The opinion
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[PUBLISH]
In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Eleventh Circuit
____________________
No. 21-13799
____________________
EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
EBERSPAECHER NORTH AMERICA INC.,
Defendant-Appellee.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Alabama
D.C. Docket No. 2:21-mc-00891-RDP
____________________
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2 Opinion of the Court 21-13799
Before WILSON, BRANCH, and LAGOA, Circuit Judges.
BRANCH, Circuit Judge:
This appeal involves the limitations on the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission’s (“EEOC”) investigatory
powers. It arises from a district court order enforcing only part of
an administrative subpoena issued by the EEOC against
Eberspaecher North America (“ENA”), a company that
manufactures car components with its headquarters in Novi,
Michigan and six other locations across the country.
An employee at one of these locations—ENA’s Northport,
Alabama plant—complained to the EEOC that he was fired for
taking protected absences under the Family Medical Leave Act
(“FMLA”). An EEOC Commissioner charged ENA with
discrimination under the Americans with Disabilities Act
Amendments Act (“ADAAA”),1 listing only the Northport facility
in the written charge. 2 The EEOC then issued requests for
information on every employee terminated for attendance-related
infractions at each of ENA’s seven domestic facilities around the
nation. When ENA objected to the scope of those requests, the
1 Enacted in 2008, the ADAAA is an amended version of the 1990 Americans
with Disabilities Act (“ADA”).
2 While the EEOC never charged ENA with a violation of the FMLA, the
EEOC’s theory is that ENA discriminated against the employee in violation of
the ADAAA by firing him for taking FMLA–protected leave which, the EEOC
asserts, is a “reasonable accommodation” required under the ADAAA.
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21-13799 Opinion of the Court 3
EEOC issued a subpoena and eventually sought judicial
enforcement in federal district court.
The district court ordered ENA to turn over information
related to the Northport, Alabama facility, but refused to enforce
the subpoena as to information from other facilities, holding that
nationwide information was not relevant to the EEOC’s charge to
the Northport facility. The EEOC appeals, arguing that the district
court abused its discretion in concluding that the charge related
only to Northport. In the alternative, the EEOC contends that,
even if the charge were limited to the Northport facility,
nationwide data is still relevant to its investigation.
As we outline below, the EEOC’s investigatory process is a
multistep process designed to notify employers of investigations
into potentially unlawful employment practices. First, an
aggrieved employee, or the EEOC acting on behalf of an aggrieved
employee, can issue a charge against an employer. This charge
serves as notice that the EEOC is investigating the potentially
unlawful employment practices specified in the charge, and it
provides the employer the opportunity to comply with the
investigation and rectify the targeted practices. However, if the
employer does not voluntarily comply with the investigation, the
EEOC can then subpoena the charged employer for information—
but only for information relevant to the investigation of the issue
set forth in the charge.
After careful review, and with the benefit of oral argument,
we hold that the EEOC charged only ENA’s Northport facility—
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4 Opinion of the Court 21-13799
which provided notice to ENA that the EEOC was investigating
potentially unlawful employment practices only at that specific
facility—and thus that the nationwide data sought by the EEOC is
irrelevant to that charge. Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s
order enforcing only part of the EEOC’s subpoena.
I. Background
ENA, headquartered in Novi, Michigan, manufactures car
components including heaters, A/C units, and service diagnostic
tools at seven facilities in four U.S. states. In 2017, a former ENA
employee at ENA’s Northport, Alabama facility, Joseph White,
filed a charge with the EEOC alleging that ENA violated the ADA
by firing him from his job following a series of disability-related
absences. 3 White alleged that ENA used “a point system to
discipline employees for absences and tardiness,” including for
absences protected under the FMLA. According to ENA’s
employee handbook, employees receive two points for
unscheduled absences, and ten points within a 12-month period
result in termination. Per the handbook, ENA is not supposed to
assign points for excused absences, including FMLA absences, but
it allegedly did so in White’s case.
The EEOC investigated White’s complaint and, purportedly
based on a review of the “employer’s practices and the employee
3 While White’s original charge alleged discrimination under the ADA, the
Commissioner ultimately charged ENA with violations of the ADAAA.
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21-13799 Opinion of the Court 5
handbook,” concluded that ENA in Northport, Alabama was
employing the same allegedly discriminatory practice with other
employees—assigning points and firing employees for FMLA-
protected absences. As a result, the EEOC charged ENA with
unlawful employment practices under the ADAAA.
(a) The Charge
In July 2019, an EEOC Commissioner filed a charge stating:
“I charge the following employer with unlawful employment
practices. Eberspaecher North America, Inc. 6801 B 5th Street
Northport, AL 35476.” “[T]he above-named employer . . . has
violated . . . and continues to violate the [ADAAA] by
discriminating against employees on the basis of disability with
respect to qualified leave.” It then listed the alleged unlawful
discriminatory practices such as “[f]ailing to properly categorize
qualified absences protected under the ADAAA” and “[u]nlawful
discipline and termination, and the improper assessment of
occurrence points wherein an employee’s absence is directly
correlated to their disability.” The charge specified that the
allegations were based on a review of the “employer’s practices and
the employee handbook,” and that “[t]he aggrieved individuals
include all employees who have, have been, or might in the future
be adversely affected by the” allegedly unlawful practices.
Several days later, the EEOC’s Mobile, Alabama office sent
ENA’s Northport facility a notice of the charge. The notice
informed ENA that “[t]he circumstances of the alleged
discrimination are based on Retaliation and Disability, and involve
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6 Opinion of the Court 21-13799
issues of Discipline, Reasonable Accommodation, and Discharge
that are alleged to have occurred on or about Jan 01, 2017 through
Aug 02, 2019.” The notice did not suggest that the charge or
investigation were of a nationwide scope.
(b) Requests for Information
The Commission also made its first request for information
to ENA’s Northport facility around that time. Similar to the notice,
the initial request for information was directed specifically to the
Northport, Alabama facility and did not mention nationwide
allegations or a nationwide investigation. Instead, the EEOC
requested information solely related to “the allegations of the
charge.” ENA responded with a position statement and produced
its companywide attendance policy.
The EEOC followed up and for the first time asked for
nationwide data, which it claimed was “relevant to the instant
charge of discrimination.” The Commission asked ENA to “[l]ist
each employee discharged from Respondent’s locations
nationwide for the period from January 1, 2018 to the present, for
attendance infractions” along with substantial accompanying
documentation (e.g., information about the employee, the
separation notice, the person who recommended discharging the
employee, the person who made the final decision on discharge
and so forth.). Notably, it did not request information about
whether the discharged employees were disabled or otherwise
unable to work for medical reasons.
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ENA refused to provide the nationwide information,
responding that “the underlying Charge [was] specific to the
Northport, Alabama facility.” ENA and the EEOC went back and
forth for months, with the EEOC pressing ENA for nationwide
information about employees it terminated under the attendance
policy. ENA resisted for several reasons pointing to the charge
being specific to the Northport facility, the large burden of
production for nationwide data, and the overbreadth of the
Commission’s nationwide requests given that the charge was based
on allegations from a single employee.
(c) Subpoena
In August 2020, the EEOC issued the subpoena in question,
sending it to ENA’s CEO at the corporate headquarters in Novi,
Michigan. The subpoena required ENA to produce and turn over
nationwide information about employees that it terminated for
attendance infractions at any of ENA’s locations. ENA petitioned
to revoke the subpoena, which the EEOC rejected as untimely.
The EEOC then filed an application for judicial enforcement of the
subpoena with the district court.4
4 At oral argument, the EEOC asserted that it had the authority to reissue a
new nationwide charge, but, as a “practical matter” it would have involved
“too many administrative hurdles.” Oral Argument at 4:15, E.E.O.C. v.
Eberspaecher N. Am., Inc., No-13799 (11th Cir. Aug 10, 2022),
https://www.ca11.uscourts.gov/oral-argument-
recordings?title=&field_oar_case_name_value=eberspaecher&field_oral_ar
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8 Opinion of the Court 21-13799
(d) District Court Enforcement
In its application for a show cause order from the district
court to enforce the administrative subpoena, the EEOC framed its
investigation as an “investigation of a charge of nationwide
unlawful employment practices.” The EEOC claimed the
subpoena should be enforced because the charge was a nationwide
charge; it did “not pertain to a single location.” Accordingly, the
EEOC argued, among other things, that: (1) the requested
information fell within the broad construction courts give to
“relevance” in an EEOC subpoena enforcement action; (2) the
nationwide information would help it assess whether ENA “failed
to reasonably accommodate . . . disabled employees” under its
attendance policy; and (3) if the EEOC concluded that ENA
violated the ADAAA, the requested information would help it
“identify specific victims of that unlawful employment practice.”
ENA countered by arguing that the subpoena was too
burdensome, indefinite, and had an “illegitimate purpose” in that
the EEOC sought a “broadened investigation” outside the scope of
the charge, and that, in any event, the subpoena should be limited
to the Northport facility based on the plain terms of the EEOC’s
charge.
The district court ordered ENA to comply with the
subpoena “but only as it applies to [ENA’s] Northport facility.”
gument_date_value%5Bvalue%5D%5Byear%5D=&field_oral_argument_da
te_value%5Bvalue%5D%5Bmonth%5D=.
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21-13799 Opinion of the Court 9
Citing the charge’s exclusive reference to the Northport facility’s
address, the district court found that only records that pertain to
the attendance policy at the Northport facility were relevant to the
charge. Reasoning that in order to bring a nationwide charge “the
Commissioner must . . . stat[e] her intent within the four corners
of the charge,” the court held that “[t]he Commissioner herself
limited the scope of her charge to the Northport facility.” The
EEOC timely appealed.
II. Standard of Review
We review the district court’s decision to enforce an EEOC
subpoena for an abuse of discretion.5 McLane Co., Inc. v.
E.E.O.C., 137 S. Ct. 1159, 1168 n.3, 1170 (2017). “A district court
abuses its discretion if it applies an incorrect legal standard, applies
the law in an unreasonable or incorrect manner, follows improper
procedures in making a determination, or makes findings of fact
that are clearly erroneous.” Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Marin, 982
F.3d 1341, 1352 (11th Cir. 2020) (quotation omitted). “The
relevance of documents in an administrative proceeding is a mixed
question of law and fact, which implies that our standard of review
5 Citing authority from other circuits, the EEOC and the dissent both argue
that the district court’s interpretation of the charge is a question of law that is
entitled to de novo review. But the Supreme Court has made it clear that even
though “[w]hether a charge is valid . . . is a pure question of law,” “pure
questions of law embedded in a district court’s decision to enforce or quash a
subpoena” are nonetheless subject to a “unitary abuse-of-discretion standard.”
McLane, 137 S. Ct. at 1168 n.3 (quotations omitted).
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of such determinations should look either to legal error or to clear
error, depending on the circumstances.” E.E.O.C. v. Royal
Caribbean Cruises, Ltd., 771 F.3d 757, 760 (11th Cir. 2014).
III. Discussion
The EEOC argues that the charge was directed at ENA’s
facilities nationwide or, alternatively, that nationwide data is
relevant to the EEOC’s investigation even if the charge is directed
only at the Northport facility. As explained below, we disagree on
both counts.
With its enactment of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, Congress established the EEOC and charged it with
responsibility for investigating potential unlawful employment
practices, as defined by Title VII. 42 U.S.C §§ 2000e-4, 2000e-5.
The ADAAA prohibits covered employers, such as ENA,
from “discriminat[ing] against a qualified individual on the basis of
disability” in the “discharge of employees.” 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a).
ADAAA-prohibited discrimination includes “not making
reasonable accommodations to the known physical or mental
limitations of an otherwise qualified individual with a
disability . . . .” 6 Id. § 12112(b)(5)(A).
6 The FMLA provides that “an eligible employee shall be entitled to a total of
12 workweeks of leave during any 12-month period for one or more of the
following . . . (D) [b]because of a serious health condition that makes the
employee unable to perform the functions of the position of such employee.”
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Congress gave the EEOC a role in enforcing the ADAAA’s
workplace protections, incorporating, “[t]he powers, remedies,
and procedures” of Title VII into the ADAAA. 42 U.S.C. § 12117(a)
(incorporating, as relevant here, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-5, 2000e-8, and
2000e-9, including the multistep charging and investigatory
procedure used by the EEOC in this case). See generally, E.E.O.C.
v. Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279, 285–86 (2002).
The EEOC’s enforcement procedure begins with the filing
of an administrative “charge” alleging discrimination, which may
be filed by or on behalf of an individual, or by a member of the
EEOC. 42 U.S.C.§ 2000e-5(b). The charge must include, among
other things, “[t]he full name and contact information of the person
against whom the charge is made, if known,” and a “clear and
concise statement of the facts . . . constituting the alleged unlawful
employment practices.” 29 C.F.R. § 1601.12(a)(2)–(3). This
naming requirement is important, as it “serves to notify the
charged party of the allegations and allows the party an
opportunity to participate in conciliation and voluntarily comply
29 U.S.C. § 2612(a). While “the FMLA protects the substantive rights it creates
by prohibiting an employer from retailing against its employee,” Baston v.
Salvation Army, 897 F.3d 1320, 1328 (11th Cir. 2018), neither White’s original
charge nor the Commissioner’s charge alleged a violation of the FMLA.
Instead, the EEOC argues that ENA violated the ADAAA by firing White for
taking FMLA leave, which they argue was a reasonable accommodation for
White’s disability under the ADAAA.
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with the requirements of Title VII.” Virgo v. Rivera Beach Assocs.,
Ltd., 30 F.3d 1350, 1358 (11th Cir. 1994).
After receiving a charge either from an aggrieved employee
or a Commissioner, the EEOC must “serve a notice of the
charge (including the date, place and circumstances of the alleged
unlawful employment practice) on [the] employer” and “shall
make an investigation thereof” to determine whether “there is
reasonable cause to believe that the charge is true.” 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-5(b). While no statutory provision or regulation requires
any specific language in making a “nationwide” charge, the EEOC
knows how to issue broad charges targeting numerous
employment locations when it suspects nationwide employment
misconduct and seeks to collect relevant evidence from several
employment locations. See EEOC v. Bass Pro Outdoor World
L.L.C., 826 F.3d 791, 798 (5th Cir. 2016) (Fifth Circuit noting that
an EEOC charge explicitly identified its target as “retail stores and
facilities nationwide”); EEOC v. Superior Servs., Inc., 56 F.3d 441,
443 (2d Cir. 1995) (Second Circuit noting that an EEOC charge
explicitly identified its target as “all . . . facilities in New York”).
“In connection with any investigation of a charge,” the
EEOC “shall at all reasonable times have access to . . . any
evidence” that “relates to unlawful employment practices covered
by [the ADAAA] and is relevant to the charge under investigation.”
Id. § 2000e-8(a) (emphasis added). As we have noted, “[t]he
relevance that is necessary to support a subpoena for the
investigation of an individual charge is relevance to the contested
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issues that must be decided to resolve that charge, not relevance to
issues that may be contested when and if future charges are
brought by others.” Royal Caribbean, 771 F.3d at 761.
If an employer refuses to provide the EEOC with
information the agency seeks as part of an investigation, the EEOC
may issue an administrative subpoena. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-9; 29
U.S.C. § 161(1); see also McLane, 137 S. Ct. at 1167 (explaining that
“Title VII confers on the EEOC the . . . authority to issue
subpoenas”). Importantly, the subpoena must “describe with
sufficient particularity the evidence whose production is required”
and the EEOC shall revoke the subpoena after a petition if “the
evidence whose production is required does not relate to any
matter under investigation.” 29 U.S.C. § 161(1). If the employer
does not comply with the subpoena, the EEOC may seek
enforcement in federal district court. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-9; 29 U.S.C.
§ 161(2).
If the charge is valid 7 and the material requested relevant,
the district court should enforce the subpoena unless the employer
7 A charge is considered “valid” if it is “in writing under oath or affirmation
and [] contain[s] such information and [is] in such form as the Commission
requires.” 42 U.S.C. 2000e-5(b); E.E.O.C. v. Shell Oil Co., 466 U.S. 54, 67
(1984). In adherence with the statute, the EEOC has promulgated regulations
that articulate what each charge should contain. See 29 C.F.R. § 1601.12(a)
(requiring that each charge contain, “(1) [t]he full name and contact
information of the person making the charge . . . , (2) [t]he full name and
contact information of the person against whom the charge is made, if known
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establishes that the subpoena is “too indefinite,” has been issued for
an “illegitimate purpose,” or is unduly burdensome. McLane, 137
S. Ct. at 1165 (quoting E.E.O.C. v. Shell Oil Co., 466 U.S. 54, 72
n.26 (1984)); see also E.E.O.C. v. Tire Kingdom, Inc., 80 F.3d 449,
450 (11th Cir. 1996). At bottom, this case involves the threshold
inquiry: whether the “material requested is relevant” to the
charged misconduct. Because we decide this case at the threshold
relevance inquiry, we need not consider whether the subpoena was
“unduly burdensome,” “too indefinite,” or issued for an
“illegitimate purpose.”
With these principles in mind, we consider whether the
district court abused its discretion in enforcing the subpoena only
as to ENA’s Northport facility. The EEOC makes two arguments
on appeal. First, it contends that it did, in fact, charge nationwide
conduct, such that the nationwide subpoena was valid and relevant
to the charge. Second, in the alternative, the EEOC argues that
nationwide data is still relevant to a charge solely against the
. . . , (3) [a] clear and concise statement of the facts . . . constituting the alleged
unlawful employment practices . . . , (4) [i]f known, the approximate number
of employees of the respondent employer . . . , [and] (5) [a] statement
disclosing whether proceedings involving the alleged unlawful employment
practice have been commenced before a State or local agency charge with the
enforcement of fair employment practice laws . . .”).
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Northport facility. For the reasons discussed below, both
arguments fail.
(a) Whether the charge is directed only at ENA’s Northport
facility
We turn first to the EEOC’s argument that it charged
nationwide conduct. The EEOC’s regulations require a charge to
include, among other things, “[t]he full name and contact
information of the person against whom the charge is made, if
known.” See 29 C.F.R. § 1601.12(a). Because only named parties
that are notified of the allegations have a chance to “participate in
conciliation and voluntarily comply,” Virgo, 30 F.3d at 1358,
whether the EEOC charged ENA’s facilities nationwide or only the
Northport, Alabama facility is an important question—and one
that turns on the information the EEOC included in the charge.
The only employer listed in the charge is ENA’s Northport
facility, and the charge cannot be fairly read to target companywide
misconduct. Specifically, the Commissioner’s charge stated: “I
charge the following employer with unlawful employment
practices. Eberspa[e]cher North America, Inc. 6801 B 5th Street
Northport, AL 35476.” (Emphasis added). And as the district court
properly noted, the EEOC knows how to charge an employer with
nationwide misconduct, as it has done so before. See, e.g., Bass Pro
Outdoor World, L.L.C., 826 F.3d at 798 (remarking that the
Commissioner’s charge explicitly included the language
“at . . . retail stores and facilities nationwide”). The employer
charged in this case, therefore, is plainly only ENA’s Northport
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facility, and the district court did not abuse its discretion in
concluding otherwise. 8
We are unpersuaded by the EEOC’s attempts to overcome
the conclusion that it charged only the Northport facility. First, the
Commission explains that the charge listed ENA’s Northport
facility (rather than the corporate headquarters) because the
Birmingham office of the EEOC brought the alleged violations to
the Commissioner and, therefore, that office was tasked with
investigating the charge. But the involvement of the Birmingham
office underscores that the allegedly discriminatory conduct at
issue occurred at ENA’s Northport facility, strengthening our
conclusion that the charge targeted only the Alabama plant.
Second, the EEOC argues that other parts of the charge
establish that the charge was directed at ENA’s companywide
practices. For example, the charge was based on a review of the
employee handbook, which governs ENA’s facilities
companywide. And the charge describes “the aggrieved
individuals” as “all employees” impacted by the allegedly unlawful
practices. (Emphasis added.)
The problem with the EEOC’s arguments about the
handbook and broad definition of aggrieved employees is that they
presuppose that the charge targets ENA facilities nationwide. To
8 The dissent points out that the EEOC has the authority to amend a charge
“to cure technical defects or omissions.” However, as we noted above, the
EEOC never tried to amend the charge, so this issue is not before the Court.
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wit: the mention of the employee handbook in the charge comes
in a sentence reading “[t]hese allegations are based upon a review
of information regarding the employer, including the employer’s
practices and the employee handbook.” (Emphasis added.) That
sentence does not suggest, let alone notify ENA, that the unlawful
practices identified in the charge were allegedly occurring at all of
ENA’s facilities. As discussed above, the only “employer”
mentioned in the charge is the ENA Northport facility. And stating
that the EEOC also reviewed “the employee handbook” did not
provide ENA with notice that the charge was alleging
companywide unlawful practices.
The EEOC’s argument about the definition of “aggrieved
individuals” including “all employees” is similarly flawed. As the
charge itself explicitly notes, “aggrieved individuals” includes “all
employees” who have been adversely affected by the “unlawful
employment practices set forth in the foregoing charge.”
(Emphasis added.) Whether the “foregoing charge” is nationwide
or Northport-centric, therefore, controls whether “all employees”
means all ENA employees across the country or just the Northport
ones. And as discussed above, the charge is best read as directed
only at the Northport facility.
Third, the EEOC asserts that it was not required to identify
ENA’s address, if unknown, and therefore the inclusion of the
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18 Opinion of the Court 21-13799
Northport address is irrelevant. But here, the EEOC did include an
address—the address for the Northport facility. 9
Accordingly, the district court did not abuse its discretion in
holding that EEOC charged only ENA’s Northport facility.
(b) Whether companywide data is relevant to a charge specific
to the Northport location
We turn next to the EEOC’s relevance argument. The
EEOC subpoenaed information on every attendance-related
termination at all ENA facilities, irrespective of the terminated
employees’ disability status or potential entitlement to FMLA
leave. Below, and on appeal, the EEOC contends that, even if the
charge is directed solely at the Northport facility, the nationwide
data is still relevant to the charge, given the expansive definition of
relevance in the Supreme Court’s decisions and the fact that ENA’s
attendance policy “appears” to apply to all its United States
facilities. It claims that nationwide information would “allow the
EEOC to identify any individuals ENA discharged following
9 The dissent claims that the EEOC“[l]isting the facility address [on the charge]
merely provides contact information, nothing more.” But, again, the
regulation calls for “[t]he full name and contact information of the person
against whom the charge was made, if known.” 29 C.F.R. § 1601.12(a)(2). If
the EEOC intended to charge ENA nationwide, it could have included the
contact information for other facilities or ENA’s headquarters in Novi,
Michigan.
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disability-related absences.” We disagree that the information is
relevant to the charge against the Northport facility.10
10 On appeal, for the first time, the EEOC asserts that nationwide information
is relevant to a Northport-specific charge because it will provide comparative
data to help the EEOC determine whether the alleged discrimination is a result
of specific managers or a broader policy and, based on that determination,
fashion appropriate relief. The EEOC further asserts that comparing data
related to all employees discharged for attendance infractions, from all of
ENA’s facilities, would help the EEOC determine whether ENA's Northport
facility improperly characterizes disability-related absences as "attendance
occurrences." But the EEOC failed to raise these arguments below and,
therefore, the EEOC has waived these arguments on appeal. See Access Now,
Inc. v. Sw. Airlines Co., 385 F.3d 1324, 1331–32 (11th Cir. 2004) (collecting
cases for the proposition that, generally, arguments raised for the first time on
appeal will not be considered by this Court); see also E.E.O.C. v. TriCore
Reference Labs., 849 F.3d 929, 942 (10th Cir. 2017) (“The problem for the
EEOC is that it did not present these relevance arguments in district court. It
has thus failed to meet its burden of explaining how [its] request would offer
information relevant to [the] charge.”).
Even if we were to consider it, the EEOC’s argument here is
unconvincing. Specifically, the EEOC argues that “several” of our sister
circuits have “reversed district courts that declined to enforce EEOC
administrative subpoenas seeking information beyond the facility where the
charge allegations arose, where the charge’s allegations implicated a
companywide policy.” In support, the EEOC cites to cases from three of our
sister circuits, appearing to allude that a decision to the contrary would create
a circuit split. We first note that because the question of whether requested
information is relevant to an underlying EEOC charge is a fact-specific inquiry,
we are not creating a circuit split.
Regardless, each of these cases are distinguishable. First, the EEOC
cites to E.E.O.C. v. Kronos Inc., 620 F.3d 287 (3d Cir. 2010), where the Third
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The relevance of the material requested is linked to the
scope of the Commission’s charge against the employer. See 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-8(a) (“In connection with any investigation of a
charge,” the EEOC “shall at all reasonable times have access
to . . . any evidence” that “relates to unlawful employment
practices covered by [the ADAAA] and is relevant to the charge
under investigation.” (emphasis added)). Unlike other federal
Circuit held that a subpoena requesting nationwide information was relevant.
Id. at 300. But Kronos is distinguishable, as the EEOC there had previously
issued a notice expanding the charge to include “all facilities in the United
States and its territories.” Id. at 293. In contrast, the EEOC here issued a single
charge that specifically identified ENA’s Northport facility but never expanded
the charge to include any other ENA facilities.
Next, the EEOC cites to E.E.O.C. v. Randstad, 685 F.3d 433 (4th Cir.
2012), where the Fourth Circuit held that a subpoena requesting statewide
information was relevant. Id. at 450. But Randstad is also distinguishable, as
the EEOC there originally sought nationwide information but voluntarily
“narrowed the geographic scope” of the subpoena to a single state after the
employer objected to the “nationwide scope of the subpoena.” Id. at 437–39.
In contrast, the EEOC here is seeking nationwide information and has not
indicated any plans to voluntarily cut the scope of its subpoena.
Finally, the EEOC cites to E.E.O.C. v. United Parcel Service, Inc., 587
F.3d 136 (2d Cir. 2009), where the Second Circuit held that a subpoena seeking
nationwide information was relevant. Id. at 140. But United Parcel Service is
distinguishable as well, as the employee there who submitted the charge
alleged that the company had a “pattern or a practice” of unlawful
employment actions, which applied nationwide to all company facilities. Id.
at 137–38. In contrast, and as discussed above, supra, the EEOC’s charge here
did not suggest that unlawful employment practices were occurring anywhere
but ENA’s Northport facility.
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21-13799 Opinion of the Court 21
agencies with “plenary authority to demand records” relevant to
their jurisdiction, “the EEOC’s investigative authority is tied to
charges filed with the Commission.” Shell Oil, 466 U.S. at 64. The
EEOC is therefore entitled “only to evidence ‘relevant to the
charge under investigation’” and may not exercise “unconstrained
investigative authority.” Id. at 64–65 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-8(a)).
The Supreme Court has broadly construed the term “relevant” to
mean “virtually any material that might cast light on the allegations
against the employer.” Id. at 68–69. But it also cautioned against
so “generously constru[ing] the term ‘relevant,’” as to render the
statutory relevancy requirement “a nullity.” Id.
“The decision whether evidence sought is relevant requires
the district court to evaluate the relationship between the
particular materials sought and the particular matter under
investigation—an analysis variable in relation to the nature,
purposes and scope of the inquiry.” McLane, 137 S. Ct. at 1167–68
(quotation omitted). The relevance inquiry is “generally not
amenable to broad per se rules” but is the “kind of fact-intensive,
close call[] better suited to resolution by the district court than the
court of appeals.” Id. at 1168 (quotation omitted).
As discussed above, the EEOC issued a charge against a
single facility, based on the complaint of a single employee, about
a specific kind of attendance-related discrimination: penalizing
employees for taking FMLA-protected absences. Yet the EEOC
requested information from every ENA facility in the country on
all attendance-related terminations regardless of the terminated-
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22 Opinion of the Court 21-13799
employees’ disability-status or entitlement to FMLA leave. Why
ENA fired other employees at other facilities for any attendance-
related reason is simply not relevant to whether the Northport
facility engaged in ADAAA discrimination in administering its
attendance policy. Holding that such an incredibly broad subpoena
for such information was “relevant” to the charge against ENA’s
Northport facility would construe that term so broadly as to render
it a “nullity.” See Shell Oil, 466 U.S. at 694.
Our decision in Royal Caribbean Cruises supports our
decision here that the EEOC’s demands for nationwide
information are not relevant to the charged conduct. In that case,
an employee filed a charge 11 with the EEOC against Royal
Caribbean, alleging ADA discrimination when it refused to renew
his contract after a medical diagnosis. 771 F.3d at 759. The EEOC
ultimately issued an administrative subpoena requesting a “[l]ist
[of] all employees who were discharged or whose contracts were
not renewed [from August 25, 2009, through present] due to a
11 The dissent attempts to distinguish Royal Caribbean by noting that the
charge there was made by an individual rather than by the Commissioner, as
is the case here. But the statute establishing the EEOC’s enforcement
authority allows for a charge to be filed by either “a person claiming to be
aggrieved[] or by a member of the Commission” and does not otherwise
distinguish any of the enforcement procedures based on who originally filed
the charge. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b). Further, while the operative charge here
was the Commissioner’s charge, this investigation began after White, an
individual, filed an EEOC charge alleging discriminatory conduct in violation
of the ADA, just like the individual in Royal Caribbean. 771 F.3d at 759.
USCA11 Case: 21-13799 Document: 42-1 Date Filed: 05/10/2023 Page: 23 of 30
21-13799 Opinion of the Court 23
medical reason.” Id. (third alteration in original). We explained
that the subpoena was improperly “aimed at discovering members
of a potential class of employees or applicants who suffered from a
pattern or practice of discrimination, rather than fleshing out [the
complaining employee’s] charge.” Id. at 760–61. Rejecting the
EEOC’s broad request for information, we held
The relevance that is necessary to support a subpoena
for the investigation of an individual charge is
relevance to the contested issues that must be decided
to resolve that charge, not relevance to issues that
may be contested when and if future charges are
brought by others.
Id. at 761. We also explained that the EEOC’s arguments in that
case, much like their arguments on appeal in this case, “amounted
to simply parroting the Supreme Court’s statement that [relevant
information was] information [that] ‘might cast light on the
allegations’ against [Royal Caribbean].” Id. at 761 (quoting Shell
Oil, 466 U.S. at 69).
The EEOC appears to be litigating this case much like it did
in Royal Caribbean. For one, as mentioned above, the EEOC’s
arguments amount, almost exclusively, to pointing to the broad
conception of relevance discussed in Shell Oil. But as we noted in
Royal Caribbean, the Supreme Court also cautioned against
reading the relevance requirement so broadly as to render it a
“nullity.” Id. at 760 (quoting Shell Oil, 466 U.S. at 68–69).
Accepting the EEOC’s arguments would do just that.
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24 Opinion of the Court 21-13799
We therefore hold that the EEOC’s request for nationwide
information was not relevant to its charge against ENA’s
Northport facility. When it issued its original charge against ENA’s
Northport facility, the EEOC put ENA on notice of the alleged
discriminatory practices at that one facility and gave ENA an
opportunity to comply with the investigation and rectify the
targeted practices. As it targeted the Northport facility, the
EEOC’s charge did not, however, provide notice of an
investigation into ENA’s facilities nationwide. No one disputes
that the EEOC could have amended this charge prior to issuing the
administrative subpoena to put ENA on notice of a nationwide
investigation—but the EEOC did not do so.
Accordingly, the district court did not abuse its discretion by
enforcing the EEOC’s subpoena of information only as to the
Northport facility. We affirm.
AFFIRMED.
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21-13799 WILSON, J., dissenting 1
WILSON, Circuit Judge, dissenting:
I disagree that this case presents an opportunity to limit an
agency’s investigatory powers. This subpoena falls well within the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission’s (EEOC)
investigatory power, and the charge before us raises no compelling
reason to disturb the longstanding latitude the Supreme Court has
afforded EEOC investigations.1
The Supreme Court has clearly explained, “[a] district
court’s role in an EEOC subpoena enforcement proceeding . . . is a
straightforward one.” McLane Co., Inc. v. E.E.O.C., 581 U.S. __;
137 S. Ct. 1159, 1165 (2017). “[W]hen a court is asked to enforce a
Commission subpoena, its responsibility is to satisfy itself that the
charge is valid and that the material requested is relevant to the
charge . . . .” Univ. of Pa. v. E.E.O.C., 493 U.S. 182, 191 (1990)
(internal quotation marks omitted). The court “should do so
cognizant of the ‘generous’ construction that courts have given the
term ‘relevant.’” McLane, 127 S. Ct. at 1165 (alteration adopted).
“If the charge is proper and the material requested is relevant, the
1 The interpretation of an EEOC charge is a question of law that we review
de novo. Cf. Flagship Marine Servs., Inc. v. Belcher Towing Co., 966 F.2d 602,
604 (11th Cir. 1992); see also E.E.O.C. v. Konica Minolta Bus. Sols. U.S.A., Inc.,
639 F.3d 366, 371 (7th Cir. 2011) (“The interpretation of an EEOC charge
presents a question of law that we review de novo . . . .”); Smith v. Cheyenne
Ret. Invs. L.P., 904 F.3d 1159, 1164 n.1 (10th Cir. 2018) (“[T]he interpretation
of the scope of an EEOC charge from the face of the charge itself . . . is best
viewed as a legal issue reviewed de novo.”).
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2 WILSON, J., dissenting 21-13799
district court should enforce the subpoena unless the employer
establishes that the subpoena is ‘too indefinite,’ has been issued for
an ‘illegitimate purpose,’ or is unduly burdensome.” Id.
Despite the Supreme Court’s generous construction of
subpoena validity and relevance, the majority opinion constrains
the EEOC’s investigation on two grounds: first, by limiting the
geographic scope of the charge to the address listed therein, and
second, by finding the nationwide information sought irrelevant. I
address each argument in turn.
I.
The majority opinion places undue weight on the facility
address listed on the charge, concluding that it alone restricts the
geographic scope of the investigation to the Northport Alabama
facility. While an EEOC charge must include, among other things,
“the full name and contact information of the person against whom
the charge is made,” the charge is not required to list an address.
29 C.F.R. § 1601.12(a)(2). Instead, a respondent’s address must
only be included “if known,” which suggests that an employer’s
address is not necessary to complete a valid charge nor is it
determinative of a charge’s substance. See id.
The employer charged with unlawful conduct here is
“Eberspacher [sic] North America, Inc.” (ENA), not Eberspaecher
Northport, Alabama. The charge does not list the Northport
facility as the employer, nor does it address the Northport facility
as if it were a separate legal entity. The only Northport-specific
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21-13799 WILSON, J., dissenting 3
language included within the charge is the address associated with
the Northport location. To suggest that the inclusion of this single
address limits the charge to this single facility turns a blind eye to
basic notions of corporate structure and a plain reading of the
charge. ENA, like many corporations, has multiple locations
nationwide and consequently multiple addresses. ENA is a single
legal entity with no parents, subsidiaries, or affiliates. 2 Despite
each facility having a unique address, an address alone does not
create a separate “entity” or “employer” as the district court and
majority seem to suggest. Listing the facility address merely
provides contact information, nothing more. See 29 C.F.R. §
1601.12(a)(2); see also id. § 1601.12(b) (providing that
“[n]otwithstanding the provisions of paragraph (a)” a charge is
sufficient if it identifies the parties, and “may be amended to cure
technical defects or omissions”).
Rather than fixate on the address, a far more natural reading
of the charge reveals that the EEOC sought to investigate a pattern-
or-practice charge against ENA nationwide. The charge refers to
2 When asked whether he represents Eberspaecher North America or
Eberspaecher Northport, the appellee’s attorney replied that he represents
“Eberspaecher North America, Inc.” because it is “one corporate entity.” Oral
Argument at 12:50, E.E.O.C. v. Eberspaecher N. Am., Inc., No-13799 (11th
Cir. Aug. 10, 2022), https://www.ca11.uscourts.gov/oral-argument-
recordings?title=21-
13799&field_oar_case_name_value=&field_oral_argument_date_value%5B
value%5D%5Byear%5D=&field_oral_argument_date_value%5Bvalue%5D
%5Bmonth%5D=.
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4 WILSON, J., dissenting 21-13799
ENA’s “unlawful discriminatory practices” and directly references
ENA’s “practices and the employee handbook” that applies
nationwide. Further, the charge states that “[t]he aggrieved
individuals include all employees who have, have been, or might
in the future be adversely affected by the unlawful employment
practices set forth in the” charge (emphasis added). As the district
court reasoned, “the commissioner must . . . stat[e] her intent
within the four corners of the charge.” It is plainly clear that
located within the four corners of the charge is the intent to
investigate ENA nationwide.
II.
Next, the majority contends that the nationwide data sought
by the EEOC is irrelevant to the Commissioner’s charge. Although
the EEOC is limited to accessing relevant information, the
Supreme Court has held “[t]hat limitation on the [EEOC’s]
investigative authority is not especially constraining.” E.E.O.C. v.
Shell Oil Co., 466 U.S. 54, 68 (1984). The term “relevant” has been
construed broadly, and courts “have afforded the [EEOC] access to
virtually any material that might cast light on the allegations
against the employer.” Id. at 68–69. An individual charge3 may
3 In general, the charge “process begins with the filing of a charge with the
EEOC alleging that a given employer has engaged in an unlawful employment
practice. A charge may be filed by an aggrieved individual or by a member of
the Commission.” Shell Oil, 466 U.S. at 62. An EEOC Commissioner may file
a charge herself if she “has reason to think that an employer has engaged in a
‘pattern or practice’ of discriminatory conduct.” Id.
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21-13799 WILSON, J., dissenting 5
be limited to investigating the individual employee’s claim in that
instance. E.E.O.C. v. Royal Caribbean Cruises, Ltd., 771 F.3d 757,
761–62 (11th Cir. 2014) (per curiam) (finding an individual charge
improperly overbroad where it sought to discover a potential class
of employees or applicants who suffered from a pattern or practice
of discrimination within the company rather than limit the charge
to the individual employee’s allegation).
The information related to ENA’s allegedly unlawful
employment practices nationwide is, under any construction of the
term, relevant to the EEOC’s investigation. The type and scale of
information sought here to investigate an alleged discriminatory
pattern and practice spanning multiple facilities nationwide is
certainly the type of material “that might cast light on the
allegations against the employer.” Shell Oil, 466 U.S. at 68–69. I
see no reason to stifle the broad investigatory power clearly laid
out by the Supreme Court. Additionally, our logic in Royal
Caribbean is inapplicable here. In Royal Caribbean, the only
charge at issue was an individual charge investigating an alleged
ADA violation by the employer against a single employee. 771 F.3d
at 759–60. The charge here is the Commissioner’s charge, not Mr.
White’s individual charge, seeking to discover whether ENA’s
policy (which applies to all ENA employees nationwide) is
discriminatory. Unlike in Royal Caribbean, where the
companywide information was irrelevant to an individual charge,
the companywide information sought here by the Commissioner
is clearly relevant to this companywide investigation.
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6 WILSON, J., dissenting 21-13799
Furthermore, we have previously contemplated the precise case
before us, as we suggested in Royal Caribbean that “[t]he
Commission has the ability to file a Commissioner’s charge
alleging a pattern and practice of discrimination that could support
a request for [companywide information].” 771 F.3d at 762. As we
suggested then, and we should hold now, ENA companywide
information is relevant to the allegation of pattern-and-practice
discrimination.
Because I would hold that the EEOC satisfied its
requirement to create a valid charge seeking relevant information
and would therefore reverse the district court, I dissent.