Opinion

Kevin Barrett v. Department of Veterans Affairs

Court: Merit Systems Protection Board
Filed: Apr 27, 2023
Status: Unpublished
Cited by: 0 cases
Authority: More cited than 23.2%

holding that the Board correctly declined to consider allegations of disclosures not clearly raised before OSC

How later courts described this case

holding that the Board correctly declined to consider allegations of disclosures not clearly raised before OSC

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

KEVIN J. BARRETT, DOCKET NUMBER

Appellant, SF-1221-16-0632-W-1

DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS DATE: April 27, 2023

AFFAIRS,

Agency.

THIS FINAL ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1

Timothy A. Bridge, Esquire, St. Charles, Illinois, for the appellant.

Glen E. Woodworth, Esquire, Anchorage, Alaska, for the agency.

BEFORE

Cathy A. Harris, Vice Chairman

Raymond A. Limon, Member

FINAL ORDER

¶1 The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which

dismissed for lack of jurisdiction his request for corrective action in an individual

right of action (IRA) appeal. Generally, we grant petitions such as this one only

in the following circumstances: the initial decision contains erroneous findings

A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add

significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders,

but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not

required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a

precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board

as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c).

of material fact; the initial decision is based on an erroneous interpretation of

statute or regulation or the erroneous application of the law to the facts of the

case; the administrative judge’s rulings during either the course of the appeal or

the initial decision were not consistent with required procedures or involved an

abuse of discretion, and the resulting error affected the outcome of the case; or

new and material evidence or legal argument is available that, despite the

petitioner’s due diligence, was not available when the record closed. Title 5 of

the Code of Federal Regulations, section 1201.115 (5 C.F.R. § 1201.115). After

fully considering the filings in this appeal, we conclude that the petitioner has not

established any basis under section 1201.115 for granting the petition for review.

Therefore, we DENY the petition for review and AFFIRM the initial decision,

which is now the Board’s final decision. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.113(b).

BACKGROUND

¶2 The appellant has served as a Nurse Practitioner at the agency’s Alaska

Healthcare System since September 2014. Initial Appeal File (IAF), Tab 6

at 304-05. On December 30, 2015, the appellant filed a complaint with the Office

of Special Counsel (OSC) in which he alleged that the agency had retaliated

against him for whistleblowing. IAF, Tab 1 at 10-30. In his complaint, the

appellant alleged that he had made two disclosures: (1) on September 4, 2015, he

had disclosed to his first-level supervisor “the denial of OT/CT in order to

complete excessive labor,” and (2) on May 21, 2015, he disclosed to his

first-level supervisor that he had “been receiving threats for adding OT/CT to

complete the work given.” 2 Id. at 21-22. The appellant also alleged that the

agency had improperly extended the length of his service obligation under a

relocation incentive agreement, and that his first-level supervisor had “created a

continuous toxic and hostile work environment” in which she treated him

“OT/CT” appears to refer to overtime and compensatory ti me off. IAF, Tab 1 at 26,

44.

differently based on race, color, and age; denied his requests for overtime;

double-booked his appointments; and took other actions against him in reprisal

for his requests for overtime and filing of an equal employment opportunity

(EEO) complaint. 3 Id. at 25-30. On May 20 and 22, 2016, the appellant

forwarded emails and other documents to the OSC Complaints Examining Unit

(CEU). IAF, Tab 5 at 15-127.

¶3 By letter dated June 8, 2016, the CEU notified the appellant that it had

made a preliminary determination to close its inquiry into his complaint and

provided him with an opportunity to respond within 13 days of the date of the

letter. 4 Id. at 13-15. On June 28, 2016, the CEU notified the appellant that,

having received no comments to its June 8, 2016 letter, it was closing its file.

IAF, Tab 1 at 9. On July 7, 2016, the appellant’s representative sent OSC a letter

alleging that the appellant was subjected to five additional prohibited p ersonnel

practices and requesting that they be included in the investigation or supplemental

In his OSC complaint, the appellant stated that he filed a complaint with the agency’s

Inspector General (IG) and OSC characterized the appellant’s IG complaint as a

protected activity in its close out letter. IAF, Tab 1 at 15, Tab 5 at 13. H owever, the

record does not contain a copy of the appellant’s complaint to the IG or any other

information about the IG complaint. Further, the appellant, who was represented by an

attorney at all stages of this process, has never alleged in front of the Board that his IG

complaint was a protected activity under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9), despite having several

opportunities to comprehensively frame his claims, and having been placed on notice

that such activity would qualify as a protected activity under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9).

IAF, Tab 1, Tab 3 at 3, Tab 5 at 1-7. The administrative judge did not address the IG

complaint in the initial decision, and the appellant has not raised the matter in his

petition for review. IAF, Tab 7, Initial Decision (ID); Petition for Review (PFR) File,

Tab 1 at 1-11. It is the parties’ prerogative to craft their case as they see fit; as the

appellant has not claimed that his IG complaint was a protected activity in front of the

Board, we need not address it.

The administrative judge noted that it was unclear whether the OSC’s CEU considered

the appellant’s December 30, 2015 complaint or another complaint. ID at 2 n.1. The

appellant has not asserted that he filed another complaint alleging reprisal with OSC

and the file number referenced in OSC’s June 8, 2016 letter matches the file number

assigned to the December 30, 2015 complaint. IAF, Tab 1 at 10, Tab 5 at 13.

Accordingly, we find that the December 30, 2015 complaint is the only OSC complaint

at issue in this appeal.

investigation. IAF, Tab 5 at 132-33. The record does not contain a response

from OSC to this letter.

¶4 On July 15, 2016, the appellant filed an IRA appeal alleging that he was

subjected to nine actions that constituted prohibited personnel pra ctices. IAF,

Tab 1 at 1-8. The administrative judge issued an order notifying the appellant of

the elements and burdens of proof to establish Board jurisdiction over his IRA

appeal and ordering him to file evidence and argument demonstrating jurisdiction .

IAF, Tab 3 at 2-8. The appellant filed a response to the order in which he alleged

that he was subjected to prohibited personnel practices after he disclosed

deficiencies in the care and treatment of patients. IAF, Tab 5 at 1 -6, 134-35. His

response described eight communications to agency officials that he alleged took

place: (1) during a May 25, 2015 meeting; (2) in a June 11, 2015 email;

(3) during a July 15, 2015 meeting; (4) in a July 15, 2015 email; (5) during a

July 16, 2015 meeting; (6) in a September 17, 2015 email; (7) during a

November 5, 2015 meeting; and (8) in a set of emails spanning November 5

and 6, 2015. Id. at 134-35. 5 The appellant alleged that the first seven

communications “concern the increasing number of patient alerts caused by the

staffing shortages in the Department and [his first-level supervisor’s] failure to

authorize sufficient CT/OT to resolve the backlog of patient alerts,” which he

made because he believed his first-level supervisor’s “patient assignment

practices presented a real and substantial danger to the health and safety of the

veterans/patients.” Id. The eighth communication was comprised of

communications made by other agency staff. Id. at 135. The agency filed a

response, arguing that the appellant had not made nonfrivolous allegations that he

The appellant did not explicitly allege in his appeal that he made disclosures on

May 21 or September 4, 2015, as he did in his OSC complaint. Compare IAF, Tab 1

at 1-8, Tab 5 at 1-7 with IAF, Tab 1 at 10-30. Accordingly, we do not further discuss

the May 21 or September 4, 2015 disclosures herein.

made protected disclosures and those disclosures were a contributing factor in

any alleged personnel actions. IAF, Tab 6 at 7-10.

¶5 The administrative judge issued an initial decision dismissing the appeal for

lack of jurisdiction based on the written record. IAF, Tab 7, Initial Decision (ID).

The administrative judge first found that, of the eight communications the

appellant alleged were protected, he had nonfrivolously alleged that the four

communications he purportedly made to agency officials during meetings on

May 25, July 15-16, and November 5, 2015, were protected disclosures. ID

at 5-6.

¶6 She found that, as to the four remaining communications, the appellant did

not nonfrivolously allege that he reasonably believed the communication

evidenced a violation of a law, rule, or regulation, gross mismanagement, a gross

waste of funds, an abuse of authority, or a substantial and specific danger to

public health or safety. ID at 6-8. Rather, the administrative judge found that

three of the communications, emails the appellant sent to agency officials on

June 11, July 15, and September 17, 2015, merely reflected his requests for

overtime and a reduced caseload, and summarized a conversation with his

supervisors about his performance. Id. Further, the administrative judge found

that the appellant failed to nonfrivolously allege that the November 5 and 6, 2015

emails sent by other staff members were protected because he did not make the

disclosures. ID at 8. Thus, the administrative judge found that the four

disclosures were not protected.

¶7 The administrative judge then found that the appellant did not prove

exhaustion of his administrative remedies before OSC concerning the four

disclosures that he had nonfrivolously alleged were protected. ID at 8-12.

She found that the appellant’s complaint and correspondence to OSC did not

reflect that he notified OSC of his July 16, 2015 or November 5, 2015

communications. ID at 9. She also found that the appellant mentioned his

May 25 and July 15, 2015 meetings to OSC but did not provide OSC with a

sufficient basis to pursue an investigation that might lead to corrective action, as

he failed to provide OSC with any information that might render either

communication a protected disclosure. ID at 9-12. The administrative judge thus

dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. ID at 12.

¶8 The appellant has filed a petition for review in which he argues that the

administrative judge erred in finding that certain disclosures regarding patient

safety were not protected and asserts that he provided OSC with a sufficient basis

on which to conduct an investigation that might lead to corrective action.

Petition for Review (PFR) File, Tab 1 at 2-11. The agency has responded in

opposition to the petition. PFR File, Tab 3.

DISCUSSION OF ARGUMENTS ON REVIEW

¶9 To establish Board jurisdiction over an IRA appeal brought pursuant to the

Whistleblower Protection Enhancement Act of 2012 (WPEA), the appellant must

exhaust his administrative remedies before OSC and make nonfrivolous

allegations that: (1) he made a protected disclosure described under 5 U.S.C.

§ 2302(b)(8) or engaged in protected activity as specified in 5 U.S.C.

§ 2302(b)(9)(A)(i), (B), (C), or (D); and (2) the protected disclosure or activity

was a contributing factor in the agency’s decision to take or fail to take a

personnel action as defined by 5 U.S.C. § 2302(a). 5 U.S.C. §§ 1214(a)(3), 1221;

Salerno v. Department of the Interior, 123 M.S.P.R. 230, ¶ 5 (2016); see Yunus v.

Department of Veterans Affairs, 242 F.3d 1367, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2001). 6

Jurisdiction in an IRA appeal is determined based on the written record. See

Graves v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 123 M.S.P.R. 434, ¶ 22 (2016)

Historically, the Board has been bound by the precedent of the U.S. Court of Appeals

for the Federal Circuit on these types of whistleblower issues. However, pursuant to

the All Circuit Review Act, Pub. L. No. 115-195, 132 Stat. 1510, appellants may file

petitions for judicial review of Board decisions in whistleblower reprisal cases with any

circuit court of appeals of competent jurisdiction. See 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(1)(B).

Therefore, we must consider these issues with the view that the appellant may seek

review of this decision before any appropriate court of appeal.

(holding that an employee is not entitled to a jurisdictional hearing in an IRA

appeal) (citing Spencer v. Department of the Navy, 327 F.3d 1354, 1356 (Fed.

Cir. 2003)).

¶10 The Board’s jurisdictional inquiry generally begins by examining whether

the appellant has shown that he exhausted his administrative remedies before

OSC, as the Board’s jurisdiction over an IRA appeal is limited to t hose issues

raised before OSC. See Ellison v. Merit Systems Protection Board, 7 F.3d 1031,

1037 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (holding that the Board correctly declined to consider

allegations of disclosures not clearly raised before OSC) 7; Miller v. Federal

Deposit Insurance Corporation, 122 M.S.P.R. 3, ¶ 6 (2014) (“The first element of

Board jurisdiction over an IRA appeal is exhaustion by the appellant of his

administrative remedies before OSC”), aff’d, 626 F. App’x 261 (Fed. Cir. 2015).

The administrative judge in this case first addressed whether the appellant made a

nonfrivolous allegation that the eight communications at issue were protected

disclosures and subsequently addressed exhaustion regarding the four disclosures

that she found the appellant had nonfrivolously alleged were protected. ID

at 4-12. The administrative judge nevertheless correctly found that the appellant

failed to make a nonfrivolous allegation that he made protected disclosures in the

June 11, July 15, September 17, and November 5 and 6, 2015 email

communications, and that he failed to exhaust his administrative remedies

concerning the disclosures he allegedly made during meetings with agency

officials on May 25, July 15-16, and November 5, 2015, warranting dismissal of

the entire appeal for lack of jurisdiction. Id. Accordingly, we first address the

appellant’s arguments regarding his alleged protected disclosures and then turn to

The WPEA, which became effective on December 27, 2012, does not affect the

relevant holding in the cited authority, nor does it affect the re levant holdings in the

other authorities cited herein that were issued prior to the effective date of the WPEA.

See Pub. L. No. 112-199, 126 Stat. 1465 (2012). We have reviewed the relevant

legislation enacted during the pendency of this appeal and have concluded that it does

not affect the outcome of the appeal.

his arguments regarding exhaustion before OSC, concluding that the appellant has

not shown error in the administrative judge’s initial decision dismissing his

appeal for lack of jurisdiction.

The administrative judge correctly found that the appellant did not make a

nonfrivolous allegation that he made protected disclosures in the June 11,

July 15, September 17, and November 5 and 6, 2015 email communications.

¶11 On review, the appellant argues that the administrative judge erred in

finding that he did not nonfrivolously allege that four email communications

regarding patient alerts evidenced a substantial and specific danger to public

health or safety. PFR File, Tab 1 at 2-9. He contends that his concerns about

unanswered patient alerts constituted imminent safety concerns “given that

treatment delays, mis-diagnosis and medical complications which [sic] could

reasonably be expected to occur within a matter of hours or even minutes.”

Id. at 4.

¶12 A nonfrivolous allegation of a protected disclosure is an allegation of facts

that, if proven, would show that the appellant disclosed a matter that a reasonable

person in his position would believe evidenced one of the categories of

wrongdoing specified in 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8)(A). Salerno, 123 M.S.P.R. 230,

¶ 6. The test to determine whether a putative whistleblower has a reasonable

belief that his disclosures evidenced wrongdoing is an objective one: whether a

disinterested observer with knowledge of the essential facts known to and readily

ascertainable by the employee could reasonably conclude that the actions of the

Government evidenced a violation of law, rule, or regulation, gross

mismanagement, a gross waste of funds, an abuse of authority, or a substantial

and specific danger to public health or safety. Id. (citing Lachance v. White,

174 F.3d 1378, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 1999)). Allegations must be detailed and facially

well-supported; vague, conclusory, or facially insufficient allegations of

Government wrongdoing do not confer jurisdiction. Johnston v. Merit Systems

Protection Board, 518 F.3d 905, 910 (Fed. Cir. 2008).

¶13 In determining whether a disclosure evidenced a substantial and specific

danger to public health or safety, it is relevant for the Board to consider factors

such as: (1) the likelihood of harm resulting from the danger; (2) the immine nce

of the potential harm; and (3) the nature of the potential harm. Parikh v.

Department of Veterans Affairs, 116 M.S.P.R. 197, ¶ 14 (2011) (citing Chambers

v. Department of the Interior, 515 F.3d 1362, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2008)).

¶14 We conclude that the administrative judge properly found that the appellant

did not make a nonfrivolous allegation that he disclosed a matter that a reasonable

person in his position would believe evidenced a substantial and specific danger

to public health or safety in his June 11, July 15, and Sep tember 17, 2015 emails

to his supervisors. ID at 6-8. Although the appellant now contends that these

communications conveyed imminent patient safety concerns, the emails do not

detail facts giving rise to a reasonable expectation of harm to patients that would

likely result in the reasonably foreseeable future. The appellant’s June 11, 2015

email to his first-level supervisor and the facility Chief Nursing Officer states

that he stayed to catch up on his alerts because “I could not stand looking at them

building up,” and does not communicate anything more than the appellant’s

personal desire to reduce his alerts and receive overtime hours and pay for staying

late to do so. IAF, Tab 5 at 30. Similarly, the appellant’s July 15, 2015 email to

his supervisors, which was sent in response to his first-level supervisor’s email

memorializing two meetings she conducted regarding his performance , also does

not reference harm to patients. 8 Id. at 31-32; IAF, Tab 6 at 246. The only

reference the appellant makes to patient care is in response to his supervisor’s

As noted by the Federal Circuit, in determining whether an appellant has made a

nonfrivolous allegation in an IRA appeal, the Board should not consider the appellant’s

allegations in a vacuum. Hessami v. Merit Systems Protection Board, 979 F.3d 1362,

1369 n.5 (Fed. Cir. 2020). The Board may consider other matters incorporated by

reference, matters integral to the appellant’s claim, and matters of public record. Id.

Accordingly, here we cite to the first-level supervisor’s email to provide context

regarding the events that precipitated the appellant’s July 15, 2015 email. IAF, Tab 5

at 31, 32, Tab 6 at 246.

request to contact her should he think of other ways she can help him “be more

efficient and manage [his] time, in order to ensure safe patient care within the

constraints of a normal work week”; his response opines that, “‘to ensure’ safe

care within a 40 hour work week [he] will try [his] best to come up with a great

idea because that would make [him] invaluable to any VA clinic.” IAF, Tab 5

at 32, Tab 6 at 246. His communication does not indicate any wrongdoing on the

part of the agency or that the agency’s current practices evidence a specific

danger to patient safety. IAF, Tab 5 at 32. Finally, the appellant’s September 17,

2015 email to his supervisor communicates that he “is being double booked

without discussion,” has “had some patients with serious M[ental] H[ealth]

issues,” and that his “alerts are building up and [he] cannot keep up with them,”

but does not connect these statements to a concern about patient health or safety;

instead, he requests a reduction in his workload. Id. at 46. Each email lacks any

indication that harm might come to patients because of the appellant’s

unprocessed alerts; accordingly, we cannot conclude that he has nonfrivolously

alleged that a disinterested observer could have reasonably concluded that the

matters he disclosed in each email evidenced a substantial and specific danger to

public health or safety. 9

The appellant also argues that it was contradictory for the administrative judge to find

certain communications regarding patient alerts were protected, but not others; for

example, he cited the administrative judge’s findings that the appellant nonfrivolously

alleged that his communication in a July 15, 2015 meeting with his supervisor and the

Chief Nursing Officer was a protected disclosure, but his July 15, 2015 email regarding

the meeting was not. ID at 5, 7; PFR File, Tab 1 at 4-5. The appellant’s description of

the July 15, 2015 meeting is distinguishable from his email communication from the

same date. The plain language of the email did not establish a connection between the

appellant’s unprocessed alerts and patient safety, whereas the appellant’s description of

his communication, during the meeting, to his supervisors that certain practices resulted

in danger to or “an obstacle to competent professional care” for patients , conveyed that

he had allegedly disclosed that agency practices could harm patients. Compare IAF,

Tab 5 at 31-32, with IAF, Tab 5 at 134-35. Thus, the administrative judge properly

concluded that the appellant nonfrivolously alleged that certain disclosures, namely, the

appellant’s description of communications during meetings he had with agency

officials, were protected, whereas others were not.

¶15 Nor can we agree with the appellant’s suggestion that the mere mention of

unprocessed safety alerts constitutes a disclosure of an imminent safety concern.

PFR File, Tab 1 at 4. Even assuming that patient alerts can notify healthcare

providers of imminent issues, such as abnormal test results, the appellant has not

identified the content of his unprocessed alerts and makes no more than

conclusory allegations that the alerts could cause “treatment delays,

mis-diagnosis, and medical complications.” Id. Thus, the appellant has not set

forth a sufficiently detailed allegation that his unprocessed alerts were o f the kind

that might cause imminent harm to a patient. Cf., e.g., Tatsch v. Department of

the Army, 100 M.S.P.R. 460, ¶¶ 10-13 (2005) (holding that the appellant

nonfrivolously alleged a reasonable belief that her disclosure evidenced a specific

danger to public health or safety in reporting two incidents involving the

improper triage of on-scene, late-term, unstable pregnant women in labor).

Accordingly, we affirm the administrative judge’s findings that the appellant

failed to make a nonfrivolous allegation that he disclosed a matter that a

reasonable person in his position would believe evidenced a substantial and

specific danger to public health or safety in his June 11, July 15, and

September 17, 2015 emails to his supervisors.

¶16 Finally, the administrative judge properly found that the November 5 and 6,

2015 email communications made by other agency staff did not constitute a

protected disclosure because the appellant did not make the disclosure. ID at 8.

Although the appellant was copied on these communications, he was not the

source of the communications, thus the communications themselves were not

protected disclosures under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8) vis-à-vis the appellant. IAF,

Tab 5 at 27-29, 135. We thus affirm the administrative judge’s findings that the

appellant did not make a nonfrivolous allegation that the November 5 and 6, 2015

email communications constituted a protected disclosure.

The administrative judge properly found that the appellant did not exhaust his

administrative remedies before OSC concerning his alleged disclosures during

meetings with agency officials on May 25, July 15-16, and November 5, 2015.

¶17 On review, the appellant also disputes the administrative judge’s findings

that, as to the four disclosures that he had nonfrivolously alleged were protected ,

he failed to exhaust his administrative remedies before OSC. PFR File, Tab 1

at 9-11. Under 5 U.S.C. § 1214(a)(3), an employee is required to “seek corrective

action from [OSC] before seeking corrective action from the Board” through an

IRA appeal. Miller, 122 M.S.P.R. 3, ¶ 6. The substantive requirements of

exhaustion are met when an appellant has provided OSC with a sufficient basis to

pursue an investigation. Chambers v. Department of Homeland Security,

2022 MSPB 8, ¶ 10. The Board’s jurisdiction over an IRA appeal is limited to

those issues that have been previously raised with OSC, but appellants may give a

more detailed account of their whistleblowing activities before the Board than

they did to OSC. Id. Appellants may demonstrate exhaustion of their OSC

remedies with evidence regarding their initial OSC complaint and other

communications with OSC concerning their allegations. See Baldwin v.

Department of Veterans Affairs, 113 M.S.P.R. 469, ¶ 8 (2010).

¶18 The appellant argues that he provided OSC with a sufficient basis on which

to pursue an investigation as to each of his alleged disclosures when he informed

OSC that unanswered patient alerts represented a substantial and specific danger

to the health and safety of the agency’s patients. PFR File, Tab 1 at 9 -11.

We agree with the administrative judge that the appellant did not prove

exhaustion regarding his alleged disclosures during meetings with agency

officials on May 25, July 15-16, and November 5, 2015. ID at 8-12.

¶19 As to the appellant’s July 16, 2015 communication to his second-level

supervisor and his November 5, 2015 communication to his first-level supervisor,

our review of the appellant’s OSC complaint and supplemental correspondence

reflects, as the administrative judge found, that there is no mention of either

communication in the appellant’s OSC complaint and subsequent correspondence.

ID at 9. We have considered the appellant’s argument that he provided OSC with

his “core” concerns about patient care but nevertheless cannot conclude that the

appellant provided OSC with a sufficient basis to investigate his July 16 and

November 5, 2015 communications to agency officials. PFR File, Tab 1 at 9-11.

At no time in the appellant’s complaint or correspondence with OSC prior to the

closure of its file did the appellant articulate that the agency’s actions constituted

harm to patients or otherwise affected public health or safety. IAF, Tab 1

at 10-30, Tab 5 at 16-127. Rather, the appellant’s complaint and correspondence

to OSC concern his relocation incentive agreement and his workload, specifically

the denial of overtime and compensatory time off, and that his first -level

supervisor’s practices put him behind in his workload. IAF, Tab 1 at 10-30,

Tab 5 at 16-127. Accordingly, no evidence provided to OSC suggests that the

appellant disclosed a substantial and specific danger to public health or safety to

agency officials.

¶20 The appellant contends that the emails he submitted to OSC “direc tly

concern Appellant’s growing apprehension and fear that the escalating number of

unanswered patient alerts represented a substantial and specific danger to the

health and safety of VA patients under his care,” but his correspondence to OSC

does not mention such a concern. PFR File, Tab 1 at 10. The appellant’s

references to alerts and patients occur in the context of his workload, which he

contends he was unable to manage, but these references do not articulate a danger

to patient health and safety. The appellant’s September 17, 2015 email to his

supervisor is perhaps the most descriptive of patient care, but as discussed above,

it fails to connect patient care with a concern about patient health or safety, and

we cannot conclude that this email or any other communication to OSC provided

sufficient facts for OSC to pursue an investigation into a substantial and specific

danger to the health and safety of the agency’s patients. IAF, Tab 5 at 46.

¶21 On review, the appellant also cites to his November 19, 2015 EEO

complaint in support of his argument that he advised OSC that factors such as

“double booking of patients, staffing shortages, reduced triage times and

increased patient load” contributed to an imminent concern for patient safety, but

we do not find that his EEO complaint put OSC on notice of any disclosure

regarding a substantial and specific danger to public health or safety. PFR File,

Tab 1 at 10-11. Although the EEO complaint references the effect that case

assignments have on patient care, treatment, and safety, there is no suggestion in

the EEO complaint that the appellant made such a disclosure outside of the

complaint; rather, his EEO complaint focuses on his allegation of disparate

treatment on the basis of race in case assignments. IAF, Tab 5 at 128-30.

Additionally, although the appellant asserts on review that he provided the EEO

complaint to OSC, there is no evidence that he in fact submitted it to OSC. Each

of the other documents the appellant asserts he provided to OSC consist of an

email showing the date on which he sent the document to the OSC investigator

and documents referenced in the email. However, there is no such email or other

evidence showing that he sent the EEO complaint to the investigator, nor does the

appellant attest to sending the EEO complaint to OSC in the sworn affidavit he

submitted in support of his jurisdictional response. Compare IAF, Tab 5

at 16-127, 134-35, with IAF, Tab 5 at 128-30. Thus, the appellant has not

established that he provided his EEO complaint to OSC or that it was sufficient to

put OSC on notice that he disclosed a substantial and specific danger to public

health or safety.

¶22 The appellant also provided a July 7, 2016 letter from his attorney to OSC,

which contends that “his immediate supervisor also increased his case loan [sic]

and reduced patient consultation time periods which directly compromised patient

safety during the period May 25, 2015 through January, 2016”; however, this

language does not suggest that he communicated this purported compromise of

patient safety to his supervisor or other agency official. IAF, Tab 5 at 132 -33.

Moreover, the letter was sent after OSC informed the appe llant that it closed its

investigative file, and the appellant has not provided any evidence that OSC

subsequently investigated this allegation. IAF, Tab 1 at 9, Tab 5 at 132 -33.

Accordingly, we find that the appellant has not established that this lette r, or any

other documentation he provided to OSC, provided sufficient facts for OSC to

pursue an investigation into a substantial and specific danger to the health and

safety of the agency’s patients.

¶23 Even if the appellant had provided sufficient facts to OSC to investigate

wrongdoing, the July 16 and November 5, 2015 communications were new

allegations outside of any core claims he made to OSC. Although an appellant

may add further detail to his claims before the Board, he must first provide OSC

with a sufficient basis to pursue an investigation. Chambers, 2022 MSPB 8, ¶ 10.

The appellant’s complaint to OSC mentioned that he notified his second -level

supervisor about his overtime complaints sometime after July 29, 2015, but there

is no indication that the appellant made any disclosure of a substantial and

specific danger to patient health or safety to his second -level supervisor prior to

that date; thus, OSC would not have had sufficient facts to pursue an

investigation of this prior alleged disclosure. IAF, Tab 1 at 17; see, e.g.,

McCarthy v. Merit Systems Protection Board, 809 F.3d 1365, 1374 (Fed. Cir.

2016) (concluding the appellant did not provide OSC with a sufficient basis to

pursue an investigation concerning four legal memoranda written by the appellant

when the memoranda identified “different disclosures, made to different people,

at different times” than those disclosures identified in th e appellant’s OSC

complaint). Similarly, the appellant’s complaint and correspondence to OSC do

not identify any disclosures occurring after September 2015; accordingly, he did

not provide OSC with sufficient facts to investigate subsequent disclosures, s uch

as his alleged November 5, 2015 disclosure.

¶24 We also agree with the administrative judge that, regarding the appellant’s

alleged disclosures during meetings on May 25 and July 15, 2015, although the

appellant’s complaint to OSC described these meetings, at no time in his

description of the meetings did he articulate that the agency’s actions constituted

harm to patients or otherwise affected public health or safety. IAF, Tab 1

at 10-30. Further, none of the correspondence the appellant provided to OSC

described these meetings in a manner that would put OSC on notice that he

disclosed a substantial and specific danger to public health or safety during the

meetings. IAF, Tab 5 at 31-32. We thus affirm the administrative judge’s

findings that the appellant did not exhaust his administrative remedies before

OSC with respect to the communications he made to agency officials during

meetings that took place on May 25, July 15-16, and November 5, 2015. 10

¶25 Accordingly, we affirm the initial decision on the grounds that the appellant

failed to make a nonfrivolous allegation that he made protected disclosures as to

four of his communications to agency officials, and as to the remaining four

communications, he failed to exhaust his administrative remedies before OSC,

warranting dismissal of his IRA appeal for lack of jurisdiction.

In his jurisdictional response, the appellant filed a March 14, 2016 letter from the

OSC Disclosure Unit, which notified the appellant that it wo uld take no further action

concerning his allegations of agency wrongdoing and that he could raise his allegation

of racial discrimination with the CEU. IAF, Tab 5 at 11-12. In his complaint alleging

retaliation, filed with the CEU, the appellant asserted that he received a letter of

counseling “after notifying . . . OSC on October 23, 2015.” IAF, Tab 1 at 19. He

further stated that, “[s]ince this . . . OSC intervention, my work environment is still

toxic.” Id. at 20. To the extent the appellant may have been alleging that the agency

retaliated against him for making disclosures to OSC, which may be protected under

5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8)(B) or (b)(9)(C), we find that the above statements were so vague

that they did not provide OSC with a sufficient basis to pursue an investigation. In fact,

there is no indication in this record that the appellant informed the OSC CEU that he

had made disclosures to the OSC Disclosure Unit. Moreover, even if we found that the

appellant had exhausted his remedies regarding allegations that the agency retaliated

against him for his disclosures to OSC, he did not make any such argument in his

submissions below. IAF, Tabs 1, 5. Further, the initial decision did not address a claim

of retaliation for disclosures to OSC, and the appellant did not raise the issue in his

petition for review. IAF, Tab 7; PFR File, Tab 1. Accordingly, do not further discuss

any claim of retaliation for disclosures made to OSC.

NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS 11

You may obtain review of this final decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(a)(1). By

statute, the nature of your claims determines the time limit for seeking such

review and the appropriate forum with which to file. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b).

Although we offer the following summary of available appeal rights, the Merit

Systems Protection Board does not provide legal advice on which option is most

appropriate for your situation and the rights described below do not represent a

statement of how courts will rule regarding which cases fall within their

jurisdiction. If you wish to seek review of this final decision, you should

immediately review the law applicable to your claims and carefully follow all

filing time limits and requirements. Failure to file within the applicable time

limit may result in the dismissal of your case by your chosen forum.

Please read carefully each of the three main possible choices of review

below to decide which one applies to your particular case. If you have questions

about whether a particular forum is the appropriate one to review your case, you

should contact that forum for more information.

(1) Judicial review in general. As a general rule, an appellant seeking

judicial review of a final Board order must file a petition for review with the U.S.

Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which must be received by the court

within 60 calendar days of the date of issuance of this decision. 5 U.S.C.

§ 7703(b)(1)(A).

If you submit a petition for review to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the

Federal Circuit, you must submit your petition to the court at the

following address:

Since the issuance of the initial decision in this matter, the Board may have updated

the notice of review rights included in final decisions. As indicated in the notice, the

Board cannot advise which option is most appropriate in any matter.

U.S. Court of Appeals

for the Federal Circuit

717 Madison Place, N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20439

Additional information about the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal

Circuit is available at the court’s website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov. Of particular

relevance is the court’s “Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants,” which is

contained within the court’s Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6, 10, and 11.

If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for an appeal to

the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you may visit our website at

http://www.mspb.gov/probono for information regarding pro bono representation

for Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the Federal Circuit. The

Board neither endorses the services provided by any attorney nor warrants that

any attorney will accept representation in a given case.

(2) Judicial or EEOC review of cases involving a claim of

discrimination. This option applies to you only if you have claimed that you

were affected by an action that is appealable to the Board and that such action

was based, in whole or in part, on unlawful discrimination. If so, you may obtain

judicial review of this decision—including a disposition of your discrimination

claims—by filing a civil action with an appropriate U.S. district court ( not the

U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit), within 30 calendar days after you

receive this decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(2); see Perry v. Merit Systems

Protection Board, 582 U.S. ____ , 137 S. Ct. 1975 (2017). If you have a

representative in this case, and your representative receives this decision before

you do, then you must file with the district court no later than 30 calendar days

after your representative receives this decision. If the action involves a claim of

discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, national origin, or a disabling

condition, you may be entitled to representation by a court-appointed lawyer and

to waiver of any requirement of prepayment of fees, costs, or other security. See

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f) and 29 U.S.C. § 794a.

Contact information for U.S. district courts can be found at their respective

websites, which can be accessed through the link below:

http://www.uscourts.gov/Court_Locator/CourtWebsites.aspx.

Alternatively, you may request review by the Equal Employment

Opportunity Commission (EEOC) of your discrimination claims only, excluding

all other issues. 5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(1). You must file any such request with the

EEOC’s Office of Federal Operations within 30 calendar days after you receive

this decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(1). If you have a representative in this case,

and your representative receives this decision before you do, then you must file

with the EEOC no later than 30 calendar days after your representative receives

this decision.

If you submit a request for review to the EEOC by regular U.S. mail, the

address of the EEOC is:

Office of Federal Operations

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission

P.O. Box 77960

Washington, D.C. 20013

If you submit a request for review to the EEOC via commercial delivery or

by a method requiring a signature, it must be addressed to:

Office of Federal Operations

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission

131 M Street, N.E.

Suite 5SW12G

Washington, D.C. 20507

(3) Judicial review pursuant to the Whistleblower Protection

Enhancement Act of 2012. This option applies to you only if you have raised

claims of reprisal for whistleblowing disclosures under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8) or

other protected activities listed in 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9)(A)(i), (B), (C), or (D).

If so, and your judicial petition for review “raises no challenge to the Board’s

disposition of allegations of a prohibited personnel practice described in

section 2302(b) other than practices described in section 2302(b)(8), or

2302(b)(9)(A)(i), (B), (C), or (D),” then you may file a petition for judicial

review either with the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit or any court

of appeals of competent jurisdiction. 12 The court of appeals must receive your

petition for review within 60 days of the date of issuance of this decision.

5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(1)(B).

If you submit a petition for judicial review to the U.S. Court of Appeals for

the Federal Circuit, you must submit your petition to the court at the