Quincy A. Williams v. Correctional Officer Radford

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[PUBLISH]

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eleventh Circuit

____________________

No. 20-13364

____________________

QUINCY A. WILLIAMS,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

CORRECTIONAL OFFICER RADFORD,

c/o Alexandria Williams

Office of the General Counsel

501 S Calhoun Street

Tallahassee, FL 32399-2500

in his individual capacity,

CAPT. SCARPATI,

in his individual capacity,

CORRECTIONAL OFFICER WILKINSON,

in her individual capacity,

OFFICER BADCOCK,

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2 Opinion of the Court 20-13364

Correctional Officer, in his official capacity,

CORRECTIONAL OFFICER SHORT, et al.,

Defendants-Appellees.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Florida

D.C. Docket No. 2:18-cv-14107-RLR

____________________

Before JORDAN, LUCK, and LAGOA, Circuit Judges.

JORDAN, Circuit Judge:

Quincy Williams, a Florida prisoner, filed a pro se civil rights

suit against several prison officials under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. He al-

leged that Captain Albert Scarpati retaliated against him in various

ways—including placing him in disciplinary/segregated confine-

ment—because of complaints he made and grievances he filed. He

also alleged that Officer Erick Radford beat him while he was hand-

cuffed, and that Officers Brian Babcock and Cameron Short held

him down and failed to intervene during the assault.

The district court granted summary judgment in favor of

Captain Scarpati and Officers Radford, Babcock, and Short on all of

Mr. Williams’ claims. Viewing the evidence in the light most fa-

vorable to Mr. Williams, and with the benefit of oral argument, we

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vacate the grant of summary judgment except as to one of the al-

leged instances of retaliation.

I

We review a district court’s grant of summary judgment de

novo. See Marbury v. Warden, 936 F.3d 1227, 1232 (11th Cir.

2019). Summary judgment is warranted “when the evidence,

viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, pre-

sents no genuine issue of material fact and compels judgment as a

matter of law in favor of the moving party.” Owusu-Ansah v.

Coca-Cola Co., 715 F.3d 1306, 1307 (11th Cir. 2013) (citation omit-

ted). We credit the “specific facts” that Mr. Williams testified to,

including those set out in his verified pleadings and filings. See,

e.g., Perry v. Thompson, 786 F.2d 1093, 1095 (11th Cir.1986).

A

Mr. Williams contends that when he complained about Cap-

tain Scarpati’s behavior, he set off a chain of events that were meant

to intimidate and silence him. The first relevant incident took place

on Friday, October 27, 2017, when Mr. Williams tried to send out

legal mail. That day, the running of meals was delayed as it “nor-

mally” was, “[a]nd for some reason the [mail official] sa[id] I’m

done. [I’m] fixing to leave.” D.E. 113-1 at 28. Mr. Williams stated

in his affidavit that the mail official said “that she had waited long

enough an[d] no one showed up and she was leaving.” D.E. 121-1

at 19. Mr. Williams was told he would have to wait until Monday

to send out his mail. See D.E. 113-1 at 28–29. As waiting until the

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4 Opinion of the Court 20-13364

following week would cause him to miss a legal deadline, Mr. Wil-

liams asked Captain Scarpati, “[Y]ou can’t get her to come back?

. . . You’re not going to let her come back so we can get this?” Id.

at 29.

Captain Scarpati responded: “Hey, she [is] gone. See you

Monday.” Id. Mr. Williams then tried to complain to the assistant

warden. Mr. Williams explained that when Captain Scarpati saw

him “trying to talk to” the assistant warden he “sent an officer and

told him to put [Mr. Williams] in handcuffs.” Id. at 36. Mr. Wil-

liams testified that he was then handcuffed and told by Captain

Scarpati, “Look, you disrespect[ed] me just then. You know you

just disrespected me? . . . In my face, you [are] going to try to go

over my head?” Id. at 37.

Mr. Williams “was place[d] in [disciplinary/segregated] con-

finement for several day[s] without a written disciplinary report.”

D.E. 121-1 at 20. Following the incident, Mr. Williams filed a griev-

ance against Captain Scarpati for “retaliation for trying to get [his]

legal mail out which [he had] a right to do.” D.E. 113-1 at 43. He

asserted in his verified complaint that no one responded to this

grievance. See D.E. 1 at 7. 1

1 At times, Mr. Williams refers to “jail” or “confinement” when discussing his

disciplinary/segregated confinement. During his deposition, Mr. Williams

testified that “jail” means “segregated confinement.” See D.E. 113-1 at 38. He

went on to explain that there is “administrative confinement” and “discipli-

nary confinement.” Id. at 39. For clarity, we will use “disciplinary/segregated

confinement” throughout this opinion.

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According to Mr. Williams, Captain Scarpati “continue[d] to

retaliate[ ] against” him. See D.E. 121-1 at 20. On November 14,

2017, Captain Scarpati and another official went to Mr. Williams’

cell during inspection. Captain Scarpati made Mr. Williams get off

his bunk, “got in [his] face,” and “told [Mr. Williams] he would

write [him] up anytime he feels like it.” D.E. 113-1 at 43–45. See

also D.E. 121-1 at 20. Captain Scarpati further told Mr. Williams

that he’d “personally” take him to “jail.” D.E. 113-1 at 45. Unde-

terred, Mr. Williams filed a grievance about this new threat. See

D.E. 1 at 8 (“Again I wrote this incident up under reprisal and

threats of harm which was denied.”).

Soon thereafter, in December of 2017, a correctional officer

came into Mr. Williams’ cell. The officer “grabbed [Mr. Williams’]

mattress” and “[threw] it out in the hallway.” D.E. 113-1 at 48. She

also grabbed his “legal material, [his] bag, [and his] canteen bag and

dumped it out there.” Id. The officer told Mr. Williams to “stop

writing up [Captain] Scarpati.” D.E. 121-1 at 21. See also D.E. 113-

1 at 49. She told Mr. Williams’ roommate, “Look, I’m fixing to

search your bunk and stuff because he wants to keep writing up

[Captain] Scarpati.” D.E. 113-1 at 47. See also D.E. 121-1, Exh. A

(Declaration of Inmate Tony Harris, explaining that the officer told

Mr. Williams to “stop writing up Capt. Scarp[ati]”). Mr. Williams

submitted a grievance about this incident as well. See D.E. 113-1

at 48.

Later that month, four correctional officers came to Mr.

Williams’ cell. They placed Mr. Williams and his cellmate in

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handcuffs and conducted a search of the cell. The officers showed

Mr. Williams a homemade knife that they said had been found in

his pillow. See D.E. 113-1 at 56–57. See also D.E. 121-1 at 21. One

of the officers told Mr. Williams that Captain Scarpati had “told

them to come down there and tear up [Mr. Williams’] house.”

D.E. 113-1 at 53. Mr. Williams testified that an officer “admitted

they . . . plant[ed] that knife when [he] didn’t have a knife.” Id.

Following the search, Mr. Williams was escorted to discipli-

nary/segregated confinement. While being taken there, the es-

corting officer said to Mr. Williams “you need to leave [Captain]

Scarpati alone,” and Mr. Williams got into a “verbal dispute” with

her. See D.E. 113-1 at 59; D.E. 121-1 at 22. See also Appellees’ Br.

at 5 (conceding that any threats Mr. Williams made were verbal,

not physical).2

Because Mr. Williams was “causing a disturbance,” he was

taken directly to disciplinary/segregated confinement. The nor-

mal protocol at the prison appeared to call for an inmate to be

taken to the medical unit for a “pre-confinement” evaluation

2Mr. Williams allegedly told the escorting officer, “You are a fag and want to

be a man[,] so I am going to hit you like a man[,] bitch.” D.E. 113-6 at 1. He

also reportedly said, “I have a life sentence, you are fucking with the wrong

one. You better watch your back.” Id. This resulted in a disciplinary charge

being filed against Mr. Williams, who pled not guilty to the charge. See D.E.

113-6 at 5. Mr. Williams was found to have threatened the officer, but the

warden later overturned that finding. See D.E. 1 at 12.

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before being placed in disciplinary/segregated confinement. See

D.E. 121-1 at 22. See also D.E. 113-1 at 68. 3

When Mr. Williams reached the confinement area, several

officers, including Officers Radford, Babcock and Short, were

there. See D.E. 113-1 at 70. Officer Radford “grabbed” him from

the escorting officer. See id. at 70-71. According to Mr. Williams,

Officer Radford then “rammed [him] into the wall where [Officers]

Short and Babcock held [him,] when [Officer] Radford hit [him]

several time[s] with glove[d] fist in the face and head.” D.E. 121-1

at 22. Here is how Mr. Williams described the assault at his depo-

sition:

[Officer Radford] just grabbed me from [the escort of-

ficer] and sa[id] “Oh, you being disorderly,” and when

he grabbed me, I’m already handcuffed in hand re-

straints behind my back. He grabbed me and grabbed

me by the neck. . . . And bent me over and ran me

into the wall. And [Officers] Short and Babcock came

3 Captain Scarpati and Officers Babcock, Short, and Radford asserted that Mr.

Williams was taken for a pre-confinement medical examination but was un-

cooperative and refused a medical exam. See D.E. 114 at 4. They provided a

“Refusal of Health Care Services” form as evidence of Mr. Williams’ refusal.

See D.E. 114-11. The form, dated December 23, 2017, provides a space for the

inmate to sign, certifying that he is refusing certain services—here, the pre-

confinement evaluation—but Mr. Williams did not sign and the signature line

states “refused to sign.” Id. Meanwhile, a “Report of Administrative Confine-

ment,” also dated December 23, 2017, indicates that on that date, Mr. Williams

“was escorted to medical and was seen by medical staff for pre-confinement

physical.” D.E. 113-10.

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8 Opinion of the Court 20-13364

over there and held me, assisted him and he got off

like six or seven good hits in my face, head, every-

where. . . [H]e just swung on me, just punching me

. . . and I got my head down trying to avoid [him]

hitting me in the face, but he busted my lip and hit

me in the head. [He] [c]hoked me, hit me around the

head and held me.

D.E. 113-1 at 71–72.

Mr. Williams sustained injuries from the beating, including

“knots on [his] head,” a swollen jaw, and a busted lip. See id. at 73.

Mr. Williams told Captain Scarpati that he needed medical assis-

tance but Captain Scarpati “refused to let [him] get medical help.”

See id. at 74–75. See also D.E. 121-1, Exh. B (Declaration of Inmate

Kunta Kinte Porter: “Officer Radford punched inmate Quincy Wil-

liams in the mouth busting his bottom lip as he requested medical

attention by Captain Scarpati which he refused inmate Williams

medical attention and threaten[ed] him with chemical agents if he

didn’t stop requesting medical attention.”). At some point—“[10]

days, a week, 10, 15 days later”—Mr. Williams saw medical person-

nel. See D.E. 113-1 at 75. He “[s]till had a scar on [his] face, still

had bruises . . . [his] jaw was still hurting, [he] had migraine head-

aches,” and he had two “loose teeth.” Id.

At a later disciplinary hearing, Mr. Williams was found to

have possessed a weapon—the knife found in his cell—despite his

claim that the officers had planted the knife at the direction of Cap-

tain Scarpati. He was also found to have made threats to his

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escorting officer while he was being moved from general popula-

tion into disciplinary/segregated confinement. The finding regard-

ing the threats, however, was subsequently overturned by the war-

den. See D.E. 1 at 12.

B

In 2018, Mr. Williams filed a § 1983 civil rights suit against

Captain Scarpati for retaliation, Officer Radford for excessive force,

and Officers Babcock and Short for failure to intervene. The de-

fendants moved for summary judgment and Mr. Williams filed a

response in opposition to that motion. The magistrate judge issued

a report recommending that the defendants’ motion be granted as

to these claims.

In evaluating the retaliation claim, the magistrate judge fo-

cused exclusively on the alleged planting of the knife in Mr. Wil-

liams’ pillow and did not consider the evidence that Mr. Williams’

complaints and grievances caused Captain Scarpati to place him in

disciplinary/segregated confinement and to order a search of his

cell. The magistrate judge concluded that because Mr. Williams

conceded that he was found guilty of possession of a weapon in a

formal disciplinary proceeding—and thus provided due process—

and because there was some evidence supporting that infraction,

our decision in O’Bryant v. Finch, 637 F.3d. 1207, 1215 (11th Cir.

2011), foreclosed his ability to raise a retaliation claim. See D.E.

128 at 14–18.

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10 Opinion of the Court 20-13364

The district court adopted the magistrate judge’s report as

to Mr. Williams’ retaliation claims concerning his placement in dis-

ciplinary/segregated confinement and the search of his cell. See

D.E. 133 at 1. The district court concluded that Captain Scarpati

presented evidence that Mr. Williams was placed in discipli-

nary/segregated confinement because he “violated protocol” in

the manner he submitted his complaint about the mail, and said

that Mr. Williams cited “no evidence” to suggest he was placed in

such confinement because of his constitutionally protected speech.

See id. at 2. The district court credited Captain Scarpati’s declara-

tion that the search of Mr. Williams’ cell was random, and dis-

counted Mr. Williams’ statement in his deposition that one of the

officers told him that Captain Scarpati had ordered the search. See

id. The district court thus concluded that Mr. Williams had “not

pointed to evidence to indicate the existence of a causal connection

between his exercise of his First Amendment rights and any action

taken by [Captain] Scarpati.” Id. at 2–3.

With regard to the excessive force claim, the magistrate

judge noted that Officers Radford, Babcock, and Short denied that

the alleged beating ever occurred. Thus, Mr. Williams’ “version of

events” had to be credited. See D.E. 133 at 8. Nevertheless, the

magistrate judge concluded that Mr. Williams admitted that he had

been “disorderly.” And the disciplinary report about the threats

made to the escorting officer cut against Mr. Williams’ argument

that the force was applied “maliciously and sadistically for the very

purpose of causing harm.” Id. at 14 (citation omitted). Because the

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existence of an excessive force violation is a prerequisite for a fail-

ure to intervene claim, the magistrate judge further concluded that

the claims against Officers Babcock and Short necessarily failed.

See id.

The district court did not separately address the excessive

force or the failure to intervene claims in its order. It adopted the

magistrate judge’s report on these claims.

II

We begin with Mr. Williams’ retaliation claims against Cap-

tain Scarpati. Mr. Williams asserted three separate instances in

which he was punished for complaining about Captain Scarpati.

First, he was placed in disciplinary/segregated confinement for

“disrespecting” Captain Scarpati by “try[ing] to go over [his] head”

when talking to the assistant warden about his issue with legal mail.

Second, his cell was searched and “trashed” on Captain Scarpati’s

orders and he was warned to “stop writing [Captain] Scarpati up.”

Third, officers planted a knife in his pillow so that he would once

again be subject to disciplinary/segregated confinement. We con-

clude that only the third of these instances of retaliation was

properly resolved by summary judgment and that the first two

should proceed to trial. When the facts are viewed in Mr. Williams’

favor, “the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a

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12 Opinion of the Court 20-13364

verdict” in his favor on those two retaliation claims. See Anderson

v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). 4

To establish a retaliation claim, a prisoner must demonstrate

“that the prison official’s actions were the result of his having filed

a grievance concerning the conditions of his imprisonment.” Far-

row v. West, 320 F.3d 1235, 1248 (11th Cir. 2003) (internal quota-

tion marks and citation omitted). Mr. Williams can prevail on a

retaliation claim if “(1) his speech was constitutionally protected;

(2) [he] suffered adverse action such that the administrator’s alleg-

edly retaliatory conduct would likely deter a person of ordinary

firmness from engaging in such speech; and (3) there is a causal re-

lationship between the retaliatory action and the protected

speech.” Smith v. Mosley, 532 F.3d 1270, 1276 (11th Cir. 2008).

A

When an inmate “complains to the prison’s administrators

about the conditions of his confinement,” he is exercising his First

Amendment right of freedom of speech. See id. Mr. Williams tes-

tified that he complained to the assistant warden about the mail,

and that he filed grievances against Captain Scarpati based on the

disciplinary/segregated confinement he received and the search

and trashing of his cell. See, e.g., D.E. 113-1 at 43 (“I wrote that up

4In the district court, Captain Scarpati did not make any substantive argu-

ments about qualified immunity on the retaliation claims, see D.E. 113 at 7,

and he does not assert qualified immunity on appeal. We therefore do not

address qualified immunity as to him.

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that [Captain Scarpati] locked me up in retaliation for trying to get

my legal mail out”).

Mr. Williams also described the “adverse actions” taken

against him—e.g., the disciplinary/segregated confinement and

the search and trashing of his cell—that would deter any ordinary

inmate from making subsequent complaints. See, e.g., id. at 45

(“[Captain] Scarpati told me he would write me up anytime he feels

like it. He [said] if I . . . write him up, he will write me up anytime

he feel[s] like it . . . . He told me I’ll take you to jail and I’ll take you

personally[.]”). We have already held that the search of an inmate’s

cell and the destruction of his possessions and materials can sup-

port a First Amendment retaliation claim. See Wright v. New-

some, 795 F.2d 964, 968 (11th Cir. 1986). And we now agree with

our sister circuits that placing an inmate in disciplinary/segregated

confinement constitutes an adverse action for purposes of a First

Amendment retaliation claim. See, e.g., Burns v. Martuscello, 890

F.3d 77, 94 (2d Cir. 2018) (“Burns has provided evidence that he

was subjected to a pretextual [involuntary protective custody]

hearing, and placed on this restricted status for over six months.

Such an injury more than suffices to show an adverse action.”);

Mitchell v. Horn, 318 F.3d 523, 530 (3d Cir. 2003) (“[W]e believe

that several months in disciplinary confinement would deter a rea-

sonably firm prisoner from exercising his First Amendment

rights.”); Martin v. Duffy, 858 F.3d 239, 250 (4th Cir. 2017) (“Cer-

tainly, placing an inmate in administrative segregation could deter

a person of ordinary firmness from exercising his First Amendment

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14 Opinion of the Court 20-13364

rights.”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); Herron v.

Harrison, 203 F.3d 410, 416 (6th Cir. 2000) (placement in adminis-

trative segregation is an adverse action which could dissuade a per-

son of reasonable firmness from exercising his First Amendment

rights); Watison v. Carter, 668 F.3d 1108, 1115 (9th Cir. 2012)

(placement in administrative segregation constitutes an adverse ac-

tion for a retaliation claim).

The next question is whether Mr. Williams has presented

sufficient evidence to create an issue of fact as to a causal relation-

ship between his complaints about Captain Scarpati and his subse-

quent placement in disciplinary/segregated confinement, the

search and trashing of his cell, and the planting of a weapon in his

pillow. We think that he has done so with respect to the first two

alleged instances of retaliation.

In determining whether Mr. Williams has established a

causal connection between his complaints and grievances and the

adverse actions he suffered, “we ask[ ] whether [Captain Scarpati]

w[as] subjectively motivated to discipline [Mr. Williams] because

[he] complained of some of the conditions of his confinement.”

Smith, 532 F.3d at 1278. This motive analysis is subject to a burden-

shifting framework. See id. (noting “that most courts resolve this

subjective motivation issue under” the burden-shifting framework

established in Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle,

429 U.S. 274 (1977), which concerned employment retaliation).

First, Mr. Williams must show that his constitutionally-protected

speech was a “motivating factor” in Captain Scarpati’s decisions to

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carry out the adverse actions. See Mt. Healthy, 429 U.S. at 287. If

Mr. Williams satisfies that burden, then Captain Scarpati must

show that he would have implemented those adverse actions irre-

spective of Mr. Williams’ complaints. See id. See also Thaddeus-

X v. Blatter, 175 F.3d 378, 399 (6th Cir. 1999) (applying the Mt.

Healthy burden-shifting framework to the prison context: “Once

the plaintiff has met his burden of establishing that his protected

conduct was a motivating factor behind any harm, the burden of

production shifts to the defendant. If the defendant can show that

he would have taken the same action in the absence of the pro-

tected activity, he is entitled to prevail on summary judgment.”)

(citation omitted).

The first instance of alleged retaliation involved Captain

Scarpati placing Mr. Williams in disciplinary/segregated confine-

ment. The district court credited Captain Scarpati’s explanation

that Mr. Williams “was placed in segregated confinement because

he violated protocol the way that he had made his complaint about

the mail, acted in a disorderly manner, and disrespected a correc-

tional officer.” D.E. 133 at 2. See also D.E. 114-3 at 2 (Declaration

of Captain (now Major) Scarpati: “Inmate Williams was placed in

administrative confinement for disobeying orders.”). The district

court went on to say that Mr. Williams did not cite to any evidence

“to indicate that he was placed in segregated confinement for exer-

cising his First Amendment rights.” D.E. 133 at 2. But, as set out

below, that was incorrect.

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Mr. Williams testified that he was handcuffed and sent to

disciplinary/segregated confinement because Captain Scarpati saw

him “trying to talk” to the assistant warden about his legal mail and

trying to “go over [Captain Scarpati’s] head.” D.E. 113-1 at 36–37.

In his deposition, Mr. Williams explained that Captain Scarpati told

him he was being disorderly (not that he was in fact disorderly) as

pretext—“the quickest catchall”—for placing any inmate in disci-

plinary confinement. See id. at 36. In fact, Mr. Williams testified

that he was sent to disciplinary/segregated confinement after Cap-

tain Scarpati saw him trying to speak to the assistant warden di-

rectly about the mail issue. See id. In addition, Mr. Williams

averred that Captain Scarpati told him a month later that he did not

care about the grievances and warned him that he could lock him

up anytime because it was his prison. See D.E. 1 at 8. Captain

Scarpati also said to Mr. Williams that when he filed a grievance

against him, it “comes back to him.” Id.

The district court seemed to take Captain Scarpati at his

word and ignored Mr. Williams’ testimony (and the reasonable in-

ferences which could be drawn from it). Viewing the evidence in

the light most favorable to Mr. Williams—as we must on summary

judgment—we think that a reasonable jury could find that Captain

Scarpati was motivated by (and wanted to deter) Mr. Williams’

complaints against him. This first retaliation claim therefore sur-

vives summary judgment on the “motivating factor” issue.

We come to the same conclusion with respect to the second

retaliation claim, the one concerning the search and trashing of Mr.

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Williams’ cell. Again, the district court seemed to credit Captain

Scarpati’s statements and discount Mr. Williams’ version of events.

The district court said that Mr. Williams “cite[d] to no evidence to

indicate that the search of his cell was not random and was at [Cap-

tain] Scarpati’s request.” D.E. 133 at 2. But Mr. Williams provided

enough evidence to support a jury finding that Captain Scarpati or-

dered the search and trashing of the cell because of the former’s

complaints.

Some time after Mr. Williams submitted a grievance regard-

ing the incident with the legal mail, Captain Scarpati went to Mr.

Williams’ cell, “told [him] he d[id] not care about [his] grievances,”

and warned that he would “lock [Mr. Williams] up anytime he fel[t]

like” it. See D.E. 1 at 8. Indeed, he said that “he w[ould] personally

take [Mr. Williams] to confinement.” Id. Captain Scarpati also told

Mr. Williams that “when you write him up it comes back to him.”

Id. When Mr. Williams submitted another grievance regarding

this threat, an officer came to his cell, “trashed [his] stuff,” and

warned him to “stop writing [Captain] Scarpati up.” See D.E. 113-

1 at 47–49. Mr. Williams submitted a grievance about this second

threat, and soon thereafter officers executed a search of his cell (and

allegedly planted a knife) on Captain Scarpati’s orders. See id. at

49, 52–53 (“[A]nd when I was escorted, she told me that [Captain]

Scarpati had told them to come down there and tear up my house.

She admitted they had them to plant that knife when I didn’t have

a knife.”). Mr. Williams’ testimony directly contradicts Captain

Scarpati’s assertion that the initial search was “random.” The

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18 Opinion of the Court 20-13364

evidence—when viewed in Mr. Williams’ favor—shows a causal

connection between the submission of complaints and grievances

and the initial search and trashing of the cell. Summary judgment

was therefore not warranted with respect to the alleged retaliatory

search and trashing of Mr. Williams’ cell.5

B

We end with the third and final instance of alleged retalia-

tion—the purported planting of the knife in Mr. Williams’ pillow—

which we think the district court (and the magistrate judge) got

right. There is certainly evidence (as with the two previous in-

stances) to support a finding that Mr. Williams satisfied each of the

elements necessary to establish a retaliation claim. But there is one

important difference: Mr. Williams was charged with unlawful

possession of the knife, received a disciplinary hearing on that

charge, and was found to have possessed the knife. Under our prec-

edent, if an inmate is “found guilty of an actual disciplinary infrac-

tion after being afforded due process,” and “there was evidence to

support the disciplinary panel’s fact finding,” he cannot assert a re-

taliation claim. See O’Bryant, 637 F.3d. at 1215.

Mr. Williams admits that he received a disciplinary hearing.

See D.E. 113-1 at 76. Pursuant to the prison’s policy (and assuming

it was followed because Mr. Williams does not allege that it was

5 In

his summary judgment motion, Captain Scarpati did not make any argu-

ment about the second step of the Mt. Healthy burden-shifting framework.

We therefore do not address this issue.

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20-13364 Opinion of the Court 19

not), Mr. Williams was “advised of the charge[ ] against” him, was

able to “request staff assistance” to prepare his case, and had the

right to present witnesses through written statements to support

his innocence. See, e.g., D.E. 113-5 at 2 (disciplinary report for pos-

session of weapon charge). He also had “the opportunity to make

a statement in writing regarding the charge and provide infor-

mation relating to the investigation.” Id. According to his own

testimony, Mr. Williams did in fact call witnesses at his hearing.

See D.E. 113-1 at 76. He also provided a witness statement de-

nouncing the legitimacy of the search and characterizing it as retal-

iation for his grievances. See D.E. 113-12. But Mr. Williams’ evi-

dence did not persuade the prison officials at the hearing because,

after considering “all statements, documents, and evidence” before

them, they found that he had indeed possessed the knife. See D.E.

113-5 at 4.

Mr. Williams maintains on appeal that the knife was planted

in his cell, but he does not deny that he was afforded a hearing or

that the prison officials based their findings on evidence. O’Bryant

therefore controls, and Mr. Williams cannot pursue his retaliation

claim concerning the planting of the knife. The district court

properly granted summary judgment in favor of Captain Scarpati

on this third retaliation claim.

III

We next address Mr. Williams’ Eighth Amendment exces-

sive force claim against Officer Radford. The ultimate question is

“whether force was applied in a good-faith effort to maintain or

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20 Opinion of the Court 20-13364

restore discipline, or maliciously and sadistically to cause harm.”

Wilkins v. Gaddy, 559 U.S. 34, 37 (2010) (quotation and citation

omitted).

A

The magistrate judge explained that the case presented a de-

bate about the reasonableness of the force used. See D.E. 128 at

12–13. Because Mr. Williams had been “disorderly” and made

threats against the escorting officer, he could not show that Officer

Radford applied force maliciously or sadistically for the purpose of

causing harm. See id. at 14. As noted earlier, the district court

adopted the magistrate judge’s report on the excessive force claim

but did not separately address it.

We disagree with the magistrate judge and the district court.

At summary judgment, the inquiry is not whether the force used

was definitively malicious or sadistic, but whether “the evidence,

viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, will support a

reliable inference of wantonness in the infliction of pain.” Camp-

bell v. Sikes, 169 F.3d 1353, 1375 (11th Cir. 1999) (quoting Whitley

v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 322 (1986)). Under that standard, and given

the evidence in the record, summary judgment was inappropriate.

Mr. Williams provided specific testimony about the incident

from his first-hand experience of the encounter. He testified that

while he was handcuffed, and being held by Officers Babcock and

Short, Officer Radford grabbed him by the neck, slammed him into

a wall, hit him six or seven times in the face, “punch[ed]” him,

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20-13364 Opinion of the Court 21

“choked” him, “busted [his] lip,” and struck him in the head. See

D.E. 113-1 at 71–72. See also D.E. 121-1, Exh. B (Declaration of

Inmate Kunta Kinte Porter: “I observed Officer Radford punch in-

mate Quincy Williams in his mouth while being held by Officer

Babcock . . . on December 23, 2017.”). His injuries were significant

enough—a busted lip, knots in his head, a swollen jaw, a crook in

his neck, loose teeth, and bruises—to warrant medical treatment,

which he sought the day after the alleged attack. See D.E. 131-1 at

73–78, 89. See also D.E. 113-16 (inmate sick-call request dated De-

cember 24, 2017). The pain from the beating persisted, and Mr.

Williams said that he continued to suffer from headaches and that

his prior back problems were aggravated after the incident. See

D.E. 113-1 at 78. 6

In evaluating an excessive force claim, we adhere to two

equally important principles. The first is that unreasonable or un-

necessary force does not necessarily constitute excessive force for

purposes of the Eighth Amendment. See Whitley, 475 U.S. at 319.

The second is that even though “the Constitution does not require

comfortable prisons, it does not permit inhumane ones.” Camp-

bell, 169 F.3d at 1362. The Eighth Amendment excessive force

6 We acknowledge that Officer Radford denied ever hitting or striking Mr. Wil-

liams. See D.E. 113-14 at 1. And the nurse who saw Mr. Williams stated in

her medical report that there was “no indication for treatment” and that he

had asked her to falsify her report to reflect that he sustained certain injuries.

See D.E. 113-17. But given that we are required to view the evidence in the

light most favorable to Mr. Williams at summary judgment, we credit his ver-

sion of events, understanding that the actual facts may be different.

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22 Opinion of the Court 20-13364

standard reflects these two principles. Force that is “applied in a

good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline” is acceptable,

while force that is inflicted “maliciously and sadistically to cause

harm” is prohibited. See Wilkins, 559 U.S. at 37. To determine

where force falls along this spectrum we look to five factors: “(1)

the extent of injury; (2) the need for application of force; (3) the

relationship between that need and the amount of force used; (4)

any efforts made to temper the severity of a forceful response; and

(5) the extent of the threat to the safety of staff and inmates, as rea-

sonably perceived by the responsible officials on the basis of facts

known to them.” Campbell, 169 F.3d at 1375 (internal quotation

marks omitted).

The record indicates that Mr. Williams got into a “verbal

dispute” with the escorting officer, “raising his voice,” getting

“loud with her,” and making some threats. See D.E. 121 at 2; D.E.

113-1 at 58. But a prisoner initiating a verbal altercation does not

give prison guards carte blanche to use force sadistically and mali-

ciously. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Mr.

Williams under the Campbell factors, Officer Radford was not en-

titled to summary judgment.7

7 The magistrate judge seemed to believe that Mr. Williams admitted he was

being “disorderly” while he was being escorted from his cell. But Mr. Williams

testified only that the officers characterized him as disorderly, not that he in

fact was disorderly. See D.E. 113-1 at 70 (“[Officer] Swain called it [in] and said

we got an inmate that’s being disorderly and we [are] sending him straight to

confinement.”). See also id. at 71 (“And when [Officer Radford] grabbed me

he sa[id], ‘Oh, you being disorderly.’”). Moreover, Mr. Williams pled not

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20-13364 Opinion of the Court 23

The first Campbell factor is the extent of the injury. As

noted, Mr. Williams suffered injuries—a busted lip, knots in his

head, a swollen jaw, a crook in his neck, loose teeth, and bruises—

which warranted medical treatment. Those injuries weigh in his

favor under Campbell at summary judgment. As the Supreme

Court has explained, “[a]n inmate who is gratuitously beaten by

guards does not lose his ability to pursue an excessive force claim

merely because he has the good fortune to escape serious injury.”

Wilkins, 559 U.S. at 38.

The second Campbell factor—the need for application of

force—weighs in favor of Officer Radford. Mr. Williams engaged

in a verbal altercation with, and made threats to, the escorting of-

ficer. Our cases recognize that prison officials “may use force when

necessary to restore order and need not wait until disturbances

reach dangerous proportions before responding.” Bennett v. Par-

ker, 898 F.2d 1530, 1533 (11th Cir. 1990).

The remaining Campbell factors consider the relationship

between the need for use of force and the amount of force used,

the efforts made to temper the severity of a forceful response, and

the extent of the threat to the safety of staff and inmates reasonably

perceived by the responsible prison officials. Viewing the record in

guilty to the charge that he had threatened the escorting officer, and the find-

ing on that charge was later overturned. See D.E. 1 at 12. For purposes of our

analysis, we assume without deciding that the magistrate judge’s understand-

ing was correct.

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24 Opinion of the Court 20-13364

the light most favorable to Mr. Williams, these factors weigh in his

favor at summary judgment.

Mr. Williams was no longer in his cell (where the knife was

found) and he was not armed. And he was handcuffed and being

held by Officers Babcock and Short when Officer Radford used

force. Although Mr. Williams was being disorderly, the altercation

between him and the escorting officer was verbal and not physical.

Moreover, there is nothing in the record indicating that Mr. Wil-

liams physically resisted being handcuffed and transported to disci-

plinary/segregated confinement before force was used against

him. A reasonable jury could find, if it views the evidence and in-

ferences in Mr. Williams’ favor, that the threat to the safety of

prison staff and other inmates—as perceived by those on the

ground—was low.

Officer Radford did not make any efforts to temper a force-

ful response. He slammed Mr. Williams into a wall and repeatedly

hit him while he was being restrained, causing him a number of

injuries that required medical attention. We note in this respect

that Officers Radford, Babcock, and Short do not assert that a cer-

tain level of force was, in their view, necessary under the circum-

stances, as they deny using any force against Mr. Williams. See

Perry, 786 F.2d at 1095 (reversing summary judgment in favor of

officers on inmate’s excessive force claim in part because the “of-

ficers d[id] not state that unusual force by them was justified by [the

inmate] resisting or himself using force,” and instead “sa[id] that

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20-13364 Opinion of the Court 25

they took him one by each arm and led him or escorted him into

the [barber] shop”).

On this record a reasonable jury could find that the amount

of force used against Mr. Williams violated the Eighth Amend-

ment. If Mr. Williams’ version of events is believed, the evidence

supports “a reliable inference of wantonness in the infliction of

pain”—Officer Radford repeatedly struck a handcuffed, restrained,

and unarmed prisoner several times because he “rais[ed] his voice.”

Campbell, 169 F.3d at 1375.

B

Officer Radford relies in part on Bennett, 898 F.2d at 1530–

31, where we rejected an inmate’s § 1983 claim of excessive force

and upheld the grant of summary judgment in favor of the correc-

tional officers who had been sued. At the end of the day, Bennett

does not help Officer Radford. We explain why below.

According to Mr. Bennett, when he asked a prison guard

why he couldn’t use the gymnasium, the guard “grabbed him by

the throat” and yelled racial slurs at him. After Mr. Bennett “strug-

gle[d]” to break free from the guard’s grasp, another guard pushed

him against the cell bars. Then the first guard (Officer Jackson) hit

him with a nightstick. As a result, he suffered considerable and

long-lasting pain. See id. at 1530–31, 1533.

We concluded that Mr. Bennett had not shown a constitu-

tional violation. See id. at 1533. First, although other inmates had

submitted affidavits saying that two officers grabbed Mr. Bennett

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26 Opinion of the Court 20-13364

by the throat and pushed him against the bars, “no other evidence

support[ed] his claim that Officer Jackson struck him with a

nightstick.” Id. Second, an inmate had to show “some evidence of

injury beyond a minimal one,” and the medical records “con-

tain[ed] no report of head injuries or treatment for pain following

the incident, even though [Mr. Bennett] had daily opportunities to

seek medical assistance.” Id. at 1533.

To the extent that Bennett suggests (or can be read to hold)

that an inmate’s first-hand account of excessive force needs corrob-

oration to survive summary judgment, it is no longer good law in

this circuit. Sitting en banc, we held several years ago that an affi-

davit which satisfies Rule 56 and is based on personal knowledge

“may create an issue of material fact and preclude summary judg-

ment even if it is self-serving and uncorroborated.” United States

v. Stein, 881 F.3d 853, 854 (11th Cir. 2018) (en banc). The same

principle, of course, applies to a witness’ first-hand account pro-

vided at a deposition. See, e.g., Robinson v. Pezzat, 818 F.3d 1, 9

(D.C. Cir. 2016) (holding that homeowner’s uncorroborated depo-

sition testimony created an issue of fact as to the circumstances sur-

rounding the shooting of the family’s dog: “Corroboration goes to

credibility, a question for the jury, not the court.”).8

8 As noted earlier, Mr. Williams’ testimony about the alleged assault by Officer

Radford was corroborated in part by the declaration submitted by Mr. Kinte

Porter, another inmate. See D.E. 121-1, Exh. B.

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20-13364 Opinion of the Court 27

In addition, after Bennett was decided, the Supreme Court

held that a prisoner “who is gratuitously beaten by guards does not

lose his ability to pursue an excessive force claim [under the Eighth

Amendment] merely because he has the good fortune to escape

without serious injury.” Wilkins, 559 U.S. at 38–39 (explaining that

the Eighth Amendment focuses on the “nature of the force” used).

Insofar as Bennett implied that serious or permanent injuries are

required, any such implication has been abrogated by Wilkins.

IV

Finally, we consider Mr. Williams’ failure-to-intervene claim

against Officers Babcock and Short. We conclude that the district

court’s grant of summary judgment on this claim must also be va-

cated.

“[A]n officer who is present at the scene and who fails to take

reasonable steps to protect the victim of another officer’s use of ex-

cessive force can be held liable for his nonfeasance.” Velazquez v.

City of Hialeah, 484 F.3d 1340, 1341 (11th Cir. 2006) (internal quo-

tation marks and citation omitted). To survive summary judg-

ment, Mr. Williams had to present sufficient evidence to permit a

reasonable jury to find that Officers Babcock and Short were (1) in

a position to intervene in an ongoing constitutional violation and

(2) failed to do so. See Priester v. City of Riviera Beach, 208 F.3d

919, 924 (11th Cir. 2000) (“[A]n officer can be liable for failing to

intervene when another officer uses excessive force.”).

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28 Opinion of the Court 20-13364

Of course, a failure-to-intervene claim requires an underly-

ing constitutional violation. “[A]n officer cannot be held liable for

failing to stop or intervene when there was no constitutional viola-

tion being committed.” Sebastian v. Ortiz, 918 F.3d 1301, 1312

(11th Cir. 2019). The magistrate judge and the district court

granted judgment in favor of Officers Babcock and Short based on

their determination that Mr. Williams had not shown any Eighth

Amendment violation. See, e.g., D.E. 128 at 14 (“[E]ssential to any

failure to intervene claim lies a central assumption: excessive force

was applied.”). Because the magistrate judge and the district court

concluded that Officer Radford did not use excessive force, Officers

Babcock and Short did not have any obligation to intervene.

As we have explained, however, genuine issues of material

fact exist as to whether Officer Radford used excessive force against

Mr. Williams. We therefore vacate the grant of summary judg-

ment in favor of Officers Babcock and Short on the failure-to-inter-

vene claim and remand for reconsideration of that claim. We ex-

press no view on its proper resolution.

V

We vacate the district court’s grant of summary judgment

in favor of Captain Scarpati and Officers Radford, Babcock, and

Short, with the exception of the retaliation claim against Captain

Scarpati relating to the allegedly-planted knife. As to that claim,

we affirm because Mr. Williams was found to have possessed that

knife following a disciplinary hearing. On remand the district court

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20-13364 Opinion of the Court 29

can consider any summary judgment issues that remain outstand-

ing, including those related to qualified immunity.

AFFIRMED IN PART, VACATED IN PART, AND REMANDED.