a plaintiff “may not, by creatively framing their complaint, circumvent a congressional grant of exclusive jurisdiction.”
How later courts described this case
- a plaintiff “may not, by creatively framing their complaint, circumvent a congressional grant of exclusive jurisdiction.”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
JOHN DALE ALLEN, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) Civil Action No. 1:23-cv-01012 (UNA)
)
)
JANET L. YELLEN, et al., )
)
)
Defendants. )
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Plaintiff, proceeding pro se, is a resident of Ohio. He has filed an application for leave to
proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”), ECF No. 2, and a complaint, ECF No. 1, against the United
States and the United States Secretary of the Treasury. For the reasons stated below, the court will
grant the IFP application and dismiss the complaint for failure to meet the minimal pleading
requirements of Rule 8(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and for want of subject matter
jurisdiction, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3).
Plaintiff broadly alleges that the federal government is legally obligated to pay him $72.5
million because he purports to be “a principal of the United States.” Plaintiff contends that he is
owed this “portion of the public debt,” and although he cites to a few federal statutes, none of
them, in fact, authorize the relief that plaintiff seeks.
Pro se litigants must comply with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Jarrell v. Tisch,
656 F. Supp. 237, 239 (D.D.C. 1987). Rule 8(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires
complaints to contain “(1) a short and plain statement of the grounds for the court’s jurisdiction
[and] (2) a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a); see Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678–79 (2009); Ciralsky v. CIA, 355 F.3d
661, 668–71 (D.C. Cir. 2004). The Rule 8 standard ensures that defendants receive fair notice of
the claim being asserted so that they can prepare a responsive answer and an adequate defense and
determine whether the doctrine of res judicata applies. Brown v. Califano, 75 F.R.D. 497, 498
(D.D.C. 1977). “A confused and rambling narrative of charges and conclusions . . . does not
comply with the requirements of Rule 8.” Cheeks v. Fort Myer Constr. Corp., 71 F. Supp. 3d 163,
169 (D.D.C. 2014) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). The instant complaint satisfies
this standard.
And, to whatever extent plaintiff is alleging breach of contract, this court cannot exercise
jurisdiction over such a claim. The Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1491, gives the United States Court
of Federal Claims jurisdiction to render judgment upon any claim against the United States
founded either upon the Constitution, or any Act of Congress or any regulation of an executive
department, or upon any express or implied contract with the United States, or for liquidated or
unliquidated damages in cases not sounding in tort. This grant of jurisdiction to the Court of
Federal Claims is “exclusive,” but “only to the extent that Congress has not granted any other court
authority to hear the claims that may be decided by the [Court of Federal Claims].” Bowen v.
Massachusetts, 487 U.S. 879, 910 n.48 (1988). Absent other grounds for jurisdiction, a claim is
subject to the Tucker Act’s stringent jurisdictional restrictions if, in whole or in part, it explicitly
or “in essence” seeks more than $10,000 in monetary relief from the federal government. See
Megapulse, Inc. v. Lewis, 672 F.2d 959, 967–68 (D.C. Cir. 1982); Heller, Ehrman, White &
MacAuliffe v. Babbitt, 992 F.2d 360, 363 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (a plaintiff “may not, by creatively
framing their complaint, circumvent a congressional grant of exclusive jurisdiction.”). Here,
plaintiff seeks in excess of $10,000. Accordingly, this court is want of jurisdiction, and assuming
he could make out a viable claim, he would be required to seek recourse in the Court of Federal
Claims.
Put simply, the complaint is vague, confused, and fails to provide adequate notice of any
claim. Furthermore, plaintiff fails to establish this court’s jurisdiction or to present a valid basis
for relief. Consequently, the complaint is dismissed without prejudice. An order consistent with
this memorandum opinion is issued separately.
Date: April 20, 2023
Tanya S. Chutkan
TANYA S. CHUTKAN
United States District Judge