Opinion

Thomas Scott v. Department of the Army

Court
Merit Systems Protection Board
Filed
Jun 28, 2023
Status
Unpublished
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 23.6%

The opinion

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

THOMAS A. SCOTT, DOCKET NUMBER

Appellant, AT-1221-17-0637-W-1

v.

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY, DATE: June 28, 2023

Agency.

THIS ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1

James Ouellette, Esquire, Martinez, Georgia, for the appellant.

Christopher M. Kenny, Fort Gordon, Georgia, for the agency.

BEFORE

Cathy A. Harris, Vice Chairman

Raymond A. Limon, Member

REMAND ORDER

¶1 The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which

dismissed his individual right of action (IRA) appeal for lack of jurisdiction . For

the reasons discussed below, we GRANT the appellant’s petition for review and

REMAND the case to the Atlanta Regional Office for further adjudication in

accordance with this Remand Order.

1

A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add

significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders,

but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not

required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a

precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board

as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c).

2

BACKGROUND

¶2 The appellant was a GS-11 Physical Security Specialist for the agency,

stationed at Fort Gordon, Georgia. Initial Appeal File (IAF), Tab 1 at 2. On

July 17, 2017, he filed the instant IRA appeal with the Board, alleging that he

made 14 protected disclosures between 2012 and 2016 related to alleged breaches

of security protocol and that the agency took numerous personnel actions against

him in retaliation for these disclosures. Id. at 4-5. The administrative judge

issued an order informing the appellant of the jurisdictional standard in an IRA

appeal and directing him to file evidence and argument on the issue. IAF, Tab 3.

The appellant responded by filing several pages of documentary evidence. IAF,

Tab 5.

¶3 After the close of the record, the administrative judge issued an initial

decision dismissing the appeal for lack of jurisdiction on the basis that the

appellant failed to make a nonfrivolous allegation that he made a protected

disclosure. IAF, Tab 8, Initial Decision (ID). The ap pellant has filed a petition

for review in which he provides additional information related to his disclosures

and submits for the first time several exhibits, some of which he claims to have

submitted previously but which do not appear in the record below . Petition for

Review (PFR) File, Tab 1. The agency has filed a response to the petition for

review, PFR File, Tab 3, and the appellant has filed a reply to the agency’s

response, PFR File, Tab 4.

ANALYSIS

¶4 As relevant here, to establish jurisdiction over an IRA appeal, an appellant

must exhaust his administrative remedies with the Office of Special Counsel

(OSC) and make nonfrivolous allegations that he made a protected disclosure and

that his disclosure was a contributing factor in the agency’s decision to take,

threaten to take, or fail to take a covered personnel action against him. Yunus v.

Department of Veterans Affairs, 242 F.3d 1367, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2001); Rusin v.

3

Department of the Treasury, 92 M.S.P.R. 298, ¶ 9 (2002). 2 For the reasons

explained in the initial decision, we agree with the administrative judge that the

appellant failed to satisfy his jurisdictional burden below. ID at 3 -6. We find

that the initial decision was correct and that the administrative judge made no

error in reaching his conclusion.

¶5 Furthermore, although the issue of jurisdiction is always before the Board,

the Board generally will not consider evidence submitted for the first time on

review absent a showing that it was previously unavailable despite the party’s due

diligence. See Washington v. Department of the Navy, 77 M.S.P.R. 525, 528-29

(1998); Avansino v. U.S. Postal Service, 3 M.S.P.R. 211, 214 (1980); 5 C.F.R.

§ 1201.115(d). Nevertheless, under the unique circumstances of this case, we

exercise our discretion to consider the appellant’s newly filed evidence. See

5 C.F.R. § 1201.115(e). It appears to us that the appellant was genui nely

confused and actually believed that he had submitted this evidence, labeled as

Exhibits 1-23, on July 28, 2017, before the close of the record below. 3 The

appellant alleges on review that he uploaded these documents through the Board’s

e-Appeal Online system on that date and subsequently confirmed that they were

posted in the repository. PFR File, Tab 1 at 4. Although we are unable to

confirm the appellant’s version of events through his e-Appeal Online activity,

other evidence of record is consistent with his account. Specifically, on July 31,

2017, the appellant filed exhibits labeled 24-32 and noted on the transmission

sheet that these were in addition to Exhibits 1-23, which were previously filed.

IAF, Tab 5. Furthermore, the appellant’s Exhibit 2 is an affidavit that was

2

The Whistleblower Protection Enhancement Act (WPEA), which went into effect on

December 27, 2012, does not affect the relevant holding in th ese cited authorities, nor

does it affect the relevant holdings in the other authorities cited herein that were issued

prior to the effective date of the WPEA. See Pub. L. No. 112-199, 126 Stat. 1465

(2012).

3

On review, the appellant submits only Exhibits 2, 4-8, and 14-15. PFR File, Tab 1

at 24-50.

4

notarized on July 27, 2017, which supports his claim that he attempted to file it

with the Board the following day. PFR File, Tab 1 at 33. We also note that,

although the appellant has designated an attorney to represent him, IAF, Tab 1

at 10, the representation that he is actually receiving is limited. As the

administrative judge noted, the appellant’s attorney has made no submissions

whatsoever in this appeal. ID at 2 n.1. Therefore, notwithstanding any legal

advice that the appellant may be receiving from his attorney, he seems to be

effectively acting pro se when it comes to actually filing his pleadings.

Considering the appellant’s effective pro se status, his genuine confusion, his

apparent reasonable diligence, and the jurisdictional nature of the matter at issue,

we find that, in this particular case, the interests of justice are best served by the

Board considering, as appropriate, the documentation he has submitted for the

first time on petition for review. 4

¶6 Considering this documentation, we find that the appellant has established

jurisdiction over his appeal. First, as the administrative judge correctly found,

the appellant has exhausted his administrative remedies with OSC. ID at 2; IAF,

Tab 1 at 11-16. Second, the appellant has made a nonfrivolous allegation that he

made at least one protected disclosure. The appellant alleges that, on

November 7, 2014, the Secretary of the Army directed Army installations to

conduct National Crime Information Center background checks on all

non-Department of Defense personnel before granting such i ndividuals access to

the installation. PFR File, Tab 1 at 34. He further alleges that on January 23,

2015, he informed various agency officials of an incident in which an agency

4

The appellant also has submitted additional evidence and allegations of fact, for the

first time on review, outside the Exhibits 1-23 that he attempted to submit below. PFR

File, Tab 1 at 7-12, 60-96. Enforcing the Board’s general rule that it will not consider

evidence and argument raised for the first time on petition for review without a showing

that it previously was unavailable despite the party’s due diligence, we have not

considered these allegations and documents in deciding whether the appellant made a

nonfrivolous allegation of Board jurisdiction. See Washington, 77 M.S.P.R. at 528-29.

5

employee failed to conduct a background check as required, resulting in an

individual with an active arrest warrant gaining access to Fort Gordon. PFR File,

Tab 1 at 34-35, 47-48; IAF, Tab 5 at 9, 20. We find that the appellant has made a

nonfrivolous allegation that he reasonably believed that this disclosure evidenced

a violation of law, rule, or regulation, or a substantial and specific danger to

public health and safety. See Aquino v. Department of Homeland Security,

121 M.S.P.R. 35, ¶ 14 (2014). Third, we find that the appellant has made a

nonfrivolous allegation that this disclosure was a contributing factor in a

personnel action. One of the individuals to whom the appellant made his

disclosure was the Director of Emergency Services. IAF, Tab 5 at 9. The

appellant alleges that, on May 5, 2016, or shortly thereafter, the Director of

Emergency Services ordered the appellant to begin performing the duties of

another position in addition to his own. PFR File, Tab 1 at 27, 30. We find that

the appellant has made a nonfrivolous allegation that this “cross-training,” as he

calls it, constituted a significant change in duties or responsibilities—a personnel

action under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(a)(2)(A)(xii). We further find that the appellant has

made a nonfrivolous allegation under the knowledge/timin g test of 5 U.S.C.

§ 1221(e)(1) that his disclosure was a contributing factor in this personnel action.

See Redschlag v. Department of the Army, 89 M.S.P.R. 589, ¶ 87 (2001) (finding

that the knowledge/timing test was satisfied when the personnel action was taken

18 months after the disclosure).

¶7 We make no findings on the other 13 disclosures at issue or the other

alleged personnel actions that the appellant identifies in this appeal. In his

petition for review, the appellant has clearly identified the precise date and

content of each disclosure, as well as the individuals who were aware of the

disclosures. PFR File, Tab 1 at 7-12. However, because the administrative judge

is primarily responsible for ensuring the development of the record and otherwise

governing the proceedings on remand, we find it appropriate for him to consider

these matters in the first instance.

6

ORDER

¶8 For the reasons discussed above, we remand this case to the Atlanta

Regional Office for further adjudication in accordance with this Remand Order.

FOR THE BOARD: /s/ for

Jennifer Everling

Acting Clerk of the Board

Washington, D.C.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

A word about cookies

We need a few to keep you signed in and the library working. The rest help us see which pages people use and where they get stuck. They stay off unless you say yes.