Gonzalez v. Google LLC

(Slip Opinion) Cite as: 598 U. S. ____ (2023) 1

Per Curiam

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the

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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

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No. 21–1333

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REYNALDO GONZALEZ, ET AL., PETITIONERS v.

GOOGLE LLC

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF

APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

[May 18, 2023]

PER CURIAM.

In 2015, ISIS terrorists unleashed a set of coordinated at-

tacks across Paris, France, killing 130 victims, including

Nohemi Gonzalez, a 23-year-old U. S. citizen.1 Gonzalez’s

parents and brothers then sued Google, LLC, under 18

U. S. C. §§2333(a) and (d)(2), alleging that Google was both

directly and secondarily liable for the terrorist attack that

killed Gonzalez.2 For their secondary-liability claims,

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1 “ISIS” is shorthand for the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria. In some

form or another, it has been designated a Foreign Terrorist Organization

since 2004; ISIS has also been known as the Islamic State of Iraq and

the Levant, al Qaeda in Iraq, and the al-Zarqawi Network.

2 Title 18 U. S. C. §2333(a) provides: “Any national of the United States

injured in his or her person, property, or business by reason of an act of

international terrorism, or his or her estate, survivors, or heirs, may sue

therefor in any appropriate district court of the United States and shall

recover threefold the damages he or she sustains and the cost of the suit,

including attorney’s fees.” Section 2333(d)(2) provides: “In an action un-

der subsection (a) for an injury arising from an act of international ter-

rorism committed, planned, or authorized by an organization that had

been designated as a foreign terrorist organization under section 219 of

the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U. S. C. 1189), as of the date on

which such act of international terrorism was committed, planned, or

authorized, liability may be asserted as to any person who aids and

2 GONZALEZ v. GOOGLE LLC

Per Curiam

plaintiffs alleged that Google aided and abetted and con-

spired with ISIS. All of their claims broadly center on the

use of YouTube, which Google owns and operates, by ISIS

and ISIS supporters.

The District Court dismissed plaintiffs’ complaint for fail-

ure to state a claim, though it offered plaintiffs leave to

amend their complaint. Instead, plaintiffs stood on their

complaint and appealed, and the Ninth Circuit affirmed in

a consolidated opinion that also addressed Twitter, Inc. v.

Taamneh, ___ U. S. ___ (2023). 2 F. 4th 871 (2021). With

respect to this case, the Ninth Circuit held that most of the

plaintiffs’ claims were barred by §230 of the Communica-

tions Decency Act of 1996, 110 Stat. 137, 47 U. S. C.

§230(c)(1). The sole exceptions were plaintiffs’ direct-

and secondary-liability claims based on allegations that

Google approved ISIS videos for advertisements and then

shared proceeds with ISIS through YouTube’s revenue-

sharing system. The Ninth Circuit held that these poten-

tial claims were not barred by §230, but that plaintiffs’

allegations failed to state a viable claim in any event.

We granted certiorari to review the Ninth Circuit’s appli-

cation of §230. See 598 U. S. ___ (2022). Plaintiffs did not

seek review of the Ninth Circuit’s holdings regarding their

revenue-sharing claims. In light of those unchallenged

holdings and our disposition of Twitter, on which we also

granted certiorari and in which we today reverse the Ninth

Circuit’s judgment, it has become clear that plaintiffs’ com-

plaint—independent of §230—states little if any claim for

relief. As plaintiffs concede, the allegations underlying

their secondary-liability claims are materially identical to

those at issue in Twitter. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 58. Since we

hold that the complaint in that case fails to state a claim for

aiding and abetting under §2333(d)(2), it appears to follow

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abets, by knowingly providing substantial assistance, or who conspires

with the person who committed such an act of international terrorism.”

Cite as: 598 U. S. ____ (2023) 3

Per Curiam

that the complaint here likewise fails to state such a claim.

And, in discussing plaintiffs’ revenue-sharing claims, the

Ninth Circuit held that plaintiffs plausibly alleged neither

that “Google reached an agreement with ISIS,” as required

for conspiracy liability, nor that Google’s acts were “in-

tended to intimidate or coerce a civilian population, or to

influence or affect a government,” as required for a direct-

liability claim under §2333(a). 2 F. 4th, at 901, 907. Per-

haps for that reason, at oral argument, plaintiffs only

suggested that they should receive leave to amend their

complaint if we were to reverse and remand in Twitter. Tr.

of Oral Arg. 58, 163.

We need not resolve either the viability of plaintiffs’

claims as a whole or whether plaintiffs should receive fur-

ther leave to amend. Rather, we think it sufficient to

acknowledge that much (if not all) of plaintiffs’ complaint

seems to fail under either our decision in Twitter or the

Ninth Circuit’s unchallenged holdings below. We therefore

decline to address the application of §230 to a complaint

that appears to state little, if any, plausible claim for relief.

Instead, we vacate the judgment below and remand the

case for the Ninth Circuit to consider plaintiffs’ complaint

in light of our decision in Twitter.

It is so ordered.