Chester Upland S.D. & Chichester S.D. v. Delaware County Board of Assessment Appeals & City of Chester

IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Chester Upland School District and :

Chichester School District, :

Appellants :

:

v. :

:

Delaware County Board of Assessment : No. 171 C.D. 2022

Appeals and City of Chester : Argued: March 7, 2023

BEFORE: HONORABLE RENÉE COHN JUBELIRER, President Judge

HONORABLE ANNE E. COVEY, Judge

HONORABLE MARY HANNAH LEAVITT, Senior Judge

OPINION NOT REPORTED

MEMORANDUM OPINION BY

JUDGE COVEY FILED: May 17, 2023

The Chester Upland School District and Chichester School District

(collectively, School Districts) appeal from the Delaware County Common Pleas

Court’s (trial court) January 12, 2022 order (January 12, 2022 Order) sustaining the

Delaware County (County) Board of Assessment Appeals’ (Board) preliminary

objections (Preliminary Objections) and dismissing the School Districts’ complaint

seeking declaratory relief (Declaratory Complaint) to revoke real estate tax

exemptions for several properties in their districts (Declaratory Case). There are

three issues for this Court’s review: whether the trial court erred or committed legal

error by ruling that the Declaratory Complaint should be dismissed with prejudice

(1) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction; (2) due to the principles of res judicata

and/or collateral estoppel; and (3) for failure to conform to law and/or failure to state

a claim upon which relief can be granted. After review, this Court affirms.

On January 21, 2021, the School Districts, which are two County school

districts, filed the Declaratory Complaint in the trial court, averring therein that they

had appealed to the Board seeking to revoke the real estate tax exemptions granted

for several properties in their respective districts (Exemption Appeals) following a

countywide assessment revision conducted pursuant to the Consolidated County

Assessment Law (Assessment Law).1 Therein, the School Districts alleged that in

each Exemption Appeal, the Board provided written notice by First Class Mail to

the respective property owner(s) and to the respective School Districts that a hearing

would be held. The School Districts further averred that the Board conducted

separate hearings on each of their respective Exemption Appeals at which their

counsel appeared, but neither the property owner(s) nor their representatives

attended to demonstrate that the subject properties were entitled to the exemptions,

and at each hearing, the School Districts’ counsel requested that, in the absence of

property owner challenges, the tax exemptions for the subject properties should be

revoked. The School Districts declared that the Board ultimately denied the School

Districts’ requests and declined to revoke the real estate tax exemptions for the 127

properties listed in Declaratory Complaint Exhibit A.

The School Districts’ Declaratory Complaint consisted of two counts.

In Count I, the School Districts sought to obtain a judicial determination pursuant to

the Declaratory Judgments Act2 that the Board employed the incorrect legal standard

in declining to revoke the subject properties’ exemptions and, therefore, the trial

court should direct the Board to revoke those exemptions. In Count II, the School

Districts attempted to initiate a class action against the Board and the City of Chester

(City) in the City’s capacity individually and as a representative of the class of all

referenced property owners.

1

53 Pa.C.S. §§ 8801-8868.

2

42 Pa.C.S. §§ 7531-7541.

2

On March 1, 2021, the Board filed the Preliminary Objections to the

Declaratory Complaint. Therein, the Board averred that on December 9, 2020, under

a separate trial court number, the School Districts filed a complaint in mandamus

(Mandamus Complaint) and an emergency motion for peremptory judgment in

mandamus (Emergency Motion) (collectively, Mandamus Case), wherein the

School Districts sought a ruling that the Board impermissibly refused to revoke the

real estate tax exemptions when the property owners did not appear at the hearing

and, thus, failed to prove entitlement to the real estate tax exemption. The Board

further stated that on December 15, 2020, the trial court held a hearing on the

Emergency Motion, during which the School Districts and the Board reached an

agreement in open court; the trial court entered an order on December 18, 2020,

affording the School Districts until January 31, 2021, to appeal to the trial court from

the Board’s determinations in the Exemption Appeals;3 and, on January 5, 2021, the

trial court dismissed the School Districts’ Emergency Motion (January 5, 2021

Order).

In its Preliminary Objections, the Board asserted: (1) the trial court

lacked subject matter jurisdiction; (2) the School Districts’ claims are barred by res

judicata and collateral estoppel; and (3) the Declaratory Complaint failed to conform

to law/failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. The trial court

sustained the Preliminary Objections and dismissed the Declaratory Complaint with

prejudice.

On March 16, 2022, the trial court issued its opinion pursuant to

Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure (Rule) 1925(a) (Rule 1925(a) Opinion).

Regarding the Board’s first Preliminary Objection - that the trial court lacked subject

matter jurisdiction because the School Districts failed to exhaust their administrative

3

See Reproduced Record at 45a.

3

remedies - the trial court stated: “The School[] Districts’ active appeals [regarding]

the purported 127 properties where the Board refused to revoke the real estate tax

exemption necessitate[] the dismissal of the instant [Declaratory] Complaint . . . .

The School Districts are attempting to bypass the individual appeals process.” Rule

1925(a) Op. at 12. The trial court sustained the Board’s second Preliminary

Objection - the School Districts’ action was barred by res judicata and collateral

estoppel - because the trial court previously decided the matters at issue in its

Mandamus Case disposition.

Finally, the trial court sustained the Board’s third Preliminary

Objection - that the Declaratory Complaint failed to conform to law/failed to state a

claim upon which relief can be granted - reasoning:

Here[,] the Assessment Law provides that the School

Districts[,] as taxing districts[,] have the right to appeal

any assessment within their jurisdiction in the same

manner, subject to the same procedure and with like effect

as if the appeal were [sic] taken by a taxable person with

respect to the assessment. See [Section 8855 of the

Assessment Law,] 53 Pa.C.S. § 8855 (emphasis added).

Because the Assessment Law provides a process for the

School Districts to adequately obtain the relief they seek,

the proposed class action lawsuit is improper.

Additionally, the School Districts named the [City] as a

[d]efendant in conjunction with their request that the [t]rial

[c]ourt certify [the Declaratory Case] as a class action and

appoint the [City] as class representative to represent the

class of [p]roperty [o]wners listed in Exhibit A to the

[Declaratory] Compliant [sic]. However, the [City] is also

a taxing district and[,] as a taxing district[,] the City has a

vested pecuniary interest in the assessment of every

property located within its geographic boundaries. See

generally [Sections 8844, 8846, 8848 and 8855 of the

Assessment Law,] 53 Pa.C.S. §§ 8844, 8846, 8848[, and]

8855. The inherent conflict between the City and the

interests of the [p]roperty [o]wners within its boundaries

prohibits class certification.

4

Rule 1925(a) Op. at 16-17. The School Districts appealed to this Court.4

The School Districts first argue that the trial court erred by sustaining

the Board’s first Preliminary Objection that the trial court lacked subject matter

jurisdiction because the School Districts had not exhausted their

administrative/statutory remedies. The School Districts contend that they exhausted

their administrative remedies, and further claim, that the relief they requested is

permissible under the Declaratory Judgments Act.

This Court has declared:

A party may not seek judicial resolution of a dispute until

he or she has exhausted available statutory or

administrative remedies. [See Section 1504 of the

Statutory Construction Act of 1972,] 1 Pa.C.S. § 1504;

City of Phila[.] v. Lerner, . . . 151 A.3d 1020, 1024 ([Pa.]

2016) (citing Canonsburg Gen. Hosp. v. Dep’t of Health,

. . . 422 A.2d 141, 144 ([Pa.] 1980)). The doctrine “reflects

a recognition of the general assembly’s directive of strict

compliance with statutorily prescribed remedies” and it

also acknowledges that “an unjustified failure to follow

the administrative scheme undercuts the foundation upon

which the administrative process was founded.” Jordan v.

Fayette C[n]ty. Bd. of Assessment Appeals, 782 A.2d 642,

646 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2001) (quoting Shenango Valley

Osteopathic Hosp. v. Dep’t of Health, . . . 451 A.2d 434

([Pa.] 1982)). If a party fails to pursue a statutory remedy,

the court is without power to act until the statutory

remedies have been exhausted, even in cases where a

4

When reviewing a trial court’s order sustaining preliminary

objections in the nature of a demurrer, our standard of review is de

novo and our scope of review is plenary. Preliminary objections

may be sustained when, based on the facts pled, it is clear that the

plaintiff will be unable to establish a right to relief. All well-pled

material facts alleged in the complaint, and the inferences fairly

deducible therefrom, must be accepted as true. However,

conclusions of law, argumentative allegations, expressions of

opinion and unwarranted inferences need not be accepted.

Young v. Est. of Young, 138 A.3d 78, 84-85 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2016) (citations omitted).

5

constitutional question is presented. Muir v. Alexander,

858 A.2d 653, 660 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2004).

Martel v. Allegheny Cnty., 216 A.3d 1165, 1172 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2019) (emphasis

added). “It is well[ ]settled that when an adequate statutory remedy exists, [a c]ourt

lacks jurisdiction to entertain a suit in either law or equity.” Chambers Dev. Co.,

Inc. v. Dep’t of Env’t Res., 532 A.2d 928, 930 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1987) (emphasis added).

[A] “court’s equity powers are limited by the existence of

an adequate statutory remedy.” [Lundy v. City of

Williamsport, 548 A.2d 1339,] 1341 [(Pa. Cmwlth. 1988)]

(citing Arsenal Coal Co. v. Dep’t of Env[’]t Res., . . . 477

A.2d 1333 ([Pa.] 1984)). Further, “[i]n local

governmental agency appeals[,] jurisdiction and remedy is

conferred by statute. A court has no equity powers if it has

no jurisdiction.” Lundy, 548 A.2d at 1341.

In re Est. of Pancari, 176 A.3d 404, 409 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2017); see also E. Coast

Vapor, LLC v. Pa. Dep’t of Revenue, 189 A.3d 504 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2018). Thus, “[t]he

courts must refrain from exercising equity jurisdiction when there exists an adequate

statutory remedy.” Keystone ReLeaf LLC v. Pa. Dep’t of Health, 186 A.3d 505, 513

(Pa. Cmwlth. 2018); see also Zarwin v. Montgomery Cnty., 842 A.2d 1018, 1021

(Pa. Cmwlth. 2004) (“It is axiomatic that a court should not exercise equitable

jurisdiction where the plaintiff has an adequate remedy at law.”); Klein v. Shadyside

Health Educ. & Rsch. Corp., 643 A.2d 1120, 1125 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1994) (“The use of

equity jurisdiction is particularly inappropriate when . . . a statutory . . . appeal is

already being pursued.”).5

5

The School Districts contend that “an alleged failure to exhaust administrative remedies

. . . would not deprive the lower court of subject matter jurisdiction.” School Districts’ Br. at 5.

However, this Court has held:

“It is well settled that when an adequate administrative remedy

exists, [a] Court lacks jurisdiction to entertain a suit in either law

or equity.” Grand Cent[.] Sanitary Landfill, Inc. [v. Dep’t of Env’t

Res.], 554 A.2d [182,] 184 [(Pa. Cmwlth. 1989)]. “The doctrine of

exhaustion of administrative remedies requires a party to exhaust all

6

The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is

intended to prevent the premature interruption of the

administrative process, which would restrict the agency’s

opportunity to develop an adequate factual record, limit

the agency in the exercise of its expertise, and impede the

development of a cohesive body of law in that area.[6]

adequate and available administrative remedies before the right of

judicial review arises.” Empire Sanitary Landfill, Inc. [v. Dep’t of

Env’t Res.], 684 A.2d [1047,] 1053 [(Pa. 1996)]. It is a court-made

doctrine “intended to prevent premature judicial intervention into

the administrative process” and “operates as a restraint on the

exercise of a court’s equitable powers and a recognition of the

legislature’s direction to comply with statutorily-prescribed

remedies.” Id.

Pa. Indep. Oil & Gas Ass’n v. Dep’t of Env’t Prot., 135 A.3d 1118, 1129 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2015)

(emphasis added).

6

Notwithstanding,

[t]here are narrow circumstances where exhaustion of remedies is

not required. See Commonwealth ex rel. Nicholas v. P[a.] Lab[.]

Rel[s.] B[d.], . . . 681 A.2d 157 . . . ([Pa.] 1996). Indeed, our

Supreme Court has recognized three exceptions to the exhaustion of

administrative remedies for constitutional attacks:

The first exception is where the jurisdiction of an

agency is challenged. The second exception is where

the constitutionality of a statutory scheme or its

validity is challenged. The third exception is where

the legal or equitable remedies are unavailable or

inadequate, or the administrative agency is unable to

provide the requested relief.

Empire Sanitary, 684 A.2d at 1054 (internal citations omitted). . . .

....

A party seeking to avoid exhaustion must demonstrate a “substantial

question of constitutionality (and not a mere allegation) and the

absence of an adequate statutory remedy.” Kowenhoven v. C[nty.]

of Allegheny, . . . 901 A.2d 1003, 1012 n.8 ([Pa.] 2006) (quoting

Borough of Green Tree v. B[d.] of Prop[.] Assessments, Appeals &

Rev[.] of Allegheny C[nty.], . . . 328 A.2d 819, 822 ([Pa.] 1974)

(plurality)) (emphasis added) . . . . The exception applies to facial

challenges “made to the constitutionality of the statute or regulation

as a whole, and not merely to the application of the statute or

regulation in a particular case.” Lehman v. P[a.] State Police, . . .

7

Keystone ReLeaf, 186 A.3d at 513. Accordingly,

equity jurisdiction is precluded unless a two-part test is

satisfied: the taxpayers must (1) raise a substantial

constitutional issue, and (2) lack an adequate remedy

through the administrative appeal process. See Borough

of Green Tree [v. Bd. of Prop. Assessments, Appeals &

Rev.], . . . 328 A.2d [819,] 822 [(Pa. 1974)] (“[W]hat is

required to confer jurisdiction on an equity court is the

existence of a substantial question of constitutionality (and

not a mere allegation) and the absence of an adequate

statutory remedy.” ([E]mphasis in original[.]) (quoting

Rochester & Pittsburgh Coal Co. v. Indiana C[nty.] Bd. of

Assessment & Revision of Taxes, . . . 266 A.2d 78, 79 ([Pa.]

1970))[]; Kowenhoven [v. Cnty. of Allegheny], . . . 901

A.2d [1003,] 1012 n.8 [(Pa. 2006)].

Beattie v. Allegheny Cnty., 907 A.2d 519, 524-25 (Pa. 2006) (bold emphasis added).

A substantial question of constitutionality is one that

challenges “the validity of the statute as a whole and

not simply a challenge to the application of the statute

to a particular party.” Cherry [v. City of Phila.,] 692

A.2d [1082,] 1084 [(Pa. 1997)]. In other words, there must

be a facial or direct challenge to the statute, as opposed to

an as-applied challenge.

E. Coast Vapor, 189 A.3d at 511 (emphasis added).

The School Districts contend that they exhausted their administrative

remedies by filing the Exemption Appeals to the Board and appealing from the

Board’s decisions to the trial court before asserting the instant claim in the trial court.

Citing Martel, the School Districts insist that “[this] Court has made clear that[,] so

long as the aggrieved party commenced the appeals process under the Assessment

Law and appealed the Board’s decision to the trial court, the aggrieved party may

also seek declaratory relief.” School Districts’ Br. at 6.

839 A.2d 265, 275 ([Pa.] 2003) (emphasis added); accord Funk [v.

Dep’t of Env’t Prot.,] 71 A.3d [1097,] 1102 [(Pa. Cmwlth. 2013)].

Keystone ReLeaf, 186 A.3d at 513-14.

8

In Martel, the property owners filed a class action complaint in equity

against the county board of assessment appeals and review (county board) pursuant

to the law known as the Second Class County Assessment Law,7 challenging

property reassessments that the county board had ordered in assessment appeals

brought by the school district, the county and the city (collectively, taxing

authorities). The county board and taxing authorities filed preliminary objections

that the property owners failed to exhaust their statutory remedies at law. Relying

on Beattie’s two-part test, the trial court overruled the preliminary objections. On

appeal, this Court, en banc, concluded that the trial court erred in applying the

Beattie test.

With respect to an adequate remedy, the Martel Court explained:

The [Second Class County] Assessment Law specifically

grants the [county b]oard the “power” and “duty” “[t]o

hear all cases of appeals from assessments, and all

complaints as to assessments, errors, exonerations and

refunds.” Section 4 of the [Second Class County]

Assessment Law, 72 P.S. § 5452.4(c) (emphasis added).

“[A]ny taxable person may apply to the [county] board for

the reassessment of any subject of taxation which he

considers incorrectly assessed or as to which he considers

himself entitled to a change in valuation . . . .” Section 14

of the [Second Class County] Assessment Law, 72 P.S. §

5452.14. If a taxpayer prevails on his or her appeal and

the [county b]oard or trial court lowers the assessed value

of his or her real estate, the taxpayer will be entitled to a

refund for the tax years at issue and interest. Section 17(a)

of the [Second Class County] Assessment Law, 72 P.S. §

5452.17(a). However, if the [county b]oard renders a

decision regarding the reassessments and refunds that the

taxpayer disagrees with, the aggrieved taxpayer may file

an appeal to the trial court. Section 11 of the [Second

Class County] Assessment Law, 72 P.S. § 5452.11;

Chartiers Valley Sch. Dist. v. Bd. of Prop. Assessment,

Appeals & Rev[.], . . . 622 A.2d 420, 427 ([Pa. Cmwlth.]

7

Act of June 21, 1939, P.L. 626, as amended, 72 P.S. §§ 5452.1-5452.20.

9

1993) (explaining that the trial court conducts a de novo

hearing on assessment appeals referenced in 72 P.S. §

5452.11).

As for [the] [p]roperty [o]wners’ request for injunctive and

declaratory relief and attorneys’ fees and costs, if they are

unsuccessful before the [county b]oard on their claims

for reassessments and refunds, they can seek this

additional relief from the trial court in their appeal as

provided by [Section 11 of the Second Class County

Assessment Law,] 72 P.S. § 5452.11. [The] [p]roperty

[o]wners may seek an injunction pursuant to

Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 1531[,

Pa.R.Civ.P. 1531,] and may seek a declaration

regarding the [Allegheny County] Administrative

Code[8] and [county b]oard [r]ule as provided in

Section 7532 of the Declaratory Judgments Act, 42

Pa.C.S. § 7532. Similarly, [p]roperty [o]wners may

request attorneys’ fees and costs from the trial court due to

the [county b]oard’s failure to provide them with the

requested assessment and refund relief pursuant to Section

2503 of the Judicial Code, 42 Pa.C.S § 2503.

[The] [p]roperty [o]wners, here, acknowledged that one of

their complainants, the Martels, commenced the appeals

process under the [Second Class County] Assessment

Law. The Martels filed an appeal with the [county b]oard

with respect to their property assessment but the [county

b]oard did not provide the relief they sought[,] so they

filed a timely appeal of the [county b]oard’s decision with

the “Court of Common Pleas Board of Viewers and

docketed at No. BV-001316.” [Martel] Complaint ¶ 37.

Because the Martels appealed the [county b]oard’s

decision to the trial court as provided by the [Second

Class County] Assessment Law, they may seek

injunctive and declaratory relief, in addition to

attorneys’ fees, costs, and any other relief to which they

contend they are entitled as a result of the [county

b]oard’s failure to properly grant them relief on the

assessments and refunds. The legislature provided an

appeals process per the [Second Class County]

Assessment Law to obtain the relief sought in the

complaint, and the process must be followed

8

Allegheny County, Pa., Administrative Code.

10

exclusively. Lilian v. Commonwealth, . . . 354 A.2d 250,

252-53 ([Pa.] 1976) (explaining that where the legislature

provides a statutory form of relief, it must be followed

exclusively).

Martel, 216 A.3d at 1173-74 (bold and underline emphasis added; footnotes

omitted).

Because the Second Class County Assessment Law provided an

adequate process for the individual property owners to obtain the relief sought, the

Martel Court found that the class action lawsuit was improper. Further, the Martel

Court held that the trial court erred in applying the Beattie test when it concluded

that the property owners had raised a substantial constitutional question to provide

the basis for equity jurisdiction, because “the exercise of equity jurisdiction is

appropriate when a ‘substantial frontal attack’ to the statute is brought[,] but it is not

appropriate when the challenge pertains to the application of the statute.” Martel,

216 A.3d at 1176.

Contrary to the School Districts’ contention, Martel does not stand for

the proposition that because the School Districts commenced the appeals process

under the Assessment Law and appealed from the Board’s decision to the trial court,

they may also file an action in the trial court’s equitable jurisdiction seeking

declaratory relief. Rather, the School Districts may seek equitable relief in their

statutory appeals to the trial court from the Exemption Appeals. In the Exemption

Appeals, the Assessment Law permitted the School Districts to appeal from each

Board determination to the trial court, and the School Districts did so. The statutory

remedy includes an appeal from the Board to the trial court, see 53 Pa.C.S. § 8855,

11

and is not exhausted until it is complete.9 The School Districts must pursue that

statutorily authorized process unless they can satisfy both parts of the Beattie test.10

The School Districts filed the instant Declaratory Case in the trial court

seeking equity jurisdiction, contending, inter alia, that the Board’s misapplication

of the relevant burden violates their due process rights. 11 As in Martel, the School

Districts’ constitutional challenge applies to the Board’s application of the

Assessment Law and, thus, it does not meet the requisite Beattie standard by raising

a “substantial question of constitutionality.” E. Coast Vapor, 189 A.3d at 511.

9

The School Districts also assert that the trial court erroneously relied “solely on case law

governing declaratory actions filed in the [trial court] as a court of original jurisdiction where the

plaintiffs completely bypassed a board of assessment appeals.” School Districts’ Br. at 7.

Notwithstanding, this Court has described the use of declaratory judgment actions as

“inappropriate” where a statutory appeal to a trial court was pending. Klein, 643 A.2d at 1125.

10

As described in Martel, parties appealing from tax assessment decisions may seek, inter

alia, equitable relief in individual trial court appeals, but they may not implement a separate

declaratory judgment action outside of the process set forth in the Assessment Law.

11

The School Districts complain that the Board erroneously placed the burden on the

School Districts to prove the subject properties were not exempt. The Board retorts:

Despite [the] School Districts’ argument that the law places the

burden of proof on a property owner to demonstrate that they

continue to qualify for an exemption before a [b]oard of

[a]ssessment, [the] School Districts have not cited one case decided

since the Institutions of Purely Public Charity Act[, Act of

November 26, 1997, P.L. 508, 10 P.S. §§ 371-385 (IPPCA),] was

enacted in 1997 for this proposition. Every case cited by School

Districts that was decided since 1997 arose in the context of a

property owner initially seeking an exemption where they

clearly have the burden of proof. This is a critical distinction

because the burden of proof is shifted by the [IPPCA] for institutions

that have less than $10 million in revenue. [See Section 6 of the

IPPCA, 10 P.S. § 376]. In those cases, the burden of proof is on a

taxing authority seeking to challenge exempt status.

Board Br. at 17 (emphasis added; footnotes omitted).

12

Accordingly, the trial court properly sustained the Board’s first Preliminary

Objection for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.12, 13

For all of the above reasons, the trial court’s order is affirmed.

_________________________________

ANNE E. COVEY, Judge

Judge Fizzano Cannon did not participate in the decision in this matter.

12

With respect to the second Beattie element, that the party lacks an adequate remedy, the

Pennsylvania Supreme Court has explained:

“[I]n order to determine whether equity jurisdiction is proper in the

face of an existing legal or statutory remedy, we must determine if

the legal remedy available to the plaintiff is adequate and

complete. . . . Where . . . a legal remedy would result in a

multiplicity of duplicative lawsuits and, in contrast, an action in

equity would provide a tidy global resolution, this Court has

found the legal remedy to be inadequate.”

Kowenhoven, 901 A.2d at 1011 (emphasis added) (quoting Pentlong Corp. v. GLS Cap., Inc., 820

A.2d 1240, 1245-46 (Pa. 2003) (superseded by statute)). The trial court in the instant matter

recognized that there are appeals pending in the trial court with respect to the 127 properties where

the Board refused to revoke the real estate tax exemption. In each such Exemption Appeal, the

property owners failed to offer evidence to establish their right to a tax exemption; nonetheless,

the Board granted each an exemption. Thus, although it appears that the School Districts would

satisfy the second Beattie element, the Beattie test requires both elements to be met to secure equity

jurisdiction.

13

Having concluded that the trial court properly sustained the Board’s first Preliminary

Objection, this Court does not reach the remaining issues.

13

IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Chester Upland School District and :

Chichester School District, :

Appellants :

:

v. :

:

Delaware County Board of Assessment : No. 171 C.D. 2022

Appeals and City of Chester :

ORDER

AND NOW, this 17th day of May, 2023, the Delaware County Common

Pleas Court’s January 12, 2022 order is affirmed.

_________________________________

ANNE E. COVEY, Judge