Opinion

In Re: Condemnation of the Twp. of Robinson ~ Appeal of: E&R Partners, L.P.

Court
Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania
Filed
Apr 24, 2023
Status
Unpublished
On the bench
Wallace, J. ~ Dissenting Opinion by Leavitt, President Judge Emerita
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 23.1%

trial court’s factual findings based upon its site visit supported its decision to sustain condemnee’s preliminary objections to the takings

How later courts described this case

  • trial court’s factual findings based upon its site visit supported its decision to sustain condemnee’s preliminary objections to the takings

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

In Re: :

:

Condemnation of the Township :

of Robinson of Certain Lands :

Owned Now or Formerly of: :

: No. 312 C.D. 2022

E&R Partners, L.P., : Argued: October 11, 2022

82 Forest Grove Road :

Coraopolis, PA 15108 :

:

James Esposito :

5852 Steubenville Pike :

McKees Rocks, PA 15136 :

(Lot & Block 266-G-51) :

:

Huntley and Huntley :

2660 Monroeville Blvd. :

Monroeville, PA 15146 :

:

Herman Edwards :

5852 Steubenville Pike :

McKees Rocks, PA 15136 :

:

Appeal of: E&R Partners, L.P. :

BEFORE: HONORABLE MICHAEL H. WOJCIK, Judge

HONORABLE STACY WALLACE, Judge

HONORABLE MARY HANNAH LEAVITT, Senior Judge

OPINION NOT REPORTED

MEMORANDUM OPINION

BY JUDGE WALLACE FILED: April 24, 2023

E&R Partners, L.P. (E&R) appeals the March 4, 2022 order (Order) of the

Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County (trial court) overruling its preliminary

objections (POs) to a declaration of taking (Declaration) filed by the Township of

Robinson (Township). Upon review, we reverse the trial court’s order.

BACKGROUND

1. Factual Background

E&R owns a parcel of real estate located at 5852 Steubenville Pike, McKees

Rocks, Pennsylvania, Parcel Number 266-G-51 (E&R Property). Reproduced

Record (R.R.) at 8a. E&R Property’s driveway sits along Steubenville Pike across

from Tidball Road (Tidball intersection).

James Esposito (Esposito) is the president of Capital Builders, Inc., the

general partner of E&R, and is responsible for day-to-day operations and use of E&R

Property. R.R. at 62a. Before 2003, Esposito was involved in a motor vehicle

collision when he was pulling out of E&R Property’s driveway onto Steubenville

Pike. Id. After that collision, Township and the Pennsylvania Department of

Transportation (PennDOT) installed a traffic safety light at the Tidball intersection.

Id. The Tidball intersection is signalized at all four of its “legs,” and is the subject

of a Traffic Signal Permit, which was originally approved by Township and

PennDOT in May 2003. R.R. at 68a.

On March 1, 2011, Michael Dunn (Dunn), member and manager of Five D

Development, LLC (Five D), purchased a 2.846-acre parcel of real estate located at

Steubenville Pike, Robinson Township, Lot and Block No. 266-G-49 (Five D

Property), which sits just west of E&R Property. R.R. at 63a. Dunn purchased Five

D Property for developmental purposes. Id. at 63a-64a. However, Five D Property

lacked direct access to Steubenville Pike. Id. at 63a-64a. In an effort to obtain access

2

to Steubenville Pike, Dunn hired engineers and contemplated options for ways to

gain access. Id.

In mid-2015, Dunn submitted a land development plan to Township’s

planning commission that envisioned a private right of access to and from Five D

Property from Steubenville Pike across from Tidball Road (Five D Site Plan). R.R.

at 64a. Township conditionally approved the Five D Site Plan but required that Five

D obtain a Highway Occupancy Permit (HOP) and approval from PennDOT before

proceeding. Id. However, PennDOT indicated that Five D could not put a private

entrance immediately adjacent to E&R’s signalized driveway and that for Five D to

have access to Steubenville Pike at the Tidball intersection, it would need “to be a

shared driveway in lieu of just a private entrance.” R.R. at 64a. Dunn approached

Esposito several times regarding the concept of a shared driveway, but the parties

were not able to come to an agreement. Id.

Dunn and Esposito were unable to reach an agreement for a shared driveway,

so Township began efforts in 2016 to obtain PennDOT approval for a public road

through Five D Property from the Tidball intersection to Waterford Drive. R.R. at

65a. It is common for Township to work with developers regarding upgrades, such

as public roads and intersections, because the cost of the upgrades is often absorbed

by the developer. Id.

Meanwhile, in mid-2017, Dunn fired his previous engineer and hired David

E. Wooster and Associates, Inc. (Wooster) to provide engineering services related

to this project. R.R. at 66a. Jared Crosby (Crosby), Vice President of Wooster,

handled this project. Id.

On April 19, 2018, Crosby electronically mailed (e-mailed) Dunn regarding

PennDOT’s requirements for a HOP approval and suggested the possibility of

3

Township condemning a portion of E&R Property to allow for the traffic signal and

intersection to be configured in a more standard design. Id. Crosby determined

Township would need 188 square feet of E&R Property to meet PennDOT’s turning

radius requirements and safely contain the construction. Id.

Mere days after Crosby’s e-mail, on April 25, 2018, Township’s Board of

Commissioners (Township’s Commissioners) received notice that a proposed

resolution authorizing the condemnation of a portion of E&R Property would be on

the agenda for May 7, 2018’s regularly scheduled monthly meeting.1 R.R. at 67a.

Township’s Commissioners received the proposed resolution the afternoon before

the meeting, on May 6, 2018. Id. Around noon on the date of the meeting, May 7,

2018, Crosby e-mailed Township’s solicitor John Cambest (Solicitor Cambest) and

provided him with the plans and a legal description of E&R Property that would

need to be condemned. Id. In his e-mail, Crosby indicated “the plans [were] not far

advanced,” and noted they were “conservative on what was necessary for the

taking.” Id.

At the meeting on May 7, 2018, all five of Township’s Commissioners voted

to approve Resolution Number 11 of 2018 (Condemnation Resolution). The

Resolution provides that Township “desires to construct a new public road and

signalization of the intersection with Tidball Road and [Steubenville Pike] on a

portion of [E&R Property.]” R.R. at 11a. The Condemnation Resolution indicates

Township and E&R could not agree on terms of the value of the property to be

condemned and Township desires to acquire the portion of E&R Property by

1

Under The First Class Township Code, Section 3301-A of the Act of June 24, 1931, P.L. 1206,

as amended, added by the Act of October 29, 2020, P.L. 782, the powers of the township are vested

with the board of commissioners and the board of commissioners is responsible for adopting

resolutions on behalf of the township. 53 P.S. § 58301-A.

4

condemnation pursuant to Section 1901 of The First Class Township Code.2 Id.

Section Two of the Condemnation Resolution states “it is hereby resolved by the

[Township’s Commissioners] that [E&R Property] shall be condemned for the

purpose of obtaining title in fee simple so that a new public road and traffic

signalization equipment may be constructed to signalize the new [Tidball

intersection.]” R.R. at 12a.

2. The Declaration of Taking

On May 11, 2018, Township filed its Declaration in the trial court. The

Declaration states the purpose of the condemnation is to “acquire fee simple title . .

2

According to Section 1901 of The First Class Township Code:

(a) A township may acquire property by eminent domain, including entering upon,

appropriating, taking, using and occupying private lands and property for any of

the following public purposes:

(1) The laying out, opening, widening, extending, vacating, grading or

changing the grades or lines of streets or highways.

(2) The construction of bridges and the piers and abutments for bridges.

(3) The construction of slopes, embankments and storm water sewers and

storm water facilities, the changing of watercourses, and the construction of

sanitary sewer mains, drains or treatment works.

(4) The erection and extension of water systems, wharves and docks, public

buildings, public works or land for a public works related function,

municipal waste processing and disposal facilities, including municipal

waste landfills, libraries, and the establishing of parks, playgrounds and

recreation places.

(5) For all other purposes authorized by this act.

(b) Eminent domain proceedings shall be subject to and conform with the

provisions of 26 Pa.C.S. (relating to eminent domain).

53 P.S. § 56901.

5

. [of E&R Property] for the purpose of constructing a new public road and traffic

signalization at the new intersection of Tidball Road and [Steubenville Pike].” R.R.

at 9a. The Declaration specifies that the condemnation was carried out pursuant to

Township’s approval of Resolution Number 11 of 2018. R.R. at 11a.

3. E&R’s POs

On June 12, 2018, E&R filed POs to the Declaration3 asserting, in relevant

part, that Township acted in violation of the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment

to the United States Constitution,4 the Pennsylvania Constitution,5 and the Property

3

Section 306 of the Eminent Domain Code provides for the exclusive method of challenging a

Declaration as follows:

(1) Within 30 days after being served with notice of condemnation, the condemnee

may file preliminary objections to the declaration of taking.

(2) The court upon cause shown may extend the time for filing preliminary

objections.

(3) Preliminary objections shall be limited to and shall be the exclusive method of

challenging:

(i) The power or right of the condemnor to appropriate the condemned

property unless it has been previously adjudicated.

(ii) The sufficiency of the security.

(iii) The declaration of taking.

(iv) Any other procedure followed by the condemnor.

26 Pa. C.S. § 306.

4

The Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution states: “[N]or shall

private property be taken for public use, without just compensation.” See U.S. Const. amend. V.

5

Pursuant to article I, section 10 of the Pennsylvania Constitution, “nor shall private property be

taken or applied to public use, without authority of law and without just compensation being first

made or secured.” Pa. Const. art. I, § 10.

6

Rights Protection Act (the Protection Act).6 R.R. at 21a. E&R argued that the

purpose of the condemnation was an attempt, by Township, to take E&R Property

on behalf of, and for the benefit of, Five D. Id. Specifically, E&R asserted that

Township was acting on behalf of Five D to improve access to Five D Property for

a nonpublic, private purpose under the guise of public convenience or safety. Id.

4. Trial Court’s Opinion

On March 4, 2022, the trial court issued a memorandum opinion and order

overruling E&R’s POs.7 See generally Trial Ct. Op. at 1-5 (pagination supplied);

Original Record (O.R.) at 3051-3056.8 The trial court cited to its review of the

deposition testimony and indicated that “the testimony of the five [Township’s

Commissioners] clearly demonstrates that their decision was based on the advice of

the various professionals who testified that the primary reasons for the taking of the

property was to improve the safety of the intersection.” Trial Ct. Op. at 5

(emphasis added). Regarding E&R’s assertion that Township’s condemnation was

done on behalf of and for the benefit of another private party, Five D, the trial court

stated that “any such inference would require [the trial court] to use speculation

which cannot outweigh the direct credible evidence.” Id. at 4. Citing In Re

Condemnation of .036 Acres, More or Less, of Land Owed by Wexford Plaza

Association, 674 A.2d 1204 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1996), the trial court relied on this Court’s

6

The Protection Act states that, except in limited circumstances, “the exercise by any condemnor

of the power of eminent domain to take private property in order to use it for private enterprise is

prohibited.” 26 Pa. C.S. § 204(a).

7

We note that the trial court elected not to file a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) statement and is relying on its

March 4, 2022 Memorandum and Order of Court to satisfy its Pa. R.A.P. 1925(a) requirements.

8

For ease of reference, Original Record page numbers reflect electronic pagination.

7

prior determination that it was immaterial that a private interest may also benefit

from a condemnation. Id. at 4-5. The trial court concluded that based on the

evidence, “it was clear that the current intersection required changes for the

benefit of the public at large[.]” Id. at 4 (emphasis added).

ISSUES ON APPEAL9

On appeal to this Court, E&R argues the trial court erred in overruling its POs

to Township’s Declaration on the basis that it ignored substantial evidence presented

by E&R that E&R Property was condemned for the benefit of Five D Property rather

than the public. E&R Br. at 24. E&R argues Township’s assertion that the

condemnation was for public safety purposes was merely a pretext developed after

E&R Property was condemned. Id.

E&R further asserts the condemnation was not the result of an investigation

leading to an intelligent, informed decision by Township. Id. at 31-32. In support

of this argument, it points to various discrepancies between the trial court’s factual

findings and the deposition testimony regarding what Township’s Commissioners

knew about the condemnation at the time of their vote to condemn E&R Property.

Id. at 31. Additionally, E&R notes there was ample evidence that the intersection

9

In its Statement of Questions Involved, E&R framed its issues as follows:

Did the Trial Court err in overruling E&R’s Preliminary Objections to the

condemnation of E&R’s property despite the substantial evidence presented that

the Township condemned the property: (i) for the benefit of a private property

owner; and (ii) without appropriate investigation leading to an intelligent informed

decision?

E&R Br. at 4.

8

was safe, further supporting its argument that Township’s purported basis for the

condemnation, “public safety,” was pretextual. Id. at 25-26.

In response, Township argues its condemnation of E&R Property was within

the power afforded to it by The First Class Township Code and is presumed to have

been lawful. Township Br. at 8. It argues the authorization was based on “a desire

for a safer geometrically designed [i]ntersection with better access to [E&R

Property] and [Five D Property], to open access to vacant developable land, and to

provide signalized access to Steubenville Pike for residents of the Waterford Plan.”

Township Br. at 8. Township asserts the mere fact that the developer is benefitted

“does not cast a shadow of doubt as to [its] public purpose.” Township Br. at 8.

ANALYSIS

Eminent Domain Legal Discussion

In an eminent domain proceeding where the appeal involves preliminary

objections to a declaration of taking,10 as it does here, this Court’s scope of review

is limited to determining whether the trial court abused its discretion or committed

an error of law. In re Condemnation by City of Coatesville of Certain Props., 822

A.2d 846 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2003). We recognize that in the trial court’s review of

Township’s decision to condemn E&R Property, the trial court was limited to

determining whether Township was “guilty of fraud, bad faith, or [] committed an

abuse of discretion.” In re Condemnation by Dep’t of Transp., of Right-of-Way of

State Route 0443, Section 02S, in Twp. of Mahoning, 255 A.3d 635, 644-45 (Pa.

10

While preliminary objections serve a different purpose in other civil actions, preliminary

objections in eminent domain cases are the procedure intended to expeditiously resolve factual and

legal challenges to a declaration of taking before the parties move on to determine damages. In

re Condemnation of .036 Acres, More or Less, of Land Owned by Wexford Plaza Assocs., 674

A.2d 1204 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1996); N. Penn Water Auth. v. A Certain Parcel of Land, 650 A.2d 1197

(Pa. Cmwlth. 1994).

9

Cmwlth. 2021) (citation omitted). We are also mindful that E&R bore the burden

of proving that Township abused its discretion because the law provides a strong

presumption that a municipality has acted properly. Id. (citation omitted).

The power of eminent domain permits the Commonwealth to take private

property for public use upon payment of just compensation. Pa. Const. art. I, § 10

(“nor shall private property be taken or applied to public use, without authority of

law and without just compensation[.]”). The Commonwealth’s power to acquire

property by eminent domain extends to Township via Section 1901 of The First

Class Township Code, 53 P.S. § 56901. However, Township’s eminent domain

power is limited by constitutional and statutory law.

First, we address the constitutional limitations on Township’s exercise of

eminent domain power. Under the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the

United States Constitution, land may only be taken without the landowner’s consent

if it is taken for public use. U.S. Const. amend. V; Reading Area Water Auth. v.

Schuylkill River Greenway Ass’n, 100 A.3d 572, 580 (Pa. 2014). Likewise, the

Pennsylvania Constitution authorizes the exercise of eminent domain power to

condemn privately owned property only if it is done for public use. See Pa. Const.

art. I, § 10 (“[N]or shall private property be taken or applied to public use, without

authority of law and without just compensation being first made or secured.”).

Thus, our constitutions require that for a municipality’s condemnation of private

property to be lawful, it must be for a public purpose.

Next, we turn to the statutory limitations on Township’s exercise of eminent

domain power. The Eminent Domain Code (Code), 26 Pa. C.S. §§ 101-1106,

governs eminent domain proceedings in Pennsylvania and provides “a complete and

exclusive procedure and law to govern all condemnations of property for public

10

purposes.” 26 Pa. C.S. § 102. In 2006, the General Assembly amended the Code

by enacting the Protection Act, 26 Pa. C.S. § 204. In relevant part, the Protection

Act expressly prohibits, subject to several exceptions, the taking of one’s private

property for another private enterprise. 26 Pa. C.S. § 204(a). We find it noteworthy

that our legislature’s enactment of the Protection Act followed the United States

Supreme Court’s decision in Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005).

In Kelo, the United States Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether the

city’s taking of private property for economic development and use by a private

developer satisfied the “public use” requirement of eminent domain power. Id. In

the 5-4 decision, the majority concluded that economic development qualified as a

public purpose because, although the properties to be taken were not blighted, the

economic rejuvenation of the development was in the public interest. See id. at 483.

In Justice O’Connor’s dissenting opinion, in which Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice

Scalia, and Justice Thomas joined, she wrote, in criticism of the majority’s opinion:

To reason, as the Court does, that the incidental public benefits resulting

from the subsequent ordinary use of private property render economic

development takings “for public use” is to wash out any distinction

between private and public use of property- and thereby effectively to

delete the words “for public use” from the Takings Clause of the Fifth

Amendment.

Id. at 494 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).

Our legislature, perceiving the Kelo decision as an abuse of eminent domain

power, passed the Protection Act. See, e.g., House Legislative Journal, Nov. 1, 2005,

at 2169-72; Senate Legislative Journal, April 25, 2006, at 1552. The purpose of the

Protection Act is to balance individual private property rights and the needs of urban

centers to rehabilitate blighted areas imposing harm upon the public. See, e.g.,

House Legislative Journal, Nov. 1, 2005, at 2169-72; Senate Legislative Journal,

11

April 25, 2006, at 1552. The legislature designed the Protection Act to diminish the

ability of condemnors to take private property. Reading, 100 A.3d at 583.

Considering the intent and purpose of the Protection Act, we note its broad

prohibition in terms of whether private property is being condemned “to use it for

private enterprise.” 26 Pa. C.S. § 204(a). Because both the United States

Constitution and the Pennsylvania Constitution require a condemnation be for a

public use, a condemnation intended solely for the benefit of a private party would

be unconstitutional. Thus, it is clear from the legislature’s language in the Protection

Act that it intended to further limit the application of the public use standard.

Reading, 100 A.3d at 583. Our Pennsylvania Supreme Court has acknowledged that

the Protection Act is more restrictive in scope than preexisting constitutional

protections against the government’s power of eminent domain. Id. Additionally,

the Supreme Court noted that the government’s eminent domain power “is

necessarily in derogation of a private right, and the rule in that case is that the

authority is to be strictly construed: what is not granted is not to be exercised.”

Middletown Twp. v. Lands of Stone, 939 A.2d 331, 337 (Pa. 2007).

In consideration of the relevant constitutional standards combined with the

Protection Act, it is clear that without a public use purpose, the government lacks

authority to take property from private owners. Middletown, 939 A.2d at 337. As

our Supreme Court has indicated, what constitutes a “public use is highly fact-

dependent.” Reading, 100 A.3d at 580. The Court has established that “public use”

equates to a “public purpose” and has indicated that to determine whether a public

purpose exists, the court must look for the “real or fundamental” purpose behind a

condemnation. Middletown, 939 A.2d at 337. A public purpose exists only when

the public is “the primary and paramount” beneficiary of the condemnation. Id.

12

While we acknowledge that a condemnation “does not lose its public character

merely because there may exist in the operation some feature of private gain[,]”

Reading, 100 A.3d at 577 (citation omitted), a condemnation cannot be “under the

mere pretext of a public purpose, when its actual purpose was to bestow a private

benefit.” Kelo, 545 U.S. at 478. In determining whether an asserted public purpose

is pretextual, the court must consider whether the condemnation was executed

pursuant to a carefully developed plan. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 478 (citation omitted). A

condemnation is only valid where the property is condemned “after a suitable

investigation leading to an intelligent, informed judgment by the condemnor.”

Middletown, 939 A.2d at 338 (citation omitted).

In Pidstawski v. South Whitehall Township, 380 A.2d 1322, 1324 (Pa.

Cmwlth. 1977), a township’s taking was upheld “because rather than being arbitrary,

the record demonstrated that it was carefully planned and painstakingly thought out

with a view toward present and future requirements.” Middletown, 939 A.2d at 338.

Evidence of a well-developed plan provides proof that an authorized purpose

motivates a condemnation. Id. We note that the government cannot give “mere lip

service to its authorized purpose” or “act precipitously and offer retroactive

justification” for its condemnation of private property. Id. at 338. To be valid, a

condemnation must be supported by a condemnation proceeding informed by an

intelligent judgment to use the condemned property for its asserted purpose. Id.

Standard of Review

E&R argues the trial court’s findings are not supported by substantial

evidence. This Court has stated that “[a]n abuse of discretion occurs when the

findings are not supported by substantial evidence in the record. Substantial

evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to

13

support a conclusion.” Coal Gas Recovery, L.P. v. Franklin Twp. Zoning Hearing

Bd., 944 A.2d 832, 838 n.9 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2008). For evidence to be substantial, it

must be “more than a scintilla and must do more than create a suspicion of the

existence of the fact to be established.” Bennett v. Bureau of Pro. & Occupational

Affs., State Bd. of Chiropractic, 214 A.3d 728, 735 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2019) (citation

omitted). We review the trial court’s findings to determine whether its findings are

based on substantial evidence. We begin by reviewing the trial court’s findings

regarding Township’s Commissioners because the “corporate power of a township

of the first class [is] vested in [the board] of commissioners[,]” Section 1502 of The

First Class Township Code, 53 P.S. § 56502, and, therefore, in reviewing whether

Township, as the condemnor, complied with the law regarding its condemnation of

E&R Property, the trial court necessarily considered the testimony of Township’s

Commissioners.

Evidence of Record

Township’s Commissioners

In its decision, the trial court indicates that it reviewed the deposition

testimony of the five Township Commissioners and made specific findings

regarding each of Township’s Commissioners.

Commissioner Abatta

First, the trial court stated that “Commissioner Sam Abatta [(Commissioner

Abatta), who was chairman of Township’s Commissioners,] testified that he put

significant weight upon the recommendations of the Planning Commission.” Trial

Ct. Op. at 2. However, the evidence of record does not substantially support this

conclusion. The record reveals that Commissioner Abatta’s testimony indicated he

was unaware that Township had condemned E&R Property and further unable to

14

indicate precisely what he relied on during the decision to do so. When asked about

the condemnation of E&R Property during his deposition on January 8, 2019,

Commissioner Abatta testified as follows:

Q: Will you agree with me that the Township has

condemned a portion of [E&R Property] . . . ?

A: No

Q: [Township] hasn’t taken any property to your

knowledge?

A: No

Q: At any time?

A: No.

Q: [Commissioner Abatta,] we’re taking your deposition

today in relation to a matter that’s pending before [trial

court]. Do you know what that matter relates to?

A: It’s a situation between [Esposito] and [Dunn].

Q: Okay, it doesn’t have to do with [Township] as far as

you know?

A: Well, it’s occurring on Township property, I mean, the

confines.

Q: Is [Township] a party to that litigation, or is it

effectively just a witness?

A: I think it would be just a witness. I don’t think

[Township] has any interest one way or another what

happens.

R.R. at 371a-72a. Upon further questioning, Commissioner Abatta stated the

following:

15

Q: Is it your understanding that [Township] has taken

property of [E&R]?

A: No. [Township] – we haven’t taken anything.

Q: Okay. From your perspective, this remains a dispute

between [Dunn] and [Esposito], and that’s the end of it as

far as you’re concerned, correct?

A: Yes.

R.R. at 372a-73a. When questioned specifically about whether he recalled having

voted on a resolution to condemn [E&R Property], he stated “we vote on so many

different motions during any public meetings. Specifically [,] do I remember every

one, and this one specifically? No.” Id. When asked whether he was provided with

a copy of any plans indicating precisely what was condemned, he said “[n]o.” R.R.

at 381a. Therefore, the record offers no support for the trial court’s conclusion that

Commissioner Abatta put significant weight upon the recommendations of the

Planning Commission in his decision to vote to pass the Resolution.

Commissioner Kisow

Next, the trial court indicates that Commissioner Kenneth Kisow

(Commissioner Kisow) “relied on the professional advice of the engineer, PennDOT

and Solicitor.” Trial Ct. Op. at 2. However, the evidence of record does not

substantially support this conclusion. Upon review of the record, Commissioner

Kisow is the “head of the Public Safety Commission” for Township. R.R. at 264a.

When asked why Township was taking E&R Property, he stated “[f]rom my

understanding, from the Solicitor and PennDOT viewed it as an issue to straighten

that light out, is the way I took it.” R.R. at 266a.

16

His testimony regarding his knowledge of the condemnation of E&R Property

was as follows:

Q. Okay. Do you recall what was the basis for the decision

to condemn a portion of [E&R Property]?

A. Before the meeting in executive session, we discussed

from the advice of the [S]olicitor and the PennDOT

recommendation is solely what I went on.

Q. When you refer to the PennDOT recommendation?

A. The realignment thing that we were told that they said

they need that place for. Need the piece of property for

the realignment of the light. That’s the way I understood

it in that meeting.

R.R. at 271a. When asked whether safety of the intersection was discussed when

they were making the decision to condemn E&R Property, he stated “[n]o, solely on

professional advice of the engineer, PennDOT, and the [S]olicitor, whoever

designed it.” R.R. at 273a.

When asked whether Commissioner Kisow, as the head of Township’s Public

Safety Commission, had any reason to believe there was a safety issue with the

Tidball intersection, he indicated he did not. He indicated that over the five years

that he had been with Township, no one approached him regarding an issue with the

safety of the Tidball intersection. He stated that as far as he was aware, none of the

accidents at the intersection were unusual. He has never been asked to evaluate

safety considerations of the intersection, has never had any discussions with other

Township officials regarding safety concerns of the Tidball intersection, and he

never concluded at any time that Township needed to take action to improve the

operation of the safety signal or the intersection’s alignment. R.R. at 269a-70a.

17

Commissioner Barefoot

Next, the trial court found that Commissioner James Barefoot (Commissioner

Barefoot) “weighed all of the professional opinions such as the Planning

Department[,] the Township Engineer, and . . . PennDOT.” Trial Ct. Op. at 3. The

evidence of record does not substantially support this conclusion. Commissioner

Barefoot, who was chair of planning and zoning, testified regarding his

understanding of the reason Township condemned E&R Property as follows:

Q. And what was the reason the Township condemned [E&R

Property]?

A. My understanding is for an entrance to –

Q. So [Township] condemned the property so that there would be an

entrance to what?

A. I understand a strip mall there.

....

Q. Would you say it’s the primary reason for the take, for the

condemnation, that was approved by [Township] was for development

of the [Five D Property]?

A. Yes.

....

Q. What is your personal reasoning, your personal understanding, as to

why it was a good idea to condemn this property?

A. My personal reason, there was a business in there prior to it, and it

seemed good, if it was a strip mall in there, to have another exit.

R.R. at 642a, 644a.

Regarding a plan, Commissioner Barefoot testified that he did not observe any

plans regarding the purported road going through Five D Property before voting on

18

the condemnation. R.R. at 659a. He indicated that he did not conduct any

investigation into the merits of the condemnation, and when asked if anyone else

did, he stated “[t]o my knowledge, probably the people in the Township did.” R.R.

at 645a. Upon further questioning, he was not able to indicate that anyone, even the

professionals he referenced, had provided him with information, a

recommendation, or any plans regarding the condemnation. R.R. at 647a. When

specifically questioned about whether he recalled looking at any plans before voting,

he stated, “No.” R.R. at 647a. Therefore, the record does not support the trial court’s

conclusion that Commissioner Barefoot actually weighed any professional opinions

before voting to pass the resolution.

Commissioner Mancici

Next, the trial court found that Commissioner James Mancici (Commissioner

Mancici) was “presented with information from the Planning Commission,

Township Engineer[,] and others and relied on that information in making a

decision.” Trial Ct. Op. at 3. Upon review of the evidence, while Commissioner

Mancici referenced that he “would have” been provided with information from the

Planning Commission, Township Engineer and “from whoever they would work

with to address that[,]” he was not able to articulate what, if any, information those

parties provided to him. R.R. at 613a-14a. Specifically, Commissioner Mancici

testified as follows:

Q. And do you recall having any conversations with the Township

Engineer with respect to the [Tidball intersection]?

A. I don’t recall the conversation, so I couldn’t tell you the date or

anything like that. I would say there was probably – there was a

conversation; I just don’t know when it was.

19

Q. Anything with respect to the merits of it, why it was a good idea to

condemn the property that came from the Township Engineer?

A. Again, I wouldn’t be able to tell you specifics.

Q. What led you to decide that it was a good idea to condemn the

property?

A. I would have made that decision based on the information that was

given to me at that time.

Q. Okay. You don’t remember what it is, but you would have relied on

something; is that your –

A. I would have. I would have relied on that information.

Q. But you don’t know what it is?

A. I do not.

R.R. at 613a-14a. When asked whether he had any discussions with the other

Township Commissioners regarding the merits or the pros and cons of the

condemnation, Commissioner Mancici stated, “I don’t recall any.” R.R. at 620a.

Commissioner Shiwarski

The trial court found that Commissioner Ronald Shiwarski “relied on the

expertise of the Engineer, Solicitor, and Planning director and listened to what their

opinion [was] for the best interest of [Township].” Trial Ct. Op. at 3. Upon review

of the record, Commissioner Shiwarski testified as follows regarding the reason for

the condemnation:

Q. . . . . What was the reason for [Township] condemning a portion of

[E&R Property] that’s at issue in this case?

A. I don’t have an answer to that, okay? I’d have to refer – I know it

was brought before our board that’s how it became – we acted to use

your word, condemn the property.

20

R.R. at 679a. While it is true, as the trial court found, that Commissioner Shiwarski

indicated that he relied on various individuals, it is clear upon further review of the

record that he was unable to articulate any information upon which he relied or

specify who provided him information based on the following testimony:

Q. Do you remember any pros or any cons at all with respect to it?

A. I’m trying to remember, but I don’t recall. And again, I don’t want

to sound redundant, but in my position, okay, I rely heavily on the

Township Manager, the appointed engineer, the planning director, or

our solicitor to give us the information, and then I formulate what I feel

is best.

Q. Do you recall anything with respect to the information they provided

you in relation to this condemnation?

A. Specifically, no, except that whatever they did tell me that led me to

vote yes for the –

Q. Do you recall having asked any questions with respect to the

information that they were providing you?

A. I’m sure I did, okay, but I don’t recall because . . . I usually ask

questions.

R.R. at 681a. When asked about the size of the condemned property, Commissioner

Shiwarski indicated, “I heard it was minimal.” R.R. at 688a. When asked about the

location of the condemned property, he indicated, “I can’t recall it specific that way.”

R.R. at 689a.

Reliance on Others

We recognize Township’s Commissioners justifiably rely upon trusted

advisors, such as experts and municipal staff in reaching these decisions. Because

the trial court’s basis for upholding Township’s condemnation was because

Township’s Commissioners’ decision was based on the “advice of the various

21

professionals who testified that the primary reasons for the taking of the property

was to improve the safety of the intersection[,]” Trial Ct. Op. at 5, we must consider

whether Township staff and other professionals actually relayed this as the reason

for the taking to Township’s Commissioners.

Township Staff and Professionals

First, we review the record containing the testimony of Rick Urbano (Urbano),

Township’s Planning Director. The trial court found that Urbano “testified that the

current intersection as it exists has deficiencies and is unsafe.” Trial Ct. Op. at 3.

Urbano has been on Township’s planning commission since 1981 and has been

planning director since 1998. R.R. at 65a. Regarding the safety of the Tidball

intersection, Urbano testified as follows:

Q. . . . Do you believe there are deficiencies with that intersection?

A. Most definitely. It’s unsafe.

Q. What are they?

A. Turning lanes, radiuses, the whole bit.

R.R. at 283a. However, upon further questioning, Urbano was unable to articulate

any further basis for his contention that the intersection was not safe. He testified

that he “didn’t seek any police reports[,]” could not verify a number of accidents at

that intersection, and he had not heard of anyone from the public who has a concern

about the safety of that intersection. R.R. at 283a-84a. Urbano testified several times

that it was PennDOT that first brought up the idea of condemning E&R Property.

Next, we review the testimony of Frank Piccolini (Piccolini), Township’s

Manager. The trial court found that Piccolini “testified that the plan was to condemn

22

a specific small parcel to have a better signalization of the [Tidball intersection]

which would make it safer.” Trial Ct. Op. at 3.

When specifically asked, Piccolini stated:

Q. Do you believe that the intersection is unsafe as it exists today at [the

Tidball intersection]?

A. I couldn’t answer that. I’m not an engineer.

Q. You don’t have an opinion either way?

A. No.

R.R. at 564a.

Piccolini believed that PennDOT had informed Crosby that it wanted

Township to condemn E&R Property. R.R. at 565a. Piccolini testified:

Q. And was the fact that [Township] heard that PennDOT told [Crosby]

that PennDOT thought it was a good idea to take property at this

intersection, was that a factor – [d]id that influence [Township’s]

decision to take [E&R Property]?

A. I believe it did.

....

Q. If PennDOT had said to [Township] the developer could just simply

have a driveway that entered into Waterford and not have any access to

[Steubenville Pike], would there be a need for this condemnation?

A. I don’t think so. I can’t speak for the board[,] but I don’t think so.

....

Q. . . . What was the reason why the property was condemned?

A. To basically make the signal safer. I think there was a more

geometric term, a 90-degree radius. That was the reason for PennDOT.

23

Q. It came from PennDOT?

A. Yes.

Q. If it weren’t for PennDOT making that suggestion, this wouldn’t

have happened?

A. Yes. Correct.

....

Q. At this point other than PennDOT’s statement as reflected in

[Crosby’s] [e-mail], is there any other reason why you think it would

be appropriate to take [E&R Property]?

A. None that I’m aware of.

R.R. at 566a, 571a.

Piccolini testified that at the time Township’s Commissioners passed the

resolution and the condemnation occurred, the plans for the roadway were not yet

developed. R.R. at 563a. Piccolini also testified that Township’s Commissioners

did not receive the plans for the condemnation or the metes and bounds until

“sometime before four o’clock via [e-mail]” on the date of the meeting. R.R. at

584a. Township’s Commissioners were provided a hard copy of the packet at the

meeting. R.R. at 584a. Piccolini further indicated that it was Crosby’s e-mail that

triggered moving forward with the condemnation. R.R. at 574a. He stated his

understanding was that the developer would pay for the costs associated with the

changes to the signalization and that if the developer refused to pay, then Township

would not proceed. R.R. at 568a.

Next, we review the testimony of Michael Meyers (Meyers), Township’s

Engineer. The trial court found that Meyers “testified that he believes that the

intersection as it stands is unsafe.” Trial Ct. Op. at 3. When asked why he did not

24

believe the intersection was safe, he indicated “when you don’t have an intersection

that is at 90 degrees or 180 degrees from each other, and you have an angled

intersection like that, I think it leads to concerns.” O.R. at 2302. Other than the

geometric deficiencies, Meyers testified that he had no other concerns with the

intersection. O.R. at 2309. Regarding the condemnation, Meyers testified as

follows:

Q: . . . At some point [Township] decides to condemn a portion of [E&R

Property]. Were you involved in that decision making process where

[Township] goes from not condemning it to deciding to condemn it?

A: I believe at one time I had discussions with Township officials

concerning a response from PennDOT that required the condemnation

of these areas.

Q: And so there was a communication from PennDOT saying that the

condemnation is required?

A: I was part of those conversations, however, I cannot remember

specifically the communication.

Q: Do you remember when that was?

A: No.

O.R. at 2319.

PennDOT Employees

Next, we review the record evidence regarding the PennDOT employees’

testimony as several witnesses testified that the condemnation was brought about by

PennDOT’s concerns of safety at the Tidball intersection.

First, we review the testimony of Frank Cippel (Cippel), a PennDOT civil

engineer. The trial court found that Cippel “believed bringing the intersection

directly across from Tidball would make it safer.” Trial Ct. Op. at 4. When asked

25

directly whether Cippel believed that the Tidball intersection, as it exists today, is

unsafe, he stated “I think it could be made safer.” R.R. at 434a. When asked whether

PennDOT considers safety in its approval of intersections, he stated, “Yeah.” R.R.

at 430a. Cippel testified that “PennDOT . . . . compiles a listing of the top crash

intersections. And a lot of times that’s how [PennDOT] find[s] out which traffic

signalized intersections are problem areas.” R.R. at 452a. He specified that he

“[didn’t] ever recall this specific intersection ever coming up on any of those lists.”

Id.

Regarding his understanding of the purpose of the intersection, Cippel

indicated, “I mean, if there was nobody developing their property, we obviously

wouldn’t be having a meeting to discuss a new driveway location onto

[Steubenville Pike].” R.R. at 446a (emphasis added). When specifically asked if

the primary purpose of the meeting where the intersection was discussed was for the

purpose of safety, he indicated, “No. No. The primary reason for that meeting

was to discuss a potential development and an access point for that development

onto [Steubenville Pike].” R.R. at 447a (emphasis added).

The trial court failed to make any findings of fact with respect to PennDOT

employee Jason Molinero’s (Molinero) testimony. Upon review of the record, we

note that despite Crosby’s testimony that he was told by Molinero, a PennDOT

employee, that the condemnation would be an acceptable and more desirable way

forward to provide the best possible intersection, Molinero denied making that

statement to Crosby. R.R. at 427a-28a. Further, Molinero testified that he did not

know anyone at PennDOT who would have relayed that to Crosby. Id. Molinero

specified he did not suggest condemnation to Township and “[does] not know

enough about eminent domain to ever suggest it in a conversation.” R.R. at 419a.

26

Therefore, the record lacks support for the proposition that Township’s

fundamental purpose in exercising its eminent domain power was to improve the

safety of the intersection based on advice from PennDOT. Similarly, the record

lacks support for the trial court’s conclusion that Township’s Commissioners relied

on advice from other Township staff and professionals when they voted to pass the

Condemnation Resolution to exercise Township’s eminent domain power.

Application of Evidence

Whether this Court, not having heard any of the witnesses, believes

Township’s condemnation was a ploy to benefit Five D is irrelevant; the only

relevant inquiry is whether the record supports the trial court’s conclusions. For the

following reasons, we conclude that it does not.

First, we note the record demonstrates a lack of plan by Township to condemn

E&R Property. While the trial court noted one-line snippets of each Township’s

Commissioner’s testimony to support its conclusion that their testimony “clearly

demonstrates that their decision was based on the advice of the various professionals

who testified that the primary reasons for taking of the property was to improve the

safety of the intersection[,]” Trial Ct. Op. at 5, upon review of the totality of the

record, including the testimony of Township’s Commissioners and various

professionals, this conclusion is not supported by substantial evidence.

Additionally, the record lacks evidence of any carefully developed plan to

effectuate Township’s stated purpose of “public safety.” Township’s

Commissioners were notified that there would be a resolution for a condemnation

days before their scheduled meeting and they received the resolution and plans on

the day of the meeting. While several of Township’s Commissioners testified that

they relied on the advice of the various professionals in making the decision to

27

condemn E&R Property, it is clear upon review of those individuals’ testimony, as

well as the testimony of the identified professionals, that Township’s

Commissioners did not exercise informed judgment. Township’s Commissioners

asserted reasonings for the condemnation of E&R Property were inconsistent. While

some made broad assertions about “safety,” none were able to articulate the safety

concerns being addressed. While some made assertions about straightening the

intersection, none were able to articulate what public benefit that would confer.

Some of Township’s Commissioners testified that their understanding was that

PennDOT was proposing that it needed the portion of E&R Property to improve

safety of the intersection. See R.R. at 266a-67a, 564a-66a. However, the record is

devoid of evidence to support the idea that PennDOT recommended condemnation

of E&R Property for safety or any other purpose.

At the time Township’s Commissioners acted to invoke Township’s eminent

domain power, they did not discuss the source of their authority or note that “safety”

was the primary purpose authorizing the decision to invoke the power of eminent

domain. As our Supreme Court stated in Middletown, it cannot “be sufficient to

merely wave the proper statutory language like a scepter under the nose of a property

owner and demand that he forfeit his land for the sake of the public.” Middletown,

939 A.2d at 340. We require “substantial and rational proof by way of an intelligent

plan” to prove that a public purpose is the actual goal of a condemnation. Id. This

record does not support a finding that the condemnation proceeding was informed

by intelligent judgment or a concrete plan to use the land to implement a public

roadway to improve public safety.

Conversely, the record demonstrates that Township’s assertion that the

condemnation was for public safety is pretextual. Commissioner Kisow,

28

Township’s head of the public safety commission, testified at length regarding the

safety of the Tidball intersection. Commissioner Kisow testified that he had no

reason to believe that there was any issue with safety at the Tidball intersection, that

no one had ever come to him with a concern about the safety of the Tidball

intersection, and that he was not aware of any unusual traffic accidents at that

intersection. R.R. at 266a-67a. As the head of the public safety commission,

Commissioner Kisow indicated that he has never evaluated safety considerations at

the Tidball intersection, that he has never had any discussions with other Township

officials regarding safety of the intersection, and that he has not concluded at any

time that Township needed to take action to improve the intersection. Id. at 270a.

Notably, Commissioner Kisow testified that the safety of the Tidball intersection

was never discussed in reference to condemning E&R Property. Id. at 273a.

Similarly, Commissioner Abatta, who was chairman of Township’s Commissioners,

testified that he had no knowledge of Township evaluating the safety of the Tidball

intersection. R.R. at 368a. Likewise, Commissioner Barefoot, who was chair of

planning and zoning, testified that he has no knowledge of any safety concerns with

the Tidball intersection. R.R. at 641a. Commissioner Barefoot stated that he did not

review anything from any professional with respect to safety of the Tidball

intersection. R.R. at 642a. Consistently, Commissioner Shiwarski testified that he

did not have any conversations with respect to the safety of the Tidball intersection.

R.R. at 686a.

Therefore, the record evidence does not support the trial court’s conclusion

that Township’s condemnation of E&R Property was for a public purpose. Rather,

the evidence demonstrates that Township’s condemnation of E&R Property was on

behalf of and for the benefit of Five D. The condemnation process was initiated by

29

Crosby, the engineer working on behalf of Five D. It was Crosby’s e-mail

referencing PennDOT’s alleged recommendation to condemn the property that was

relied on by Township’s Commissioners in making the decision for Township to

condemn E&R Property. Even Township’s Commissioners assert that the

condemnation was for Five D. Specifically, when asked why Township condemned

the E&R Property, Commissioner Barefoot indicated “my understanding for an

entrance to . . . I understand a strip mall there.” R.R. at 642a. When asked whether

the condemnation was done for the development of Five D Property, Commissioner

Barefoot indicated, “Yes.” R.R. at 642a. Piccolini, Township Manager, testified:

Q. If PennDOT had said to [Township] the developer

could just simply have had a driveway that entered into

Waterford and not have any access to [Steubenville Pike,]

would there be a need for this condemnation?

A. I don’t think so. I can’t speak for the board[,] but I

don’t think so.

R.R. at 566a.

The record demonstrates that the public is not the “primary and paramount”

beneficiary of the condemnation, as is required to conclude that Township’s

condemnation of the E&R Property was for a public purpose. While the law may

permit development as a broad public purpose, the trial court’s conclusion that the

condemnation was for the purpose of public safety is not supported by the record. It

cannot be sufficient to conclude Township’s Commissioners relied on various

professionals when (1) Township’s Commissioners did not indicate they relied on

various professionals’ opinions regarding the safety of the intersection and (2) the

testimony of the professionals does not support the conclusion that the taking was

for public safety or any other public purpose.

30

CONCLUSION

The trial court’s conclusion that Township’s condemnation of E&R Property

was for the purpose of public safety is not substantially supported by the evidence

of record.11 The law requires “more than a scintilla [of evidence] creating a mere

suspicion” that Township’s condemnation of E&R Property was for a public

purpose. Barnes v. Dep’t of Justice, 452 A.2d 593 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1982). While the

public may benefit from an additional road and a geometric signalized intersection,

the record demonstrates that the primary purpose of the condemnation is for

development of Five D Property. Additionally, this record does not support any

finding that Township’s Commissioners, acting on behalf of Township, were

involved in a condemnation proceeding that was informed by intelligent judgment

or a concrete plan, which is required for a condemnation to be valid. See

Middletown, 939 A.2d at 338. Thus, the condemnation of the portion of E&R

Property for the installation of the road to connect Five D Property to Steubenville

Pike falls within the Protection Act’s prohibitive scope. Therefore, this Court

concludes that by failing to consider the Protection Act’s requirements and

overruling E&R’s POs, the trial court abused its discretion and erred as a matter of

law.

Accordingly, we reverse the trial court’s order.

______________________________

STACY WALLACE, Judge

11

We acknowledge the trial judge visited the Tidball intersection and that this is a factor which is

to be given substantial weight by this Court when reviewing an award in an eminent domain case.

See In re Dep’t of Transp., 393 A.2d 41, 43 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1978). However, the trial judge’s visit

and observation of the property does not circumvent the requirement that the taking be for a public

purpose.

31

IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

In Re: :

:

Condemnation of the Township :

of Robinson of Certain Lands :

Owned Now or Formerly of: :

: No. 312 C.D. 2022

E&R Partners, L.P., :

82 Forest Grove Road :

Coraopolis, PA 15108 :

:

James Esposito :

5852 Steubenville Pike :

McKees Rocks, PA 15136 :

(Lot & Block 266-G-51) :

:

Huntley and Huntley :

2660 Monroeville Blvd. :

Monroeville, PA 15146 :

:

Herman Edwards :

5852 Steubenville Pike :

McKees Rocks, PA 15136 :

:

Appeal of: E&R Partners, L.P. :

ORDER

AND NOW, this 24th day of April 2023, the March 4, 2022 order of the Court

of Common Pleas of Allegheny County overruling E&R Partners, L.P.’s preliminary

objections is REVERSED.

______________________________

STACY WALLACE, Judge

IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

In Re: :

:

Condemnation of the Township :

of Robinson of Certain Lands :

Owned Now or Formerly of: :

: No. 312 C.D. 2022

E&R Partners, L.P., : Argued: October 11, 2022

82 Forest Grove Road :

Coraopolis, PA 15108 :

:

James Esposito :

5852 Steubenville Pike :

McKees Rocks, PA 15136 :

(Lot & Block 266-G-51) :

:

Huntley and Huntley :

2660 Monroeville Blvd. :

Monroeville, PA 15146 :

:

Herman Edwards :

5852 Steubenville Pike :

McKees Rocks, PA 15136 :

:

Appeal of: E&R Partners, L.P. :

BEFORE: HONORABLE MICHAEL H. WOJCIK, Judge

HONORABLE STACY WALLACE, Judge

HONORABLE MARY HANNAH LEAVITT, Senior Judge

OPINION NOT REPORTED

DISSENTING OPINION

BY SENIOR JUDGE LEAVITT FILED: April 24, 2023

The majority has done a careful and thoughtful review of this case.

Respectfully, however, I must dissent.

This case concerns the Township of Robinson’s (Township)

condemnation of less than one acre of land owned by E&R Partners, L.P.

(Condemnee) to improve the intersection of Tidball Road and Steubenville Pike in

the Township. The Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County (trial court) found

that the improvement was necessary on the basis of credited testimony from a traffic

engineer with the Pennsylvania Department of Transportation, as well as the

testimony of the Township manager and the Township engineer. The trial court

credited the Township’s evidence that “the intersection as it stands is unsafe” and

“required changes for the benefit of the public at large.” Trial Court Op. at 4.

Perhaps most importantly, the trial court’s own site visit confirmed the need for a

reconfiguration of the intersection. The trial court’s findings based on the site visit

are entitled to deference, as are all its factual findings. See Township of Millcreek v.

Angela Cres Trust of June 25, 1998, 25 A.3d 1288, 1291 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2011) (trial

court’s factual findings based upon its site visit supported its decision to sustain

condemnee’s preliminary objections to the takings).

As to the vote on the condemnation, the trial court credited the

testimony of the Township Commissioners that their decision was based upon the

advice of Township staff and professionals that “the current intersection required

changes for the benefit of the public at large[.]” Trial Court Op. at 4. The majority

concludes that the trial court erred or abused its discretion in making this factual

finding because while “some made broad assertions about ‘safety,’” the

Commissioners were not able to articulate “the safety concerns being addressed” or

“what public benefit that would confer.” In Re: Condemnation of Township of

Robinson of Certain Lands (Appeal of: E&R Partners, L.P.) (Pa. Cmwlth., No. 312

C.D. 2022, filed April 24, 2023, slip op. at 28. The majority finds significant the

testimony that there have not been an unusual number of accidents at the intersection

in recent years. The majority further reasons that because the Township

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Commissioners were not presented with a “carefully developed plan” on public

safety, they did not exercise “informed judgment.” Id. There are several problems

with this analysis.

To begin with, the relevant inquiry is not whether there is evidence in

the record to support a factual finding contrary to the one made but, rather, whether

there is substantial evidence to support the factual finding that was made. Mulberry

Market, Inc. v. City of Philadelphia, Board of License and Inspection Review, 735

A.2d 761, 767 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1999). Here, the trial court referred to precise

deposition testimony in finding that each Commissioner in question relied on the

recommendation of professionals or staff that the new road would improve safety.

The trial court’s factual findings on each Commissioner’s vote are supported by

substantial evidence and cannot be disturbed. Appeal of Waite, 641 A.2d 25, 27 n.1

(Pa. Cmwlth. 1994). We cannot give different weight to the testimony of the

Commissioners or reverse the trial court’s credibility determinations thereon,

without assuming the fact-finding function of the trial court. See In re

Condemnation of Land for the South East Central Business District Redevelopment

Area # 1, 946 A.2d 1143, 1149 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2008).

In its challenge to the declaration of taking, Condemnee bore the burden

of proving that the Township condemned its land fraudulently, or in bad faith, for a

private purpose, and that burden is a heavy one. Appeal of Waite, 641 A.2d at 28.

There is “a strong presumption that the condemnor has acted properly.” Id. Here,

Condemnee tried to meet its burden with circumstantial evidence, i.e., using

depositions of the Township Commissioners to show that they “did not conduct a

suitable investigation leading to an intelligent, informed judgment” before

condemning the property. Condemnee Brief at 32. Thus, Condemnee believes it

MHL-3

can be inferred that the true purpose of the condemnation was to benefit a private

development. The majority agrees, citing to Middletown Township v. Lands of

Stone, 939 A.2d 331 (Pa. 2007).

The majority’s reliance on Middletown Township is misplaced. In

Middletown Township, the township condemned a 175-acre working farm “for

recreation and open space purposes.” Id. at 333. Our Supreme Court reversed the

trial court’s denial of the condemnee’s preliminary objection although it did so while

leaving “undisturbed the factual findings made by the trial court.” Id. at 338. The

Supreme Court held, first, that the Open Space Lands Act1 prohibited the township

from using its eminent domain power to preserve open space. Second, there was no

record evidence that recreation was the actual purpose for the condemnation because

“recreation” did not appear in the township’s planning resolution. Other than

preservation for open space, the township had “no specific plan” for the farm, and

the trial court so found. Middletown Township, 939 A.2d at 334. In that context,

the Supreme Court ruminated on the desirability of a “carefully developed plan” and

noted that a condemnation based on sound judgment will be upheld. Id. at 340.

However, the issue in Middletown Township was not whether the township’s

condemnation plan was “carefully developed” but, rather, whether the township

even had the power to condemn land for open space. The Supreme Court held that

the township “took the land for purposes outside its limited authority” because it

lacked authority to condemn land to preserve open space. Id.

Unlike Middletown Township, where the township had no recreational

development plan whatsoever for a 175-acre farm, here the Township’s resolution

stated expressly that the property shall be condemned “so that a new public road and

1

Section 8 of the Act of January 19, 1968, P.L. (1967) 992, as amended, 32 P.S. §5008.

MHL-4

traffic signalization equipment may be constructed to signalize the new intersection

of Tidball Road and State Route 60[.]” Reproduced Record at 12a (emphasis added).

This resolution states a “carefully considered development plan.” Further, the

Township is expressly authorized to condemn land for “laying out, opening,

widening, extending, vacating, grading or changing the grades or lines of streets or

highways.” Section 1901 of The First Class Township Code, Act of June 24, 1931,

P.L. 1206, as amended, 53 P.S. §56901.

Middletown Township did not establish that a condemnor must prepare

a written development plan before it can exercise the power of eminent domain.

Nothing in Section 1901 of The First Class Township Code, 53 P.S. §56901, or the

Eminent Domain Code, 26 Pa. C.S. §§101-1106, requires the condemnor to prepare

a “carefully developed plan” on public roadway use before filing a declaration of

taking. Neither statute provides that the governing body of a condemnor must

exercise “informed judgment.” Further, the General Assembly has instructed that

the Eminent Domain Code provides “a complete and exclusive procedure and law

to govern all condemnations of property for public purposes[.]” 26 Pa. C.S. §102.

Finally, courts review what a local government or agency does, not

why. Whether the condemnation was done for a public purpose is determined by

review of what the Township Commissioners approved, not why or how they

approved it, i.e., on the same day they received the resolution for a condemnation.

Under the Morgan Doctrine, it is inappropriate to depose an agency

head to explain the process by which she made a decision, including “the manner,

extent of study of the record and consultation with subordinates.” U.S. v. Morgan,

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313 U.S. 409, 422 (1941).2 Agency heads must rely upon staff when they act, lest

the work of government grind to a halt. Courts look, instead, to the merits of the

decision and do not “try to penetrate the precise course of the Secretary’s reasoning.”

Id. at 420. Morgan cautioned against depositions that “probe the mental processes”

of the responsible government official, explaining that the “integrity of the

administrative process” requires no less. Id. at 422. The depositions of the

Township Commissioners were inappropriate in their line of inquiry but, in any case,

did not prove Condemnee’s case.

In its appeal, Condemnee has conflated the condemnor, the Township,

with its governing body, the Township Commissioners. The Township has to show

a primary public purpose for its condemnation when challenged, but it did not have

to show that its Board of Commissioners is comprised of Solons. Simply, the

depositions into the mental processes of the Township Commissioners were not

relevant to the question of whether the reconfigured road will serve a public purpose.

I would affirm the trial court’s well-reasoned opinion.

____________________________________________

MARY HANNAH LEAVITT, President Judge Emerita

2

This process is also known as the deliberative process privilege. See Joe v. Prison Health

Services, Inc., 782 A.2d 24, 33 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2001). The deliberative process privilege “permits

the government to withhold documents containing confidential deliberations of law or

policymaking, reflecting opinions, recommendations or advice.” Id. “The privilege recognizes

that if governmental agencies were forced to operate in a fishbowl, the frank exchange of ideas

and opinions would cease and the quality of administrative decisions would consequently suffer.”

Id.

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This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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