Opinion

Konecranes Nuclear Equipment & Services, LLC v. United States

Court
United States Court of Federal Claims
Filed
May 16, 2023
Status
Published
On the bench
Stephen S. Schwartz
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 23.3%

The opinion

In the United States Court of Federal Claims

No. 22-873C

(Filed Under Seal: May 5, 2023)

(Reissued: May 16, 2023)

FOR PUBLICATION

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KONECRANES NUCLEAR *

EQUIPMENT & SERVICES, LLC, *

*

Plaintiff, *

*

v. *

*

UNITED STATES, *

*

Defendant, *

*

and *

*

IMPSA INTERNATIONAL, INC., *

*

Defendant- *

Intervenor. *

*

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Suzanne Sumner, Taft Stettinius & Hollister, LLP, Dayton, Ohio, for Plaintiff.

With her on briefs were Erin R. Davis, Brandon E. Dobyns, Barbara A. Duncombe,

and Stephen G. Darby, Taft Stettinius & Hollister, LLP.

Ioana Cristei, Trial Attorney, Commercial Litigation Branch, Civil Division,

United States Department of Justice, Washington, D.C., for Defendant, United

States. With her on briefs were Brian M. Boynton, Principal Deputy Assistant

Attorney General, Patricia M. McCarthy, Director, Martin F. Hockey, Jr., Deputy

Director, as well as Major Michael R. Tregle, Jr., Trial Attorney, U.S. Army Legal

Services Agency and Major Ben Hogan, Trial Attorney, U.S. Army Legal Services

Agency.

Pursuant to the protective order in this case, the Court initially filed this opinion under seal on May 5,

2023, for the parties to propose redactions of confidential or proprietary information. The parties were

directed to propose redactions by May 19, 2023. A joint notice of proposed redactions was received from

the parties. The Court has incorporated the parties’ proposed redactions and makes them with

bracketed ellipses (“[. . .]” below.

Scott R. Williamson, Williamson Law Group, LLC, Bethesda, Maryland, for

Defendant-Intervenor, IMPSA International. With him on briefs was Daniel R.

Williamson, Williamson Law Group, LLC.

OPINION AND ORDER

Plaintiff Konecranes Nuclear Equipment & Services, LLC (“Konecranes”)

brings this post-award bid protest challenging the U.S. Department of the Army’s

decision to award a contract to Defendant-Intervenor IMPSA International, Inc.

(“IMPSA”). The parties have filed cross-motions for judgment on the administrative

record, and I have heard oral argument.1 For the reasons discussed below, Plaintiff’s

motion is DENIED and Defendant and Defendant-Intervenor’s motions are

GRANTED. The case is DISMISSED.

BACKGROUND

The Army issued a request for proposals (No. W56HZV-20-R-0025, hereafter

“RFP”) for a single-award fixed-price contract to acquire two ship-to-shore container

cranes. Administrative Record (“AR”) 425. The proposals were to be evaluated for

“best value” to the government, meaning the final award would be made to the bid

that provides the best overall value to the government given the price, not necessarily

to the bid with the lowest price. AR 534 § M.1.1. The Army determined that both

Konecranes and IMPSA had submitted strong proposals, but that IMPSA’s reflected

the best value.

A. Relevant RFP Provisions

Konecranes’s claims hinge on the RFP’s evaluation and eligibility criteria. The

Army amended the RFP seven times, with the fifth amendment providing the final

updates germane here.2 AR 1527. The relevant provisions are as follows.

The RFP contains three sections of relevance. Section C, the statement of work,

describes the nature of the work required for performance. AR 1506. Section L

provides instructions to offerors about proposal submission, contents, and processing.

1 Pl.’s Mot. for J. on the Admin. Rec. (ECF 22) (“Pl.’s Mot.”); Def.’s Cross-Mot. for J. on the Admin. Rec.

& Resp. to Pl.’s Mot. for J. on the Admin. Rec. (ECF 25) (“Def.’s Cross-Mot. & Resp.”); Def.-Int.’s Cross-

Mot. for J. on the Admin. Rec. & Resp. to Pl.’s Mot. for J. on the Admin. Rec. (ECF 23) (“Def.-Int.’s

Cross-Mot. & Resp.”); Pl.’s Resp. & Reply to Def.’s Cross-Mot. for J. on the Admin. Rec. (ECF 33) (“Pl.’s

Resp. & Reply”); Def.’s Reply in Supp. of Def.’s Cross-Mot. for J. on the Admin. Rec. (ECF 35) (“Def.’s

Reply”); Def.-Int.’s Reply in Supp. of Def.-Int’s Cross-Mot. for J. on the Admin. Rec. (ECF 34) (Def.-

Int.’s Reply); Hearing Tr. (ECF 37) (“Tr.”).

2 In addition to this case and the proceedings described in the following section, Konecranes filed a

pre-award bid protest objecting to the original terms of the RFP. Compl., Konecranes Nuclear

Equipment & Serv., LLC v. United States, No. 1:21-cv-1441 (ECF 1). Konecranes filed a motion for

voluntary dismissal after the government took partial corrective action. Notice of Voluntary Dismissal,

Konecranes Nuclear Equipment & Serv., LLC v. United States, No. 1:21-cv-1441 (ECF 21).

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AR 1519. Section M elaborates on the evaluation factors the Army was to apply to

proposals. AR 1527. The RFP included three evaluation factors: technical, price, and

small business participation. AR 1527; see also AR 1521–25 § L.4.

Technical evaluation hinged on whether the proposal contained three required

certifications: (1) a quality system meeting the International Organization for

Standardization (“ISO”) 9001 requirements, AR 1529 § M.4.1.1.1; (2) an inspector

certified by the American Society for Nondestructive Testing, AR 1529 § M.4.1.1.2;

and (3) a professional engineer license for the offeror’s engineer of record or

subcontracted review engineer in various specialties, AR 1529 § M.4.1.1.3. For each

certification, the RFP provided that offerors with the certification would be assessed

as “low risk,” while offerors who could not demonstrate certification “may be assessed

as higher risk for this requirement.” AR 1529 §§ M.4.1.1.1–.3. At the same time, the

RFP did not require or reward presentation of certifications beyond the ones specified:

“No evaluation credit will be given for providing data that exceeds the requirements

identified above.” AR 1529 § M.4.1.2.

The intended result of the Army’s technical evaluation was an adjectival

technical rating (i.e., outstanding, good, etc.) and an adjectival risk rating (i.e., low

risk, moderate risk, etc.). AR 408. The technical rating called for a comparison of a

proposal’s strengths and weaknesses. The Source Selection Plan defined a strength

as “an aspect of an offeror’s proposal that has merit or exceeds specified performance

or capability requirements in a way that will be advantageous to the Government

during contract performance.” AR 423. A weakness, in contrast, was “a flaw in the

proposal that increases the risk of unsuccessful contract performance.” Id. Risk

referred to “the potential for unsuccessful contract performance.” AR 422. The

adjectival technical and risk ratings had defined meanings as well. AR 408.

For the price evaluation, the RFP required the Army to determine if each

offeror’s proposed price was reasonable. AR 1529 § M.4.2.1.2. The Army was

authorized to assess reasonableness using any of the analytical techniques listed in

Federal Acquisition Regulation (“FAR”) 15.404-1 (codified at 48 C.F.R.). Id. The RFP

also required the Army to evaluate proposals for unbalanced pricing, which exists

when “the price of one or more contract line items is significantly over- or understated

as indicated by the application of cost and price analysis techniques.” AR 1529–30

§ M.4.2.1.3.

In addition to the evaluation criteria, two independent RFP requirements are

at issue. First, the Army had an affirmative duty to make a responsibility

determination for any prospective awardee. See FAR 9.103. To be deemed responsible

and eligible for an award, a bidder must demonstrate compliance with the standards

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in FAR 9.104. As part of this responsibility determination, the RFP stated that the

Army “reserve[d] the right” to conduct a pre-award survey on any or all offerors or

their subcontractors, which could involve a site visit or requests for financial or other

background information. AR 1528.

Second, because the RFP contemplated delivery of “materials handling

equipment,” it was subject to the Trade Agreements Act (“TAA”), 19 U.S.C. §§ 2501

et seq., in accordance with Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement

(“DFARS”) 225.401-70. AR 430. As such, the Army could only consider offers for U.S.-

made, qualifying-country, or designated-country end products unless certain

exceptions applied. AR 430; see also DFARS 252.225-7021.

B. Submissions, Award, and Subsequent Proceedings

The Army initially received three bids. One offeror withdrew, leaving only

Konecranes and IMPSA. AR 1951, 2023, 2636.

Both Konecranes and IMPSA were “known vendors in the crane

manufacturing industry[.]” AR 376. Konecranes is a manufacturer based in the

United States. AR 1954. IMPSA is a subsidiary of Industrias Metalurgicas

Pescarmona S.A.I.C.F.-IMPSA (“IMPSA S.A.”), based in Argentina. AR 3410. IMPSA,

the subsidiary, is a small entity with no manufacturing facilities of its own. See AR

259, 262, 3369; Pl.’s Mot. at 10–11. It had, however, previously supplied four

container cranes to the Department of the Navy in 1993 and 2000. AR 376; see also

AR 260 (describing crane manufacturing history). IMPSA supported its proposal with

an ISO 9001 certification covering IMPSA S.A., AR 2025, 3397, a certification for a

nondestructive testing inspector, AR 2026–28, and licenses for professional

engineers, AR 2029–37. Konecranes likewise supported its proposal with its own

certifications and licenses. AR 1954–59.

For the technical evaluation, the Source Selection Authority (“SSA”) assigned

both IMPSA and Konecranes a rating of outstanding with low risk, with each proposal

receiving three strengths and no weaknesses. AR 2873

For its price evaluation, the SSA conducted three of the analyses listed in FAR

15.404-1(b): comparison of offers, comparison to an independent government cost

estimate (“IGCE”),3 and assessment of offer price data and assumptions. AR 2744–

51, 2783–84; FAR 15.404-1(b)(2)(i), (v), (vii). The SSA determined that IMPSA’s price

was reasonable under each analysis. AR 2783–84. The SSA determined that

3 An IGCE is intended to “represent [an] agency’s best estimate of the most reasonable current price

of the products or services being procured.” Process Control Techs. v. United States, 53 Fed. Cl. 71, 77

(2002) (quoting John Cibinic, Jr. & Ralph C. Nash, Jr., Formation of Government Contracts 1317 (3d

ed. 1998)).

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Konecranes’s price was reasonable too, but only under the third reasonableness

analysis method. AR 2751; see also FAR 15.404-1(b)(2)(vii).

To assess responsibility and verify other information, the contracting officer

asked the Defense Contract Management Agency (“DCMA”) to conduct pre-award

surveys on the offerors. Supplemental Administrative Record (“Supp. AR”) 3560–80.

The DCMA evaluated Konecranes’s facilities and technical capabilities during the

pre-award survey. AR 3302–3312. The DCMA initiated an investigation of IMPSA,

but was unable to pursue a survey of IMPSA S.A. facilities abroad and canceled those

aspects of the survey. Supp. AR 3574–81.

In the course of the IMPSA pre-award survey, the Army became concerned that

IMPSA’s proposal would not comply with the TAA. Supp. AR 3579. The Army

accordingly issued an evaluation notice to IMPSA asking it to demonstrate TAA

compliance. AR 2356–57. IMPSA represented that the cranes would be erected in

Colombia, Panama, or Chile, which are all considered designated countries under the

TAA. AR 2527. IMPSA explained that parts would be sourced worldwide, but that the

cranes would be “assembled under direct supervision by IMPSA with local labor and

equipment into sub-assemblies and then erected into cranes” for export to the United

States, “thereby satisfying DFARS clauses in the solicitation.” Id.

Having determined that both Konecranes and IMPSA had made technically

outstanding offers with low risk and that IMPSA complied with the TAA, the SSA

turned to the determinative questions of responsibility and best value. Although the

government had not been able to survey IMPSA S.A.’s facilities, the SSA determined

that IMPSA was responsible. AR 2898–900. As for best value, Konecranes’s proposed

price was [. . .] and IMPSA’s proposed price was $47,944,815. AR 2783. Because

IMPSA’s price was [. . .] than Konecranes’s and the proposals were otherwise

comparable, AR 3078–84, the SSA awarded the contract to IMPSA. AR 2973.

Konecranes filed a protest of the award with the Government Accountability

Office (“GAO”). AR 3114–30. In response, the Army issued a stop work order to

IMPSA and agreed to take corrective action including: (1) re-evaluation of IMPSA’s

technical proposal; (2) a new responsibility determination; and (3) a new best-value

determination. AR 3113, 3391.

For its re-evaluation of IMPSA’s technical proposal, the Army requested

additional information about the ISO 9001 certification held by IMPSA S.A. AR 3396–

97. IMPSA responded that it and its parent company “operate as an integrated

enterprise, with shared management, common policies, and shared resources,” and

that its parent company’s ISO certification would “cover the quality management

system that will be used in performance of this contract.” Id. The SSA determined

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that reliance on IMPSA S.A.’s certification created some risk, and assigned IMPSA

an additional weakness for the ISO 9001 certification technical subfactor. AR 3545.

But the SSA determined that because IMPSA’s response sufficiently addressed how

the ISO certification covered its quality management system, the risk was low. Id.

The SSA therefore once again assigned the same overall technical rating (i.e.,

outstanding with low risk) to Konecranes and IMPSA. Id.

For the Army’s new responsibility determination, the DCMA conducted an

additional pre-award survey of IMPSA. AR 3398. The DCMA assigned IMPSA a

moderate risk due to its lack of on-site manufacturing capability and verifiable

delivery information, but it nonetheless recommended complete award to IMPSA

because its capabilities, including its reliance on the resources of its parent company,

were adequate. AR 3398–402. The DCMA also conducted a search of IMPSA for

exclusion records and confirmed that IMPSA had a counterfeit mitigation policy in

place. AR 3399; Tr. at 87–88.

After assigning the same technical ratings to IMPSA and Konecranes and

determining that IMPSA was responsible, the SSA determined once again that

IMPSA represented the best overall value to the government because of its lower

price. AR 3543–48.

DISCUSSION

I. Jurisdiction

To reach the merits of the case, I must first determine that the Court has

jurisdiction over Konecranes’s claims. See Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523

U.S. 83, 94 (1998). This Court’s jurisdiction in bid protests rests on the Tucker Act,

as amended by the Administrative Dispute Resolution Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-

320, § 12(a)–(b), 110 Stat. 3870, 3874 (1996) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1491(b)); see

Dyonyx, L.P. v. United States, 83 Fed. Cl. 460, 464–65 (2008). The Tucker Act now

grants this Court jurisdiction “to render judgment on an action by an interested party

objecting to … the award of a contract or any alleged violation of statute or regulation

in connection with a procurement[.]” 28 U.S.C. § 1491(b)(1).

“[S]tanding is a threshold jurisdictional issue,” Myers Investigative & Sec.

Servs., Inc. v. United States, 275 F.3d 1366, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2002), and only an

“interested party” has standing to challenge a solicitation. Digitalis Educ. Sols. Inc.

v. United States, 664 F.3d 1380, 1384 (Fed. Cir. 2012). To establish that it is an

interested party, a plaintiff must show (1) that it is an “actual or prospective bidder”

and (2) that it “possesses the requisite direct economic interest.” Rex Serv. Corp. v.

United States, 448 F.3d 1305, 1307 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (citing Myers Investigative, 275

F.3d at 1369 (itself citing Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992))).

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Here, there is no dispute that Konecranes meets the two-part test, and the

government does not contest that Konecranes is an interested party. Tr. at 71. First,

Konecranes was an actual bidder who submitted a proposal. AR 2726. Second,

Konecranes has the requisite economic interest. The Federal Circuit has held that in

order to show a direct economic interest, a plaintiff must “establish that it had a

substantial chance of securing the award.” Myers Investigative, 275 F.3d at 1370. As

the only other offeror in addition to IMPSA who also met the solicitation’s technical

requirements, Konecranes had a substantial chance of winning the award. See McVey

Co., Inc. v. United States, 111 Fed. Cl. 387, 405 (2013).

II. Merits

This Court reviews bid protests “pursuant to the standards set forth in section

706 of title 5,” i.e., the Administrative Procedure Act. 28 U.S.C. § 1491(b)(4); see

Banknote Corp. of Am., Inc. v. United States, 365 F.3d 1345, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2004).

The protester must show that the agency’s action was arbitrary and capricious and

that it was prejudiced by the agency’s conduct. 5 U.S.C. § 706; see also, e.g., Bannum,

Inc. v. United States, 404 F.3d 1346, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2005). When resolving motions

for judgment on the administrative record under Rule 52.1(c), this Court proceeds “as

if it were conducting a trial on the record.” Bannum, 404 F.3d at 1354 (addressing

former RCFC 56.1); see also Young v. United States, 497 F. App’x 53, 58–59 (Fed. Cir.

2012).

There are two bases for setting aside government procurements as arbitrary

and capricious: “(1) the procurement official’s decision lacked a rational basis; or

(2) the procurement procedure involved a violation of regulation or procedure.”

Impresa Construzioni Geom. Domenico Garufi v. United States, 238 F.3d 1324, 1332

(Fed. Cir. 2001); see also Bannum, 404 F.3d at 1351; Advanced Data Concepts, Inc. v.

United States, 216 F.3d 1054, 1057–58 (Fed. Cir. 2000). The first route involves

determining “whether the contracting agency provided a coherent and reasonable

explanation of its exercise of discretion.” Impresa, 238 F.3d at 1332–33 (quotes

omitted) (citing Latecoere Int’l, Inc. v. United States Dep’t of Navy, 19 F.3d 1342, 1356

(11th Cir. 1994)). To succeed, “the disappointed bidder bears a heavy burden of

showing that the award decision had no rational basis.” Id. at 1333 (quotes omitted)

(citing Saratoga Dev. Corp. v. United States, 21 F.3d 445, 456 (D.C. Cir. 1994)). The

second route requires the disappointed bidder to “show a clear and prejudicial

violation of applicable statutes or regulations.” Id. (quotes omitted). In either case,

this Court’s review is “highly deferential” to agency decision-making, Advanced Data

Concepts, 216 F.3d at 1058 — especially in an award based on best value, where “the

contracting officer ha[s] even greater discretion than if the contract were to have been

awarded on the basis of cost alone.” Galen Med. Assocs., Inc. v. United States, 369

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F.3d 1324, 1330 (Fed. Cir. 2004); see also Cleveland Assets, LLC v. United States, 883

F.3d 1378, 1382 (Fed. Cir. 2018).

A. Evaluation Factors

Konecranes argues that the Army’s technical and price evaluation of IMPSA’s

proposal was irrational and inconsistent with the RFP’s evaluation factors. See Pl.’s

Mot. at 9–15, 22–27. I disagree.

1. ISO Certification

As mentioned above, offerors were asked to provide an ISO 9001 certification.

AR 1529 § M.4.1.1.1.4 Konecranes argues that the Army misapplied the RFP’s

evaluation criteria when it accepted the ISO 9001 certification of IMPSA’s parent

company, IMPSA S.A. Pl.’s Mot. at 10–11.

Konecranes’s theory is that because the technical evaluation subfactor for ISO

9001 certification cross-referenced part of the statement of work in Section C of the

RFP, technical evaluation had to include Section C requirements as well. See AR 1529

§ M.4.1.1.1 (referencing § C.3.3); Pl.’s Mot. at 9–10. The cross-referenced language in

Section C stated that “[t]he Contractor … shall have a quality system that shall be

certified by an ISO accredited third party registrar to meet the requirements of ISO

9001, or the Contractors quality system shall address each of the elements of ISO

9001.” AR 461 § C.3.3.1. Because the Section C language is phrased in mandatory

terms — Konecranes reasons — IMPSA was ineligible for award without its own ISO

certification. Pl.’s Mot. at 10–11.

That misunderstands how the RFP provisions interact.5 The evaluation

criteria in Section M and the statement of work in Section C are separate sections of

4 The technical evaluation subfactor provided that:

The Government will assess the risk associated with the Offerors ability to

demonstrate that it will meet the following requirements:

M.4.1.1.1 ISO certification for quality system by an ISO accredited third party

registrar to meet the requirements of ISO 9001 (SOW Section C.3.3)

If the offeror provides an ISO certification for quality system by an ISO accredited

third party registrar to meet the requirements of ISO 9001 in the proposal, the offeror

will be assessed as low risk for this requirement. If the offeror does not provide the

certification in the proposal, the offeror may be assessed as higher risk for this

requirement.

AR 1529 § M.4.1.1.1.

5 When interpreting an RFP, this Court begins with the plain language. If the provisions of the RFP

are “clear and unambiguous, they must be given their plain and ordinary meaning.” Banknote Corp.,

365 F.3d at 1353. The Court must consider the RFP as a whole and interpret it “in a manner that

harmonizes and gives reasonable meaning to all of its provisions.” Safeguard Base Operations, LLC v.

United States, 989 F.3d 1326, 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2021) (quotes omitted).

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the RFP that serve distinct purposes: Section M governs evaluation of offers for

award, while Section C governs contract performance. AR 1506, 1527. Konecranes’s

interpretation also ignores the remaining language of the evaluation subfactor, which

contemplates that offerors might not provide an ISO certification and permits the

Army to assign such offerors a higher risk. AR 1529 § M.4.1.1.1 (“If the offeror does

not provide the [ISO] certification in the proposal, the offeror may be assessed as

higher risk for this requirement.”). Lack of certification is thus not a bar to award,

but simply a fact for the Army to consider — as it did here. AR 3539, 3545. Konecranes

now concedes that the ISO certification was not mandatory. Tr. at 15.

Konecranes relatedly claims that IMPSA’s manufacturing subcontractors

must also have an ISO certification. Pl.’s Mot. at 15. But Konecranes does not point

to any language in the evaluation factors imposing any such requirement, only

language in the statement of work. Id. Considering subcontractor certification thus

would have meant applying an unstated evaluation criterion, which is not permitted.

See 41 U.S.C. § 3701(a); FAR 15.305(a); Banknote Corp. of America, Inc. v. United

States, 56 Fed. Cl. 377, 386 (2003) (citing Acra, Inc. v. United States, 44 Fed. Cl. 288,

293 (1999)), aff’d, 365 F.3d 1345.

Konecranes argues in the alternative that the Army’s decision to assign IMPSA

a “low” risk rating for the ISO certification subfactor (rather than a higher risk level)

was arbitrary and capricious. Pl.’s Mot. at 12; Tr. at 15.

First, Konecranes argues that IMPSA S.A.’s ISO certification does not

explicitly include crane manufacturing. Pl.’s Mot. at 13–14; Tr. at 17. The quality

management system covered by the certification encompasses a wide range of

activities including “manufacturing, assembly, installation, … and technical

assistance for equipment and civil works; through contracts for the supply of separate

pieces of equipment.” AR 2025. IMPSA represented that the certification would cover

its performance. AR 3397. The ISO certification’s references to, e.g., “equipment” and

“civil works” could be interpreted to encompass IMPSA’s proposal for crane

manufacturing, especially given other indications in the record that IMPSA

manufactures cranes. See AR 258–60. The Army requested additional information to

verify that IMPSA S.A.’s certification would apply to IMPSA’s performance, AR 3396,

and IMPSA represented that the certification covered IMPSA’s manufacturing

facilities, AR 3397. Thus, the SSA had a rational basis for rating IMPSA’s reliance on

IMPSA S.A.’s certification as a low risk. Impresa, 238 F.3d. at 1333 (quotes omitted)

(citing Saratoga Dev. Corp., 21 F.3d at 456).

Second, Konecranes contends that the certification only covers IMPSA S.A.

locations in Argentina and does not extend to IMPSA or to other locations where

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IMPSA represents that manufacture will take place. Pl.’s Mot. at 13–14. As for the

locations covered by the certification, the RFP appears to assume that ISO 9001

certification covers a “quality system” rather than specific work locations.6 AR 1529

§ M.4.1.1.1. Konecranes has provided no evidence that an ISO certification applies to

a performance location rather than a management system.7 Further, agencies are

permitted to credit the performance or experience of a parent company to an offeror

if the proposal demonstrates that the resources of the parent company will be

available to the offeror. Femme Comp Inc., v. United States, 83 Fed. Cl. 704, 746

(2008); see also PricewaterhouseCoopers Public Sector, LLP v. United States, 126 Fed.

Cl. 328, 353 (2016); Bender Shipbuilding & Repair Co. v. United States, 297 F.3d

1358, 1360–62 (Fed. Cir. 2002). IMPSA represented to the Army that IMPSA S.A.’s

certification covers a quality management system applied across the entire

enterprise, including IMPSA. AR 3397. The other arguments Konecranes raises

about IMPSA’s contract risk — e.g., reliance on to-be-determined foreign contractors

— are plausible, but within the SSA’s discretion to weigh. E.g., Pl.’s Resp. & Reply at

8. That leaves no basis to overturn the Army’s decision to treat the certification as

covering IMPSA S.A.’s manufacturing system as a whole.

2. Price Evaluation

The other evaluation factor relevant here is price reasonableness. As

mentioned, the Army considered both IMPSA’s and Konecranes’s prices reasonable.

AR 2744–51, 2783–84. Konecranes argues that each of the Army’s three bases for

finding IMPSA’s pricing reasonable were arbitrary and capricious. Pl.’s Mot. at 22–

26. According to Konecranes, (1) the two offerors’ prices were too different for the

Army to draw any reasonableness conclusions, Pl.’s Mot. at 23; Tr. at 46,

(2) comparison to the Army’s IGCE was not meaningful because it did not properly

estimate the price of delivering the cranes, Pl.’s Mot. at 24, and (3) IMPSA’s pricing

6 The GAO has stated that “ISO 9001 certifications are issued to cover specific quality management

systems[,] not specific entities.” See Qbase, LLC, et. al., B-416377.9–.14, 2020 C.P.D. ¶ 367, 2020 WL

6799077 at 9 (Nov. 13, 2020). GAO opinions, although not binding on this Court, can be persuasive.

See Allied Tech. Grp., Inc. v. United States, 649 F.3d. 1320, 1331 n.1 (Fed. Cir. 2011). But because the

GAO in Qbase did not provide any explanation or evidence, its opinion does not carry any particular

persuasive power.

7 To support its characterization of ISO certification, Konecranes points only to a non-public white

paper on a private company’s website. Pl.’s Mot. at 12–13 & n.2. The white paper is not in the

administrative record, see Tr. at 9–10, and thus outside the normal scope of this Court’s review. See

GW Government Travel, Inc. v. United States, 110 Fed. Cl. 462, 479 (2013); see also 5 U.S.C. § 702,

706(2)(A); Impresa, 238 F.3d at 1332. Nor is there any basis for judicial notice of the white paper’s

unknown contents. Fed. R. Evid. 201(c)(2); see Confidential Informant 59–05071 v. United States, 134

Fed. Cl. 698, 711 (2017), aff’d, 745 Fed. App’x 166 (Fed. Cir. 2018).

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is speculative because IMPSA’s proposal left locations of performance to be

determined, Tr. at 51.

To begin with, Konecranes concedes that it cannot argue IMPSA’s proposed

price was too low. Tr. at 42. As the Federal Circuit has explained, “[p]rice

reasonableness generally addresses whether a price is too high[.]” See Agile Defense,

Inc. v. United States, 959 F.3d 1379, 1384 (Fed. Cir. 2020) (quoting First Enter. v.

United States, 61 Fed. Cl. 109, 123 (2004)) (internal quotes omitted; emphasis added).

Evaluation of whether a price is too low calls for a cost realism analysis, id.; FAR

15.404-1(d), which the RFP did not call for and which the Army therefore was not

permitted to perform.8

Konecranes also concedes that if the Court rejects its arguments about other

aspects of the procurement, its challenge to the Army’s reasonableness determination

would have to be rejected as well for lack of prejudice. See Tr. at 44; Bannum, Inc.,

404 F.3d at 1354. As discussed elsewhere in this Opinion, none of Konecranes

arguments outside price reasonableness have merit. Thus, even if the Army’s price-

reasonableness determination were flawed, Konecranes cannot show prejudice.

Even so, at least one ground for the Army’s price-reasonableness

determination — its comparison of IMPSA’s price to the Army’s IGCE — has support

in the record. See Veteran Shredding, LLC v. United States, 146 Fed. Cl. 543, 579

(2019); Nutech Laundry & Textile, Inc. v. United States, 56 Fed. Cl. 588, 594 (2003).

The ICGE was based on cost estimates from a previous procurement for a similar

crane, adjusted for inflation using the Producer Price Index. AR 366. Konecranes

quibbles with the Army’s choice of baseline, mainly because of the wide range of

proposed prices. Pl.’s Mot. at 24. Yet even if the comparison was debatable — as

historical analogies inevitably are — Konecranes has no evidence that it was

irrational. See Veteran Shredding, 146 Fed. Cl. at 580 (finding that an agency’s use

of historical prices to develop an IGCE was sufficient).

Konecranes next argues that the IGCE failed to fully account for inflation of

labor, materials, equipment, and shipping costs. Pl.’s Mot. at 23–27; AR 366–69.

8 One rationale for considering only whether a price is too high at the price evaluation stage has been

that in a fixed-price contract like this one, the contractor bears the risk of loss if performance is more

expensive than expected. First Enter., 61 Fed. Cl. at 124; Labat-Anderson, Inc. v. United States, 50

Fed. Cl. 99, 106 (2001). That explanation is incomplete because the government does, in reality, bear

some of the risk. A contractor surprised by the cost of performance can simply default: Whatever

contractual remedies the Army may have, it could be left with half-finished cranes at the time when

it needed and expected complete ones. A better explanation might be that an offeror’s ability to perform

is relevant to the responsibility analysis, see FAR 9.104-1, which substitutes for price realism to some

extent.

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Assuming those arguments go to price reasonableness (as opposed to whether

IMPSA’s price was too low), they fail.

The examples Konecranes provides all relate to additional inflation in 2022 —

the year after the IGCE was prepared and offers with price proposals were submitted.

See Pl.’s Mot. at 23–27; AR 2784, 2303. Those developments, standing alone, do not

cast doubt on whether the IGCE was rational at the time it was prepared, for the

Army obviously could not have accounted for actual 2022 inflation in early 2021.

Konecranes objects that the Agency used a Producer Price Index dataset with data

missing after 2015 and failed to account for the effect of the COVID-19 pandemic on

inflation. Pl.’s Mot. at 25. But the Army — which documented the basis for its

estimates through the IGCE, see AR 371–75 — explained that it projected the

inflation rate using historical data. AR 373. Even if that assumption turned out to be

incorrect, Konecranes provides no reason to think it was irrational when made.

And even if the IGCE turned out to underestimate future inflation, the IMPSA

and Konecranes price proposals both preceded the additional inflation as well.

Because the government and the bidders all faced the same price uncertainty, the

Army reasonably made an apples-to-apples comparison.

B. Independent Requirements

Besides arguing that the Army did not evaluate the proposals in accordance

with the RFP, Konecranes claims the Army misapplied the FAR responsibility

determination requirements and the processes that ensure compliance with the TAA.

See Pl.’s Mot. at 17–22; Pl.’s Resp. & Reply at 23–30. I conclude that the Army

complied with the law.

1. Responsibility Determination

As to the responsibility determination, Konecranes first argues that the Army

violated the requirement that a contracting agency treat all offerors fairly and

equitably. AR 3302–3312, 1381; Pl.’s Mot. at 17–19; FAR 1.602-2(b), 1.102-2.

Konecranes asserts that the Army collected significantly less information from

IMPSA than Konecranes, Tr. at 28, and that the DCMA survey of IMPSA was never

properly completed. Pl.’s Resp. & Reply at 10.9

9This Court reviews an “agency's responsibility determination if there has been a violation of a statute

or regulation, or alternatively, if the agency determination lacked a rational basis.” Impresa, 238 F.3d

at 1332. “Responsibility decisions are largely a matter of judgment, and contracting officers are

normally entitled to considerable discretion and deference in such matters.” Bender, 297 F.3d at 1362;

see also Sup. Foodservice GmbH v. United States, 112 Fed. Cl. 402, 415 (2013); News Printing Co. v.

United States, 46 Fed. Cl. 740, 746 (2000).

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Although FAR 1.602-2(b) requires that a contracting agency “ensure that

contractors receive impartial, fair, and equitable treatment,” prospective contractors

“need not be treated the same.” FAR 1.102-2. For an unsuccessful offeror to prevail

on a disparate treatment claim, it must be similarly situated to a successful offeror.

Office Design Grp. v. United States, 951 F.3d 1366, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2020).

Konecranes and IMPSA are not similarly situated. The DCMA conducted the

evaluation of Konecranes’s facilities and capabilities during the pre-award survey

because its manufacturing location was in the United States. AR 3302–12. IMPSA’s

pre-award survey was canceled because the cranes would be manufactured in a

different country. AR 3302–12; Supp. AR 3581. Instead, the Army issued an

evaluation notice asking IMPSA to identify the designated country from which it

would deliver the cranes. AR 2356–59. Although the Army asked IMPSA questions,

it did not include a site visit in part because IMPSA’s manufacturing location was yet

to be determined. AR 2527. In short, the Army had to collect different information

using different mechanisms because of differences between the proposals.

Konecranes asserts that the pre-award survey of IMPSA was insufficient and

that the Army should have requested additional information about IMPSA’s

manufacturing capabilities and delivery experience. Tr. at 27; Pl.’s Resp. & Reply at

9–11. But “[c]ontracting officers are ‘generally given wide discretion’ in making

responsibility determinations and in determining the amount of information that is

required to make a responsibility determination.” Impresa, 238 F.3d at 1334–35

(quoting John C. Grimberg Co. v. United States, 185 F.3d 1297, 1303 (Fed. Cir. 1999)).

The solicitation gives the Army the right to request additional information, but it

does not require the Army to request any piece of information; the Army can decide

what information to request. AR 535 § M.3.6.

Second, Konecranes argues that the Army misapplied the requirements for a

responsibility determination. Pl.’s Mot. at 19–22.10 Konecranes asserts that the Army

erred by resting its responsibility determination on the resources available to

IMPSA’s parent company, IMPSA S.A., rather than IMPSA itself. Id. at 20.

IMPSA itself has limited resources and no manufacturing capacity. But as

mentioned above, IMPSA represented that IMPSA and IMPSA S.A. “operate as an

integrated enterprise.” AR 3397. As part of a pre-award survey of IMPSA, IMPSA

S.A. guaranteed the resources required for performance of the contract. AR 3410. The

10Before awarding a contract, an agency must determine that the prospective contractor is responsible.

FAR 9.103(b). A determination of responsibility must be based on “information clearly indicating that

the prospective contractor is responsible[.]” Id. The FAR sets out several criteria required for a

determination of responsibility. FAR 9.104-1.

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Army relied on that representation in its responsibility determination. AR 3403–10,

3461. That was permissible: As this Court has held, “[a]n agency properly may

attribute the experience of past performance of a parent or affiliated company to any

offeror where the firm’s proposal demonstrates that the resources of the parent or

affiliated company will affect the performance of the offeror.” Femme, 83 Fed. Cl. at

747 (quoting Hot Shot Express, Inc., B-290482, 2002 C.P.D. ¶ 139, 2002 WL 1831022

(Aug. 2, 2002)); see also PricewaterhouseCoopers, 126 Fed. Cl. at 353; Bender, 297

F.3d at 1360–62.

Konecranes relatedly claims that IMPSA failed to satisfy some of the specific

requirements for a responsibility determination — in particular, FAR 9.104-1(b),

which concerns the ability to comply with the proposed delivery or performance

schedule, FAR 9.104-1(d), which requires the prospective contractor to demonstrate

a satisfactory record of integrity and business ethics, and FAR 9.104-1(f), which

requires that the prospective contractor have the “necessary production, construction,

and technical equipment and facilities, or the ability to obtain them.” Tr. at 33–35.

The Administrative Record, however, contains evidence relevant to each

requirement. The DCMA assessed IMPSA with a moderate risk based on its lack of

on-site manufacturing capability and lack of verifiable delivery information, but

concluded that the risk could be mitigated with a post-award conference and

ultimately recommended award to IMPSA. AR 3399. The Army conducted a review

of contracting databases and confirmed that IMPSA was not “listed as disbarred,

suspended or otherwise ineligible for award.” AR 3461; see also AR 3399, 3464; Tr. at

87–88. The Army also confirmed that IMPSA did not have unpaid federal tax liability,

was not convicted of a federal felony criminal violation, and had a counterfeit

mitigation policy in place. AR 3399, 3463. And once again, the Army reasonably

concluded that IMPSA S.A.’s resources would be available to IMPSA. AR 3403–10,

3461. After reviewing IMPSA S.A.’s financial statements, including assets and

liabilities, the Army determined that the parent company’s resources were sufficient

to demonstrate IMPSA’s financial responsibility. AR 3403, 3407, 3461. Thus, the

Army provided evidence of a rational basis for a responsibility determination as to

IMPSA.

Konecranes also asserts that the Army should have conducted a responsibility

determination on IMPSA’s prospective subcontractors. Pl.’s Mot. at 20–21. No such

determination was required. The regulations provided that subcontractor

responsibility determinations “may affect the Government’s determination of the

prospective prime contractor’s responsibility,” but did not require such

determinations. FAR 9.104-4 (emphasis added).

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Third, Konecranes argues that the Army failed to properly document its

responsibility determination under FAR 9.105-2(b). Pl.’s Mot. at 21–22. Although “the

contracting officer is not required to explain the basis for his responsibility

determination,” Impresa, 238 F.3d at 1334, Konecranes claims that the Army relied

on a computer-generated report rather than performing and documenting the SSA’s

independent analysis. Pl.’s Mot. at 21–22; see also AR 2892. Assuming, as Konecranes

contends, that a computer-generated report would not substitute for the judgment

required by FAR 9.105-2(b), the Army documented a determination of responsibility

based on the SSA’s independent judgment during its corrective action following the

GAO protest. AR 3462.

Although Konecranes points to a handful of facts and considerations not

directly addressed in the SSA’s decisions, e.g., Pl.’s Mot. at 20–22, this Court must

“uphold a decision of less than ideal clarity if the agency’s path may reasonably be

discerned,” Bowman Transp., Inc. v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., Inc., 419 U.S. 281,

286 (1974), which it is here. In sum, Konecranes has not shown a “clear … violation

of applicable statutes or regulations” regarding the responsibility determination.

Impresa, 238 F.3d. at 1333.

2. Trade Agreement Act

As explained above, the TAA and its implementing regulations require that

the Army could only consider offers for U.S.-made, qualifying-country, or designated-

country end products unless certain exceptions applied. 19 U.S.C. §§ 2501 et seq.;

DFARS 225.401-70, 252.225-7021. IMPSA represented that it would comply and

completed a trade agreement certificate. AR 2525, 2527. Konecranes nonetheless

contends that IMPSA’s cranes will likely be manufactured in Argentina, which is not

a qualifying or designated country. Pl.’s Resp. & Reply at 24; see also Supp. AR 3579.

Konecranes therefore argues that IMPSA’s TAA compliance was in doubt, compelling

the Army to investigate IMPSA’s manufacturing plans in more detail. Pl.’s Resp. &

Reply at 25 (citing Leisure-Lift, Inc., B-291878.3, B-292448.2 (Sep. 25, 2003); Klinge

Corp. v. United States, 82 Fed. Cl. 127, 135 (2008)).

“When a solicitation contains a TAA certification requirement, the agency is

entitled to rely upon an offeror’s certification.” Klinge, 82 Fed. Cl. at 135. An exception

applies when a proposal contains inconsistencies suggesting that the offeror’s

representations about TAA compliance should not be taken at face value, in which

case more investigation might be required. PlanetSpace, Inc. v. United States, 92 Fed.

Cl. 520, 533–34 (2010); Klinge, 82 Fed. Cl. at 135. But no such inconsistencies are

evident here. Konecranes points to an internal Army communication (sent before

IMPSA’s certification) stating that IMPSA’s manufacturing would occur in

- 15 -

Argentina. Supp. AR 3577–79. The basis of that statement is unclear, for it does not

appear to be directly based on any information reported by IMPSA. It may have been

only a misunderstanding that IMPSA corrected when given the opportunity.

Konecranes also notes a reference in IMPSA’s proposal to a certain manufacturing

vendor. See Pl.’s Resp. & Reply at 26; Tr. at 63; AR 2047. Konecranes believes the

vendor is located in Argentina, but has no record evidence to prove it. Even if

Konecranes is correct, the significance of that fact for IMPSA’s TAA compliance is

speculative.

Thus none of Konecranes’s evidence directly contradicts IMPSA’s

representation that manufacture would be TAA-compliant. The Army was therefore

entitled to rely on IMPSA’s trade agreement certificate to confirm compliance.

C. Best-Value Determination

Finally, Konecranes takes issue with the Army’s ultimate determination that

IMPSA’s proposal represented the “best value” to the government. AR 534 § M.1.1.

Konecranes argues that the SSA misapplied the RFP’s guidelines for identifying a

proposal’s strengths and adjectival ratings. I find no error.

“It is well-established that contracting officers have a great deal of discretion

in making contract award decisions, particularly when, as here, the contract is to be

awarded to the bidder or bidders that will provide the agency with the best value.”

Banknote Corp., 365 F.3d at 1355; see also TRW, Inc. v. Unisys Corp., 98 F.3d 1325,

1327–28 (Fed. Cir. 1996); E.W. Bliss Co. v. United States, 77 F.2d 445, 449 (Fed. Cir.

1996). Agencies “have an even greater degree of discretion when it comes to best-

value determinations, as compared to deciding on price alone.” Am. Auto Logistics,

LP v. United States, 117 Fed. Cl. 137, 181 (2014) (citing Galen Med. Assocs., 369 F.3d

at 1330).

Konecranes asserts that the SSA should not have rated IMPSA as

“outstanding.” Pl.’s Mot. at 29, 37. IMPSA’s rating rested on the SSA’s identification

of multiple “strengths” in its proposal. AR 3545. But Konecranes objects that the

strengths noted by the SSA were aspects of the proposal that met RFP requirements;

Konecranes argues that a proposal strength must exceed RFP requirements in some

way. Pl.’s Mot. at 37. If the Army had identified strengths in that way, Konecranes

believes it still would have received an outstanding rating because Konecranes

(unlike IMPSA) went beyond the RFP’s engineering and testing requirements — for

example, by identifying more professional engineers on staff and having inspectors

with higher level certifications. Pl.’s Mot. at 32–33.

Konecranes misconstrues the definition of a strength. The Army Source

Selection Plan defined a strength as “an aspect of an offeror’s proposal that has merit

- 16 -

or exceeds specified performance or capability requirements in a way that will be

advantageous to the Government during contract performance.” AR 423 (emphasis

added). The RFP also stated that no evaluation credit would be given for any data

beyond the minimum requirements identified in the technical evaluation factors. AR

1529 § M.4.1.2. The RFP’s language therefore allows the SSA to assign a strength to

a proposal not only when RFP requirements are exceeded, but simply when the SSA

thinks it has merit.

As a fallback, Konecranes argues that regardless of whether the RFP required

awarding the proposals the same technical rating, the Army should have relied on

the differences between the proposals in its best-value determination. Pl.’s Mot. at

32–34; Pl.’s Resp. & Reply at 19. Konecranes’s arguments for the superiority of its

proposal are not unreasonable in the abstract. But “[p]rocurement officials have

substantial discretion to determine which proposal represents the best value for the

government.” E.W. Bliss Co., 77 F.3d at 449. Just as an agency can decide not to

consider Konecranes’s supposed advantages in the technical evaluation, it could

disregard them for the best-value analysis and emphasize the proposals’ wide

difference in price. This Court generally should not second-guess an agency’s decision

to do so.

Besides, Konecranes has not shown that the differences between its proposal

and IMPSA’s would in fact provide a better value to the government. Konecranes

seems to presume that its supposed improvements warranted a higher strength

rating or would have added value for the Army, Tr. at 83, but nothing in the record

shows why, much less at the level that would justify overturning the SSA’s judgment.

I therefore find no reason to set aside the best-value determination as arbitrary and

capricious.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons discussed below, Plaintiff’s motion is DENIED and

Defendant’s and Defendant-Intervenor’s motions are GRANTED. The case is

DISMISSED.

Pursuant to the Court’s August 10, 2022 Protective Order (ECF 12), this

Opinion has been issued under seal. The transcript of the November 8, 2022 hearing

is under seal as well. The parties shall have two weeks to propose redactions and,

accordingly, shall file notice of their proposed redactions no later than May 19, 2023.

To aid the Court’s evaluation of the proposed redactions and in light of the

“presumption of public access to judicial records,” Baystate Techs., Inc. v. Bowers, 283

F. App’x 808, 810 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (per curiam), each party shall file a memorandum

- 17 -

explaining why redactions are necessary for each item of information for which a

redaction is proposed.

The Clerk is directed to enter judgment accordingly.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

s/ Stephen S. Schwartz

STEPHEN S. SCHWARTZ

Judge

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This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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