9)(A)(i), (B), (C),

or (D)). Similarly, the appellant’s anticipated nonselection for the Procurement

Property Specialist position, allegedly proximately caused by nepotism, is not an

appealable adverse action pursuant to 5 U.S.C. chapter 75. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 7512,

7513(d); Prewitt, 133 F.3d at 886. However, the appellant could potentially

pursue an IRA appeal based on alleged whistleblower reprisal by first exhausting

his remedies with OSC in accordance with 5 U.S.C. § 1214(a)(3) and the Board’s

regulations at 5 C.F.R. § 1209.5.

¶11 The administrative judge erroneously found that the appellant stated in his

initial appeal form that he had not filed a claim with OSC. ID at 3 n.1. In fact,

the appellant stated that he had filed a whistleblowing complaint with OSC on

September 11, 2015. IAF, Tab 1 at 4. However, although the appellant

referenced an OSC case number in the 45 pages of supporting documentation,

IAF, Tab 2 at 1, he did not provide a copy of the complaint that he filed with OSC

or provide any other supportive evidence. Also, he did not reply to the

administrative judge’s jurisdictional order, which explained the Board’s

jurisdictional limitations in IRA appeals and instructed the appellant how to meet

his jurisdictional burden. IAF, Tab 4. He has failed to allege any facts that

would support a finding that he made a complaint to OSC that he engaged in

whistleblowing or other protected activity that was a contributing factor in the

agency’s decision to take the anticipated action to hire another individual for the

Procurement Property Specialist position. Thus, although the appellant went to

OSC with some type of complaint, he has failed to allege or show it was the type

of whistleblower reprisal complaint that could be the basis for an IRA appeal. 4

4

Attached to the appellant’s untimely petition for review is a March 31, 2016 letter

from OSC. PFR, Tab 1 at 4-5. That letter states that OSC concluded that the appellant

had not presented evidence of a violation of 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(7), and it contains no

references to any claim of reprisal for whistleblowing or other protected activity that

may be adjudicated in an IRA appeal. Id.; see 5 U.S.C. §§ 1221, 2302(b)(8)-(9). Thus,

8

¶12 Accordingly, we dismiss the petition for review as untimely filed. We

vacate the initial decision and dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction for the

reasons set forth in this Final Order, which is now the Board’s final decision in

this matter. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.113(c).

NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS 5

You may obtain review of this final decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(a)(1). By

statute, the nature of your claims determines the time limit for seeking such

review and the appropriate forum with which to file. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b).

Although we offer the following summary of available appeal rights, the Merit

Systems Protection Board does not provide legal advice on which option is most

appropriate for your situation and the rights described below do not represent a

statement of how courts will rule regarding which cases fall within their

jurisdiction. If you wish to seek review of this final decision, you should

immediately review the law applicable to your claims and carefully follow all

filing time limits and requirements. Failure to file within the applicable t ime

limit may result in the dismissal of your case by your chosen forum.

Please read carefully each of the three main possible choices of review

below to decide which one applies to your particular case. If you have questions

about whether a particular forum is the appropriate one to review your case, you

should contact that forum for more information.

(1) Judicial review in general. As a general rule, an appellant seeking

judicial review of a final Board order must file a petition for review with the U .S.

Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which must be received by the court

this letter does not support a finding that the appellant exhausted a whistleblower

reprisal complaint with OSC.

5

Since the issuance of the initial decision in this matter, the Board may have updated

the notice of review rights included in final decisions. As indicated in the notice, the

Board cannot advise which option is most appropriate in any matter.

9

within 60 calendar days of the date of issuance of this decision. 5 U.S.C.

§ 7703(b)(1)(A).

If you submit a petition for review to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the

Federal Circuit, you must submit your petition to the court at the

following address:

U.S. Court of Appeals

for the Federal Circuit

717 Madison Place, N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20439

Additional information about the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal

Circuit is available at the court’s website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov. Of particular

relevance is the court’s “Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants,” which is

contained within the court’s Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6, 10, and 11.

If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for an appeal to

the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you may visit our website at

http://www.mspb.gov/probono for information regarding pro bono representation

for Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the Federal Circuit. The

Board neither endorses the services provided by any attorney nor warrants that

any attorney will accept representation in a given case.

(2) Judicial or EEOC review of cases involving a claim of

discrimination. This option applies to you only if you have claimed that you

were affected by an action that is appealable to the Board and that such action

was based, in whole or in part, on unlawful discrimination. I f so, you may obtain

judicial review of this decision—including a disposition of your discrimination

claims—by filing a civil action with an appropriate U.S. district court ( not the

U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit), within 30 calendar days after you

receive this decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(2); see Perry v. Merit Systems

Protection Board, 582 U.S. 420 (2017). If you have a representative in this case,

and your representative receives this decision before you do, then you must file

10

with the district court no later than 30 calendar days after your representative

receives this decision. If the action involves a claim of discrimination based on

race, color, religion, sex, national origin, or a disabling condition, you may be

entitled to representation by a court-appointed lawyer and to waiver of any

requirement of prepayment of fees, costs, or other security. See 42 U.S.C.

§ 2000e-5(f) and 29 U.S.C. § 794a.

Contact information for U.S. district courts can be found at their respective

websites, which can be accessed through the link below:

http://www.uscourts.gov/Court_Locator/CourtWebsites.aspx.

Alternatively, you may request review by the Equal Employment

Opportunity Commission (EEOC) of your discrimination claims only, excluding

all other issues. 5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(1). You must file any such request with the

EEOC’s Office of Federal Operations within 30 calendar days after you receive

this decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(1). If you have a representative in this case,

and your representative receives this decision before you do, then you must file

with the EEOC no later than 30 calendar days after your representative receives

this decision.

If you submit a request for review to the EEOC by regular U.S. mail, the

address of the EEOC is:

Office of Federal Operations

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission

P.O. Box 77960

Washington, D.C. 20013

If you submit a request for review to the EEOC via commercial delivery or

by a method requiring a signature, it must be addressed to:

Office of Federal Operations

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission

131 M Street, N.E.

Suite 5SW12G

Washington, D.C. 20507

11

(3) Judicial review pursuant to the Whistleblower Protection

Enhancement Act of 2012. This option applies to you only if you have raised

claims of reprisal for whistleblowing disclosures under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8) or

other protected activities listed in 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9)(A)(i), (B), (C), or (D).

If so, and your judicial petition for review “raises no challenge to the Board’s

disposition of allegations of a prohibited personnel practice described in section

2302(b) other than practices described in section 2302(b)(8), or 2302(b)(9)(A)(i),

(B), (C), or (D),” then you may file a petition for judicial review either with the

U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit or any court of appeals of

competent jurisdiction. 6 The court of appeals must receive your petition for

review within 60 days of the date of issuance of this decision. 5 U.S.C.

§ 7703(b)(1)(B).

If you submit a petition for judicial review to the U.S. Court of Appeals for

the Federal Circuit, you must submit your petition to the court at the

following address:

U.S. Court of Appeals

for the Federal Circuit

717 Madison Place, N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20439

Additional information about the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal

Circuit is available at the court’s website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov. Of particu lar

relevance is the court’s “Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants,” which is

contained within the court’s Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6, 10, and 11.

6

The original statutory provision that provided for judicial review of certain

whistleblower claims by any court of appeals of competent jurisdiction expired on

December 27, 2017. The All Circuit Review Act, signed into law by the President on

July 7, 2018, permanently allows appellants to file petitions for judicial review of

MSPB decisions in certain whistleblower reprisal cases with the U.S. Court of Appeals

for the Federal Circuit or any other circuit court of appeals of competent jurisdiction.

The All Circuit Review Act is retroactive to November 26, 2017. Pub. L. No. 115-195,

132 Stat. 1510.

12

If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for an appeal to

the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you may visit our website at

http://www.mspb.gov/probono for information regarding pro bono representation

for Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the Federal Circuit. The

Board neither endorses the services provided by any attorney nor warrants that

any attorney will accept representation in a given case.

Contact information for the courts of appeals can be found at their

respective websites, which can be accessed through the link below:

http://www.uscourts.gov/Court_Locator/CourtWebsites.aspx.

FOR THE BOARD: /s/ for

Jennifer Everling

Acting Clerk of the Board

Washington, D.C.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

A word about cookies

We need a few to keep you signed in and the library working. The rest help us see which pages people use and where they get stuck. They stay off unless you say yes.