Yvonne Mack v. Resurgent Capital Services, L.

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

____________________

No. 21‐2792

YVONNE MACK,

Plaintiff‐Appellant,

v.

RESURGENT CAPITAL

SERVICES, L.P. and LVNV

FUNDING, LLC,

Defendants‐Appellees.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.

No. 1:18‐cv‐16300 — Sara L. Ellis, Judge.

____________________

ARGUED NOVEMBER 9, 2022 — DECIDED JUNE 7, 2023

____________________

Before ROVNER, JACKSON‐AKIWUMI, and LEE, Circuit Judges.

ROVNER, Circuit Judge. Yvonne Mack appeals from the dis‐

missal of her claims for lack of standing in this Fair Debt Col‐

lection Practices Act (“FDCPA”) case. See 15 U.S.C. § 1692 et

seq. The district court concluded that Mack failed to demon‐

strate that she had suffered an injury in fact sufficient to sup‐

port her standing to bring suit. But Mack adequately alleged

2 No. 21‐2792

an injury in fact, and supported her allegations with evidence

that the defendants’ violation of the statute caused her to suf‐

fer monetary damages, albeit of modest size. We therefore re‐

verse and remand for further proceedings.

I.

Mack had a US Bank credit card that she used to make

household purchases. After she allegedly defaulted on that

account, defendant LVNV Funding, LLC (“LVNV”) pur‐

chased the debt. Debts purchased by LVNV are serviced by a

related entity, defendant Resurgent Capital Services, L.P.

(“Resurgent”). In this instance, Resurgent engaged Frontline

Asset Strategies, LLC (“Frontline”) to collect on the debt. In a

letter dated April 27, 2018, Frontline informed Mack that her

account had been placed for collection, and that she owed

$7,179.87. The letter provided a website and a phone number

that Mack could use to pay the debt. It listed US Bank as the

“Original Creditor,” and LVNV as the “Current Creditor.”

The letter also contained, among other things, the following

notices to Mack:

This communication is from a debt collector and

is an attempt to collect a debt. Any information

obtained will be used for that purpose.

…

Unless you notify this office within 30 days after

receiving this notice that you dispute the valid‐

ity of this debt, or any portion thereof, this office

will assume this debt is valid. If you notify this

office in writing within 30 days from receiving

this notice that you dispute this debt, or any

portion thereof, this office will obtain

No. 21‐2792 3

verification of the debt or obtain a copy of a

judgment and mail you a copy of such judgment

or verification. If you request of this office, in

writing, within 30 days after receiving this no‐

tice, this office will provide you with the name

and address of the original creditor, if different

from the current creditor.

R. 1‐3 (hereafter “Frontline Letter”).

Although Mack was aware of her debt to US Bank, she was

uncertain about the amount claimed in the letter, which

seemed high to her, and her obligations to LVNV, an entity

with which she was not familiar. Within thirty days of receiv‐

ing this letter, Mack researched her options using her cell

phone, drafted a validation request by hand, traveled to her

local library to type and print the letter on the library’s com‐

puter (she did not have access to a computer or a printer at

home), and then went to the post office where she paid $6.70

in postage and $3.45 for a certified mail fee (for a total of

$10.15) to send the letter to Frontline. Her letter, postmarked

June 5, 2018, was received by Frontline on June 7, 2018. R. 1‐4.

Mack did not receive the validation that she requested. In‐

stead, she received a second letter, this one from Resurgent.

The letter identified US Bank as the “Original Creditor,”

LVNV as the “Current Owner,” and listed the balance of

$7,179.87. The body of the June 18, 2018 letter stated in whole:

Resurgent Capital Services L.P. manages the

above referenced account for LVNV Funding

LLC and has initiated a review of the inquiry we

recently received.

4 No. 21‐2792

For further assistance, please contact one of our

Customer Service Representatives toll‐free at

1‐866‐464‐1187.

Sincerely,

Customer Service Department

Resurgent Capital Services L.P.

Please read the following important notices as

they may affect your rights.

Unless you notify us within 30 days after receiv‐

ing this notice that you dispute the validity of

this debt, or any portion of it, we will assume

this debt is valid. If you notify us in writing

within 30 days after receiving this notice that

you dispute the validity of this debt, or any por‐

tion of it, we will obtain verification of the debt

or obtain a copy of a judgment and mail you a

copy of such judgment or verification. If you re‐

quest of us in writing, within 30 days after re‐

ceiving this notice, we will provide you with the

name and address of the original creditor, if dif‐

ferent from the current creditor.

This is an attempt to collect a debt and any in‐

formation obtained will be used for that pur‐

pose. This communication is from a debt collec‐

tor.

R. 1‐5 (hereafter “Resurgent Letter”). The bottom of the Re‐

surgent Letter listed hours of operation, an address, phone

and fax numbers, and a “Customer Portal” website address.

Mack was confused and alarmed by the Resurgent Letter.

She had already requested validation within 30 days of

No. 21‐2792 5

receiving the Frontline Letter and had not received the re‐

quested validation. More than 30 days had passed since re‐

ceiving the Frontline Letter and she was now being told that

she would have to request validation again from a different

company or the creditor would assume the debt was valid.

She was even more confused regarding who owned the debt,

now believing that Resurgent might own it. She concluded

that she needed to send a second validation request, this time

to Resurgent, so that the creditor would not assume that the

debt was valid. She once again took the steps necessary to

write up her draft letter by hand. She returned to the library

to type it into the library computer (because library users can‐

not save previous documents on the library’s computer),

printed it, and returned to the post office where she once

again paid for postage and a certified letter fee (this time to‐

taling $3.95) to send her July 17, 2018 validation request.1

None of this was easy for Mack. She had been unem‐

ployed for some time and spent her days caring for family

members with serious health problems. Trips to the library

and post office meant that she was away from the family

members who needed her assistance. The $3.95 postage fee

for the second letter was also problematic for Mack. Mack ex‐

plained the harm caused by the letter from Resurgent:

1 To send the first letter, Mack appears to have used Priority Mail

($6.70) plus Certified Mail ($3.45) for the total of $10.15 that is reflected on

the receipt for that letter. The envelope for the second letter shows a cost

of $3.95, which we may assume included regular First Class postage of

fifty cents plus the Certified Mail fee of $3.45. See https://about.usps.

com/news/national‐releases/2017/pr17_062.htm (last visited June 7, 2023),

archived at https://perma.cc/J9KV‐AP4D. The defendants do not dispute

that Mack paid $3.95 in postage to send the second validation request.

6 No. 21‐2792

It was unclear—first of all, I didn’t get a re‐

sponse from the first letter. I asked for valida‐

tion. I got nothing. Shortly after that I got a sec‐

ond letter from a sister company as it appears to

be under the same umbrella here requesting the

same thing and waited and got no response.

So the confusing part was can they do this? Can

they ask me for—can they tell me that I owe a

debt to them and not verify the information that

I’m requesting and then just pass it on, which

they never verified any proof of—other than

sending this initial letter to me—is that—I was

trying to see is that legal, something they can

do, and is that going to continue on because it’s

time, money, frustration, you know, going to

the library, typing, printing and, you know, just

wanted to know what were they doing, is that

legal, because I’m steady dishing out money

that I don’t have and they’re not even respond‐

ing back to me, you know, things that I’m ask‐

ing for to validate it, just saying that, oh, you

owe me this money.

R. 65‐2, at 115–16. When asked what she meant by “dishing

out money,” Mack responded:

Well, I mean spending money. I have to pay for

the postage. Mind you, I’m not working or any‐

thing. So this is time, money to go to the library,

have it typed up[.]

No. 21‐2792 7

R. 65‐2, at 116.2 See also R. 65‐2, at 117 (where Mack explained,

“[T]he money was—it doesn’t seem like much, but when you

don’t have it, even this adds up, you know.”). Mack explained

that this was all new to her and that she was trying to take the

proper steps to validate the debt so that she would not “get

duped” into sending money to someone who had no proof of

the amount or ownership of the debt. She explained that any‐

one could claim that someone owed them a debt and that

without validation, there was no proof that LVNV or Resur‐

gent owned the debt. In addition to the monetary cost, Mack

also cited other harms from the Resurgent Letter including

the expenditure of her time in responding to the second vali‐

dation request and her added stress, frustration and confu‐

sion brought about by the Resurgent Letter.

Mack never received validation of the debt from Frontline,

Resurgent or LVNV. Approximately three months after send‐

ing her second request for validation, Mack filed a class action

suit against Resurgent and LVNV, claiming violations of the

Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”). R. 1 (Com‐

plaint). In particular, Mack asserted in her Complaint that the

Resurgent Letter “would cause any consumer, let alone the

unsophisticated consumer, to believe that she must yet again

dispute the Debt despite the fact that such consumer had al‐

ready submitted a valid dispute of the Debt.” R. 1, at 6. She

alleged that the Resurgent Letter violated the FDCPA in a

number of ways, including that it used false, deceptive,

2 Mack did not testify about the cost of getting to the library, which

she testified was approximately five minutes from her home. Nor did she

discuss the cost of printing at the library. Without any evidence regarding

the costs of travel or printing, we will limit our analysis to the $3.95 that

Mack expended on postage for her second validation request.

8 No. 21‐2792

misleading and unfair or unconscionable means to collect or

to attempt to collect a debt in violation of sections 1692e,

1692e(10), and 1692f; it failed to adequately state the name of

the creditor to whom the debt was owed in violation of sec‐

tion 1692g(a)(2); and it was otherwise deceptive and failed to

comply with the FDCPA. Mack again asserted that these ma‐

terial violations of the FDCPA “would lead a consumer to be‐

lieve that their dispute had not been effective and that they

had to re‐dispute the debt, or that they did not have the rights

that Congress gave them under the FDCPA. In fact, Defend‐

ants’ letter confused and alarmed Plaintiff.” R. 1, at 6. She also

pled allegations in support of a class action. She attached to

her complaint a copy of the Frontline Letter as well as the re‐

ceipt for the postage and certified mail fees.

The defendants ultimately moved to dismiss under Rule

12(b)(1) for lack of standing. The defendants asserted that

Mack failed to allege an injury in fact from the Resurgent Let‐

ter, claiming only that the Letter confused and alarmed her.

They faulted Mack for not pleading that the confusion caused

her to take any action to her detriment on account of her con‐

fusion. Mack countered that she did in fact plead and demon‐

strate that the Resurgent Letter caused her to act to her detri‐

ment: it caused her to spend both time and money sending a

second request for validation in order to preserve her rights.

The district court ultimately agreed with the defendants that

Mack had failed to establish standing. The district court found

that the time and money spent to send the second validation

request did not rise to the level of detriment required for

standing in FDCPA cases because the Resurgent Letter “did

not adversely affect any interests Congress sought to protect

through the FDCPA and instead effectively provided Mack

with another opportunity to dispute her debt if she had failed

No. 21‐2792 9

to properly do so upon receipt of the first letter.” Mack v. Re‐

surgent Capital Servs., L.P., 2021 WL 3901747, *3 (N.D. Ill. Sept.

1, 2021). Mack could have established standing, the court ex‐

plained, if she had “taken some action related to her debt

management choices,” such as paying something she did not

owe, or paying a debt with low interest when the money

could have been used to pay a debt with high interest. Id. The

court characterized Mack’s second validation request as an

“attempt to clear up her confusion,” and compared this to in‐

juries arising from consulting a lawyer or filing suit, which

the court said were insufficient to establish standing. Id. Mack

appeals.

II.

Before we begin with our analysis of Mack’s appeal, we

must address a preliminary matter: in its opinion, the district

court acknowledged that the defendants moved under Rule

12(b)(1) to dismiss for lack of standing. The court then re‐

marked that, because the parties had engaged in discovery, it

would treat the motion as one for summary judgment under

Rule 56. That was error. Although a district court may trans‐

form a motion for dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) into one for

summary judgment when “matters outside the pleadings are

presented to and not excluded by the court,” Fed.R.Civ.P.

12(d), “the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure contain no analo‐

gous recognition that a 12(b)(1) motion can evolve into dis‐

missal pursuant to Rule 56.” Capitol Leasing Co. v. F.D.I.C., 999

F.2d 188, 191 (7th Cir. 1993). A grant of summary judgment is

a decision on the merits, but “a court must dismiss the case

without ever reaching the merits if it concludes that it has no

jurisdiction.” Id. If the plaintiff lacks Article III standing to

sue, the court has no jurisdiction to hear the matter. Spokeo,

10 No. 21‐2792

Inc. v. Robins, 578 U.S. 330, 337–38 (2016) (noting that Article

III limits the power of the judiciary to addressing cases and

controversies, and “[s]tanding to sue is a doctrine rooted in

the traditional understanding of a case or controversy.”). “In

short, the question of jurisdiction is inappropriate for sum‐

mary judgment, and discussing the interplay of Rule 12(b)(1)

and Rule 56 verges on non sequitur.” Capitol Leasing, 999 F.2d

at 191. Nevertheless, “[w]hen subject‐matter jurisdiction—

which is to say, the power to hear and decide the case at all—

is at stake, a district judge may resolve factual disputes and

make any findings necessary to determine the court’s adjudi‐

catory competence.” Craftwood II, Inc. v. Generac Power Sys.

Inc., 920 F.3d 479, 481 (7th Cir. 2019). Although the court pur‐

ported early in its decision to treat the motion as one for sum‐

mary judgment, the court ultimately dismissed the case with‐

out prejudice due to lack of standing, and vacated its order

certifying a class. If Mack lacked standing, that would have

been the proper disposition, and we will therefore simply re‐

view the case as an appeal from a dismissal under Rule

12(b)(1).

On appeal, Mack asserts that the district court erred when

it found that the time, effort and out‐of‐pocket costs expended

in sending a second validation request were not adequate to

establish standing. We review de novo the district court’s dis‐

missal for lack of Article III standing. Flynn v. FCA US LLC, 39

F.4th 946, 952 (7th Cir. 2022). Standing consists of three ele‐

ments: a plaintiff must have “(1) suffered an injury in fact,

(2) that is fairly traceable to the challenged conduct of the de‐

fendant, and (3) that is likely to be redressed by a favorable

judicial decision.” Flynn, 39 F.4th at 952 (quoting Spokeo, 578

U.S. at 338). “To establish injury in fact, a plaintiff must show

that he or she suffered ‘an invasion of a legally protected

No. 21‐2792 11

interest’ that is ‘concrete and particularized’ and ‘actual or im‐

minent, not conjectural or hypothetical.’” Spokeo, 578 U.S. at

1548 (quoting Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560

(1992)). “By particularized, we mean that the injury must af‐

fect the plaintiff in a personal and individual way.” Lujan, 504

U.S. at 560 n.1. The Supreme Court has described a “concrete”

injury as an injury in fact, one that is real and not abstract,

although it need not necessarily be tangible. Spokeo, 578 U.S.

at 1548–49. In determining if an injury is concrete, “it is in‐

structive to consider whether an alleged intangible harm has

a close relationship to a harm that has traditionally been re‐

garded as providing a basis for a lawsuit in English or Amer‐

ican courts.” Spokeo, 578 U.S. at 341. “Tangible harms, like

physical or monetary harms, ‘readily qualify as concrete inju‐

ries.’” Persinger v. Southwest Credit Sys., L.P., 20 F.4th 1184,

1190 (7th Cir. 2021) (quoting TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, 141

S. Ct. 2190, 2204 (2021)). A bare procedural violation, divorced

from any concrete harm, would not satisfy the injury‐in‐fact

requirement for Article III standing. Spokeo, 578 U.S at 341. In‐

stead, a plaintiff “must show that the violation harmed or

‘presented an “appreciable risk of harm” to the underlying

concrete interest that Congress sought to protect.’” Casillas v.

Madison Ave. Assocs., Inc., 926 F.3d 329, 333 (7th Cir. 2019)

(quoting Groshek v. Time Warner Cable, Inc., 865 F.3d 884, 887

(7th Cir. 2017)). “If a defendant has caused physical or mone‐

tary injury to the plaintiff, the plaintiff has suffered a concrete

injury in fact under Article III.” TransUnion, 141 S. Ct. at 2204.

Congress passed the FDCPA to curb “the use of abusive,

deceptive, and unfair debt collection practices by many debt

collectors.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692(a). Such practices “contribute to

the number of personal bankruptcies, to marital instability, to

the loss of jobs, and to invasions of individual privacy.” Id. In

12 No. 21‐2792

order to “eliminate abusive debt collection practices by debt

collectors, to insure that those debt collectors who refrain

from using abusive debt collection practices are not competi‐

tively disadvantaged, and to promote consistent State action

to protect consumers against debt collection abuses,” Con‐

gress placed certain obligations on debt collectors and

granted rights to consumers. 15 U.S.C § 1692(e). As is relevant

here:

Within five days after the initial communication

with a consumer in connection with the collec‐

tion of any debt, a debt collector shall, unless the

following information is contained in the initial

communication or the consumer has paid the

debt, send the consumer a written notice con‐

taining—

(1) the amount of the debt;

(2) the name of the creditor to whom the debt is

owed;

(3) a statement that unless the consumer, within

thirty days after receipt of the notice, disputes

the validity of the debt, or any portion thereof,

the debt will be assumed to be valid by the debt

collector;

(4) a statement that if the consumer notifies the

debt collector in writing within the thirty‐day

period that the debt, or any portion thereof, is

disputed, the debt collector will obtain verifica‐

tion of the debt or a copy of a judgment against

the consumer and a copy of such verification or

No. 21‐2792 13

judgment will be mailed to the consumer by the

debt collector; and

(5) a statement that, upon the consumer’s writ‐

ten request within the thirty‐day period, the

debt collector will provide the consumer with

the name and address of the original creditor, if

different from the current creditor.

15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a). The statute also provides a clear directive

to debt collectors who receive a written dispute from a con‐

sumer:

If the consumer notifies the debt collector in

writing within the thirty‐day period described

in subsection (a) that the debt, or any portion

thereof, is disputed, or that the consumer re‐

quests the name and address of the original

creditor, the debt collector shall cease collection

of the debt, or any disputed portion thereof, un‐

til the debt collector obtains verification of the

debt or a copy of a judgment, or the name and

address of the original creditor, and a copy of

such verification or judgment, or name and ad‐

dress of the original creditor, is mailed to the

consumer by the debt collector. Collection activ‐

ities and communications that do not otherwise

violate this subchapter may continue during the

30‐day period referred to in subsection (a) un‐

less the consumer has notified the debt collector

in writing that the debt, or any portion of the

debt, is disputed or that the consumer requests

the name and address of the original creditor.

Any collection activities and communication

14 No. 21‐2792

during the 30‐day period may not overshadow

or be inconsistent with the disclosure of the con‐

sumer’s right to dispute the debt or request the

name and address of the original creditor.

15 U.S.C. § 1692g(b).

Mack argues that Resurgent’s letter confused her and

caused her to question whether her first attempt to seek vali‐

dation of the debt had been deficient in some way. Because it

came from a different party, she was even more uncertain

about who owned the debt. As she pled in her complaint, the

Resurgent Letter “would cause any consumer, let alone the

unsophisticated consumer, to believe that she must yet again

dispute the Debt despite the fact that such consumer had al‐

ready submitted a valid dispute of the Debt.” R. 1, at 6. Citing

the various ways that the letter violated the FDCPA, Mack

again asserted that the defendants’ violations of the FDCPA

“would lead a consumer to believe that their dispute had not

been effective and that they had to re‐dispute the debt, or that

they did not have the rights that Congress gave them under

the FDCPA. In fact, Defendants’ letter confused and alarmed

Plaintiff.” R. 1, at 6. The defendants contend that Mack pled

nothing more than confusion, that confusion alone is insuffi‐

cient to establish a concrete harm, and so she lacks standing.

The defendants’ argument ignores the standards under

which we assess the allegations in a complaint when consid‐

ering a motion to dismiss. A complaint does “not need de‐

tailed factual allegations,” but “[f]actual allegations must be

enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level[.]”

Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). A com‐

plaint may meet this standard by pleading enough factual

matter (taken as true) “to raise a reasonable expectation that

No. 21‐2792 15

discovery will reveal evidence of” a necessary element of the

claim. Bell Atlantic, 550 U.S. at 556. See also Bazile v. Finance Sys.

of Green Bay, Inc., 983 F.3d 274, 280 (7th Cir. 2020). Where a

complaint does not detail an injury, if the “allegations support

a plausible inference that [the plaintiff] suffered a concrete

detriment to her debt‐management choices,” the details re‐

garding how the plaintiff would have acted differently would

have to be resolved later. Bazile, 983 F.3d at 281. See also

Spuhler v. State Collection Serv., Inc., 983 F.3d 282, 285 (7th Cir.

2020) (initially, “a plaintiff may demonstrate standing by

clearly pleading allegations that ‘plausibly suggest’ each ele‐

ment of standing when all reasonable inferences are drawn in

the plaintiff’s favor”). Where the debt collector challenges the

truth of the underlying jurisdictional allegations, “the action

may not proceed without additional inquiry into whether she

actually suffered such a harm.” Bazile, 983 F.3d at 281. At that

point, “the plaintiff must supply proof, by a preponderance

of the evidence or to a reasonable probability, that standing

exists.” Spuhler, 983 F.3d at 285. Moreover, “if a complaint

‘omitted essential jurisdictional allegations,’ but evidence

later demonstrates that the court has jurisdiction, ‘the defi‐

ciency in the complaint is not fatal.’” Spuhler, 983 F.3d at 285

(quoting Casio, Inc. v. S.M. & R. Co., 755 F.2d 528, 530 (7th Cir.

1985).

In this instance, Mack pled that the Resurgent Letter

would confuse any debtor, leading her to believe that her ini‐

tial dispute of the debt was not valid, and causing her to be‐

lieve that she must re‐dispute the debt or lose the rights that

the FDCPA grants to debtors. She also alleged that she was,

in fact, confused in that manner. The debt, as we have noted,

must be disputed in writing. Mack attached to her complaint

the receipt detailing what she paid to mail the first letter.

16 No. 21‐2792

Freeman v. Metropolitan Water Reclamation Dist. of Greater Chi‐

cago, 927 F.3d 961, 963 (7th Cir. 2019) (when reviewing a grant

of a motion to dismiss, we assume the truth of the allegations

in the complaint and its attachments); Carmody v. Board of Trs.

of Univ. of Ill., 747 F.3d 470, 471 (7th Cir. 2014) (when review‐

ing a grant of a motion to dismiss, we take the facts alleged in

the complaint as true and also consider attached exhibits).

Applying the Bell Atlantic standard, it is reasonable to infer

that Mack re‐disputed the debt, and in doing so suffered a

concrete injury at least in the form of postage paid to send the

second validation request. Mack’s deposition testimony “illu‐

minated these allegations.” Persinger, 20 F.4th at 1190. She

clarified that she went through the same process to mail the

second letter as she did for the first, spending time, effort, and

money for postage and certified mail fees. R. 65‐2, at 116–17.

The Resurgent Letter thus caused her to suffer a concrete det‐

riment to her debt‐management choices in the form of the ex‐

penditure of additional money to preserve rights that she had

already preserved.

Congress clearly anticipated that preserving the right to

validation would have some cost to the consumer: the provi‐

sion requires that the consumer notify the debt collector of the

request for validation “in writing.” The initial $10.35 that

Mack spent sending the first validation request was an ex‐

pected cost of the consumer preserving her rights. But with

the second postage fee of $3.95, Mack has pled harm to an un‐

derlying concrete interest that Congress sought to protect.

Casillas, 926 F.3d at 333. Namely, Congress sought to protect

debtors from abusive debt collection practices that contrib‐

uted to personal bankruptcies, to marital instability, to the

loss of jobs, and to invasions of individual privacy. Money

damages caused by misleading communications from the

No. 21‐2792 17

debt collector are certainly included in the sphere of interests

that Congress sought to protect. TransUnion, 141 S. Ct. at 2204.

Indeed, when we asked counsel at oral argument whether

there was any limit to how many times a debt collector could

mislead a debtor into reasserting rights and spending addi‐

tional money to do so, counsel’s answer, essentially, was that

her client had done so only once. See Oral Argument at 18:15–

19:00 (“This was one letter though. This wasn’t multiple at‐

tempts.”). An argument that the defendant harmed the plain‐

tiff only once is not an argument that the plaintiff was not

harmed. There is no discernable limit to the number of times

a debt collector could mislead a debtor to her detriment with

impunity under that argument.

Although money damages are almost always found to be

concrete harm, Persinger, 20 F.4th at 1190, the defendants con‐

tend that we must look to the reason that Mack spent the

money. They argue that because she spent the money in order

to clear up her confusion, the cost is inadequate to establish

standing. It is true that we have held that “the state of confu‐

sion is not itself an injury.” Brunett v. Convergent Outsourcing,

Inc., 982 F.3d 1067, 1068 (7th Cir. 2020). But the defendants’

argument mischaracterizes Mack’s claim and her evidence.

“A debtor confused by a dunning letter may be injured if she

acts, to her detriment, on that confusion—if, for example, the

confusion leads her to pay something she does not owe, or to

pay a debt with interest running at a low rate when the money

could have been used to pay a debt with interest running at a

higher rate.” Brunett, 982 F.3d at 1068. The examples offered

in Brunett are not an exclusive list of the ways in which a

plaintiff’s confusion might cause her to act to her detriment.

Mack spent extra money not to clear up her confusion but in

order to preserve her right to seek validation, which she had

18 No. 21‐2792

been misled to believe she failed to do the first time. This dis‐

tinguishes Mack’s situation from cases where plaintiffs

caused themselves injury or were literally trying to clear up

their own confusion, for example, by seeking advice from a

lawyer.

The defendants also assert that sending the second letter

did not harm Mack in any way because it helped her preserve

her rights. But Mack had already preserved her rights, and it

was only because of the misleading Resurgent Letter that

Mack went to the trouble and expense of asserting her rights

a second time. This did not benefit Mack in any way as her

testimony reveals. Fixing the problem that the Resurgent Let‐

ter created caused Mack to again leave her home where she

was caring for ill relatives, travel to the library, type and print

the letter, go to the post office and again pay to mail the letter

to the defendants. That the dollar cost was modest is irrele‐

vant; she was misled to her financial detriment. Craftwood II,

920 F.3d at 481 (even when an injury is slight, an “identifiable

trifle” suffices to establish standing).

Mack meets the remaining prongs of the standing test as

well. The injury was particular to her. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560

n.1. That is, the money she spent fixing the problem created

by the Resurgent Letter came out of her own pocket. The time

and effort she spent reasserting her rights were specific to her.

These injuries affected Mack “in a personal and individual

way.” Id. Thus, Mack has adequately demonstrated an injury

in fact.

That injury is also fairly traceable to the challenged con‐

duct of the defendants. Spokeo, 578 U.S. at 338; Flynn, 39 F.4th

at 952. Mack pled that, instead of sending the statutorily re‐

quired validation, the debt collector sent a misleading

No. 21‐2792 19

communication that violated the statute and caused her to be‐

lieve that she had not yet adequately preserved her right to

validation. The Resurgent Letter led her unnecessarily to ex‐

pend additional time, money and effort reasserting her right.

Mack would not have gone to the trouble and expense of

sending a second request for validation if she had not been

misled by the Resurgent Letter.

Finally, Mack’s injury is likely to be redressed by a favor‐

able judicial decision. Spokeo, 578 U.S. at 338. In addition to

her modest money damages, the FDCPA provides for statu‐

tory damages up to $1000. The defendants protest that Mack

has disclaimed actual damages and they contend that this

means her injuries are not redressable by a favorable result.

They cite the complaint and a portion of Mack’s deposition as

evidence that Mack does not seek recovery for the time and

money she spent sending the second validation request. That

is not a fair reading of the complaint, though, which requests

statutory damages, costs, reasonable attorney’s fees and “any

other relief deemed appropriate,” a phrase which easily en‐

compasses actual damages. As for the deposition, defendants’

counsel sought Mack’s admission that the complaint did not

use the words “actual damages” and instead sought only stat‐

utory damages. When it became clear that Mack, a layperson,

did not know the legal difference between actual and statu‐

tory damages, Mack’s counsel interjected and conceded that

the complaint did not expressly ask for actual damages. Con‐

struing the evidence in Mack’s favor for the purposes of the

motion to dismiss, this was not a concession that Mack was

not seeking actual damages but only a concession that the

complaint did not use that express term. Because the com‐

plaint included the catch‐all “any other relief” clause and be‐

cause Mack made clear at her deposition that the cost of

20 No. 21‐2792

postage was an actual loss to her, this argument falls flat. Even

if Mack disclaimed compensatory damages for the postage,

statutory damages would more than compensate her for her

modest out‐of‐pocket costs and satisfy the redressability

prong of the standing test. “The FDCPA does not require

proof of actual damages as a precursor to the recovery of stat‐

utory damages.” Keele v. Wexler, 149 F.3d 589, 593‐94 (7th Cir.

1998). Thus Mack’s injuries are likely to be redressed by a fa‐

vorable judicial decision. Cf. Uzuegbunam v. Preczewski, 141

S. Ct. 792, 800–02 (2021) (holding that a request for nominal

damages satisfies the redressability element of standing

where the plaintiff’s claim is based on a completed violation

of a legal right, and noting that a party whose rights have been

invaded can always recover nominal damages without fur‐

nishing any evidence of actual damage).

We decline to address Mack’s additional argument that

standing is supported by a theory that the Resurgent Letter

intruded upon her seclusion or invaded her privacy, or that it

resembled common‐law fraud. Finally, when the district

court dismissed the case, it also vacated its order certifying

the class. Mack notes that, on remand, it will be necessary to

re‐define the previously certified class to include only those

persons who submitted a second dispute. We agree that the

class definition should be modified to limit the class to per‐

sons who acted to their detriment upon receiving the second

letter.

REVERSED AND REMANDED.