Jarvis v. Hall

Case: 22-60098 Document: 00516775500 Page: 1 Date Filed: 06/05/2023

United States Court of Appeals

for the Fifth Circuit United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

____________ FILED

June 5, 2023

No. 22-60098 Lyle W. Cayce

____________ Clerk

Thaddeus L. Jarvis,

Plaintiff—Appellant,

versus

Pelicia Hall, Mississippi Department of Corrections Commissioner, in her

official capacity ; Tommy Taylor, Interim Commissioner, in his official

capacity; Unknown Turner, M.S.P. Superintendent, in his official

capacity; Unknown Morris, M.S.P. Warden, Camp 29, in his

individual and official capacity; Unknown Simon, Warden, Camp 29, in

individual and official capacity; Unknown Muford, Captain, Camp 29,

in individual and official capacity; Unknown Cannon, Correctional

Officer, in individual and official capacity; Unknown Meeks, Captain

Camp 29,in individual and official capacity,

Defendants—Appellees.

______________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Mississippi

USDC No. 4:20-CV-193

______________________________

Before Jones, Clement, and Haynes, Circuit Judges.

Per Curiam: *

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*

This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.

Case: 22-60098 Document: 00516775500 Page: 2 Date Filed: 06/05/2023

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Thaddeus L. Jarvis, a Mississippi prisoner proceeding pro se and in

forma pauperis, sued several prison officials under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging

violations of his constitutional rights. The district court sua sponte dismissed

three of Jarvis’s claims and later granted summary judgment on the

remaining two. For the reasons set forth below, we AFFIRM.

I. Factual Background

Jarvis is an inmate at the Mississippi State Penitentiary (“M.S.P.”).

In January 2020, a violent dispute broke out in the prison between rival gangs,

resulting in the death of multiple inmates. To regain control of the

penitentiary, prison officials temporarily transferred Jarvis and other inmates

to another section of the facility, “Unit 32.” The inmates remained in Unit

32 for the next seven days. Jarvis alleges that, during this period, prison

officials denied him food, water, clothing, bedding, and personal hygiene

items, including properly functioning toilets. In particular, he asserts that

they failed to provide him with meals containing at least 2,900 calories and

that they did not permit him to shower. He also pleads that he was not

allowed to bring his personal belongings with him to Unit 32.

Jarvis contends that, at some point during this time, an emergency

response team of over “fifty cars” of Mississippi State Troopers arrived at

the prison to help regain control of M.S.P. Although his allegations on this

point are not abundantly clear, he seems to aver that one officer used

excessive force against him. Per Jarvis, the officer slammed him to the

ground while his hands were restrained, bruising his back and chipping his

tooth. He alleges that he subsequently requested—but was denied—medical

treatment for four days.

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Based on these events, Jarvis filed this § 1983 suit against various

prison officials 1 (collectively, “Defendants”). His complaint avers that

Defendants violated his constitutional rights by: (1) failing to protect him

from the threat of gang violence; (2) subjecting him to unconstitutional

conditions of confinement; (3) using excessive force against him; (4) denying

him medical treatment; and (5) depriving him of his personal property

without due process.

The district court scheduled a Spears 2 hearing on Jarvis’s claims, but

later cancelled the hearing without explanation. Though the district court’s

order does not say so explicitly, it appears the court reviewed Jarvis’s

complaint under the screening provisions of 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and

1915A. In doing so, it sua sponte dismissed Jarvis’s claims for failure to

protect, denial of medical treatment, and deprivation of property without due

process. However, it permitted Jarvis’s remaining claims to proceed.

Defendants subsequently moved for summary judgment. They urged

that the official-capacity claims were barred by sovereign immunity, and they

were entitled to qualified immunity on the individual-capacity claims. In

support, they attached to the motion a copy of Jarvis’s administrative

grievances. Many of the statements contained in the administrative

grievances directly contradicted the allegations in Jarvis’s complaint. Jarvis

responded to the motion but did not submit any evidence in support. The

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1

His complaint names: the Commissioner of the Mississippi Department of

Corrections, the Interim Commissioner of the Mississippi Department of Corrections, the

M.S.P. Superintendent, an M.S.P. Warden, two M.S.P. Captains, and an M.S.P.

Correctional Officer. He sues all Defendants in their official capacities, and the Warden,

Captains, and Correctional Officer in their individual capacities.

2

Spears v. McCotter, 766 F.2d 179, 181–82 (5th Cir. 1985), overruled on other

grounds by Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319 (1989).

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district court subsequently granted summary judgment, dismissing the

remaining claims. Jarvis timely appealed.

II. Jurisdiction & Discussion

The district court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, and we

have appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We address the district

court’s sua sponte dismissal and summary judgment, in turn, below.

A. Sua Sponte Dismissal

The district court first screened and dismissed Jarvis’s claims for

failure to protect, denial of medical treatment, and deprivation of property

without due process. Where, as here, a prisoner is proceeding in forma

pauperis, §§ 1915(e) and 1915A require a court to dismiss an action or claim

against a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity

that is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be

granted. We review a district court’s dismissal under these provisions de

novo. Legate v. Livingston, 822 F.3d 207, 209 (5th Cir. 2016).

To determine whether a complaint fails to state a claim in this context,

we apply the same standard we use to review dismissals under Rule 12(b)(6).

Id. at 209–10. Accordingly, the “complaint must contain sufficient factual

matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal quotation marks and

citation omitted). Alternatively, “[a] claim may be dismissed as frivolous if

it does not have an arguable basis in fact or law.” Brewster v. Dretke, 587 F.3d

764, 767 (5th Cir. 2009) (per curiam). It lacks an arguable basis in fact or law

if it is predicated “on an indisputably meritless legal theory.” Samford v.

Dretke, 562 F.3d 674, 678 (5th Cir. 2009) (per curiam) (quotation omitted).

Generally, a district court must offer a pro se plaintiff an opportunity

to remedy perceived errors in his complaint before it dismisses those claims

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with prejudice. 3 See Bazrowx v. Scott, 136 F.3d 1053, 1054 (5th Cir. 1998) (per

curiam); Eason v. Thaler, 14 F.3d 8, 9 (5th Cir. 1994). But a district court

need not afford such an opportunity (1) if the plaintiff’s claims are clearly

frivolous, see Eason, 14 F.3d at 9, or (2) if the plaintiff “has already pleaded

his best case,” Mendoza-Tarango v. Flores, 982 F.3d 395, 402 (5th Cir. 2020)

(quotation omitted).

Here, Jarvis does not dispute the district court’s determination that

he failed to state a claim for failure to protect, denial of medical treatment, or

deprivation of property. Rather, his sole argument on appeal is that the

district court erred in dismissing his claims without a Spears hearing. The

problem with this argument is that Jarvis’s appellate brief fails to identify how

his “insufficient factual allegations” could “be remedied by more specific

pleading.” Eason, 14 F.3d at 9.

Jarvis does not, for instance, explain what additional details a Spears

hearing would have revealed, nor does he “state any material facts he would

have included in an amended complaint” if afforded the opportunity.

Brewster, 587 F.3d at 768; see also Scott v. U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n, 16 F.4th

1204, 1209 (5th Cir. 2021) (per curiam) (noting that movants must provide

“some notice of what his or her amendments would be and how those

amendments would cure the initial complaint’s defects” to be entitled to

leave to amend). He simply maintains that his claims “[a]re supported by

the complaint” and rests on the allegations contained within. We liberally

construe pro se briefs, Mapes v. Bishop, 541 F.3d 582, 584 (5th Cir. 2008) (per

curiam), but—even so—we conclude Jarvis has failed to brief any argument

establishing his entitlement to a Spears hearing. This failure constitutes

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3

A district court typically offers this opportunity through a “questionnaire or in a

Spears dialog.” Eason v. Thaler, 14 F.3d 8, 9 (5th Cir. 1994).

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abandonment on appeal. See Yohey v. Collins, 985 F.2d 222, 224–25 (5th Cir.

1993); see also Davis v. Scott, 157 F.3d 1003, 1006 (5th Cir. 1998) (“[T]he

plaintiff remains the master of his complaint and is, in the end, the person

responsible for articulating the facts that give rise to a cognizable claim.”).

Because Jarvis does not address whether or how he failed to plead his

best case before the district court, Mendoza-Tarango, 982 F.3d at 402, we

conclude the district court did not err by failing to hold a Spears hearing and

sua sponte dismissing Jarvis’s claims.

B. Summary Judgment

We next consider the district court’s summary judgment on Jarvis’s

claims for unconstitutional conditions of confinement and excessive force.

As an initial matter, Defendants moved for summary judgment on Jarvis’s

official-capacity claims, asserting that they were barred by sovereign

immunity. Jarvis does not contest that on appeal, so we deem the issue

waived. 4 See Hughes v. Johnson, 191 F.3d 607, 613 (5th Cir. 1999); Yohey, 985

F.2d at 224–25; Brinkmann v. Dall. Cnty. Deputy Sheriff Abner, 813 F.2d 744,

748 (5th Cir. 1987). Defendants next moved for summary judgment on

Jarvis’s individual-capacity claims, asserting that they were entitled to

qualified immunity. 5

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4

To the extent that Jarvis claims on appeal that Defendants are liable on a

supervisory liability theory, Jarvis’s pleadings do not make such an allegation. We generally

do not consider arguments raised for the first time on appeal. See Leverette v. Louisville

Ladder Co., 183 F.3d 339, 342 (5th Cir. 1999) (per curiam). Accordingly, we decline to

address that argument here.

5

We observe that the district court did not make its reasons for granting summary

judgment abundantly clear, and as a result, it did not explicitly conclude that Defendants

were entitled to qualified immunity. Nevertheless, Defendants moved for summary

judgment on that basis, and we may affirm on any grounds supported by the record.

Doctor’s Hosp. of Jefferson, Inc. v. Se. Med. All., Inc., 123 F.3d 301, 307 (5th Cir. 1997).

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We review “a district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo,

applying the same standards as the trial court.” Griffin v. UPS, Inc., 661 F.3d

216, 221 (5th Cir. 2011). Summary judgment is proper “if the movant shows

that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is

entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a). However,

a good-faith assertion of qualified immunity “alters the usual summary

judgment burden of proof.” Trent v. Wade, 776 F.3d 368, 376 (5th Cir. 2015)

(quotation omitted). Once a defendant raises qualified immunity, the burden

shifts to the plaintiff to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the

alleged conduct violated a clearly established right. Id.; Cole v. Carson, 935

F.3d 444, 451 (5th Cir. 2019) (en banc).

With this framework in mind, we address whether Defendants are

entitled to qualified immunity on Jarvis’s claims for unconstitutional

conditions of confinement and excessive force.

1. Conditions of Confinement

First, Jarvis contends that the conditions during his seven days of

confinement in Unit 32 were so inadequate that they violated his Eighth

Amendment rights. The Eighth Amendment “does not mandate

comfortable prisons, but neither does it permit inhumane ones.” Hinojosa v.

Livingston, 807 F.3d 657, 665 (5th Cir. 2015) (quotation omitted).

Accordingly, to establish his conditions-of-confinement claim, Jarvis must

satisfy two prongs. First, he must show that his confinement resulted in an

“objectively, sufficiently serious” deprivation that “constitutes a ‘denial of

the minimal civilized measures of life’s necessities.’” Coleman v. Sweetin,

745 F.3d 756, 764 (5th Cir. 2014) (quoting Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825,

834 (1994)). Second, Jarvis must demonstrate that Defendants acted with

deliberate indifference to his health and safety. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834.

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We need not reach the second prong because Jarvis cannot satisfy the

first. 6 Jarvis argues that Defendants deprived him of five main needs: food,

water, clothing, bedding, and personal hygiene items (including showers and

functioning plumbing). But, as we explain below, Jarvis failed to submit

summary judgment evidence demonstrating that any of these deprivations

were sufficiently serious to create a constitutional violation. Hudson v.

McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 9 (1992) (noting that “extreme deprivations are

required to make out a conditions-of-confinement claim.”).

Jarvis’s most extreme claims are that prison officials denied him water

and food. But according to the administrative grievances he filed following

these events, he did receive both. As to the former, Jarvis admitted that he

received many bottles of water during the seven-day period, and, as to the

latter, he similarly conceded that he was provided meals—just not the 2,900

calories a day in three meals like he usually received. But even that

interruption was temporary. Prison officials provided inmates one meal the

day after the riot and two meals the next day. Within three days, they had

resumed the regularly scheduled routine. On these facts, we conclude that

Jarvis did not suffer a deprivation of the “minimal civilized measure of life’s

necessities.” Talib v. Gilley, 138 F.3d 211, 214 n.3 (5th Cir. 1998) (quotation

omitted); see also Palmer v. Johnson, 193 F.3d 346, 352 (5th Cir. 1999)

(recognizing that missing one meal “does not rise to the level of a cognizable

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6

However, even assuming arguendo Jarvis could establish he suffered a severe

deprivation, his claim would still fail at the second prong. To establish that Defendants

acted with deliberate indifference to inmate health or safety, Jarvis needed to demonstrate

that they were “aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial

risk of serious harm exist[ed]” and they actually “dr[e]w the inference” to that effect.

Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. But deliberate indifference “is an extremely high standard to

meet,” Gobert v. Caldwell, 463 F.3d 339, 346 (5th Cir. 2006) (quotation omitted), and Jarvis

has simply failed to raise a genuine fact issue as to the prison official’s subjective intent.

Therefore, his Eighth Amendment claim fails on this basis, too.

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constitutional injury”); Green v. Ferrell, 801 F.2d 765, 770–71 (5th Cir. 1986)

(concluding that the provision of only two, as opposed to three, nutritionally

adequate meals daily does not violate the Eighth Amendment).

Jarvis’s remaining claims regarding the deprivation of clothing,

bedding, and personal hygiene items fare no better. In assessing these alleged

deprivations, we consider both their duration and their severity. See Taylor

v. Riojas, 141 S. Ct. 52, 54 n.2 (2020); Talib, 138 F.3d at 214 n.3 (considering

deprivations in context of duration); Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 686–87

(1978) (observing that “the length of confinement cannot be ignored”;

indeed “[a] filthy, overcrowded cell . . . might be tolerable for a few days and

intolerably cruel for weeks or months.”).

As to duration, none of the deprivations Jarvis complains of lasted

more than a week. According to Jarvis’s administrative grievances, he

received proper bedding within three days, toiletries within four days, and

access to showers and properly functioning plumbing within seven days.

What’s more, nothing in the record suggests that prison officials subjected

inmates to these conditions longer than needed to restore order in the main

penitentiary; this was an emergency situation and not one where Jarvis was

being penalized or the like. This is particularly important. As instructed by

the Supreme Court, we will not second-guess prison officials’ decisions—

even “restrictive and [] harsh” ones, Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347

(1981),—that are “reasonably related to legitimate penological interests,”

Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987). As to severity, none of these

temporary deprivations rose to the level of extreme, inhumane conditions,

particularly in light of their short duration. See Novak v. Beto, 453 F.2d 661,

665–66, 69 (5th Cir. 1971) (short-term solitary confinement without full

bedding not severe); Hamilton v. Lyons, 74 F.3d 99, 106 n.8 (5th Cir. 1996)

(short-term lack of showers and sheets not severe); Davis, 157 F.3d at 1006

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(same as to unsanitary cell); Wilson v. Lynaugh, 878 F.2d 846, 849 & n.5 (5th

Cir. 1989) (similar).

Because Jarvis has failed to establish that the conditions of

confinement violated the Constitution, we conclude that Defendants are

entitled to qualified immunity and summary judgment on this claim.

2. Excessive Force

Jarvis next contends that the emergency response team used excessive

force against him. To determine whether Jarvis has established a claim in

this context, we ask whether the Defendants used force “in a good-faith

effort to maintain or restore discipline, or maliciously and sadistically to

cause harm.” Byrd v. Harrell, 48 F.4th 343, 347 (5th Cir. 2022) (quoting

Hudson, 503 U.S. at 7). In answering this question, we assess the Defendants’

subjective intent by considering the well-known Hudson factors: (1) “the

extent of the injury suffered” by the plaintiff; (2) the need for force; (3) the

relationship between the force needed and the amount of force ultimately

employed; (4) the threat reasonably perceived by prison officials; and

(5) “any efforts made to temper the severity of a forceful response.” Byrd,

48 F.4th at 347 (quotation omitted).

Jarvis alleges one incident of excessive force. His pleadings and the

limited summary judgment evidence provide little context, but viewing the

facts in the light most favorable to Jarvis, we discern the following events: At

some point after the riot, “more than fifty cars” of Mississippi State

Troopers and Mississippi Special Response Team officers arrived at M.S.P.

Once there, the officers bound all inmates’ hands behind their backs “using

physical force.” An unidentified officer then slammed Jarvis into the ground,

bruising his back and chipping his tooth.

We need not address whether the use of force as Jarvis describes

violates the Eighth Amendment. Even assuming arguendo Jarvis could

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establish the officers violated a constitutional right, he has failed to

demonstrate that “right was clearly established.” Cunningham v. Castloo,

983 F.3d 185, 190–91 (5th Cir. 2020) (internal quotation marks and citation

omitted); see also Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236 (2009) (observing

that we may resolve the case on a single prong). To satisfy the clearly

established prong in a situation that is not obvious, Jarvis must cite to caselaw

that provides officials with “reasonable warning that the conduct then at

issue violated [his] constitutional rights.” Bush v. Strain, 513 F.3d 492, 501–

02 (5th Cir. 2008) (quotation omitted). But Jarvis has simply failed to do so

here. He does not cite to any authority establishing that the use of force in

this context violates the Eighth Amendment. Given the facts here, in the

absence of any precedent, Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity and

summary judgment on this claim. 7

III. Conclusion

For the reasons discussed above, we AFFIRM.

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7

Finally, we note that Jarvis asks us to assign this case to a different district judge.

Because we are affirming, this request is moot.

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