Richard Webber v. Armslist, LLC

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

____________________

No. 21-3198

RICHARD WEBBER, as Special Administrator of the Estate of

Sara J. Schmidt,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

ARMSLIST LLC and JONATHAN GIBBON,

Defendants-Appellees.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Eastern District of Wisconsin.

No. 1:20-cv-01526-WCG — William C. Griesbach, Judge.

____________________

No. 21-3207

ERIN BAUER and ESTATE OF PAUL BAUER,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

v.

ARMSLIST LLC and JONATHAN GIBBON,

Defendants-Appellees.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Eastern District of Wisconsin.

No. 2:20-cv-00215-PP — Pamela Pepper, Chief Judge.

2 Nos. 21-3198 and 21-3207

____________________

ARGUED SEPTEMBER 13, 2022 — DECIDED JUNE 12, 2023

____________________

Before FLAUM, BRENNAN, and SCUDDER, Circuit Judges.

BRENNAN, Circuit Judge. In these cases, we consider

whether a website that hosts advertisements for the sale and

purchase of firearms can be held liable under Wisconsin law

for the deaths of two shooting victims. The circumstances giv-

ing rise to the complaints at issue are grave and the allega-

tions are serious.

Erin Bauer and Richard Webber are the legal representa-

tives and family members of two individuals killed using

guns that had been listed on armslist.com, an online firearms

marketplace. Bauer and Webber each sued Armslist LLC and

its member manager, Jonathan Gibbon, in separate diversity

actions, alleging negligence and other Wisconsin state law

claims. The plaintiffs assert that the defendants designed the

website to encourage and assist individuals in circumventing

federal and state law regulating firearms. The defendants ar-

gue that the plaintiffs have failed to state a claim upon which

relief can be granted because publishing third-party offers to

sell firearms does not establish tort or other liability under

Wisconsin law.

The district court dismissed the negligence claim in both

cases, concluding that the plaintiffs failed to plausibly allege

the website’s design caused the deaths. The remaining claims

were also dismissed, and in Bauer, Gibbon was dismissed

from the lawsuit for lack of personal jurisdiction. Bauer seeks

reversal of Gibbon’s dismissal, and Armslist LLC challenges

Nos. 21-3198 and 21-3207 3

the exercise of personal jurisdiction over Gibbon in Webber. At

the heart of these appeals, Bauer and Webber also challenge

the dismissal of their claims under Federal Rule of Civil Pro-

cedure 12(b)(6). The defendants ask us to affirm the dismissal

of the plaintiffs’ claims, either on the merits under Wisconsin

law or as preempted by the Communications Decency Act

(CDA), 47 U.S.C. § 230. The CDA precludes a website from

being “treated” as the “publisher or speaker of any

information provided by another information content pro-

vider.” § 230(c)(1). We agree with the defendants that the dis-

trict court lacked personal jurisdiction over Gibbon. We also

affirm the district court’s dismissal of the plaintiffs’ negli-

gence and other state law claims against Armslist LLC. Be-

cause we affirm on the state law claims, we decline to rule on

the preemption issue.

We first describe the factual and procedural background

of the cases. Then we address the exercise of personal juris-

diction over Gibbon, followed by the question of preemption

by the CDA. Next, we review the plaintiffs’ negligence claim,

as well as their other state law claims. Finally, we consider the

plaintiffs’ requests to amend their complaints. 1

1 Armslist LLC argues that Illinois law should govern Bauer’s claims.

Although the company acknowledges that Wisconsin’s choice-of-law

rules require this court to analyze whether an outcome-determinative con-

flict exists between Wisconsin and Illinois law, see State Farm Mut. Auto.

Ins. Co. v. Gillette , 641 N.W.2d 662, 675 (Wis. 2002); Hunker v. Royal Indem.

Co., 204 N.W.2d 897, 901 (Wis. 1973), it contends in a conclusory fashion

that Bauer’s allegations cannot state any claim under either state’s law.

Armslist LLC offers no arguments about the standard governing Bauer’s

claims under Illinois law and fails to engage with the district court’s rea-

soning as to why Wisconsin law applies. We conclude that Armslist LLC

has waived its challenge to the application of Wisconsin law. See Cont’l W.

4 Nos. 21-3198 and 21-3207

I. Background

Under federal law, only licensed gun dealers may “engage

in the business of importing, manufacturing, or dealing in

firearms, or importing or manufacturing ammunition.” 18

U.S.C. § 923(a); see also § 922(a)(1). 2 Among other require-

ments, licensed dealers must contact the national instant

criminal background check system prior to completing a

transfer, verify the identity of any purchaser, and maintain

records of importation, production, shipment, receipt, sale, or

other disposition. § 922(t)(1); § 923(g)(1)(A); 27 C.F.R.

§ 478.124.

Under Wisconsin law, a firearms dealer, defined as “any

person engaged in the business of importing, manufacturing

or dealing in firearms and having a license as an importer,

manufacturer or dealer issued by the federal government,” is

subject to similar requirements. WIS. STAT. § 175.35(1)(ar), (2).

Private sellers may also sell firearms in Wisconsin consistent

with state and federal law. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 921(a)(21)(C),

923(a); Daniel v. Armslist, LLC, 926 N.W.2d 710, 722 (Wis.

2019). A private seller is not engaged in the business of selling

firearms as defined under federal and state law and therefore

is not subject to the same requirements as firearms dealers.

§ 921(a)(21)(C); § 923(a); § 175.35(1)(ar), (2).

Ins. Co. v. Country Mut. Ins. Co., 3 F.4th 308, 318 (7th Cir. 2021); Puffer v.

Allstate Ins. Co., 675 F.3d 709, 718 (7th Cir. 2012).

2 Unless otherwise indicated, all federal and state statutory and regu-

latory citations are to the versions in effect at the time of the shootings and

the purchases of the firearms.

Nos. 21-3198 and 21-3207 5

A. Factual

Armslist.com is an online marketplace for firearms. De-

fendants Armslist, LLC, a Pennsylvania limited liability com-

pany, and Jonathan Gibbon, a Pennsylvania resident, are the

operator and member manager of armslist.com. 3 Armslist

LLC is not engaged in the business of selling firearms. Rather,

its website hosts “for sale” and “want to buy” ads posted by

users.

Plaintiff Erin Bauer is the widow and executor of the estate

of Paul Bauer and resides in Illinois. Thomas Caldwell, a pri-

vate seller from Wisconsin, listed a Glock 26 9mm handgun

for sale on armslist.com. That gun was purchased by Ron

Jones from Milwaukee in 2017. According to Bauer’s com-

plaint, Jones resold that Glock handgun “into the broader

criminal market where it ultimately was obtained” by

Shomari Legghette. Legghette used the gun to shoot and kill

Chicago Police Commander Paul Bauer on February 13, 2018,

in downtown Chicago.

Plaintiff Richard Webber is the special administrator of the

estate of his deceased daughter, Sara Schmidt, of Harrison,

Wisconsin. She was the victim of domestic violence by her es-

tranged husband, Robert Schmidt, who was arrested. A court

prohibited him from possessing any firearms, but he pur-

chased a gun on January 8, 2018 from a private party, Brock

Verstagen, through armslist.com. Schmidt used the handgun

to kill Sara and himself the next day.

3 We use the title reflected in Jonathan Gibbon’s affidavits in support

of his motions to dismiss.

6 Nos. 21-3198 and 21-3207

Webber sued Armslist LLC and Gibbon under diversity

jurisdiction, alleging negligence and six other causes of ac-

tion. 4 Bauer sued the same defendants, making the same

claims and adding causes of action for aiding and abetting

tortious conduct as well as loss of consortium.

The plaintiffs level serious accusations against the defend-

ants. They allege that armslist.com allows individuals to en-

gage in the business of selling firearms without a license and

to circumvent federal and state law governing firearms deal-

ers, including avoiding background checks. The defendants

purportedly accomplished this through design and content

features. Among these are choosing to label purchases and

sales as private party transactions by default. The plaintiffs

also claim that armslist.com allows users to filter listings to

identify private party sellers. This “filter function” allegedly

facilitates the private sale of firearms without background

checks to individuals prohibited from possessing firearms.

The plaintiffs also contend the defendants provided cer-

tain assurances that enabled both buyers and sellers to oper-

ate anonymously, including that:

• “ARMSLIST DOES NOT become involved in trans-

actions between parties and does not certify, inves-

tigate, or in any way guarantee the legal capacity of

any party to transact”;

• “ARMSLIST can not and will not be a party in trans-

actions. It is the sole responsibility of the buyer and

seller to conduct safe and legal transactions”;

4 Negligence per se, public nuisance, civil conspiracy, wrongful death,

a survival action, and piercing the corporate veil.

Nos. 21-3198 and 21-3207 7

• “You can perform all of the major functions with-

out creating an account”; and

• Armslist will not contact a seller on behalf of a user

or provide a user with information about another

user but can provide this information to law en-

forcement during due process of law.

In addition to contending that the website’s design is

flawed, Bauer and Webber allege that Armslist LLC and Gib-

bon should have implemented certain design features,

adopted by other online firearm marketplaces, to prevent il-

legal transactions. These include requiring evidence of the le-

gality of the transactions, background checks and transaction

records, delivery through federal firearms licensees, and a

waiting period. They also include taking certain actions with

respect to high volume sellers, allowing users to flag illegal

conduct, and providing updated information on firearms

laws.

B. Procedural

These two diversity cases proceeded before different dis-

trict judges. Gibbon sought dismissal for lack of personal ju-

risdiction in both cases. In each case, both defendants moved

under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) to dismiss the

complaints for failure to state a claim.

In Bauer, the plaintiffs amended their complaint twice be-

fore the defendants moved to dismiss for lack of personal ju-

risdiction and failure to state a claim. The district court held a

hearing at which it granted Gibbon’s motion to dismiss for

lack of personal jurisdiction. At the hearing, counsel in Bauer

asked whether they could amend their complaint to remedy

the personal jurisdiction issues. The court responded

8 Nos. 21-3198 and 21-3207

affirmatively but advised the plaintiffs to wait to do so until

after the court had ruled on Armslist LLC’s motion to dismiss.

After the hearing, the court granted Armslist LLC’s motion to

dismiss for failure to state a claim and entered judgment dis-

missing the case. The court ruled that Bauer sufficiently al-

leged duty, breach, and damages, but not causation.

Webber moved to transfer his case to federal court in Penn-

sylvania. But the Eastern District of Wisconsin court denied

that motion. It also denied Gibbon’s motion to dismiss for lack

of personal jurisdiction and granted the defendants’ motion

to dismiss for failure to state a claim. The court found that

Webber sufficiently alleged all elements of a negligence claim

except causation. Judgment was entered dismissing the Web-

ber case.

Armslist LLC and Gibbon further asserted in their mo-

tions to dismiss that § 230 of the CDA barred Bauer’s and

Webber’s state law claims. The district court rejected the de-

fendants’ arguments, however. In Webber, the court concluded

that the plaintiffs sought to hold Armslist LLC and Gibbon

responsible for their own role in developing content, and that

neither plaintiff sought to treat the defendants as the pub-

lisher or speaker of third-party content, which the CDA pro-

hibits. Bauer reached the same conclusion. The court also dis-

missed the plaintiffs’ remaining claims, including because

failure to plead negligence was fatal to many of them.

II. Personal Jurisdiction

We consider first whether the defendants waived their

right to challenge the court’s ruling in Webber that personal

jurisdiction existed over Gibbon.

Nos. 21-3198 and 21-3207 9

The plaintiffs argue a cross-appeal is necessary to reach

this question, but we do not agree. A cross-appeal is required

when a party seeks to modify the district court’s judgment.

Wellpoint, Inc. v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 599 F.3d 641, 649

(7th Cir. 2010). “The judgment is not the court’s opinion or

reasoning; it is the court’s bottom line … .” Id. at 650. A cross-

appeal permits an appellant “the same right to respond to his

opponent’s brief” and “alert[s] the court to the dual role of the

parties in the appeal.” Id.

Here, the judgment is the dismissal of the case and entry

of final judgment. Dismissing the case for lack of personal ju-

risdiction would not modify that judgment. Additionally,

Bauer already appealed the grant of Armslist LLC and Gib-

bon’s motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, so

we are aware of this issue and the positions of the parties in

both cases. Gibbon therefore has not waived his challenge on

this point.

In Bauer, the district court concluded that it lacked

personal jurisdiction over Gibbon. It reasoned that specific ju-

risdiction was absent because, although Armslist LLC’s activ-

ities could be attributed to Gibbon, there was no indication

that Gibbon or Armslist LLC targeted the forum state of Wis-

consin.

But in Webber the court ruled differently, concluding that

subsection (4)(a) of Wisconsin’s long-arm statute for “[s]olici-

tation or service activities … carried on within” Wisconsin

conferred jurisdiction over Gibbon. WIS. STAT. § 801.05(4)(a).

Under the due process prong of the personal jurisdiction in-

quiry, the court reasoned that the complaint sought to hold

Gibbon responsible for his role as a creator, designer, and ad-

ministrator of armslist.com, and not merely because of his

10 Nos. 21-3198 and 21-3207

corporate role. Because Gibbon was willing to serve and sell

to customers in Wisconsin and collect the benefits flowing

therefrom, the court found that personal jurisdiction existed

over Gibbon.

Dismissal for lack of personal jurisdiction is reviewed de

novo. Curry v. Revolution Lab’ys, LLC, 949 F.3d 385, 392 (7th

Cir. 2020). Where there has been no evidentiary hearing, a

plaintiff need only make a prima facie showing that the court

has personal jurisdiction over the defendant. Id. at 392–93.

Federal courts sitting in diversity must apply the personal ju-

risdiction rules of the forum state. Kipp v. Ski Enter. Corp. of

Wis., Inc., 783 F.3d 695, 697 (7th Cir. 2015). A federal court sit-

ting in Wisconsin may exercise jurisdiction only if it comports

with Wisconsin’s long-arm statute, WIS. STAT. § 801.05, and

Fourteenth Amendment due process. Felland v. Clifton, 682

F.3d 665, 672 (7th Cir. 2012).

Two subsections of Wisconsin’s long-arm statute have

been argued or held to establish jurisdiction over Gibbon:

Wisconsin Statute § 801.05(3) and (4)(a). Plaintiffs contend

that specific jurisdiction over Gibbon exists under § 801.05(3),

which provides that Wisconsin courts have personal jurisdic-

tion in an action “claiming injury to person or property within

or without this state arising out of an act or omission within

this state by the defendant.” In Webber, the court concluded

that jurisdiction could be exercised under § 801.05(4)(a),

which provides for jurisdiction in an action “claiming injury

to person or property within this state arising out of an act or

omission outside this state by the defendant, provided in ad-

dition that at the time of the injury…[s]olicitation or service

activities were carried on within this state by or on behalf of

the defendant.”

Nos. 21-3198 and 21-3207 11

Plaintiffs argue that Gibbon designed armslist.com to

solicit business “in many states, including Wisconsin.” By in-

stituting design elements that permitted users to search for

private sellers in Wisconsin, according to the plaintiffs, Gib-

bon subjected himself to personal jurisdiction in the forum.

In dispute is whether Armslist LLC’s business in Wiscon-

sin may be attributed to Gibbon by virtue of his corporate role

for purposes of personal jurisdiction. Under Wisconsin law,

showing that an officer has control over a corporation allows

for attribution of the corporation’s activities to that officer.

Yet, a corporation’s contacts with a forum must have existed

by virtue of the officer’s control.

In Pavlic v. Woodrum, 486 N.W.2d 533, 534 (Wis. Ct. App.

1992), Louis Woodrum solicited the plaintiff’s investment in

a corporation organized with his son Timothy. After the

plaintiff agreed to invest, Timothy sent the stock certificates

by mail to the plaintiff’s Wisconsin address, and later sent a

letter to the same address informing the plaintiff that the cor-

poration had failed. Id. The plaintiff sued Timothy for dam-

ages in Wisconsin, arguing that personal jurisdiction could be

exercised over him based on the sending of the stock certifi-

cate and letter. See id. at 534–35. The Wisconsin Court of Ap-

peals held that Louis’s and the corporation’s contacts with

Wisconsin could not be attributed to Timothy solely because

of his role as an officer. Id. at 534. That court analyzed Timo-

thy’s contacts with the forum—the stock certificate and the

letter—and held that these were insufficient to establish long-

arm jurisdiction over Timothy for soliciting business in Wis-

consin. Id. at 535. The court reasoned that Timothy could not

have anticipated a financial benefit when he made the two

mailings. Id. Rather, the mailing of the stock certificate was a

12 Nos. 21-3198 and 21-3207

ministerial duty required because of Louis’s contact, and the

letter merely informed the plaintiff of dissolution. See id. That

court then considered whether personal jurisdiction existed

over Timothy under State v. Advance Marketing Consultants,

Inc., 225 N.W.2d 887 (Wis. 1975). Pavlic, 486 N.W.2d at 536.

In Advance Marketing, the Wisconsin Supreme Court con-

cluded that “the placing of advertisements in newspapers cir-

culated in Wisconsin” constituted an act or omission within

the state from which the injury arose. 225 N.W.2d at 892. This

activity was undertaken by virtue of the corporate officer’s

control of the corporation, as shown through trial testimony,

and therefore could be attributed to him for purposes of exer-

cising personal jurisdiction. See id. at 891–92. In Pavlic, the

Wisconsin Court of Appeals explained that Advance Marketing

could not be understood to conclude that an officer of a cor-

poration who commits a personal tort—in those cases, involv-

ing fraud or misrepresentation—is always subject to personal

jurisdiction. See Pavlic, 486 N.W.2d at 536. Rather, “[t]here

must be some act or omission by that officer in Wisconsin to

justify personal jurisdiction.” Id. Pavlic explained that the “ad-

vertisements [in Advance Marketing] were circulated in Wis-

consin by virtue of the officer’s control” and therefore could

be attributed to the officer. Id. Because Timothy had not acted

in Wisconsin, Advance Marketing was not controlling. Pavlic,

486 N.W.2d at 536.

As in Pavlic, Gibbon’s activities cannot be considered

actions within Wisconsin for purposes of exercising personal

jurisdiction over him. Plaintiffs have alleged that Gibbon de-

signed armslist.com to permit it to be accessed “in many

states, including Wisconsin.” But they have failed to plead

that in designing the website, Gibbon anticipated receiving a

Nos. 21-3198 and 21-3207 13

financial benefit from users in Wisconsin because he made the

decision to solicit business in that state. In other words, the

plaintiffs do not allege that Gibbon was responsible for Arm-

slist LLC’s decision to target the forum. Instead, plaintiffs

plead only that Gibbon “played a role in the design, architec-

ture, and administration of Armslist.com” and “controls its

operations.” We decline to draw from these allegations the

unsupported inference that Gibbon’s “role” or “control” en-

compassed deciding that Armslist LLC would solicit business

from Wisconsin. 5 Plaintiffs have therefore not alleged an act

or omission occurring within the state or solicitation or ser-

vice activities outside of the state by Gibbon that would bring

him within the grasp of Wisconsin’s long-arm statute.

Under this reasoning, the district court did not have per-

sonal jurisdiction over Gibbon.

III. Communications Decency Act

The defendants argue in each case that the plaintiffs’ state

law claims are preempted by the Communications Decency

Act (CDA), 47 U.S.C. § 230. The provision at issue states:

Protection for “Good Samaritan” blocking and

screening of offensive material

(1) Treatment of publisher or speaker

No provider or user of an interactive computer

service shall be treated as the publisher or

5 Gibbon describes his role as a “member manager,” and Bauer sug-

gests there may be additional “members” of Armslist LLC. This is an ad-

ditional reason to be cautious to attribute Armslist LLC’s decision to solicit

business in Wisconsin to Gibbon given only a vague allegation that Gib-

bon “controls [Armslist LLC’s] operations.”

14 Nos. 21-3198 and 21-3207

speaker of any information provided by another

information content provider.

§ 230(c)(1). Two terms in this statute are defined in § 230(f).

First, an “interactive computer service” is “any information

service, system, or access software provider that provides or en-

ables computer access by multiple users to a computer server,

including specifically a service or system that provides access

to the Internet and such systems operated or services offered

by libraries or educational institutions.” § 230(f)(2) (emphasis

supplied). An ”access software provider” is a provider of soft-

ware (including client or server software), or enabling tools

that do any one or more of the following:

(A) filter, screen, allow, or disallow content;

(B) pick, choose, analyze, or digest content; or

(C) transmit, receive, display, forward, cache,

search, subset, organize, reorganize, or translate

content.

§ 230(f)(4). This court has previously considered websites

hosting third-party advertisements, like armslist.com, to fall

within the definition of “interactive computer service.” See

Chicago Laws.’ Comm. for Civ. Rts. Under L., Inc. v. Craigslist,

Inc., 519 F.3d 666, 668, 671–72 (7th Cir. 2008) (treating the

online host of third-party housing advertisements as an inter-

active computer service). Second, § 230(f)(3) defines an “infor-

mation content provider” as “any person or entity that is

responsible, in whole or in part, for the creation or develop-

ment of information provided through the Internet or any

other interactive computer service.”

Whether the CDA preempts plaintiffs’ state law claims is

a pure question of law that we review de novo. See Talignani

Nos. 21-3198 and 21-3207 15

v. United States, 26 F.4th 379, 381 (7th Cir. 2022); White v. United

Airlines, Inc., 987 F.3d 616, 620 (7th Cir. 2021). As a federal

court sitting in diversity, we are not bound by the decisions

of state courts interpreting a federal statute.6

This court first examined § 230(c)(1) in Doe v. GTE Corp.,

347 F.3d 655 (7th Cir. 2003). There, the plaintiffs sued corpo-

rations that provided web hosting services to websites that

offered hidden camera videos of the plaintiffs for sale. Id. at

656. Others provided the video and website content, although

the corporations may have provided “technical or artistic as-

sistance in the creation and maintenance of” the websites. Id.

at 657. This court proposed two potential readings of

§ 230(c)(1). See id. at 660. First, § 230(c)(1) might be read as a

clause defining “provider or user” for immunity under

§ 230(c)(2). Id. Thus, if the objectionable information came

from someone else, then the defendant would be eligible for

immunity under § 230(c)(2); but if the defendant created the

objectionable information, it would be a “publisher or

speaker” of that content and fall outside of § 230(c)(2). Id. Sec-

ond, § 230(c)(1) might preclude liability to the extent an inter-

net service provider could be considered a “publisher” of

6 In each case, the parties argue for the interpretations of the CDA by

Wisconsin’s appellate courts in Daniel v. Armslist, LLC, 913 N.W.2d 211

(Wis. Ct. App. 2018), rev’d, 926 N.W.2d 710 (Wis. 2019)—the plaintiffs for

the ruling by the state appellate court, and the defendant for that by the

state supreme court.

We apply Wisconsin substantive law as a court sitting in diversity, but

that state’s appellate decisions do not govern our interpretation of the fed-

eral CDA. Cf. Budinich v. Becton Dickinson & Co., 486 U.S. 196, 198 (1988)

(citations omitted) (“Although state law generally supplies the rules of de-

cision in federal diversity cases, it does not control the resolution of issues

governed by federal statute.”).

16 Nos. 21-3198 and 21-3207

another’s content. Id. But the court did “not decide which un-

derstanding of § 230(c) is superior” because plaintiffs failed to

plead any underlying state claim. Id.

In Craigslist, the Chicago Lawyers’ Committee for Civil

Rights Under Law sued Craigslist under the Fair Housing Act

for allegedly discriminatory ads that were posted by third

parties. 519 F.3d at 668. The Lawyers’ Committee argued that

Craigslist caused these ads “to be made, printed, or pub-

lished” under 42 U.S.C. § 3604(c). Craigslist, 519 F.3d at 671.

This court explained that § 230(c)(1) does not grant “compre-

hensive immunity from civil liability for content provided by

a third party,” illustrated by the liability of information con-

tent providers “for contributory infringement if their system

is designed to help people steal music or other material in

copyright.” Id. at 670 (citing Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc.

v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913 (2005)). But we concluded that

the only way Craigslist could be held liable under § 3604(c)

was if it was treated as a publisher or speaker of advertise-

ments authored by third parties, which § 230(c)(1) precluded.

See id. at 671.

Later, in City of Chicago v. Stubhub!, Inc., an internet auction

site invoked the CDA in response to an action by the City of

Chicago to collect and remit taxes for tickets sold. 624 F.3d

363, 364–65 (7th Cir. 2010). We held that § 230(c)(1) did not

apply because the City did not seek to hold StubHub! liable

as a publisher or speaker of information, such as through a

defamation, obscenity, or copyright infringement suit. See id.

at 366.

Five years later in Backpage.com, LLC v. Dart, this court con-

sidered whether a county sheriff violated the First Amend-

ment by threatening credit card companies with criminal

Nos. 21-3198 and 21-3207 17

prosecution as accomplices to illegal activity being advertised

on an online forum. See 807 F.3d 229, 233–34 (7th Cir. 2015).

This court referred to Doe, 347 F.3d at 659, in noting that under

ordinary understandings of culpable assistance of wrongdo-

ers, entities that know the information’s content do not be-

come liable for the poster’s words. Backpage, 807 F.3d at 234.

We therefore expressed doubt that the online forum could be

held liable for aiding and abetting a crime just because they

were aware that users had posted ads for illegal conduct. See

id. We acknowledged, however, that the CDA did not immun-

ize the online forum from federal criminal liability. Id.

Most recently, in Huon v. Denton, this court implicitly ac-

cepted the second of Doe’s descriptions of § 230(c)(1)’s effect:

that the provision precludes liability whenever the cause of

action treats an interactive computer service as the publisher

of another’s content. 841 F.3d 733, 741 (7th Cir. 2016) (describ-

ing that Doe “explain[ed] that ‘entities that know the infor-

mation’s content do not become liable for the sponsor’s

deeds,’ and not[ed] that § 230(c) preempts contrary state law”

(quoting Doe, 347 F.3d at 658–59)). In Huon, this court reversed

dismissal of a defamation claim where the plaintiff plausibly

alleged that employees of the defendant website “helped

create and develop” some of the allegedly defamatory com-

ments. Id. at 736–37. We explained that “for purposes of defa-

mation and other related theories of liability, a company …

cannot be considered the publisher of information simply be-

cause the company hosts an online forum for third-party us-

ers to submit comments.” Id. at 741. But the CDA does not

preclude liability against companies “for creating and post-

ing, inducing another to post, or otherwise actively participat-

ing in the posting of” content. Id. at 742.

18 Nos. 21-3198 and 21-3207

These precedents show that § 230(c)(1) is not a compre-

hensive grant of immunity for third-party content. Instead,

that subsection precludes liability only where the success of

the underlying claims requires the defendant to be considered

a publisher or speaker of that content. But § 230(c)(1) may not

necessarily preclude liability if the underlying claims identify

the interactive computer service’s own content as objectiona-

ble.

Plaintiffs argue their claims are based on content Armslist

LLC created to allegedly encourage and assist prohibited

third parties to engage in illegal firearms transactions. To

Webber and Bauer, armslist.com enables anyone to identify

themselves as a “Private Party.” The website also applies that

phrase to all advertisements created by users without an ac-

count. Both complaints further allege that Armslist LLC cre-

ated content that informed users that the company does not

become involved in transactions or certify, investigate, or

guarantee the legal capacity of any party to transact. Accord-

ing to the plaintiffs, these features enabled individuals to cir-

cumvent federal and state firearms laws.

Armslist LLC responds that the plaintiffs seek to impose

upon it a duty of care to protect others from harm that arises

from publication of third-party advertisements on arm-

slist.com. The plaintiffs’ theory, in Armslist LLC’s view, is

that prohibited possessors and sellers used armslist.com to

advertise illegal gun transactions. According to Armslist LLC,

any state cause of action for failing to prevent illegal transac-

tions treats Armslist LLC as a publisher of third-party adver-

tisements. Along the same line, Armslist LLC submits that the

decision to create a listing with the private-party label was ul-

timately the user’s decision.

Nos. 21-3198 and 21-3207 19

Our analysis is aided by this court’s discussion in Craigslist

about the interaction between § 230(c)(1) and contributory

copyright infringement suits. 519 F.3d at 670. Plaintiffs’ alle-

gations that armslist.com was designed to encourage and as-

sist individuals to engage in illegal gun sales and purchases

are similar to the allegations that the software products of

Grokster, Ltd. and StreamCast Networks, Inc. were designed

to encourage the illegal obtaining of music or other copy-

righted material. See Grokster, 545 U.S. at 918–19, 936–37. We

explained in Craigslist that § 230(c)(1)’s limited role meant

that the cause of action in Grokster would not necessarily be

precluded because § 230(c)(1) is not a grant of comprehensive

immunity for content provided by a third party. Craigslist, 519

F.3d at 670. Even so, we need to decide whether § 230(c)(1)

precludes the plaintiffs’ claims only if they have stated a cause

of action against Armslist LLC. See Doe, 347 F.3d at 660. We

therefore assess those claims.

IV. Negligence

We next address whether the plaintiffs have plausibly

pleaded common law negligence claims against Armslist

LLC. As in our personal jurisdiction analysis, the substantive

law of the forum state controls, Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 204

U.S. 64, 78 (1938), here, Wisconsin tort law. If the Wisconsin

Supreme Court has not yet addressed an issue before us, we

look to the decisions of the Wisconsin Court of Appeals to pre-

dict that state’s law. In re Zimmer, NexGen Knee Implant Prods.

Liab. Litig., 884 F.3d 746, 751 (7th Cir. 2018).

To the extent a conflict exists between the state and federal

pleading standards, see Cattau v. Nat’l Ins. Servs. of Wis., 926

N.W.2d 756, 758–59 (Wis. 2019), we apply the federal pleading

standard to assess the sufficiency of the allegations on a

20 Nos. 21-3198 and 21-3207

motion to dismiss. Windy City Metal Fabricators & Supply, Inc.

v. CIT Tech. Fin. Servs., Inc., 536 F.3d 663, 670–72 (7th Cir. 2008).

“To survive a motion to dismiss, a plaintiff must allege

‘enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its

face.’” Boucher v. Fin. Sys. of Green Bay, Inc., 880 F.3d 362, 365–

66 (7th Cir. 2018) (quoting Bell Alt. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.

544, 570 (2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility when the

plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw

the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the

misconduct alleged.” Id. (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.

662, 678 (2009)).

A. Wisconsin common law of negligence, including

public policy factors

A negligence claim under Wisconsin law consists of four

elements: duty, breach, causation, and damages. See Brenner

v. Amerisure Mut. Ins. Co., 893 N.W.2d 193, 198 (Wis. 2017) (cit-

ing Gritzner v. Michael R., 611 N.W.2d 906, 912 (Wis. 2000)).

Armslist LLC does not dispute that damages have been al-

leged. Among the other three elements, we focus on the third,

causation.

Legal cause under Wisconsin law has two components:

cause-in-fact and public policy factors. See Fandrey ex rel. Con-

nell v. Am. Fam. Mut. Ins. Co., 680 N.W.2d 345, 351–52 (Wis.

2004); see also Wis. JI-CIVIL 1500 cmt. Cause-in-fact is estab-

lished using the “substantial factor” test. Fandrey, 680 N.W.2d

at 351. The public policy factors address whether the cause of

the harm is legally sufficient to permit recovery. See id. at 353.

In other words, under Wisconsin law, “[p]roximate cause in-

volves public policy considerations for the court,” although

the term “proximate cause” is no longer used. Id. at 352–53.

Nos. 21-3198 and 21-3207 21

The six public policy factors Wisconsin courts consider

when deciding whether to limit liability are: (1) “[T]he injury

is too remote from the negligence”; (2) “Recovery is ‘too

“wholly out of proportion to the culpability of the negligent

tort-feasor”’”; (3) “[I]n retrospect it appears too highly ex-

traordinary that the negligence should have brought about

the harm”; (4) “Allowing recovery ‘would place too unreason-

able a burden upon [the tortfeasor]’”; (5) “Allowing recovery

would be ‘too likely to open the way to fraudulent claims’”;

or (6) “Allowing recovery ‘would “enter a field that has no

sensible or just stopping point.”’” Id. at 348 n.1 (quoting Colla

v. Mandella, 85 N.W.2d 345, 348 (Wis. 1957)). Because these

factors are set out in the disjunctive, a finding that one is sat-

isfied is sufficient to preclude liability. See Tobias v. Cnty. of

Racine, 507 N.W.2d 340, 342 (Wis. Ct. App. 1993).

The application of these public policy factors is a question

of law. Fandrey, 680 N.W.2d at 350. The Wisconsin Supreme

Court has emphasized that when courts limit liability as part

of the legal cause analysis, they are not pronouncing on “what

is politically appropriate for the state as a whole.” Id. at 354.

Rather, they are engaged in an analysis that is “inexorably

tied to legal cause in Wisconsin,” id. at 354, and is “a function

of the court.” Stephenson v. Universal Metrics, Inc., 641 N.W.2d

158, 168–69 (Wis. 2002). But that function must be exercised

with due respect for legislative choices expressed in its enact-

ments. See Hoida, Inc. v. M & I Midstate Bank, 717 N.W.2d 17,

33–34 (Wis. 2006); Smaxwell v. Bayard, 682 N.W.2d 923, 941,

941 n.15 (Wis. 2004); Stephenson, 641 N.W.2d at 168–69.

In conducting the public policy analysis, Wisconsin courts

have tread carefully when it comes to subject matters that are

“highly regulated by the legislature.” Stephenson, 641 N.W.2d

22 Nos. 21-3198 and 21-3207

at 170. On those topics, the Wisconsin Supreme Court has ex-

pressed a particular reluctance “to create liability where the

legislature has not expressed that there should be any.” Id.

That court has sometimes addressed the relevance of legisla-

tive enactments under the sixth public policy factor; on other

occasions, it has considered certain statutes apart from its dis-

cussion of the relevant factors. Compare Smaxwell, 682 N.W.2d

at 939–42 and Nichols v. Progressive N. Ins. Co., 746 N.W.2d 220,

229–31 (Wis. 2008), with Hoida, 717 N.W.2d at 33–35.

The Wisconsin Supreme Court has expressed that “the

better practice is to submit the case to the jury before deter-

mining whether the public policy considerations preclude li-

ability.” Alvarado v. Sersch, 662 N.W.2d 350, 355 (Wis. 2003).

But it has also stated that a court may apply public policy con-

siderations before trial where the policy questions are fully

presented and the facts are easily ascertainable. Fandrey, 680

N.W.2d at 358; see Hornback v. Archdiocese of Milwaukee, 752

N.W.2d 862, 875–76 (Wis. 2008).

Plaintiffs contend the district court in Webber erred in ad-

dressing the public policy factors at the motion to dismiss

stage because the facts are insufficiently established. But the

public policy factors have previously been applied on mo-

tions to dismiss. See, e.g., Nichols, 746 N.W.2d at 222–23, 227.

Important to our consideration is that the relevant public pol-

icy to be applied in these cases stems from legislative enact-

ments. The parties acknowledge that Armslist LLC does not

sell firearms, let alone engage in the business of selling fire-

arms, so the interpretation and application of statutes to these

cases does not require full development of the facts. Moreo-

ver, the pleadings and briefing present a question of public

policy. See Bowen v. Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 517 N.W.2d

Nos. 21-3198 and 21-3207 23

432, 443 (Wis. 1994). That question is whether it contravenes

statutes for a website hosting firearms transactions to be held

to the standards regulating firearms dealers in Wisconsin, or

to charge such a website with enforcing those standards. The

parties submitted substantial briefing addressing the first,

second, fourth, and sixth public policy factors, and the scope

of Wisconsin statutes regulating firearms transactions ap-

pears on the face of the complaints. For these reasons, the

public policy factors are appropriately considered in resolv-

ing these cases at the motion to dismiss stage.

B. Wisconsin statute on purchase of handguns

The key legislative enactment guiding our discussion is

Wisconsin Statute § 175.35, which regulates the purchase of

handguns. That statute defines “firearms dealer” as “any per-

son engaged in the business of importing, manufacturing or

dealing in firearms and having a license as an importer, man-

ufacturer or dealer issued by the federal government.”

§ 175.35(1)(ar). By referring to the federal licensing scheme,

the state statute incorporates certain definitions provided un-

der federal law. First, a “licensed dealer” is “any dealer who

is licensed under the provisions of this chapter,” and a

“dealer” includes “any person engaged in the business of sell-

ing firearms at wholesale or retail.” 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(11). The

term “engaged in the business,” however, “shall not include

a person who makes occasional sales, exchanges, or purchases

of firearms for the enhancement of a personal collection or for

a hobby, or who sells all or part of his personal collection of

firearms.” § 921(a)(21)(C). Therefore, the provisions of

§ 175.35 governing firearms dealers exclude individuals mak-

ing occasional sales and exchanges—that is, private sellers.

Wisconsin law compels firearms dealers to obtain evidence of

24 Nos. 21-3198 and 21-3207

the legality of the transaction, conduct background checks,

and keep transaction records, among other requirements. See

§ 175.35. To aid our evaluation, we consider these statutory

demands on firearms dealers.

Evidence of transaction’s legality. Before transferring posses-

sion of a handgun, a firearms dealer must, among other

things, obtain identification and a completed notification

form from a transferee. § 175.35(2)(a)–(b). Sec-

tion 175.35(2g)(a) specifies, “The department of justice shall

promulgate rules prescribing procedures for a transferee to

provide and a firearms dealer to inspect identification con-

taining a photograph of the transferee.” The Wisconsin State

Department of Justice promulgated Wisconsin Administra-

tive Code § Jus. 10.01, which declared the purpose of the

chapter to be “to establish the procedures, as required under

s. 175.35(2g), Stats., for searching the records of persons to

whom a handgun dealer proposes to transfer a handgun.”7

Section Jus. 10.06(1)(a) states that a dealer “shall require each

handgun transferee to show the dealer, for the dealer’s inspec-

tion, a reliable identification document. The identification

document shall include a photograph of the transferee.” A

dealer must also “require each transferee to complete an offi-

cial notification form obtained from the department,” which

collects information including a transferee’s legal name, birth

date, gender, race, social security number, and current ad-

dress. § Jus. 10.06(1)(c)(1). This information is then used to

7“Handgun dealer” or “dealer” as used in the chapter refers to “a

firearms dealer as defined in s. 175.35(1)(ar), Stats., who offers one or more

handguns for sale.” WIS. ADMIN. CODE § Jus. 10.03.

Nos. 21-3198 and 21-3207 25

certify the legality of a handgun transfer. See generally § Jus.

10.06(1)(d)–(2).

Background Checks and Transaction Records. Before transfer-

ring a handgun, a firearms dealer must also request a “fire-

arms restrictions record search.” WIS. STAT. § 175.35(2)(c).

That includes “a search in the national instant criminal back-

ground check system.” § 175.35(at). Further, a firearms dealer

must keep “the original record of all completed notification

forms and a record of all confirmation numbers and corre-

sponding approval or nonapproval numbers.” § 175.35(2j); see

also WIS. ADMIN. CODE § Jus. 10.10(1).

Delivery and Waiting Period. Wisconsin Statute § 175.35

does not require purchasers of firearms from private sellers to

take delivery in any specific way, nor does it impose a waiting

period on the delivery of a firearm to the purchaser after a

confirmation number from a firearms restrictions record

search is obtained, see Daniel, 926 N.W.2d at 722. Moreover,

Wisconsin Statute § 66.0409 governs the local regulation of

weapons. That statute specifies “[n]othing in this section pro-

hibits a political subdivision from continuing to enforce until

November 30, 1998, an ordinance or resolution that is in effect

on November 18, 1995, and that requires a waiting period of

not more than 7 days for the purchase of a handgun.”

§ 66.0409(am) (emphasis added).

C. Plaintiffs’ negligence allegations

The allegations of Armslist LLC’s negligence track the

same three categories:

1. Evidence of Legality. Bauer and Webber contend Armslist

LLC breached its duty by failing to require buyers and sellers

to provide information about the legality of transactions.

26 Nos. 21-3198 and 21-3207

They specifically allege that Armslist LLC failed to demand

greater transparency from users, such as by requiring both

buyers and sellers to create accounts and provide credit-card

verified evidence of their identities. They also aver Armslist

LLC failed to oblige buyers and sellers to certify and provide

evidence that they are legal transactors. Bauer adds that Arm-

slist LLC was negligent in failing to require buyers and sellers

to register.

2. Background Checks and Transaction Records. Bauer and

Webber further allege that Armslist LLC breached its duty by

failing to require or recommend that sellers conduct back-

ground checks. Webber adds that Armslist was negligent in

failing to require or recommend that sellers create transaction

records.

3. Delivery and Waiting Period. Bauer and Webber also

claim that Armslist LLC was negligent in failing to require

purchasers from private sellers to take delivery of the firearm

through a federal firearms licensee, who would run a back-

ground check and create transaction records. Webber further

alleges that Armslist LLC was negligent in failing to impose a

reasonable waiting period for delivery of a firearm purchased

through the website.

As shown above, Wisconsin Statute § 175.35 regulates

each of these aspects of handgun sales. Concluding that the

allegations in these three categories state a negligence claim

would directly contravene the Wisconsin legislature’s judg-

ments, as reflected in Wisconsin Statute §§ 175.35 and 66.0409.

Section 175.35 requires firearms dealers—not websites,

private sellers, or other entities—to obtain certain evidence of

the legality of a transaction, the first category. Armslist LLC

Nos. 21-3198 and 21-3207 27

is not a firearms dealer. Concluding that the allegations in this

first category can proceed would impose the responsibilities

of firearms dealers on actors which the Wisconsin legislature

has not chosen to regulate in this manner. It would also hold

Armslist LLC liable for failing to operate as an arm of the state

where Wisconsin has not given it this function. Just so, on al-

legations about background checks and transaction records—

the second category—the Wisconsin legislature has not cho-

sen to regulate websites or private sellers, such as Verstagen,

or to oblige them with enforcement.

Under § 175.35, neither a method of delivery nor a waiting

period is specified—the third category—even for firearms

dealers. That statute also incorporates the federal definition in

18 U.S.C. § 921 of “engaged in the business” of dealing in fire-

arms, which expressly exempts private sellers from its re-

quirements. Therefore, the Wisconsin legislature has chosen

not to impose delivery specifications on handguns obtained

via private sale, the third category. Nor has it imposed a wait-

ing period on transactions. In fact, a forty-eight-hour waiting

period that formerly existed under Wisconsin law was elimi-

nated in later versions of § 175.35. See Act of June 24, 2015, § 3,

2015 Wis. Legis. Serv. 22 (West) (eliminating a minimum wait-

ing period of forty-eight hours).

Armslist LLC is not a firearms dealer—rather, it operates

a website that hosts third-party advertisements for the sale

and purchase of firearms. The state has not entrusted it with

enforcing the provisions of the regulatory scheme governing

handgun transfers. It follows that Armslist LLC has no

statutory obligation to collect identification, require

certification and evidence of legal transactions, mandate or

recommend background checks or recordkeeping, or regulate

28 Nos. 21-3198 and 21-3207

the delivery of firearms. If we decided that plaintiffs stated a

negligence claim against Armslist LLC based on these three

categories of allegations, that conclusion would contravene

the Wisconsin legislature’s judgment on which entities—i.e.,

firearms dealers—will be held liable for meeting the

requirements of state and federal law. Wisconsin has not

chosen to include websites hosting firearms transactions as

among the actors regulated in the ways plaintiffs allege, a

decision that must be respected. Wisconsin has also chosen to

exempt private sellers, like Verstagen, from certain

requirements, WIS. STAT. § 175.35(1)(ar), and has made the

decision to eliminate a waiting period on handgun purchases,

see Act of June 24, 2015, § 3, 2015 Wis. Legis. Serv. 22 (West).

We decline to redefine what is politically appropriate for the

state or to find liability where Wisconsin has not expressed it

should exist. See Hoida, 717 N.W.2d at 27; Stephenson, 641

N.W.2d at 170. Just so, we note that state officials can take

measures to ensure that this regulatory scheme, enacted by

elected representatives, is complied with so its requirements

do not become a “dead letter.”

Although most of plaintiffs’ allegations fall into these

three categories and are in unmistakable tension with Wis-

consin’s legislative enactments, we see three sets of allega-

tions that are not:

• High Volume Sellers. Bauer alleges Armslist LLC was

negligent in failing to: monitor high volume sellers,

design its website to prevent unlawful high volume

sales, remove sellers engaged in the business of sell-

ing firearms without a license, provide users with

tools to report repeat offenders, notify law enforce-

ment of users engaged in the business of selling

Nos. 21-3198 and 21-3207 29

firearms, and inform users that law enforcement

will be notified of persons who appear to be en-

gaged in selling firearms without a license.

• Flagging Illegal Conduct. Plaintiffs also claim Arm-

slist LLC was negligent in failing to enable users to

flag potentially illegal conduct and alert it and law

enforcement of this activity.

• Providing Updated Firearms Law. Bauer and Webber

aver Armslist LLC breached its duty by failing to

provide “extensive and regularly updated” infor-

mation regarding all applicable firearms laws.

We consider next whether plaintiffs have plausibly pleaded

causation in any of these three sets of allegations.

“The phrase ‘substantial factor’ denotes that the defend-

ant’s conduct has such an effect in producing the harm as to

lead the trier of fact, as a reasonable person, to regard it as a

cause, using that word in the popular sense.” Merco Distrib.

Corp. v. Com. Police Alarm Co., 267 N.W.2d 652, 654 (Wis. 1978)

(citing Restatement (Second) of Torts § 431, cmt. a (1965)). Un-

der Wisconsin law, causation is not restricted to a single act

or omission: “[T]here can be more than one substantial factor

contributing to the same result and thus more than one cause-

in-fact.” Morgan v. Pa. Gen. Ins. Co., 275 N.W.2d 660, 666 (Wis.

1979). Causation is a factual question for a jury if reasonable

people “could differ on the issue.” Id. It becomes a question

of law if reasonable people “could not disagree.” Id.

“Cause-in-fact has also been described as requiring an un-

broken sequence of events connecting the negligent act and

the injury.” Hoida, 717 N.W.2d at 33 n.19; see also Cefalu v.

Cont’l W. Ins. Co., 703 N.W.2d 743, 747 (Wis. App. 2005);

30 Nos. 21-3198 and 21-3207

Fondell v. Lucky Stores, Inc., 270 N.W.2d 205, 210 (Wis. 1978).

In other words, the defendant’s negligence must be “actively

operating at the time of the accident which produced the

plaintiff’s injury.” Cefalu, 703 N.W.2d at 747.

Bauer’s high-volume seller claim fails due to a break in the

chain of causation. Even if we assume Bauer’s high volume

seller allegations adequately plead duty and breach, Bauer

does not plead any facts that demonstrate Jones was prohib-

ited by law from purchasing firearms. Rather, Bauer alleges

only that Jones had been previously arrested on drug charges;

Bauer does not claim that Jones had been charged with any

crime that would have precluded him from lawfully obtain-

ing a firearm. What is more, Bauer pleads only that Jones

“may have feared” he would be unable to pass a background

check, as opposed to alleging that a background check would

have affirmatively prevented him from buying a gun. Private

sales are legal in Wisconsin, see 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(21)(C); Dan-

iel, 926 N.W.2d at 722, and Bauer has not alleged that Jones

unlawfully obtained the firearm at issue. Reasonable people

could not disagree that Bauer failed to plead that Armslist

LLC’s alleged negligence was actively operating when Jones

obtained the firearm. See Cefalu, 703 N.W.2d at 747. Bauer thus

has not alleged causation as a matter of law in a high-volume

seller claim.

We reach the same conclusion as to the other two sets of

allegations. Causation is not established where the harm

would have occurred even absent the defendant’s negligence.

See Beacon Bowl, Inc. v. Wis. Elec. Power Co., 501 N.W.2d 788,

807 (Wis. 1993). Bauer and Webber have failed to plausibly

plead that the deaths would not have occurred but for Arm-

slist LLC’s failure to permit users to flag illegal conduct. In

Nos. 21-3198 and 21-3207 31

fact, in its website’s terms of use, Armslist LLC provided the

contact information number for the Bureau of Alcohol, To-

bacco, Firearms and Explosives. Given that users could report

the same conduct directly to ATF, plaintiffs do not explain

how allowing users to flag conduct would plausibly have pre-

vented the deaths.

Plaintiffs have also failed to plausibly allege that the

deaths would not have occurred but for Armslist’s failure to

provide updated firearms laws. Bauer and Webber do not al-

lege any facts about the effect of providing updated firearms

information on the likelihood that individuals will engage in

illegal transactions. Without these allegations, we cannot con-

clude that plaintiffs have plausibly alleged providing up-

dated firearms laws would have prevented the deaths.

Even if we assume the duty and breach elements of negli-

gence have been satisfied, these three additional sets of alle-

gations, not precluded by Wisconsin Statute § 175.35, do not

survive the plausibility standard necessary to plead a negli-

gence claim. None of these allegations plead factual content

that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the

defendants are liable for the misconduct alleged. See Boucher,

880 F.3d at 365–66. Put another way, the allegations in any of

these three sets do not plausibly show that Armlist LLC

caused the deaths of Commander Bauer and Sara Schmidt.

D. Application of public policy factors

As noted above, in addition to cause-in-fact, Wisconsin

law on causation includes public policy considerations. Fan-

drey, 680 N.W.2d at 352; see also Wis. JI-CIVIL 1500 cmt. As an

alternative causation analysis, we consider plaintiffs’ allega-

tions under two of the public policy factors, the second

32 Nos. 21-3198 and 21-3207

(disproportionate liability) and the sixth (no sensible or just

stopping point).

In Webber, the district court ruled that the plaintiff’s negli-

gence claim was precluded, including by the second policy

factor of disproportionate liability. He concluded that impos-

ing civil liability here would likely destroy Armslist LLC’s

business. In Bauer, the district court declined to base its deci-

sion on the public policy factors.

Out of proportion to culpability. Bauer and Webber argue

that Wisconsin courts have invoked this public policy factor

only when the defendant’s blameworthiness is minimal at the

time the risk materializes, or if it is more than minimal, the

cost of injury is so high that it is out of proportion with the

defendant’s culpability. Among the cases plaintiffs cite for

this proposition is Stephenson.

Armslist LLC counters that because it did not use, distrib-

ute, or sell a firearm to anyone, holding it responsible for the

murders would be disproportionate to its culpability. It also

refers to Daniel and argues that creating and operating a web-

site that enables buyers to find information posted by third-

party sellers is legal.

In Stephenson, the Wisconsin Supreme Court concluded

that recovery was precluded on this factor against an individ-

ual who agreed to drive an inebriated person home, causing

a bartender to serve that person more alcohol. 641 N.W.2d at

160, 169. It reasoned, in relevant part, that liability was dis-

proportionate considering the state’s immunity laws. If the

defendant had been a social host who had served alcohol to

the defendant, he would be immune from suit. “It defies

common sense to hold someone in [the defendant]’s position

Nos. 21-3198 and 21-3207 33

liable while immunizing someone who serves or even encour-

ages alcohol consumption.” Id. at 169.

Based on Stephenson, this second factor precludes liability

in Webber on all allegations within the three categories re-

ferred to above. As in that case, statutes inform culpability.

Private sellers are exempt from the requirements plaintiffs

seek to impose. Verstagen is a private seller, and thus has no

obligation to certify, investigate, or delay the transaction. To

impose those requirements on Armslist LLC, the website

hosting Verstagen’s transaction, would place liability on an

actor one step removed from Verstagen, and circumvent leg-

islative judgment. See id. For these reasons, we agree with the

district court’s analysis and conclusion on this second factor

in Webber.

No sensible or just stopping point. Under the sixth public pol-

icy factor, Armslist LLC contends that because plaintiffs will

always conjure creative arguments about what a firearms

platform should have done to prevent harm, liability here has

no sensible or just stopping point. Armslist LLC argues that

potential harm is not limited to firearms and could apply to

any product that could harm someone. Plaintiffs respond

there is no liability if a defendant played no role in a harm,

but here the defendants consciously created, designed, and

maintained a website to allow and encourage illegal firearms

sales. Per plaintiffs, the stopping point would be a jury’s de-

cision that Armslist LLC acted reasonably.

At the end of its discussion of this sixth factor in Stephen-

son, the Wisconsin Supreme Court stated that “the possibili-

ties for expanding liability … would also threaten to run

counter to the legislative enactments regarding immunity.”

641 N.W.2d at 170. That court continued, “Finally, we give

34 Nos. 21-3198 and 21-3207

significant weight to the fact that the production, sale, distri-

bution, vending, and consumption of alcoholic beverages are

highly regulated by the legislature.” Id. “Given this history

and the current state of the law, we are reluctant to create lia-

bility where the legislature has not expressed that there

should be any. We think that it is more appropriate that the

legislature decide whether or not someone who agrees to

drive an intoxicated person home should be an exception to

the legislature’s general policy of holding the intoxicated per-

sons themselves liable for injuries they cause.” Id.

In Smaxwell, the same court ruled that the sixth factor

precluded liability against a landowner for harm caused by a

tenant’s dogs. 682 N.W.2d at 939. This was in part because al-

lowing liability would contradict a state statute imposing

strict liability exclusively on owners for injuries caused by

dogs. Id. at 941.

Under the reasoning of Stephenson and Smaxwell, this sixth

factor precludes liability in Webber and Bauer. The same con-

cerns exist with expanding liability counter to legislative en-

actments on the purchase of handguns. Wisconsin statutes

regulate the entities that qualify as firearms dealers; other ac-

tors are not subject to those statutes and have not been

charged with enforcing them. To allow liability on those other

actors, such as private sellers—and here a website—would

contradict that legislative judgment. The same holds true for

the lack of a principled stopping point. If liability is permitted

here, there would be no distinction between firearms dealers

and exempt entities, a line Wisconsin law has drawn.

Because the public policy factors are considered in the dis-

junctive, a finding that one is satisfied is sufficient to preclude

liability. See Tobias, 507 N.W.2d at 342. Most of the allegations

Nos. 21-3198 and 21-3207 35

in Webber fail under the second factor, and the first three cat-

egories of allegations in both cases fail under the sixth factor.

* * *

Concluding that plaintiffs’ allegations would state causa-

tion for a negligence claim would directly contravene Wiscon-

sin statutes on the regulation of handguns. The remaining

allegations do not state a claim under Wisconsin tort law, so

we need not review the questions of duty and breach. Two of

Wisconsin’s public policy factors also preclude plaintiffs’

claims. For these reasons, we conclude that plaintiffs have not

stated common law negligence claims against Armslist LLC.

V. Other Claims

Plaintiffs argue the district court erroneously dismissed

their public nuisance, wrongful death, survivorship, and con-

sortium claims. But their failure to plausibly plead negligence

claims disposes of these other causes of action.

Public nuisance requires a showing of negligence. WIS. JI-

CIVIL 1928 (“To sustain a claim of nuisance in this case, plain-

tiff must prove … [that the] defendant was negligent.”).

Wrongful death actions in Wisconsin require an underlying

wrongful act, neglect, or default. WIS. STAT. § 895.03 (provid-

ing that liability exists “[w]henever the death of a person shall

be caused by a wrongful act, neglect or default”); see also

Rosenthal v. Ascension Health, No. 21-cv-344-wmc, 2022 WL

203475, at *2 (W.D. Wis. Jan. 24, 2022) (stating that § 895.03 “is

a ‘derivative tort action[]’ and thus, specifically premised on

the existence of an underlying common law tort” (quoting

Christ v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 866 N.W.2d 602, 609 (Wis. 2015))).

Similarly, the survival action depends on an underlying tort,

since the “action is brought by the representative of the

36 Nos. 21-3198 and 21-3207

deceased for personal injury damages suffered by the de-

ceased prior to his death.” Force ex rel. Welcenbach v. Am. Fam.

Mut. Ins. Co., 850 N.W.2d 866, 878 n. 30 (Wis. 2014) (quoting

Prunty v. Schwantes, 162 N.W.2d 34, 37 (Wis. 1968)). Loss of

consortium is also a derivative claim, relying on the existence

of an underlying tort—here, negligence. Cf. Finnegan ex rel.

Skoglind v. Wis. Patients Comp. Fund, 666 N.W.2d 797, 804–05

(Wis. 2003) (characterizing consortium as a derivative claim).

Because plaintiffs cannot show negligence, there is no under-

lying tort for these claims, and their dismissal was proper.

Two more claims, unrelated to any alleged negligence by

Armslist LLC, require discussion: aiding and abetting tortious

conduct (only pleaded in Bauer), and civil conspiracy.

The district court held that Bauer failed to state a claim for

aiding and abetting tortious conduct because he did not suf-

ficiently allege that defendants consciously desired or in-

tended to assist illegal sales. Bauer argues on appeal that she

pleaded that defendants deliberately chose to implement cer-

tain design features and that they designed and administered

armslist.com to assist illegal purchases.

“A person is liable in tort for aiding and abetting if the per-

son (1) undertakes conduct that as a matter of objective fact

aids another in the commission of an unlawful act; and

(2) consciously desires or intends that his conduct will yield

such assistance.” Tensfeldt v. Haberman, 768 N.W.2d 641, 649

n.12 (Wis. 2009). “Mere presence, with no effort to prevent un-

lawful conduct, is not aiding and abetting unless an intent to

assist is communicated.” See Winslow v. Brown, 371 N.W.2d

417, 423 (Wis. 1985). The underlying tortious conduct alleged

by Bauer is the “transferring [of] weapons to dangerous indi-

viduals displaying a propensity to misuse such weapons in a

Nos. 21-3198 and 21-3207 37

manner that would cause harm to innocent third-parties.” As

an allegation of intent to aid this conduct, Bauer points to his

claim that “the Armslist Defendants chose to implement de-

sign, policy and content choices which made the transfer of

firearms to the criminal market an inevitable and major part

of the commerce on Armslist.com.” Bauer also refers to his

allegation that despite notice of criminal activity, “the Arm-

slist Defendants continued to design and administer Arm-

slist.com to fuel an online black market in firearms.”

Bauer’s allegations do not raise a plausible inference that

Armslist LLC aided and abetted illegal sales. At most, he

pleads facts consistent with both an intent to aid and abet and

mere presence, and Armslist LLC’s actions are more likely ex-

plained by the latter. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 680. The fact that

private sales are legal in Wisconsin provides an obvious alter-

native explanation for armslist.com’s design. Bauer also fails

to point to a specific action Armslist LLC took in “continuing”

to design and administer the website to promote illegal sales

that might indicate an intent to assist; rather, Bauer seems to

contend that armslist.com aided and abetted illegal transac-

tions simply by virtue of its continued existence. But the fail-

ure to prevent unlawful conduct is alone insufficient to state

a claim for aiding and abetting. See Winslow, 371 N.W.2d at

423.

Mere presence can support aiding and abetting liability if

an intent to assist is communicated. Id. As evidence of such a

communication, Bauer asserts Armslist included the follow-

ing disclosures on its website:

• “ARMSLIST DOES NOT become involved in trans-

actions between parties and does not certify,

38 Nos. 21-3198 and 21-3207

investigate, or in any way guarantee the legal ca-

pacity of any party to transact”; and

• “ARMSLIST can not and will not be a party in trans-

actions. It is the sole responsibility of the buyer and

seller to conduct safe and legal transactions.”

But the plaintiffs’ interpretation of these disclaimers presents

only a sheer possibility of unlawful conduct. See Iqbal, 556 U.S.

at 678. The obvious alternative explanation for the disclaimers

is that they operate as “at your own risk” provisions. These

provisions no more endorse illegal activity than a “swim at

your own risk” sign placed at a hotel pool endorses using the

pool to drown another. In fact, armslist.com’s terms of use re-

quire users to certify that they “will not use Armslist.com for

any illegal purpose.” Bauer’s claim for aiding and abetting

tortious conduct therefore fails.

In each case the district court also dismissed plaintiffs’

civil conspiracy claims. In Webber, the court reasoned that the

claim suffered from the same failure to adequately plead cau-

sation and was subject to the same public policy considera-

tions as apply to the negligence claim. And in Bauer, the court

concluded that the allegations were too vague to state a claim,

since plaintiffs alleged that Gibbon and Armslist “and/or

other parties” conspired. That court also observed that the

complaint alleged only in a conclusory fashion that Armslist

LLC intended to conspire to promote unlawful transactions.

Plaintiffs contend that Armslist LLC and co-conspirators

intended to supply firearms to prohibited possessors. They

allege they did so by encouraging the operation of “stores”

through which unlicensed firearms dealers would sell fire-

arms, and by motivating prohibited possessors to transact on

Nos. 21-3198 and 21-3207 39

the website through its design features. Bauer also argues that

Armslist LLC conspired with Gibbon and other unknown

parties. Armslist LLC responds that the allegations of civil

conspiracy are too vague to state a claim.

To support a claim for civil conspiracy, “[t]here must be

intentional participation in the transaction with a view to the

furtherance of the common design.” Coopman v. State Farm

Fire & Cas. Co., 508 N.W.2d 610, 613 (Wis. Ct. App. 1993).

“[M]ere knowledge, acquiescence or approval of a plan, with-

out cooperation or agreement to cooperate, is not enough to

make a person a party to a conspiracy.” Id. (quoting Winslow,

371 N.W.2d at 420)). Plaintiffs plead facts consistent with co-

operation in furtherance of an unlawful purpose, but they are

also compatible—and more readily explained by—mere

acquiescence. As explained above, an obvious alternative ex-

planation for Armslist LLC’s conduct is that it designed its

website to permit private sales consistent with Wisconsin law.

The plaintiffs have therefore failed to move their complaints

over the line from conceivable to plausible. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at

680. 8

8 For completeness, we note two items. First, because plaintiffs have

not plausibly alleged a cause of action, we need not resolve the CDA

preemption issue. See Gonzalez v. Google LLC, 143 S. Ct. 1191 (2023).

Second, plaintiffs’ claims of piercing the corporate veil were properly dis-

missed. Armslist LLC is a Pennsylvania limited liability company. We ap-

ply Wisconsin’s choice-of-law rules to determine whether Wisconsin or

Pennsylvania law on piercing the corporate veil applies. Klaxon Co. v. Sten-

tor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 496 (1941). Under Wisconsin’s conflict of

laws rules, “the threshold question for a court is ‘whether a genuine con-

flict exists between Wisconsin law and the law of the other state.’” Waranka

v. Wadena Ins. Co., 847 N.W.2d 324, 332 (Wis. 2014) (quoting Sharp ex rel.

Gordon v. Case Corp., 595 N.W.2d 380, 384 (1999)). Wisconsin law applies

40 Nos. 21-3198 and 21-3207

VI. Amending the Complaints

Last, Bauer and Webber argue that the district court erred

in entering judgment instead of dismissing their complaints

and permitting amendment. They ask us to remand with in-

structions to allow them to file amended complaints, if we

deem amendment necessary.

These two cases have somewhat different procedural pos-

tures. When the district court entered judgment in each case,

Bauer had twice amended her original complaint, and Web-

ber was standing on his original complaint. 9

“When a district court enters final judgment at the same

time as it dismisses a complaint, the plaintiff should file a

post-judgment motion for leave to amend under Federal Rule

of Civil Procedure 59(e).” White v. Ill. State Police, 15 F.4th 801,

808 (7th Cir. 2021). “We have rejected the argument that Rule

15 requires a district court dismissing a plaintiff’s original

complaint with prejudice to sua sponte grant leave to amend

the complaint. Even after judgment is entered, a plaintiff seek-

ing to amend a complaint must properly move to amend in

the district court.” Id. (citations omitted).

when there is no conflict between the two states’ laws. Sharp, 595 N.W.2d

at 384. A request to pierce the corporate veil is not an independent cause

of action under Wisconsin and Pennsylvania law. Commonwealth v. Golden

Gate Nat’l Senior Care LLC, 194 A.3d 1010, 1035 (Pa. 2018); see Spearing v.

Cnty. of Bayfield, 394 N.W.2d 761, 765 (Wis. Ct. App. 1986). Therefore, there

is no conflict, Wisconsin law applies, and the plaintiffs have failed to state

a claim.

9Plaintiffs have filed comprehensive complaints. Bauer’s second

amended complaint is 48 pages, with 233 paragraphs, and includes nine

counts. Webber’s complaint is 36 pages, with 227 paragraphs, and in-

cludes seven counts.

Nos. 21-3198 and 21-3207 41

“Ordinarily … a plaintiff whose original complaint has

been dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6) should be given at least

one opportunity to try to amend her complaint before the en-

tire action is dismissed.” Runnion v. Girl Scouts of Greater Chi.,

786 F.3d 510, 519 (7th Cir. 2015). But decisions in which this

court has remanded to permit amendment where no motion

under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 59 or 60 was filed after

the entry of judgment are rare. 10

When judgment was entered in Bauer’s case, she had al-

ready amended her complaint twice. Although the district

court suggested that Bauer would have an opportunity to

amend her complaint after the ruling on the Rule 12(b)(6) mo-

tion, Bauer chose to appeal the judgment rather than move to

reopen the pleadings. Webber made the same decision. Nei-

ther plaintiff attempted to file an amended complaint in the

district court after the judgment or propose to this court how

they would amend their complaints if given the opportunity.

Plaintiffs chose to appeal. Accordingly, we decline plaintiffs’

requests to remand for amendment.

VII. Conclusion

For these reasons, we REVERSE the decision in Webber that

personal jurisdiction exists over Gibbon. Because plaintiffs

have failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted,

we AFFIRM the dismissal in each case.

10 One decision that appears to have been remanded to permit amend-

ment without a Rule 59 or 60 motion is Barry Aviation Inc. v. Land O'Lakes

Mun. Airport Comm'n, 377 F.3d 682 (7th Cir. 2004). But there, the district

court expressly found that amendment would be futile, id. at 686, making

such a motion frivolous.