State v. Coffman

[Cite as State v. Coffman, 2023-Ohio-2104.]

COURT OF APPEALS

ASHLAND COUNTY, OHIO

FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

JUDGES:

STATE OF OHIO : Hon. W. Scott Gwin, P.J.

: Hon. William B. Hoffman, J.

Plaintiff-Appellant : Hon. Andrew J. King, J.

:

-vs- :

: Case No. 22-COA-036

JENNIFER COFFMAN :

Defendant-Appellee :

: OPINION

CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING: Appeal from the Ashland County Court of

Common Pleas, Case No. 22-CRI-034

JUDGMENT: Affirmed

DATE OF JUDGMENT ENTRY: June 26, 2023

APPEARANCES:

For Plaintiff-Appellant For Defendant-Appellee

CHRISTOPHER R. TUNNELL GREGORY TARKOWSKY

Ashland County Prosecutor 3 North Main Street

BY: NADINE HAUPTMAN Suite 500

Assistant Prosecutor Mansfield, OH 44902

110 Cottage Street. 3rd Floor

Ashland, OH 44805

Ashland County, Case No. 22-COA-036 2

Gwin, P.J.

{¶1} Plaintiff-appellant the State of Ohio appeals from the September 29, 2022

sentencing entry of the Ashland County Court of Common Pleas sentencing defendant-

appellee Jennifer Coffman [“Coffman”] to one year non-reporting community control

sanctions.

Facts and Procedural History

{¶2} On February 10, 2022, an Ashland County Grand Jury returned a two

count indictment against Coffman, charging her in Count One with Aggravated

Possession of Drugs, in violation of R.C. 2925.11 (A) and 2925.11(C)(1)(a), a felony of

the fifth degree; and in Count Two with Illegal Use or Possession of Drug

Paraphernalia, a violation of R.C. 2925.14(C) (1) and 2925.14(F)(1), a misdemeanor of

the fourth degree.

{¶3} On May 10, 2022, Coffman moved for Intervention in Lieu of Conviction

pursuant to R.C. 2951.041. [Docket Entry No. 14].

{¶4} On May 17, 2022, the state moved to revoke Coffman’s bond contending that

she had failed to appear for required drug testing on April 16, 2022 and May 16, 2022.

[Docket Entry No. 16]. By Judgment Entry filed May 24, 2022, the trial court revoked

Coffman’s bond. [Docket Entry No. 21].

{¶5} By Judgment Entry filed June 11, 2022, the trial court scheduled a hearing on

Coffman’s motion for Intervention in Lieu of Conviction. [Docket Entry No. 21].

{¶6} Due to unforeseen medical issues with the judge, a visiting judge was assigned

and the hearing was continued to September 29, 2022. Judgment Entry, filed September 22,

2022. [Docket Entry No. 23].

{¶7} On September 29, 2022, the parties entered into a negotiated plea. Waiver of

Ashland County, Case No. 22-COA-036 3

Constitutional Rights and Plea of Guilty, filed September 29, 2022. [Docket Entry No. 25].

Coffman withdrew her motion for Intervention in Lieu of Conviction. Sent. T. at 9. The state

agreed to dismiss Count Two of the Indictment in exchange for Coffman’s guilty plea to Count

One of the Indictment. Sent. T. at 5. As further consideration for Coffman’s guilty plea the

prosecutor informed the visiting judge, “Judge, as part of the Plea Agreement we have agreed

to remain silent.” Sent. T. at 6. After accepting Coffman’s guilty plea, the prosecutor again

informed the visiting judge, “Your Honor, pursuant to the plea agreement, we remain silent

on sentencing…And defer to the discretion of the court.” Sent. T. at 16.

{¶8} The visiting judge found Coffman amenable to community control and

imposed nonresidential and nonreporting sanctions for a period of one-year and financial

sanctions totaling approximately one hundred dollars; the visiting judge further advised

that a violation of community control could result in an order to serve six-months in the

Ashland County Jail, and also awarded her 70-days of jail time.

{¶9} Relevant to this appeal, the following exchange took place,

THE COURT: Okay. All right, good. I am going to pronounce a

sentence in the case, and this may be a sentence that the lawyers are not

used to hearing from a Judge, but it's going to be the one that I am imposing

because it's the one that I feel is correct.

So, I am not going to select any time in prison on this case. I have a

choice of picking anywhere from six months to 12 months, and I have

steadfastly over my tenure which is now 41 years as a Judge, not sent

people to prison for possessing drugs.

Now, that is something with which many people disagree, and I

acknowledge that, but that is my conviction, if you will, in the case. This

Ashland County, Case No. 22-COA-036 4

type of crime needs to be handled otherwise, you have already served 70

days in jail, I am going to order a one-year period of Community Control

Sanctions, but it's not going to be supervised. It's going to be as follows:

The conditions are that you not ingest any illegal substance, drug of abuse,

or consume any alcohol.

That you be law abiding, that you not be found guilty of nor sentenced

for any serious misdemeanor crimes or felony crimes. A serious

misdemeanor crime, is one that I define as one that you could be jailed, a

minor misdemeanor traffic offense is not a serious misdemeanor crime.

Now, possessing marijuana in less than the bulk amount, or I am

sorry, less than an amount which makes it a minor misdemeanor in Ohio,

that would be a disqualifying offense for you because that is a drug, it's still

illegal in Ohio there is medical marijuana but it's still illegal as far as personal

use, so if you would be found guilty and sentenced for a possession of

marijuana as a minor misdemeanor. That would be a disqualifying offense,

that would be a violation of your unsupervised, non-reporting Community

Control Sanctions.

Now, how do we know that you have been found guilty of a crime,

we have the ability and authority under law to search the records of

Court's throughout Ohio or beyond Ohio, where your name, your Social

Security number, your date of birth can be inputted by the Court because

we have the authority to do that, and can find out if you have been found

guilty and sentenced for any crimes during that one year period which will

Ashland County, Case No. 22-COA-036 5

start today and end one year from today.

Again, it's a one-year period of non-reporting unsupervised

Community Control Sanction. You are on your good behavior, but if you

would violate it by committing a crime as I said, or by somehow the Court

coming into the knowledge that you are using illegal drugs or consuming

alcohol which probably becomes known to the Court by you being arrested

or coming in the presence of law enforcement agencies that have a right to

test you or to take you into custody for some reason. That is how it would

ultimately get to the Court. And if you violated the one year of unsupervised

non-reporting Community Control Sanction, and you could be punished by

a maximum of six months in jail.

I am not selecting a prison term, so there never would be a prison

term if you violated this one-year period of unsupervised non-reporting

Community Control Sanction, but there could be up to six months in jail, the

Ashland County Jail for a violation. Let me pause there and ask Ms.

Coffman if you understand the Sentence that I am imposing?

MS. COFFMAN: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. All right. Now, my sincere hope is that in

this next year, there is nothing in this Court with Jennifer Coffman as a

named Defendant or in the Municipal Court or in any other court in any

counties in Ohio or beyond, but if there is an alleged violation you would

have to come back to court and it could be resolved as I just said,

understood?

Ashland County, Case No. 22-COA-036 6

MS. COFFMAN: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Doesn't mean that you would go to jail for six months

for violating, but it could happen, and so there is enough time over your

head in my opinion locally to motivate you to just leave this behind, I hope

that you can, okay?

MS. COFFMAN: Yes, your Honor. Thank you so much.

THE COURT Mike, anything else?

MR. CALLOW: Judge, just for the record, we object to the imposition

of the sentence.

THE COURT: Yes, and the record notes that the Prosecutor objects

to the sentence that is being imposed or may be more appropriately

disagrees with it.

MR. CALLOW: I think that I will object.

THE COURT: What is the basis of the objection, Mike?

MR. CALLOW: Judge, I don’t know that the Court has the ability to

put a Felony Defendant on non-reporting unsupervised visitation.

THE COURT: Not visitation.

MR. CALLOW: I am sorry, I am sorry. Probation. Probation, with a

condition that the State of Ohio may somehow review records to determine

if she violates. I don't believe that is permitted by the Court, so we would

object.

THE COURT: Okay, and I note your objection as a response to that,

just so the record reflects my response. I have been on the Common Pleas

Ashland County, Case No. 22-COA-036 7

bench for 39 years, hundreds of cases where I've imposed this identical

sentence for Felony drug possession, and have never been challenged, so

if in fact you do challenge it, I would welcome some type of appellate review,

but that is up to you Mike.

MR. CALLOW: Thank you judge.

MR. CALLOW: For the record, I have been doing this 27 years

(inaudible).

THE COURT: Never seen it?

MR. CALLOW: Never seen it. I feel very comfortable objecting to it

and we will decide it later. Thank you.

THE COURT: You are welcome. Okay. Anything else Greg?

MR. TARKOWSKY: Nothing additional, Your Honor.

Sent. T. at 21-26.

Sentencing Entry

{¶10} The sentencing court noted that it reviewed the purposes of felony

sentencing set forth in R.C. 2929.11, and "considered the provisions of R.C. Chapter

2929, the circumstances of the offense, the information contained in the pre-sentence

investigation and the information furnished by the parties in [the] case." Judgment

Entry-Sentencing, filed Sept. 29, 2022. [Docket Entry No. 24]. The visiting judge

found Coffman had the future ability to be employed and to pay financial sanctions,

and further found that, "[u]pon a consideration of the purposes and principles of the

felony sentencing law and the statutory sentencing factors," she was amenable to a

community control sanction and that such was consistent with the "purposes and

Ashland County, Case No. 22-COA-036 8

principles of the felony sentencing law of Ohio." Id. at 2-3.

{¶11} The sentencing court placed Coffman on community control for a period of

one- year to commence on September 29, 2022, which included both nonresidential and

financial sanctions. Id. at 3. The nonresidential sanctions consist of four conditions: (1)

abstain from all drugs and alcohol, (2) abide by all laws, (3) not be found guilty of any

jailable offense, and (4) not use marijuana or any of its derivatives. Id. at 3. The court

further noted that it had verbally notified Coffman that, "based upon the statutory

sentencing factors," it could impose a six- month jail term as a violation of community

control sanctions. Id. at 4. It further granted Coffman 70-days of jail-time credit.

Assignments of Error

{¶12} The state raises two Assignments of Error,

{¶13} “I. A SENTENCING COURT ABUSES ITS DISCRETION, AND IMPOSES

A SENTENCE THAT IS OTHERWISE CONTRARY TO LAW, WHEN IT FASHIONS [A]

SENTENCE PURSUANT TO A BLANKET SENTENCING POLICY BASED ON

PERSONAL CONVICTION AND MORAL OPPOSITION TO PRISON AS A

SENTENCING OPTION FOR THOSE CONVICTED OF FIFTH-DEGREE FELONY

DRUG POSSESSION OFFENSES.

{¶14} “II. SENTENCING COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT

IMPOSED COMMUNITY CONTROL CONDITIONS THAT WERE STANDARD AND NOT

"SPECIFICALLY TAILORED" TO ADDRESS APPELLEE'S UNIQUE AND INDIVIDUAL

CIRCUMSTANCES, AS WELL AS IMPRACTICAL, AND WORK TO FRUSTRATE THE

PURPOSES OF FELONY SENTENCING.

I.

Ashland County, Case No. 22-COA-036 9

{¶15} The state argues in its First Assignment of Error, that Coffman’s sentence

is contrary to law because the visiting judge stated that in his tenure as a judge he has

not sent people to prison for possessing drugs.

Standard of Appellate Review

{¶16} The state is permitted to appeal as a matter of right a sentence imposed

upon a defendant who is convicted of or pleads guilty to a felony if the sentence is contrary

to law. R.C. 2953.08(B)(2).

{¶17} A court reviewing a criminal sentence is required by R.C. 2953.08(F) to

review the entire trial-court record, including any oral or written statements and

presentence-investigation reports. R.C. 2953.08(F)(1) through (4).

{¶18} We review felony sentences using the standard of review set forth in R.C.

2953.08. State v. Marcum, 146 Ohio St.3d 516, 2016-Ohio-1002, 59 N.E.3d 1231, ¶22;

State v. Howell, 5th Dist. Stark No. 2015CA00004, 2015-Ohio-4049, ¶31. R.C.

2953.08(G)(2) provides we may either increase, reduce, modify, or vacate a sentence

and remand for resentencing where we clearly and convincingly find that either the record

does not support the sentencing court’s findings under R.C. 2929.13(B) or (D),

2929.14(B)(2)(e) or (C)(4), or 2929.20(I), or the sentence is otherwise contrary to law.

See, also, State v. Bonnell, 140 Ohio St.3d 209, 2014-Ohio-3177, 16 N.E.2d 659, ¶28.

Our standard of review is de novo. State v. Gwynne, 158 Ohio St.3d 279, 2019-Ohio-

4761, 141 N.E.3d 169, ¶ 27.

{¶19} The Ohio Supreme Court reviewed the issue of “whether a sentence is

“contrary to law” under R.C. 2953.08(G)(2)(b) when an appellate court finds that the

record does not support a sentence with respect to R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12. State v.

Ashland County, Case No. 22-COA-036 10

Jones, 163 Ohio St.3d 242, 2020-Ohio-6729, 169 N.E.3d 649. Although a court imposing

a felony sentence must consider the purposes of felony sentencing under R.C. 2929.11

and the sentencing factors under R.C. 2929.12, “neither R.C. 2929.11 nor 2929.12

requires [the] court to make any specific factual findings on the record.” Id. at ¶ 20, citing

State v. Wilson, 129 Ohio St.3d 214, 2011-Ohio-2669, 951 N.E.2d 381, ¶ 31, and State

v. Arnett, 88 Ohio St.3d 208, 215, 724 N.E.2d 793 (2000). R.C. 2953.08(G)(2)(b) does

not provide a basis for an appellate court to modify or vacate a sentence based on its

view that the sentence is not supported by the record under R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12.

State v. Jones, 163 Ohio St.3d 242, 2020-Ohio-6729, 169 N.E.3d 649, ¶39. The Ohio

Supreme Court further elucidated in State v. Toles, 166 Ohio St.3d 397, 2021-Ohio-3531,

186 N.E.3d 784, ¶10, “R.C. 2953.08, as amended, precludes second-guessing a

sentence imposed by the trial court based on its weighing of the considerations in R.C.

2929.11 and 2929.12.”

{¶20} “‘Otherwise contrary to law’ means “‘in violation of statute or legal

regulations at a given time.’” Jones at ¶ 34 quoting Black’s Law Dictionary 328 (6th Ed.

1990). Accordingly, when a trial court imposes a sentence based on factors or

considerations that are extraneous to those that are permitted by R.C. 2929.11 and

2929.12, that sentence is contrary to law. Claims that raise these types of issues are

therefore reviewable. State v. Bryant, 168 Ohio St.3d 250, 2022-Ohio-1878, 198 N.E.3d

68, ¶22.

R.C. 2929.13(B)

{¶21} R.C. 2929.13(B) applies to one convicted of a fourth- or fifth-degree felony.

Coffman pled guilty to a felony of the fifth degree. In relevant part the statute provides,

Ashland County, Case No. 22-COA-036 11

(B)(1)(a) Except as provided in division (B)(1)(b) of this section, if an

offender is convicted of or pleads guilty to a felony of the fourth or fifth

degree that is not an offense of violence or that is a qualifying assault

offense, the court shall sentence the offender to a community control

sanction or combination of community control sanctions if all of the following

apply:

(i) The offender previously has not been convicted of or pleaded

guilty to a felony offense.

(ii) The most serious charge against the offender at the time of

sentencing is a felony of the fourth or fifth degree.

(iii) If the court made a request of the department of rehabilitation and

correction pursuant to division (B)(1)(c) of this section, the department,

within the forty-five-day period specified in that division, provided the court

with the names of, contact information for, and program details of one or

more community control sanctions that are available for persons sentenced

by the court.

{¶22} R.C. 2929.13(B)(1) further provides,

(b) The court has discretion to impose a prison term upon an offender

who is convicted of or pleads guilty to a felony of the fourth or fifth degree

that is not an offense of violence or that is a qualifying assault offense if any

of the following apply:

(i) The offender committed the offense while having a firearm on or

about the offender’s person or under the offender’s control.

Ashland County, Case No. 22-COA-036 12

(ii) If the offense is a qualifying assault offense, the offender caused

serious physical harm to another person while committing the offense, and,

if the offense is not a qualifying assault offense, the offender caused

physical harm to another person while committing the offense.

(iii) The offender violated a term of the conditions of bond as set by

the court.

(iv) The court made a request of the department of rehabilitation and

correction pursuant to division (B)(1)(c) of this section, and the department,

within the forty-five-day period specified in that division, did not provide the

court with the name of, contact information for, and program details of any

community control sanction that is available for persons sentenced by the

court.

(v) The offense is a sex offense that is a fourth- or fifth-degree felony

violation of any provision of Chapter 2907. of the Revised Code.

(vi) In committing the offense, the offender attempted to cause or

made an actual threat of physical harm to a person with a deadly weapon.

(vii) In committing the offense, the offender attempted to cause or

made an actual threat of physical harm to a person, and the offender

previously was convicted of an offense that caused physical harm to a

person.

(viii) The offender held a public office or position of trust, and the

offense related to that office or position; the offender’s position obliged the

offender to prevent the offense or to bring those committing it to justice; or

Ashland County, Case No. 22-COA-036 13

the offender’s professional reputation or position facilitated the offense or

was likely to influence the future conduct of others.

(ix) The offender committed the offense for hire or as part of an

organized criminal activity.

(x) The offender at the time of the offense was serving, or the

offender previously had served, a prison term.

(xi) The offender committed the offense while under a community

control sanction, while on probation, or while released from custody on a

bond or personal recognizance.

Emphasis added. In the case at bar, Coffman’s bond was revoked because she did not

submit to two drug tests while she was released on bond. Therefore, the legislature has

given the judge discretion to determine the appropriateness of a prison sentence under

these circumstances.

Purposes and Principles of Felony Sentencing - R.C. 2929.11

{¶23} R.C. 2929.11(A) governs the purposes and principles of felony sentencing

and provides that a sentence imposed for a felony shall be reasonably calculated to

achieve the two overriding purposes of felony sentencing, which are (1) to protect the

public from future crime by the offender and others, and (2) to punish the offender using

the minimum sanctions that the court determines will accomplish those purposes. In

order to achieve these purposes and principles, the trial court must consider the need for

incapacitating the offender, deterring the offender and others from future crime,

rehabilitating the offender, and making restitution to the victim of the offense, the public,

or both. R.C. 2929.11(A). Additionally, the sentence “must be commensurate with, and

Ashland County, Case No. 22-COA-036 14

not demeaning to, the seriousness of the offender’s conduct and its impact on the victims

and consistent with sentences imposed for similar crimes by similar offenders.” R.C.

2929.11(B).

Seriousness and Recidivism - R.C. 2929.12

{¶24} R.C. 2929.12 is a guidance statute that sets forth the seriousness and

recidivism criteria that a trial court “shall consider” in fashioning a felony sentence.

Subsections (B) and (C) establish the factors indicating whether the offender’s conduct is

more serious or less serious than conduct normally constituting the offense. These

factors include the physical or mental injury suffered by the victim due to the age of the

victim; the physical, psychological, or economic harm suffered by the victim; whether the

offender’s relationship with the victim facilitated the offense; the defendant’s prior criminal

record; whether the defendant was under a court sanction at the time of the offense;

whether the defendant shows any remorse; and any other relevant factors. R.C.

2929.12(B). The court must also consider any factors indicating the offender’s conduct

is less serious than conduct normally constituting the offense, including any mitigating

factors. R.C. 2929.12(C). Subsections (D) and (E) contain the factors bearing on whether

the offender is likely or not likely to commit future crimes.

Issue for Appellate Review: Whether Coffman’s sentence was imposed

based on impermissible considerations—i.e., considerations that fall outside those that

are contained in R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12.

{¶25} The visiting judge reviewed the Pre-Sentence Investigation report that was

prepared and submitted in support of Coffman’s Motion for Intervention in Lieu of

Conviction. Sent. T. at 15. The PSI notes that Coffman has no prior felony record and

Ashland County, Case No. 22-COA-036 15

has not previously served a prison term. Sent. T. at 17. As noted in the PSI, the facts

leading to her arrest involve her driving under a suspended license. Id. As she was

leaving the driveway of her home, she was stopped and subsequently .13 grams of

methamphetamine were found. Id. As of the date of the sentencing hearing, after having

her bond revoked, Coffman had been in jail for a total of seventy days. Id. Coffman’s

Ohio Risk Assessment System score (ORAS) was low to moderate and none of the

serious factors or F-4, or F-5 factors were marked. Id. at 18.

{¶26} Coffman admitted that she had served time in jail for misdemeanor offenses

in the past. Sent. T. at 19. She further indicated that she had been employed and was

awaiting an answer to her Social Security Disability application. Sent. T. at 20. Prior to

this offense Coffman had been living with her mother. Id. Coffman apologized for her

behavior. Id. at 21.

{¶27} The visiting judge selected the sentence, “that I feel is correct.” Sent. T. at

21. The state did not object to the visiting judge’s statements concerning a preference of

non-prison for felony five drug possession offenders during the sentencing hearing.

{¶28} A “blanket policy” is a policy that is imposed as a matter of course without

any consideration of the facts and circumstances of each case. State v. Beasley, 152

Ohio St.3d 470, 2018-Ohio-16, 97 N.E.3d 474, ¶13. Although a trial court abuses its

discretion when it adheres to a blanket policy, that is not what occurred here. State v.

Hill, Slip Op. No. 2021-0913, 2022-Ohio-4544 (Dec. 20, 2022), ¶16. As referenced above,

the trial court expressly stated that it considered the PSI, the statements of counsel and

the statements of Coffman. The visiting judge considered the facts and circumstances of

Coffman’s case, specifically her low to moderate ORAS score, and the fact that she had

Ashland County, Case No. 22-COA-036 16

no prior felonies or prison time. The judge considered the fact that Coffman was

employed, and found her to have a future ability to be employed and to pay financial

sanctions. Judgment Entry-Sentencing, filed Sept. 29, 2022. The visiting judge

expressly found Coffman to be amenable to community control sanctions. Id. The

decision of the trial court here to not sentence Coffman to a prison sentence was thus not

based on a blanket policy of refusing to sentence defendants convicted of drug abuse

offenses to prison. Instead, the visiting judge exercised the discretion given to him by the

state legislature based upon the specific facts and circumstances of Coffman’s case. If

we remove the remarks made by the visiting judge, the state can cite to nothing within the

record of Coffman’s case that would prohibit any judge from imposing the identical

sentence.

{¶29} Although the visiting judge’s statements concerning its “policy” may be

unwise, in the case at bar we find that under the facts of this case, the trial court did not

arbitrarily refuse to consider the facts and circumstances presented. State v. Garcia, 5th

Dist. Tuscarawas No. 2018AP060024, 2018-Ohio-4818, ¶21. Rather, the record supports

that the visiting judge considered the purposes and principles of sentencing [R.C.

2929.11] as well as the factors that the court must consider when determining an

appropriate sentence. [ R.C. 2929.12]. The trial court has no obligation to state reasons

to support its findings. Nor is it required to give a talismanic incantation of the words of

the statute, provided that the necessary findings can be found in the record and are

incorporated into the sentencing entry.

{¶30} Upon a thorough review, we find the record clearly and convincingly

supports the sentence imposed by the visiting judge. We find the visiting judge properly

Ashland County, Case No. 22-COA-036 17

considered the purposes and principles of sentencing set forth in R.C. 2929.11, as well

as the applicable factors set forth in R.C. 2929.12, along with all other relevant factors

and circumstances. Coffman’s sentence was within the applicable statutory range and

within the judge’s discretion to impose. Therefore, we have no basis for concluding that

it is contrary to law.

{¶31} The state’s First Assignment of Error is overruled.

II.

{¶32} In the Second Assignment of Error, the state argues that the visiting judge

abused his discretion when he imposed conditions as part of community control that

were not "specifically tailored" to address Coffman's unique and individual circumstances,

and further failed to advise that Coffman "not leave the state without the permission of the

court or the offender's probation officer." [Appellant’s brief at 24].

Standard of Appellate Review

{¶33} R.C. 2929.15(A)(1) governs the authority of the trial court to impose

conditions of community control. We review the trial court’s imposition of community-

control sanctions under an abuse-of-discretion standard. State v. Talty, 103 Ohio St.3d

177, 2004-Ohio-4888, 814 N.E.2d 1201, ¶10. Generally, a court will not be found to have

abused its discretion in fashioning a community-control sanction as long as the condition

is reasonably related to the probationary goals of doing justice, rehabilitating the offender,

and insuring good behavior. Id. at ¶ 12. This means courts must “consider whether the

condition (1) is reasonably related to rehabilitating the offender, (2) has some relationship

to the crime of which the offender was convicted, and (3) relates to conduct which is

criminal or reasonably related to future criminality and serves the statutory ends of

Ashland County, Case No. 22-COA-036 18

probation.” State v. Jones, 49 Ohio St.3d 51, 53, 550 N.E.2d 469(1990) (citations

omitted).

Issue for Appellate Review: Whether the conditions of Coffman’s community

control sanctions are reasonably related to the probationary goals of doing justice,

rehabilitating the offender, and insuring good behavior

{¶34} A community-control sentence for a felony offender under R.C.

2929.15(A)(1) consists of one or more community control sanctions authorized pursuant

to section 2929.16 [community residential sanctions], 2929.17 [nonresidential sanctions],

or 2929.18 [financial sanctions] of the Revised Code. Terms of incarceration in a

community-based correctional facility, a halfway house, or a local jail are called

“community residential sanctions,” and a court sentencing for a felony is authorized to

impose “a term of up to six months in a jail.” R.C. 2929.16(A). Local probation, day

reporting, house arrest, community service, and curfew are classified as “nonresidential

sanctions.” R.C. 2929.17 (“the court imposing a sentence for a felony upon an offender

who is not required to serve a mandatory prison term may impose any nonresidential

sanction or combination of nonresidential sanctions”). Restitution, fines, and costs are

“financial sanctions.” R.C. 2929.18(A). In short, the statutes authorize a broad variety of

community-control sanctions, and trial courts are empowered to “impose any other

conditions of release under a community control sanction that the court considers

appropriate * * *.” R.C. 2929.15(A)(1). State v. Amos, 140 Ohio St.3d 238, 2014-Ohio-

3160, 17 N.E.3d 528, ¶11.

{¶35} The statute makes clear the legislature intended that trial courts should

have discretion to fashion community-control sentences that punish and protect but do

Ashland County, Case No. 22-COA-036 19

not unnecessarily waste scarce resources. Id. at ¶ 12. This statute by its plain terms

directs the trial court to conserve resources when possible by imposing a “fine-only”

sentence for a felony offense. Id. at ¶ 13.

Non-residential Community Control Sanctions

{¶36} The visiting judge sentenced Coffman to non-reporting sanctions for a

period of one-year and financial sanctions totaling approximately one hundred dollars.

R.C. 2929.17

{¶37} As a nonresidential sanction, a trial court is authorized to sentence a

defendant to “a term of monitored time.” R.C. 2929.17(G). R.C. 2929.01(Y) defines

“monitored time” as, “a period of time during which an offender continues to be under the

control of the sentencing court or parole board, subject to no conditions other than leading

a law-abiding life.” Thus, a trial court can sentence a defendant to unsupervised, non-

reporting “monitored time” during which the defendant remains subject to violation by the

sentencing court. See, In re R.B., 162 Ohio St.3d 281, 2020-Ohio-5476, 165 N.E.3d 288,

¶25; In re J.F., 121 Ohio St.3d 76, 2009-Ohio-318, 902 N.E.2d 19, ¶ 10; State v. Castleberry,

2nd Dist. Montgomery No. 28541, 2020-Ohio-4233, ¶1; State v. Eaton, 3rd Dist. Auglaize

Nos. 2-10-10, 2-10-11, 2010-Ohio-6065, ¶9; State v. Hart, 5th Dist. Tuscarawas No.

2016AP100052, 2017-Ohio-4079, ¶11; State v. Chappell, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 93298,

2010-Ohio-2465, ¶22.

{¶38} Next, the visiting judge imposed a condition that Coffman must abstain from

alcohol and drugs and must not use marijuana or any of its derivatives. The trial court

further imposed conditions of good behavior, abide by all laws, and that she not be found

guilty of any jailable offense. Sent. T. at 22-23; Judgement Entry-Sentencing, filed

Ashland County, Case No. 22-COA-036 20

Sept. 29, 2022.

{¶39} In addition to requiring an offender to “abide by the law,” R.C.

2929.15(A) gives the trial court discretion to “impose any other condition s of release

under a community control sanction that the court considers appropriate, including,

but not limited to, requiring that the offender not ingest or be injected with a drug of

abuse....” In the case at bar, the trial judge was careful to explain to Coffman that while

possessing small amounts of marijuana are not considered a crime in the state of Ohio,

use or possession of any amount would result in a violation of the terms of her community

control. Sent. T. at 22-23.

{¶40} We find that these conditions are not overly broad, are reasonably related

to rehabilitating Coffman, have some relationship to the crime of which Coffman was

convicted, and relates to conduct which is criminal or reasonably related to future

criminality and serves the statutory ends of probation. State v. Jones, 49 Ohio St.3d 51,

53, 550 N.E.2d 469(1990).

{¶41} We hold that the visiting judge did not abused his discretion in fashioning

the community-control sanctions in the case at bar. Because Coffman’s community

control is unsupervised and non-reporting, we find any failure of the visiting judge to

advise her not to leave the state without the court’s permission to be harmless beyond a

reasonable doubt.

Ashland County, Case No. 22-COA-036 21

{¶42} The judgment of the Ashland County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed.

By Gwin, P.J.,

Hoffman, J., and

King, J., concur