MEGAN BROWN and PEFORMANCE INSURANCE GROUP, INC. v. JOSEPH REGAN

DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA

FOURTH DISTRICT

MEGAN BROWN and PERFORMANCE INSURANCE GROUP, INC.,

Appellants,

v.

JOSEPH REGAN and LIFETIME GUARANTEE ADMINISTRATORS LLC,

Appellees.

No. 4D22-2352

[June 21, 2023]

Appeal from the Circuit Court for the Seventeenth Judicial Circuit,

Broward County; Barbara Anne McCarthy, Judge; L.T. Case No.

CACE15017984(03).

James William Beagle of James Beagle, P.A., Fort Lauderdale, for

appellants.

David A. Frankel of the Law Offices of David A. Frankel P.A., Hollywood,

for appellees.

PER CURIAM.

Megan Brown and Performance Insurance Group, Inc. appeal the trial

court’s order granting final summary judgment in favor of Joseph Regan

and Lifetime Guarantee Administrators LLC on their constructive trust

claim. Applying de novo review, we reverse. See Volusia County v.

Aberdeen at Ormond Beach, L.P., 760 So. 2d 126, 130 (Fla. 2000) (standard

of review for an entry of summary judgment is de novo).

The trial court’s order did not meet the requirements of the newly

amended Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.510, because the order only

vaguely described the factual history of the underlying theft and fraud and

did not recite the legal background “with enough specificity” for appellate

review. See Rkhub Logistics LLC v. E. Auto Motor Corp., 344 So. 3d 485,

486 (Fla. 4th DCA 2022) (quoting In re Amends. to Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.510,

317 So. 3d 72, 77 (Fla. 2021)). This lack of specificity is evidenced by the

order’s failure to (1) specify the cause of action supporting the constructive

trust remedy or (2) detail the facts that establish the four elements of a

constructive trust. Cf. Abdo v. Abdo, 284 So. 3d 1101, 1103 (Fla. 2d DCA

2019) (quoting Collinson v. Miller, 903 So. 2d 221, 228 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005))

(noting the trial court correctly identified breach of fiduciary duty as the

underlying cause of action).

Reversal is further warranted because appellees’ cross-motion for

summary judgment was not supported by the evidence in the record.

First, the evidence on which appellees relied—unauthenticated documents

and testimony not based on personal knowledge—was inadmissible and,

therefore, could not be used as a basis for summary judgment. Second,

the evidence did not sufficiently establish a claim for a constructive trust.

A moving party must prove an independent cause of action that would

support a constructive trust as a remedy, such as “unjust enrichment

resulting from fraud, undue influence, or breaches of fiduciary duty.” See

Est. of Kester v. Rocco, 117 So. 3d 1196, 1201 (Fla. 1st DCA 2013) (holding

a constructive trust will not be available when the record does not

demonstrate an underlying cause of action). A party may also establish a

constructive trust as an independent cause of action by showing: “(1) a

promise, express or implied, (2) transfer of the property and reliance

thereon, (3) a confidential relationship and (4) unjust enrichment.”

Provence v. Palm Beach Taverns, Inc., 676 So. 2d 1022, 1025 (Fla. 4th DCA

1996). Upon review of the record evidence, appellees failed to prove the

need for a constructive trust under either method. While appellees may

be able to prove their claim at trial, they did not satisfy their burden on

summary judgment as a matter of law.

Therefore, we reverse the order granting final summary judgment and

remand for further proceedings.

Reversed and remanded.

KLINGENSMITH, C.J., GROSS and CIKLIN, JJ., concur.

* * *

Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.

2