People v. Moore

2023 IL 126461

IN THE

SUPREME COURT

OF

THE STATE OF ILLINOIS

(Docket Nos. 126461, 126932)

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellee, v.

TORY S. MOORE, Appellant.—THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE

OF ILLINOIS, Appellant, v. MARVIN WILLIAMS, Appellee.

Opinion filed May 18, 2023.

JUSTICE NEVILLE delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

Chief Justice Theis and Justices Overstreet, Holder White, Cunningham,

Rochford, and O’Brien concurred in the judgment and opinion.

OPINION

¶1 Tory S. Moore and Marvin Williams, both sentenced to life in prison without

parole for separate murders committed when they were 19 years old, appealed from

judgments denying them leave to file successive postconviction petitions

challenging their sentences. The Appellate Court for the Fourth District affirmed

the judgment against Moore, and the Appellate Court for the Second District

reversed the judgment against Williams. We granted Moore’s petition for leave to

appeal and the State’s petition for leave to appeal from the appellate court’s order

in the case against Williams. We consolidated the cases for review. We find neither

Moore nor Williams sufficiently pled cause for filing their successive

postconviction petitions. We affirm the appellate court’s ruling against Moore,

reverse the ruling in favor of Williams, and affirm the judgments of the circuit court

in both cases.

¶2 I. BACKGROUND

¶3 A. Moore

¶4 1. Trial and Direct Appeal

¶5 Prosecutors charged Moore with murdering Savoy Brown in 1997. We adopt

the following summary from the appellate court’s disposition of Moore’s direct

appeal.

“Defendant, Andre Sayles, and Chioke Holiday kidnapped at gunpoint

Seneca Johnson, James Browning, and Savoy Brown after demanding money

and drugs from them. They drove them into an alley where the three were

searched, ordered to remove their clothing, and directed back into the car. The

three captives were required to ride with their heads between their legs. They

were taunted and threatened with being killed. Eventually, Sayles drove the car

into a cornfield. The victims were ordered out of the car and to line up in a row

facing their captors. Defendant then spun the cylinder of a revolver, pointed it

at Browning’s head, and pulled the trigger. The revolver did not fire. Defendant

then spun the cylinder again, pointed it at Brown’s head, and fired. Brown fell,

and Johnson and Browning fled. Sayles testified that, after defendant returned

from chasing Johnson and Browning, he asked Sayles to get away from Brown,

complaining, ‘he still ain’t dead.’ Defendant then fired another shot into

Brown.” People v. Moore, No. 4-99-0451, slip order at 6 (2001) (unpublished

order under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 23).

¶6 Willie Clemmons, who shared a jail cell with Moore, testified that Moore

admitted that he and Holiday picked up three guys to rob them and then took them

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to a cornfield to kill them. Moore told Clemmons “he played a game, spinning the

cylinder of the gun, pointing it at one of the men, and pulling the trigger to see if it

would discharge. The second time, the boy was shot and fell to the ground shaking”

before Moore shot him a second time. Id. Moore, laughing, then lay on the cell floor

mimicking the dying boy’s tremors. Id.

¶7 At the sentencing hearing, the prosecution presented evidence of Moore’s prior

violent acts. Chez Jones testified that on December 6, 1993, Moore “without

provocation pointed [a] gun at Jones’ head after cocking the hammer. Immediately

before firing, he asked Jones, ‘What you got to say now?’ Jones was hospitalized

for two weeks; endured three surgeries; lost her left eye; and suffered a fractured

skull, spinal damage, and facial nerve damage.” Id. at 7.

¶8 Moore’s grandmother testified that Moore’s father left Moore’s mother when

Moore was very young, and Moore’s father had “been out of the picture ever[ ]

since.” When Moore was eight or nine, his mother “[g]ot involved in drugs.”

Moore’s older sister, at the age of 11 or 12, “got to be more of the mother” to Moore.

¶9 The presentence investigator wrote, “The defendant refused to be interviewed

for this report by being non-compliant and belligerent to this officer. Upon this

officer advising the defendant that this report had been requested by his attorney

and the judge, the defendant advised that this officer could tell the judge to ‘f***

off.’ ”

¶ 10 Moore sought anger counseling in jail before the trial. The counselor testified

that Moore’s mother was a “drug addict” who “had a succession of boyfriends; and

they were physically abusive to her and to [Moore].” The counselor explained:

“[Moore’s] history of being physically abused has created unresolved anger

with him. He’s also grown up seeing anger expressed violently. That’s the

example that has been set for him. He’s grown up with no appropriate male role

model, and he’s grown up with a mother [who] due to her substance abuse ***

has a lot of the time not been able to provide effective parenting. So all of this

contributes to this unresolved anger, which if it’s not resolved appropriately

through therapy will come out inappropriately in a variety of ways including

violent behavior.”

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¶ 11 Two instructors working in the prisoner education programs testified about

Moore’s classroom conduct and concluded that he had good potential for

rehabilitation.

¶ 12 The Macon County circuit court sentenced Moore to life in prison with no

possibility of parole. The appellate court affirmed the judgment. Id.

¶ 13 2. Postconviction

¶ 14 Moore filed a postconviction petition in 2006. The trial court dismissed the

petition and again the appellate court affirmed. People v. Moore, 379 Ill. App. 3d

1092 (2008) (table) (unpublished order under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 23).

¶ 15 In 2018, Moore filed a motion for leave to file a successive postconviction

petition arguing that his sentence violated both the eighth amendment to the United

States Constitution (U.S. Const., amend. VIII) and the proportionate penalties

clause of the Illinois Constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 11). He alleged that he

lacked legal support for the challenges until the United States Supreme Court

decided Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012), and therefore he had cause for

filing a successive petition. He alleged prejudice in that his brain had not fully

matured when he committed the murder and that the trial court failed to take into

account his immaturity and rehabilitative potential when it sentenced him. The trial

court denied the motion for leave to file the successive petition.

¶ 16 3. Appellate Court

¶ 17 The appellate court found that Moore failed to allege facts that could support a

finding that his brain development at the time of the crime required the court to

treat him as a juvenile offender. 2020 IL App (4th) 190528, ¶ 40. The court affirmed

the judgment denying Moore leave to file his successive postconviction petition.

Id. ¶ 43. We granted Moore’s petition for leave to appeal.

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¶ 18 B. Williams

¶ 19 1. Trial and Direct Appeal

¶ 20 Prosecutors charged Williams with the 1997 murders of Justin Levingston and

Adrienne Austin. According to the appellate court, LeMual Conley and Antonio

Trammell testified that they, Williams, and Emmett Wright drove together to the

victims’ house, entered by force, and terrorized the occupants: Levingston, Austin,

four-year-old Luckia Austin, and Lovenia Hinton. Conley testified that, on the

previous evening, the four men had agreed to drive to the house to steal marijuana.

Williams had a gun. Conley grabbed Hinton and told her not to look, and Williams

and Wright took another woman who was downstairs to the second floor. Conley

heard one shot, then another. Soon afterward, there were two more shots. Going

upstairs, Conley saw Levingston lying in the stairwell and Williams standing alone

in a bedroom. Conley went downstairs, heard two more shots from upstairs, and

saw Williams come downstairs. Williams wanted to shoot a woman who was

downstairs, but Conley talked him out of it. The four intruders left. People v.

Williams, 313 Ill. App. 3d 849, 853-54 (2000).

¶ 21 The presentence investigator, describing Williams’s background and quoting

from a prior petition to revoke his probation, reported:

“According to *** records in the Juvenile Probation Office, [Williams’s]

father played no role in the defendant’s upbringing and his mother died of a

drug overdose in 1989, thus causing him to reside with his maternal

grandparents ***. *** [T]he defendant’s older sister has been convicted of

misdemeanors in this jurisdiction and *** his older brother currently is serving

a nine-and-a-half year prison term for Armed Robbery. ***

***

‘This family has an unstable history for structure and appropriate

interactions. The Department of Children and Family Services has had

involvement with the case as a result of the mother’s death, and the children

have made frequent moves from relative to relative. *** Marvin became more

disobedient and defiant. Events just prior to the runaway included complaints

that the minor would not report his whereabouts, did not abide by curfew, and

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began spending a good deal of time at his older sister’s, where adequate

supervision was not available. [Williams’s grandmother] also heard rumors that

Marvin was becoming involved with alcohol and [drugs], and gang associations

as well.’ ”

¶ 22 A psychologist who produced an evaluation for Williams’s probation at age 13,

which was included in the presentence investigation for the 1997 murder, wrote:

“[Williams’s drawings] reflect[ed] intellectual, perceptual or perceptual-motor

deficiencies. *** The figure of the tree was slanting at better than fifteen

degrees which suggests insecurity. There was a broad base which suggests his

early emotional needs were not met or satisfied. ***

***

*** His responses also revealed that he feels vic[ti]mized by his

environment and justified in venting his aggressions back towards the

environment and those within it. His responses also revealed a rather high level

of anxiety, apprehension and concern in respect to his physical well being and

some depression associated with these anxieties. There were also indications,

however, that he is impulsive and may well react with lowered regards for the

needs and feelings of others. ***

***

In terms of emotional functioning he reflects general as well as psycho-

sexual immaturities. *** He also seems to have problems in terms of identity

and, apparently, is attempting to establish some type of ‘rep’ in the eyes of his

peers.”

¶ 23 The Winnebago County circuit court “made a finding that a discretionary life

sentence was warranted because the offenses exhibited exceptionally brutal and

heinous behavior indicative of wanton cruelty.” People v. Williams, 2020 IL App

(2d) 180526-U, ¶ 4 n.1. The trial court sentenced Williams to life in prison with no

possibility of parole. The appellate court affirmed the judgment. Williams, 313 Ill.

App. 3d at 864.

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¶ 24 2. Postconviction

¶ 25 Williams filed a postconviction petition in 2001. The trial court dismissed the

petition, and again the appellate court affirmed the judgment. People v. Williams,

No. 2-01-0868 (2003) (unpublished summary order under Illinois Supreme Court

Rule 23(c)). Williams filed a motion for leave to file a successive postconviction

petition in 2017. He cited Miller and Montgomery v. Louisiana, 577 U.S. 190

(2016), in support of his argument that his sentence violated both the eighth

amendment to the United States Constitution (U.S. Const., amend. VIII) and the

proportionate penalties clause of the Illinois Constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art. I,

§ 11). He contended the trial court did not adequately consider his mitigating

characteristics and background circumstances as a young adult at the time of the

murders.

¶ 26 Williams alleged that, when he was 12, he found his mother in their home, dead

from a drug overdose. The Department of Children and Family Services separated

him from his four siblings, as no relatives agreed to take care of all five of his

mother’s children. Williams started using alcohol, and he joined a gang not long

after his mother’s death. Rockford public schools placed him in a program for

students with severe behavioral problems. His delinquency history began in 1990,

when he was 13, with a conviction for battery. Following his gang’s instructions,

he later stole his aunt’s car.

¶ 27 Williams alleged that, since his incarceration in 1997, he had participated, as

far as the prison would allow, in rehabilitative services. He completed several

writing courses. The Neighborhood Arts Project published several articles he wrote.

Williams also supported his motion for leave to file a successive postconviction

petition with several articles reporting on studies of brain development in young

adults. The circuit court denied Williams’s motion for leave to file the successive

postconviction petition.

¶ 28 3. Appellate Court

¶ 29 The appellate court found that an objective factor impeded Williams from

bringing his constitutional claims based on the reasoning of Miller and

Montgomery, as the United States Supreme Court had not decided Miller by the

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time Williams filed his initial postconviction petition. Williams, 2020 IL App (2d)

180526-U, ¶ 12. The court concluded that Williams made a sufficient prima facie

showing of cause for raising the arguments about both the United States

Constitution and the Illinois Constitution in a successive postconviction petition.

Id.

¶ 30 The appellate court also held Williams sufficiently alleged prejudice. Id. ¶ 18.

The court summarized the allegations and noted Williams “included his affidavit,

in which he averred to numerous issues with his upbringing, trauma involving his

mother’s death, gang influences on his life, and his rehabilitative progress in prison.

Further, he submitted the PSI, a psychological assessment, and numerous articles

regarding criminal justice reform of youthful offenders.” Id.

¶ 31 We granted the State’s petition for leave to appeal and consolidated the appeal

with Moore’s appeal. We also allowed the Children and Family Justice Center at

Northwestern Pritzker School of Law; Cabrini Green Legal Aid; the Center for

Law, Brain & Behavior; Chicago Appleseed Center for Fair Courts; Chicago

Council of Lawyers; Chicago Lawyers’ Committee for Civil Rights; the Civitas

Childlaw Center; the Juvenile Justice Initiative; Juvenile Law Center; the Law

Office of the Cook County Public Defender; and the National Association of Social

Workers to file a joint amici curiae brief. See Ill. S. Ct. R. 345 (eff. Sept. 20, 2010).

¶ 32 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 33 Moore argues that his petition adequately states a prima facie case for allowing

him to file a successive postconviction petition. The State argues that we should

affirm the appellate court’s judgment denying Moore leave to file the successive

petition. The State also argues that we should reverse the appellate court’s judgment

allowing Williams to file a successive postconviction petition, because Williams,

like Moore, failed to state a prima facie case for allowing him to file a successive

postconviction petition. We review de novo the denial of a motion for leave to file

a successive postconviction petition. People v. Robinson, 2020 IL 123849, ¶ 39.

¶ 34 The Post-Conviction Hearing Act, which prescribes the pleading standards for

successive postconviction petitions, provides:

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“(f) Only one petition may be filed by a petitioner under this Article without

leave of the court. Leave of court may be granted only if a petitioner

demonstrates cause for his or her failure to bring the claim in his or her initial

post-conviction proceedings and prejudice results from that failure. For

purposes of this subsection (f): (1) a prisoner shows cause by identifying an

objective factor that impeded his or her ability to raise a specific claim during

his or her initial post-conviction proceedings; and (2) a prisoner shows

prejudice by demonstrating that the claim not raised during his or her initial

post-conviction proceedings so infected the trial that the resulting conviction or

sentence violated due process.” 725 ILCS 5/122-1(f) (West 2016).

¶ 35 Section 122-1(f) requires a petitioner to plead facts sufficient to support a

finding of both cause and prejudice for each individual claim asserted in a proposed

successive postconviction petition. People v. Pitsonbarger, 205 Ill. 2d 444, 463

(2002). In People v. Bailey, 2017 IL 121450, ¶¶ 21-24 (quoting People v. Smith,

2014 IL 115946, ¶ 28), the court explained:

“ -‘[L]eave

- -- of court to file a successive postconviction petition should be denied

when it is clear, from a review of the successive petition and the documentation

submitted by the petitioner, that the claims alleged by the petitioner fail as a

matter of law or where the successive petition with supporting documentation

is insufficient to justify further proceedings.’ ***

***

*** The motion for leave to file is directed to the court, and it is the court

that must decide the legal question of whether a defendant has satisfied the

section 122-1(f) requirement of showing cause and prejudice. This is a

preliminary screening to determine whether defendant’s pro se motion for leave

to file a successive postconviction petition adequately alleges facts

demonstrating cause and prejudice. [Citation.] In other words, the court must

determine whether defendant has made a prima facie showing of cause and

prejudice.”

¶ 36 Both Moore and Williams contend their sentences of life imprisonment without

parole violate both the eighth amendment to the United States Constitution and the

proportionate penalties clause of the Illinois Constitution. In their motions for leave

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to file successive postconviction petitions, both Moore and Williams claimed the

decision in Miller, 567 U.S. 460, gave them cause for raising new constitutional

challenges to their sentences.

¶ 37 A. Eighth Amendment

¶ 38 The Miller court held the eighth amendment prohibits mandatory sentencing of

a juvenile to life in prison without parole. Id. at 489. As this court said in People v.

Clark, 2023 IL 127273, ¶ 54, “Miller did not prohibit life sentences for juveniles

but, instead, held that the eighth amendment required sentencing courts to have

discretion in sentencing juveniles after considering the juvenile’s youth and the

attendant characteristics of youth.” Miller directly applies only to juveniles. While

some of the reasoning of Miller could support an argument for extending its holding

to young adults, the decision in Miller itself makes no such extension. The holding

of Miller did not change the law applicable to young adults like Moore and

Williams. “Miller’s unavailability prior to 2012 at best deprived defendant of some

helpful support for his [eighth amendment] claim, which is insufficient to establish

cause.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. ¶ 67. Miller also did not change the

law applicable to discretionary sentences, even those imposed on juveniles. See

Jones v. Mississippi, 593 U.S. ___, ___, 141 S. Ct. 1307, 1314 (2021). Because

Miller did not change the law applicable to discretionary life sentences imposed on

young adults, including the sentences imposed on both Moore and Williams, Miller

did not give them cause to raise new challenges to their sentences as violations of

the eighth amendment. Moore and Williams did not sufficiently plead facts that

could support a finding of cause for failing to raise their eighth amendment

challenges prior to their proposed successive postconviction petitions.

¶ 39 B. Proportionate Penalties

¶ 40 In their petitions Moore and Williams argued Miller gave them cause to

challenge the constitutionality of their sentences under the proportionate penalties

clause of the Illinois Constitution, which requires courts to determine all penalties

both according to the seriousness of the offense and with the objective of restoring

the offender to useful citizenship. Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 11. But “ ‘Miller’s

announcement of a new substantive rule under the eighth amendment does not

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provide cause for a [juvenile offender] to raise a claim under the proportionate

penalties clause.’ ” Clark, 2023 IL 127273, ¶ 61 (quoting People v. Dorsey, 2021

IL 123010, ¶ 74). As Miller does not directly apply to young adults, it also does not

provide cause for a young adult offender to raise a claim under the proportionate

penalties clause.

¶ 41 In Clark, this court held that Miller did not establish cause for offenders with

intellectual disabilities to raise new challenges to their sentences under the

proportionate penalties clause, because “[l]ong before Miller, Illinois law

recognized the reduced culpability of defendants with intellectual disabilities.” Id.

¶ 62. Similarly, “long before Miller, Illinois law recognized the special status of

juvenile offenders for purposes of applying the principles under the proportionate

penalties clause.” Id. ¶ 61.

¶ 42 The evidence and arguments raised at the sentencing hearings for both Moore

and Williams show the parties knew Illinois law recognized the special status of

young adults, especially those subject to adverse influences, for purposes of

applying the principles of the proportionate penalties clause. “Miller does not

present new proportionate penalties clause principles with respect to discretionary

sentencing of young adult offenders. Instead, defendant had the essential legal tools

to raise his present proposed claim under the proportionate-penalties clause when

he filed his previous postconviction petitions.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.)

Id. ¶ 93. As Miller did not change the law applicable to young adults, it does not

provide cause for the proportionate penalties challenges advanced in Moore’s and

Williams’s proposed successive postconviction petitions. Because both Moore and

Williams have not sufficiently alleged facts that make a prima facie case showing

cause for raising their sentencing challenges in successive postconviction petitions,

we affirm the decisions of both circuit courts denying the motions for leave to file

the successive postconviction petitions. As our ruling on cause disposes of the

cases, we do not address the issue of whether Moore and Williams adequately stated

a prima facie showing of prejudice. See People v. Brown, 225 Ill. 2d 188, 207

(2007); see also Smith, 2014 IL 115946, ¶ 37.

¶ 43 III. CONCLUSION

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¶ 44 As Miller did not change the law applicable to discretionary sentences imposed

on young adult offenders, it does not provide cause for Moore and Williams to file

their proposed successive postconviction petitions. We affirm the appellate court’s

judgment affirming the circuit court’s dismissal of Moore’s petition for leave to file

a successive postconviction petition, and we reverse the appellate court’s judgment

reversing the circuit court’s dismissal of Williams’s petition for leave to file a

successive postconviction petition.

¶ 45 No. 126461, Affirmed.

¶ 46 No. 126932, Appellate court judgment reversed; circuit court judgment

affirmed.

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