Opinion

Gloria Green v. Office of Personnel Management

Court: Merit Systems Protection Board
Filed: Jun 26, 2023
Status: Unpublished
Cited by: 0 cases
Authority: More cited than 23.5%

The opinion

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

GLORIA D. GREEN, DOCKET NUMBER

Appellant, AT-844E-22-0166-I-1

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL DATE: June 26, 2023

MANAGEMENT,

Agency.

THIS FINAL ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1

Gloria D. Green, Selma, Alabama, pro se.

Heather Dowie, Washington, D.C., for the agency.

BEFORE

Cathy A. Harris, Vice Chairman

Raymond A. Limon, Member

FINAL ORDER

¶1 The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which

affirmed the reconsideration decision of the Office of Personnel Management

(OPM) denying her application for a disability retirement annuity under the

Federal Employees’ Retirement System (FERS). For the reasons discussed

A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add

significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders,

but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not

required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a

precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board

as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c).

below, we GRANT the appellant’s petition for review, REVERSE the initial

decision and OPM’s reconsideration decision, and ORDER OPM to award a

disability retirement annuity to the appellant.

BACKGROUND

¶2 The appellant worked for the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (COE) from

August 7, 2017, until she resigned effective March 13, 2021. Initial Appeal File

(IAF), Tab 5 at 29, 42. At the time of her resignation, she was an Administrative

Support Assistant at COE’s Hydropower Branch in Mobile, Alabama. Id. at 42.

Her duties included providing clerical and administrative support in matters such

as timekeeping, purchasing/procurement, supply management, travel, personnel

management, and inventory control. Id. at 52. On March 4, 2021, she applied for

disability retirement under FERS based on major depression and anxiety. Id.

at 31, 35.

¶3 According to the appellant’s medical documentation, she has suffered from

anxiety since at least 2005. Id. at 107. In 2013, the Department of Veterans

Affairs determined that the appellant had a service-connected disability rating of

50% for major depressive disorder, effective September 2003. Id. at 72.

According to the appellant, her mental conditions negatively affect her

concentration and cause her to have paranoid thoughts and experience heart

palpitations, chest pain, and headaches, which resulted in a 17-day stay at a VA

psychiatric hospital in 2019. Id. at 17, 31. She further notes that her conditions

worsen when she is under increased stress, despite her continuous treatment and

taking medication. Id. at 31.

¶4 OPM issued a reconsideration decision, denying the appellant’s application

for a disability retirement annuity. Id. at 4-6. The appellant filed this appeal of

OPM’s reconsideration decision and requested a hearing. IAF, Tab 1. After the

appellant failed to submit prehearing submissions and attend the prehearing

conference, and failed to provide responsive information to an order to show

cause, the administrative judge cancelled the hearing and issued a close -of-record

order. IAF, Tabs 11, 14. Following the appellant’s response, the administrative

judge issued an initial decision that affirmed OPM’s decision. IAF, Tab 15,

Initial Decision (ID) at 2, 6. She reasoned that the appellant did not show that her

depression and anxiety were disabling conditions. ID at 4-6. She found that it

was undisputed that the appellant completed 18 months of civilian service under

FERS, suffered from depression and anxiety for many years and those conditions

were expected to continue throughout her lifetime, and that the agency was

unable to accommodate or reassign her. ID at 4.

¶5 The appellant has filed a petition for review. Petition for Review (PFR)

File, Tab 1. OPM has filed a response. PFR File, Tab 3.

DISCUSSION OF ARGUMENTS ON REVIEW

¶6 In an appeal from an OPM decision on a voluntary disability retirement

application, the appellant bears the burden of proof by preponderant evidence.

Thorne v. Office of Personnel Management, 105 M.S.P.R. 171, ¶ 5 (2007);

5 C.F.R. § 1201.56(b)(2)(ii). To be eligible for a disability retirement annuity

under FERS, an employee must show the following: (1) she completed at least

18 months of creditable civilian service; (2) while employed in a position subject

to FERS, she became disabled because of a medical condition, resulting in a

deficiency in performance, conduct, or attendance, or, if there is no such

deficiency, the disabling medical condition is incompatible with either useful and

efficient service or retention in the position; (3) the condition is expected to

continue for at least 1 year from the date that the application for disability

retirement benefits was filed; (4) accommodation of the disa bling medical

condition in the position held must be unreasonable; and (5) she did not decline a

reasonable offer of reassignment to a vacant position. 5 U.S.C. § 8451(a);

Thorne, 105 M.S.P.R. 171, ¶ 5; 5 C.F.R. § 844.103(a).

¶7 The administrative judge found, and the parties do not dispute on review,

that the appellant met the 18-month service requirement under FERS at the time

she filed her application, that her conditions were expected to continue for 1 year

from that date, that providing her an accommodation in her position was

unreasonable, and that she did not decline a reasonable offer of reassignment to a

vacant position. ID at 4; IAF, Tab 5 at 27-28, Tab 15 at 8-9. We decline to

disturb those findings. The administrative judge affirmed OPM’s denial of the

appellant’s disability retirement appeal on the basis that the appellant failed to

prove that she had a disabling medical condition. ID at 4-6; see Thorne,

105 M.S.P.R. 171, ¶ 5. We disagree.

¶8 There are two ways to meet the statutory requirement that the employee “be

unable, because of disease or injury, to render useful and efficie nt service in the

employee’s position.” Jackson v. Office of Personnel Management, 118 M.S.P.R.

6, ¶¶ 6-7 (2012) (quoting 5 U.S.C. §§ 8337(a), 8451(a)(1)(B)). First, an appellant

can establish that the medical condition caused a deficiency in performance,

attendance, or conduct by showing that her medical condition affects her ability

to perform specific work requirements, prevents her from being regular in

attendance, or causes her to act inappropriately. Id., ¶¶ 7-8. Alternatively, the

employee can show that her medical condition is incompatible with either useful

and efficient service or retention in the position by showing that it is inconsistent

with working in general, in a particular line of work, or in a particular type of

work setting. Id.

¶9 The administrative judge found that the appellant failed to demonstrate that

her depression and anxiety caused deficiencies in her performance, conduct, or

attendance. ID at 4-6. The administrative judge also concluded that the appellant

failed to establish that her medical condition was incompatible with useful or

efficient service; however, she did not explain her reasoning. ID at 6. Because

we disagree with the administrative judge and find that the appellant did

demonstrate that her depression and anxiety caused deficiencies in at least her

performance and attendance, we need not reach the issue of whether her medical

conditions were inconsistent with working in general, in a particular line of work,

or in a particular type of work setting. 2

The administrative judge erred in finding that the appellant failed to establish that

her medical conditions caused a deficiency in performance and attendance.

¶10 In concluding that the appellant had failed to establish that her medical

conditions caused a deficiency in performance, conduct, or attendance, the

administrative judge acknowledged that the appellant’s depressive paranoid

behaviors impacted her work. ID at 6. However, she found that absent additional

medical evidence from the appellant, she could not conclude that the appellant

was disabled by her conditions. Id. This determination was in error.

¶11 Although objective medical evidence must be considered if available, such

evidence is not required to establish disability. Confer v. Office of Personnel

Management, 111 M.S.P.R. 419, ¶ 9 (2009) (citing Vanieken-Ryals v. Office of

Personnel Management, 508 F.3d 1034, 1040-44 (Fed. Cir. 2007)). The Board

will consider all pertinent evidence in determining an appellant’s entitlement to

disability retirement: objective clinical findings, diagnoses and medical opinions,

On review, the appellant alleges for the first time that she also suffered from a “sleep

disorder (Obstructive Sleep Apnea),” which negatively affected her performance of her

job duties. PFR File, Tab 1 at 5. Other than this allegation and general claims in the

record below that she does not sleep well, there is no evidence in the record related to a

sleep apnea condition. The appellant also did not include it in her disability retirement

application. IAF, Tab 5 at 31. Generally, the Board will not consider evidence relating

to a different or additional medical condition that was not the subject of the appellant’s

application to OPM. Rozar v. Office of Personnel Management, 61 M.S.P.R. 136, 140

(1994). An exception to this general rule exists if there is sufficient evidence that the

newly raised condition was related to the condition on which the application was based

and, thus, is not a totally different or additional condition. Gardner v. Office of

Personnel Management, 91 M.S.P.R. 391, ¶ 11 (2002) (citing Chappell v. Office of

Personnel Management, 79 M.S.P.R. 302, ¶ 6 (1998)). Because we conclude, below,

that the appellant has proven that her depression and anxiety were disabling, we decline

to make a finding regarding whether the appellant’s sleep apnea is related to those

conditions.

subjective evidence of pain and disability, and evidence relating to the effect of

the applicant’s conditions on her ability to perform the duties of her position.

Henderson v. Office of Personnel Management, 117 M.S.P.R. 313, ¶ 19 (2012).

Nothing in the law mandates that a single provider tie all of this evidence

together. Id. For example, if the medical provider sets forth clinical findings, a

diagnosis, and a description of how the medical condition affects the appellant’s

activities in general terms, the Board could consider that evidence, together with

the appellant’s subjective account of how the condition has affected her ability to

do her job and her daily life, testimony or statements from supervisors,

co-workers, family members, and friends, and the appellant’s position description

to conclude that the appellant’s medical conditions were disabling. Id.

¶12 Considering the evidence as a whole, we find that the appellant’s medical

history does roughly correlate with her performance and attendance deficiencies.

The appellant alleged that her depression and anxiety caused her t o have paranoid

thoughts that affected her ability to concentrate at work and miss deadlines,

resulting in performance deficiencies. IAF, Tab 5 at 17; PFR File, Tab 1 at 5. In

her disability retirement application, she explains that she believed that her

coworkers and supervisors were “plotting” and “scheming” against her. IAF,

Tab 5 at 31. She claims that her supervisors would have “people” communicate

with her “only to gain information to conspire and use it against [her].” Id. They

would then “twist” things she said in an effort to “breakdown her relationship[s]

and isolate [her]” in order to “frame [her] in a work related crime, and VA fraud.”

Id. She describes that as a result of these thoughts she “spiraled out of control

and feared for [her] life [when] traveling to work and at work.” Id. For example,

on April 23, 2019 she left work because she believed she was in “emanate [sic]

danger,” called ONSTAR vehicle security as she drove to a safe place, and was

then admitted to a VA Psychiatric Hospital until May 10, 2019. Id. at 17.

¶13 The appellant’s medical records corroborate that she was admitted to the

VA Medical Center during this 17-day period and recommended not to return to

work for an additional week, until she was medically cleared. Id. at 111. Indeed,

according to her supervisor, following her hospitalization, the appellant was not

able to return to work until September 23, 2019. Id. at 30. Similarly, the

appellant’s daughter’s statement further corroborates that the appellant’s

depression with psychotic features began to worsen in early 2019. IAF, Tab 15

at 10. The daughter describes an incident where she accidentally turned the gas

stove on and the appellant thought “someone else had come in to do it

intentionally.” Id. She claims that the appellant made repeated statements about

“feeling ‘unsafe’ being ‘way out there in the woods,’” referring to her remote

work location. Id. Her daughter also claims that the appellant was so fearful of

her well-being that she would send pictures of herself “to show her clothing”

before heading to work in the morning. Id.

¶14 The record reflects that during early 2020, at the beginning of the COVD -19

pandemic, the appellant’s depression and psychotic features improved whil e she

teleworked, although according to her daughter there was “always a sense of

carefulness or mistrust about coworkers and supervisors.” Id. However, the

appellant’s depressive psychotic thoughts began to worsen again in the 6 months

leading up to her March 2021 resignation and disability retirement application.

Id. According to the appellant, around the fall of 2020 when employees were

instructed to return to the office 2 days a week, the appellant came in several

days, but thereafter refused to work in the office because she believed that her

coworkers and supervisor were trying to harm her and she became fearful for her

life. IAF, Tab 5 at 17. For example, she implied on one occasion that her

coworkers and supervisor tried to poison her or harm her when they insisted she

eat food they cooked and were “looking at [her] and smirking, as if they had done

something to the food.” Id. She also claims that she believed that they turned off

the camera monitor in the office parking and gate areas in order to tamper with

her car, as she believed they had done on several other occasions. Id. Around

March 2021, she also believed she was being followed while driving home from

work. IAF, Tab 1 at 11.

¶15 The evidence described above is consistent with the medical notes from the

appellant’s medical appointments prior to and following her March 2021

resignation and application for disability retirement. On January 14, 2021, the

appellant contacted her provider, the Central Alabama Veterans Health Care

System’s Mental Health department, requesting to speak to her doctor about

changing the dosage of her antipsychotic and depression medication, Quetiapine

Fumarate (whose brand name is Seroquel). IAF, Tab 5 at 96. She stated that

“[t]his past month was not good for work” and that she was “having trouble

focusing and concentrating on [her] work.” Id. Then, on March 18, 2021, shortly

after her March 13 resignation, she again contacted her doctor to increase the

dosage of her Seroquel. Id. at 95. That day, her doctor conducted a telemedicine

appointment with the appellant and noted that the appellant stated that she was

“not doing well, not resting . . . having a lot of problem[s] on the job, [she had]

been depressed, stressed out.” Id. at 89-90. She stated that the appellant was

“having paranoid thoughts, felt that the people she worked with were plotting

against her, playing games towards her well being.” Id. at 91. She further noted

that the appellant “felt she was in a hostile work environment” and “she was

afraid for her safety.” Id. She stated that the appellant provided an example

about leaving work and thinking someone driving behind her was trying to harm

her. Id.

¶16 First, the administrative judge determined that there was insufficient

evidence to establish that the appellant’s medical condition caused a deficiency in

attendance, particularly because she was able to telework effectively in the spring

of 2020 during the COVID-19 pandemic. ID at 4-5. We disagree.

¶17 There is sufficient evidence to conclude that the appellant’s absences were

due to her medical conditions. According to her supervisor’s statement, the

appellant’s attendance deficiencies began in April 22, 2019, which correlates with

her hospitalization and resulting inability to work until September 23, 2019. IAF,

Tab 5 at 30. The record also shows that, between April 2019 and March 2021, the

appellant used 83 hours of annual leave, 60 hours of sick leave, 860 hours of

leave without pay, and was absent without leave for about 24 hours. Id.

Although the exact dates and reasons for the leave are not a part of the record ,

given the timing involved, we find that the appellant’s excessive absences were,

more likely than not, at least partly attributable to her depression and anxiety.

¶18 Second, the administrative judge found that the appellant had not

established a performance deficiency because, in the appellant’s response to

OPM, she alleged that her performance deficiencies were due to harassment . ID

at 4; IAF, Tab 5 at 16. We disagree and find sufficient evidence that the

appellant’s performance deficiencies were cause d by her depressive paranoid

thoughts and anxiety.

¶19 For instance, in the appellant’s supervisor’s statement, she indicated that

the appellant’s performance became unacceptable beginning in September 2018.

IAF, Tab 5 at 29. Indeed, the appellant’s most recent performance appraisal,

covering the rating period from April 1, 2020, to March 31, 2021, demonstrates

that the agency rated the appellant’s performance at the lowest possible level,

Unacceptable, leading up to her retirement and disability retirement application in

March 2021. Id. at 55-60. Consistent with the appellant’s statement that her

conditions affected her ability to concentrate, meet deadlines, and made her

paranoid in her communications with coworkers and supervisors, her supervisor

noted that the appellant’s critical elements of customer servic e and acquisition of

supplies and equipment were unacceptably low, particularly due to her difficulty

communicating with her supervisor and coworkers and timely placing and

tracking purchase card orders. Id. at 30. Her supervisor further observes that the

appellant’s medical absences and performance deficiencies negativel y impacted

the agency’s mission and work operations, and caused undue administrative

burdens on other administrative personnel. Id.

¶20 Lastly, the administrative judge essentially gave no weight to the

appellant’s statement and her supervisor’s statements that her work deficiencies

were related to her medical conditions because the appellant claimed that her

work deficiencies were due to her supervisor’s harassment and her hostile work

environment. ID at 4. This was error. The Board has rejected disability claims

when the appellant’s conditions were largely situational, i.e. , based exclusively

on her reaction to a particular workplace or in the context of what she perceives

as a hostile work environment. Luzi v. Office of Personnel Management,

109 M.S.P.R. 79, ¶ 9 (2008); Cosby v. Office of Personnel Management,

106 M.S.P.R. 487, ¶¶ 7, 10 (2007). However, the Board has distinguished such

circumstances from ones in which job-related stress precipitated and exacerbated

an appellant’s condition, which was itself disabling. Kimble v. Office of

Personnel Management, 102 M.S.P.R. 604, ¶ 14 (2006) (finding that the

appellant’s work-related stress exacerbated her depression and anxiety to the

point that her condition became disabling); Thorne, 105 M.S.P.R. 171, ¶ 15

(finding that the appellant’s job-related stress precipitated and exacerbated his

psychiatric condition to the point that it became disabling ). Job-related stress

resulting in mental impairments that prevent an employee from performing the

duties required in her position can warrant the granting of disability retirement.

Kimble, 102 M.S.P.R. 604, ¶ 14; see Thorne, 105 M.S.P.R. 171, ¶ 15.

¶21 Here, the medical evidence and statements do not support a finding that the

appellant’s depression and anxiety were a reaction to her particular workplace or

harassment from her supervisor or coworkers. Rather, these conditions were

apparent outside of the specific work environment at the COE, where she began

working in 2017. The record shows that in April 2005 the appellant experienced

a similar episode of depression with psychosis including “mostly paranoid

delusions concerning her job,” which also resulted in a 2 -week psychiatric

intensive day treatment program. IAF, Tab 5 at 104. The appellant’s medical

notes in October and March 2020 leading up to her resignation also show that she

was experiencing increased anxiety and work -related stress, which exacerbated

her psychotic depression and anxiety. Id. at 31, 90, 100. Lastly, the appellant’s

most recent medical evidence from an appointment on April 22, 2022, shows that

she has continued to suffer from depression and anxiety over a year after

resigning and submitting her disability retirement ap plication in March 2021.

IAF, Tab 15 at 8-9; see Bell v. Office of Personnel Management, 87 M.S.P.R. 1,

¶¶ 18-20 (2000) (finding that the appellant’s problems with interpersonal contacts

following her removal from the agency supported the conclusion that she was

impaired beyond just her assignment under the supervisors who allegedly

precipitated her psychiatric disorder). Thus, we do not find that her depression

and anxiety were situational. 3

¶22 Considering all of the evidence, we conclude that the appellant has shown

by preponderant evidence that, while employed in a position subject to FERS, she

became disabled from useful and efficient service. Accordingly, she has

established her entitlement to a disability retirement annui ty, and we reverse the

administrative judge’s initial decision and OPM’s final decision. 4

ORDER

¶23 We ORDER OPM to award the appellant disability retirement. OPM must

complete this action no later than 20 days after the date of this decision.

The administrative judge found that the appellant’s medical conditions did not result

in a deficiency in conduct, without providing an explanation for her finding. ID at 6.

Because we find that the appellant established that her medical conditions caused

deficiencies in attendance and performance, we do not reach the question of whether

they also adversely impacted her conduct. See Beeler-Smith v. Office of Personnel

Management, 112 M.S.P.R. 479, ¶¶ 8-18 (2009) (determining that an appellant proved

she was disabled based solely on a performance deficiency).

Because we find that the appellant has established her entitlement to disability

retirement benefits, we need not consider her remaining arguments on review that the

administrative judge did not properly weigh her VA service-connected disability rating

of 50% for major depressive disorder. PFR File, Tab 1 at 4. We also have not

considered the appellant’s new evidence submitted on review. Id at 7-10.

¶24 We also ORDER OPM to tell the appellant promptly in writing when it

believes it has fully carried out the Board’s Order and to describe the actions it

took to carry out the Board’s Order. We ORDER the appellant to provide all

necessary information OPM requests to help it carry out the Board’s Order. The

appellant, if not notified, should ask OPM about its progress. See 5 C.F.R.

§ 1201.181(b).

¶25 No later than 30 days after OPM tells the appellant it ha s fully carried out

the Board’s Order, the appellant may file a petition for enforcement with the

office that issued the initial decision on this appeal if the appellant believes that

OPM did not fully carry out the Board’s Order. The petition should cont ain

specific reasons why the appellant believes OPM has not fully carried out the

Board’s Order, and should include the dates and results of any communications

with OPM. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.182(a).

¶26 This is the final decision of the Merit Systems Protection Board in this

appeal. Title 5 of the Code of Federal Regulations, section 1201.113(c) ( 5 C.F.R.

§ 1201.113(c)).

ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS

You may be entitled to be paid by the agency for your reasonable attorney

fees and costs. To be paid, you must meet the requirements set forth at title 5 of

the United States Code (5 U.S.C.), sections 7701(g), 1221(g), or 1214(g). The

regulations may be found at 5 C.F.R. §§ 1201.201, 1201.202, and 1201.203. If

you believe you meet these requirements, you must file a motion for attorney fees

and costs WITHIN 60 CALENDAR DAYS OF THE DATE OF THIS DECISION.

You must file your motion for attorney fees and costs with the office that issued

the initial decision on your appeal.

NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS 5

You may obtain review of this final decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(a)(1). By

statute, the nature of your claims determines the time limit for seeking such

review and the appropriate forum with which to file. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b).

Although we offer the following summary of available appeal rights, the Merit

Systems Protection Board does not provide legal advice on which option is most

appropriate for your situation and the rights described bel ow do not represent a

statement of how courts will rule regarding which cases fall within their

jurisdiction. If you wish to seek review of this final decision, you should

immediately review the law applicable to your claims and carefully follow all

filing time limits and requirements. Failure to file within the applicable time

limit may result in the dismissal of your case by your chosen forum.

Please read carefully each of the three main possible choices of review

below to decide which one applies to your particular case. If you have questions

about whether a particular forum is the appropriate one to review your case, you

should contact that forum for more information.

(1) Judicial review in general. As a general rule, an appellant seeking

judicial review of a final Board order must file a petition for review with the U.S.

Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which must be received by the court

within 60 calendar days of the date of issuance of this decision. 5 U.S.C.

§ 7703(b)(1)(A).

If you submit a petition for review to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the

Federal Circuit, you must submit your petition to the court at the

following address:

Since the issuance of the initial decision in this matter, the Board may have updated

the notice of review rights included in final decisions. As indicated in the notice, the

Board cannot advise which option is most appropriate in any matter.

U.S. Court of Appeals

for the Federal Circuit

717 Madison Place, N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20439

Additional information about the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal

Circuit is available at the court’s website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov. Of particular

relevance is the court’s “Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants,” which is

contained within the court’s Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6, 10, and 11.

If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for an appeal to

the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you may visit our website at

http://www.mspb.gov/probono for information regarding pro bono representation

for Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the Federal Circuit. The

Board neither endorses the services provided by any attorney nor warrants that

any attorney will accept representation in a given case.

(2) Judicial or EEOC review of cases involving a claim of

discrimination. This option applies to you only if you have claimed that you

were affected by an action that is appealable to the Board and that such action

was based, in whole or in part, on unlawful discrimination. If so, you may obtain

judicial review of this decision—including a disposition of your discrimination

claims—by filing a civil action with an appropriate U.S. district court ( not the

U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit), within 30 calendar days after you

receive this decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(2); see Perry v. Merit Systems

Protection Board, 582 U.S. 420 (2017). If you have a representative in this case,

and your representative receives this decision before you do, then you must file

with the district court no later than 30 calendar days after your representative

receives this decision. If the action involves a claim of discrimination based on

race, color, religion, sex, national origin, or a disabling condition, you may be

entitled to representation by a court-appointed lawyer and to waiver of any

requirement of prepayment of fees, costs, or other security. See 42 U.S.C.

§ 2000e-5(f) and 29 U.S.C. § 794a.

Contact information for U.S. district courts can be found at their respective

websites, which can be accessed through the link below:

http://www.uscourts.gov/Court_Locator/CourtWebsites.aspx.

Alternatively, you may request review by the Equal Employment

Opportunity Commission (EEOC) of your discrimination claims only, excluding

all other issues. 5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(1). You must file any such request with the

EEOC’s Office of Federal Operations within 30 calendar days after you receive

this decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(1). If you have a representative in this case,

and your representative receives this decision before you do, then you must file

with the EEOC no later than 30 calendar days after your representative receives

this decision.

If you submit a request for review to the EEOC by regular U.S. mail, the

address of the EEOC is:

Office of Federal Operations

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission

P.O. Box 77960

Washington, D.C. 20013

If you submit a request for review to the EEOC via commercial delivery or

by a method requiring a signature, it must be addressed to:

Office of Federal Operations

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission

131 M Street, N.E.

Suite 5SW12G

Washington, D.C. 20507

(3) Judicial review pursuant to the Whistleblower Protection

Enhancement Act of 2012. This option applies to you only if you have raised

claims of reprisal for whistleblowing disclosures under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8) or

other protected activities listed in 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9)(A)(i), (B), (C), or (D).

If so, and your judicial petition for review “raises no challenge to the Board’s

disposition of allegations of a prohibited personnel practice described in section

2302(b) other than practices described in section 2302(b)(8), or 2302(b)(9)(A)(i),

(B), (C), or (D),” then you may file a petition for judicial review either with the

U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit or any court of appeals of

competent jurisdiction. 6 The court of appeals must receive your petition for

review within 60 days of the date of issuance of this decision. 5 U.S.C.

§ 7703(b)(1)(B).

If you submit a petition for judicial review to the U.S. Court of Appeals for

the Federal Circuit, you must submit your petition to the court at the