Chinniah v. Fed. Energy Regul. Comm'n

22-475

Chinniah v. Fed. Energy Regul. Comm’n

United States Court of Appeals

for the Second Circuit

August Term 2022

Submitted: February 27, 2023

Decided: March 15, 2023

No. 22-475

GNANA M. CHINNIAH,

AKA GNANACHANDRA M. CHINNIAH,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

FEDERAL ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION,

JOHN SPAIN, PRAPA HARAN,

Defendants-Appellees.

On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of New York

Before: CALABRESI, PARK, and NARDINI, Circuit Judges.

Pro se Plaintiff Gnana Chinniah filed a whistleblower claim

against his former employer, the Federal Energy Regulatory

Commission, and his former supervisors in the United States District

Court for the Southern District of New York. But before doing so,

Chinniah failed to exhaust his administrative remedies as required by

the Whistleblower Protection Act of 1989 and the Civil Service Reform

Act of 1978. The district court (Broderick, J.) thus dismissed the

claim for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. We AFFIRM.

Gnana M. Chinniah, pro se, Camp Hill, PA, for Plaintiff-

Appellant.

Alyssa B. O’Gallagher, Benjamin H. Torrance, Assistant

United States Attorneys, for Damian Williams, United

States Attorney for the Southern District of New York,

New York, NY, for Defendants-Appellees.

PARK, Circuit Judge:

Pro se Plaintiff Gnana Chinniah filed a whistleblower claim

against his former employer, the Federal Energy Regulatory

Commission (“FERC”), and his former supervisors in the United

States District Court for the Southern District of New York. But

before doing so, Chinniah failed to exhaust his administrative

remedies as required by the Whistleblower Protection Act of 1989

(“WPA”) and the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978 (“CSRA”). The

district court (Broderick, J.) thus dismissed the claim for lack of

subject-matter jurisdiction. We affirm.

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I. BACKGROUND

Chinniah began working as a civil engineer for FERC in New

York in January 2017. 1 His supervisor, Defendant Prapa Haran,

required employees to sign in and out every day on a sheet in Haran’s

office. On July 13, 2017, Chinniah went to sign in around 7:35 am

and noticed that a different employee had already “signed in” at 8:30

am. He reported this to Haran, but Haran “never showed any

interest to follow up on this incident.” App’x at 23.

Chinniah then reported the incident to Haran’s supervisor,

Defendant John Spain. Chinniah alleges that Spain “downplayed”

the incident and explained that the employee may have signed in and

then “left the office to perform dam safety inspections.” Id.

Chinniah insisted on scheduling a meeting to investigate the incident.

Spain agreed to hold a meeting, and Chinniah sent an email to

confirm the meeting with Spain but also copied other employees on

the email. Spain then allegedly “came rushing into” Chinniah’s

cubicle and “whispered threats using derogatory language.” Id. at

24. As Spain returned to his office, Chinniah followed him while

“asking him to repeat what [he] said or give the same in writing” in a

loud voice. Id. at 24–25. Spain then ordered that Chinniah be

removed from the building, but Chinniah left voluntarily.

The next week, Chinniah said that he “did not feel fit to return

to work” and requested sick leave. Spain informed Chinniah that he

had been placed on administrative leave. Two months later,

Chinniah was fired.

1 All factual allegations are taken from Chinniah’s Amended

Complaint, App’x at 20–33, which we accept as true on a motion to dismiss.

Celestin v. Caribbean Air Mail, Inc., 30 F.4th 133, 136 n.1 (2d Cir. 2022).

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Chinniah sued FERC, Haran, and Spain (“Defendants”) in

federal district court. Chinniah primarily claimed that he was

terminated in violation of the WPA. He also raised claims for

conspiracy and discrimination under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and claims for

invasion of privacy and defamation under New York law. The

district court dismissed Chinniah’s WPA claim for lack of subject-

matter jurisdiction because he failed to exhaust administrative

remedies. Chinniah v. Fed. Energy Regul. Comm’n, No. 18-CV-8261,

2022 WL 392904, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 9, 2022). The district court

dismissed the remaining federal claims for failure to allege any

protected characteristic and because FERC and its officers were

entitled to sovereign immunity. Id. at *5–6. Finally, the district

court dismissed the state-law claims as preempted by the CSRA and

because in any event, it would decline to exercise supplemental

jurisdiction. Id. at *6 & n.8. Chinniah appealed.

II. DISCUSSION

“We review de novo a district court’s grant of a motion to

dismiss under Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6).” Palmer v. Amazon.com,

Inc., 51 F.4th 491, 503 (2d Cir. 2022). As a pro se plaintiff, Chinniah

is entitled to liberal construction of his pleadings and briefs.

Publicola v. Lomenzo, 54 F.4th 108, 111 (2d Cir. 2022) (per curiam).

A. Whistleblower Protection Act Claim

We affirm the district court’s dismissal of Chinniah’s

whistleblower claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1)

for failure to exhaust administrative remedies.

1. Legal Standards

“Under the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978 (CSRA), 5 U.S.C.

§ 1101 et seq., certain federal employees may obtain administrative

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and judicial review of specified adverse employment actions.” Elgin

v. Dep’t of Treasury, 567 U.S. 1, 5 (2012). The CSRA “prescribes in

great detail the protections and remedies applicable to adverse

personnel actions against federal employees.” Id. at 11 (cleaned up).

Its “elaborate framework demonstrates Congress’ intent to entirely

foreclose . . . extrastatutory review . . . to those employees to whom

the CSRA grants administrative and judicial review.” Id. (cleaned

up).

The WPA is part of the CSRA and prohibits certain federal

employees from taking adverse personnel actions against “any

employee” 2 for reporting “any violation of any law, rule, or

regulation, or . . . gross mismanagement, a gross waste of funds, an

abuse of authority, or a substantial and specific danger to public

health or safety.” 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8)(A). “The CSRA and the

WPA are integrated into a single statutory scheme.” Kerr v. Jewell,

836 F.3d 1048, 1058 (9th Cir. 2016).

Under the CSRA, employees with WPA claims must generally

“seek corrective action from the [Office of] Special Counsel” and then

“the [Merit Systems Protection] Board.” 5 U.S.C. § 1214(a)(3); see also

id. § 1221(a), (b). “A petition to review a final order . . . of the Board”

that raises a claim under only the WPA “shall be filed in the United

2 The CSRA excludes probationary employees from its definition of

“employee.” 5 U.S.C. § 7511(a)(1). The WPA provides some remedies to

probationary employees for whistleblowing activities. See 5 U.S.C. § 1221;

see also Wren v. Merit Sys. Prot. Bd., 681 F.2d 867, 875 (D.C. Cir. 1982). The

parties dispute whether Chinniah was a probationary employee at the time

of his termination. We need not resolve the issue because Chinniah was

required to exhaust administrative remedies whether he was a

probationary employee or not.

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States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit or any court of

appeals.” Id. § 7703(b)(1)(B); see also Mount v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec.,

937 F.3d 37, 42 (1st Cir. 2019).

As several of our sister circuits have held, “the CSRA provides

the exclusive remedy for claims brought pursuant to the WPA.”

Richards v. Kiernan, 461 F.3d 880, 885 (7th Cir. 2006); see also Stella v.

Mineta, 284 F.3d 135, 142 (D.C. Cir. 2002). “Under the CSRA,

exhaustion of administrative remedies is a jurisdictional prerequisite

to suit.” Weaver v. U.S. Info. Agency, 87 F.3d 1429, 1433 (D.C. Cir.

1996); see also Kerr, 836 F.3d at 1058 (explaining that the CSRA’s

administrative exhaustion requirement applies equally to WPA

claims).

2. Failure to Exhaust Administrative Remedies

The district court correctly dismissed Chinniah’s WPA claim

for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. Chinniah did not file a

complaint with the Office of Special Counsel or the Merit Systems

Protection Board, as required by the CSRA. See 5 U.S.C. § 1214(a)(3).

Instead, he went straight to federal court. The district court thus

lacked “jurisdiction to entertain a whistleblower cause of action . . . in

the first instance” because Chinniah failed to follow the proper

administrative process. See Stella, 284 F.3d at 142.

Chinniah’s arguments to the contrary are unavailing. First, he

notes that the CSRA sometimes permits WPA claims to proceed in

district court as part of a “mixed case.” Specifically, when “an

employee complains of a personnel action serious enough to appeal

to the MSPB and alleges that the action was based on discrimination,”

Kloeckner v. Solis, 568 U.S. 41, 44 (2012), there may be “several

procedural paths” through administrative exhaustion, Bonds v.

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Leavitt, 629 F.3d 369, 378 (4th Cir. 2011). But this is not such a case.

Chinniah did not allege discrimination based on a protected

characteristic under Title VII, which is required in mixed cases. And

in any event, administrative exhaustion—whether jurisdictional or

not—would still be required, even if it may be accomplished in

different ways in mixed cases. See Jonson v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp.,

877 F.3d 52, 56 (1st Cir. 2017) (“[A]n employee who fails to exhaust

available administrative remedies under the CSRA is precluded from

bringing a mixed case in federal district court.”).

Second, Chinniah’s argument that his failure to exhaust should

be excused on equitable grounds is meritless. With respect to all the

issues as to which we lack jurisdiction, we note that we have “no

authority to create equitable exceptions to jurisdictional

requirements.” Bowles v. Russell, 551 U.S. 205, 214 (2007). And, in

any event, Chinniah offers no reason why he should be granted such

an equitable exception. In sum, the district court correctly

determined that it lacked jurisdiction over Chinniah’s WPA claim.

B. Remaining Claims

We also affirm the district court’s disposition of Chinniah’s

remaining claims. First, FERC is protected by sovereign immunity.

See Robinson v. Overseas Mil. Sales Corp., 21 F.3d 502, 510 (2d Cir. 1994).

Second, the CSRA process subsumes other state and federal claims

related to federal employment. See Elgin, 567 U.S. at 22–23; Bush v.

Lucas, 462 U.S. 367, 381–90 (1983). Third, Chinniah’s other federal

causes of action failed to state a claim upon which relief could be

granted because he failed to plead actionable discrimination or a

conspiracy. Chinniah, 2022 WL 392904, at *5. Fourth, the district

court did not abuse its discretion by declining to exercise

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supplemental jurisdiction over Chinniah’s state-law claims. See

Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. ex rel. Saint Vincent Cath. Med. Ctrs. Ret. Plan

v. Morgan Stanley Inv. Mgmt. Inc., 712 F.3d 705, 727 (2d Cir. 2013) (“[I]n

the usual case in which all federal-law claims are eliminated before

trial, the balance of factors . . . will point toward declining to exercise

jurisdiction over the remaining state-law claims.” (internal quotation

marks omitted)). Finally, it was also not an abuse of discretion to

deny further leave to amend. Even setting aside Chinniah’s failure

to seek further leave to amend from the district court and the fact that

any allegations of race-based discrimination are conclusory, his

discrimination claim would not save his case because he still failed to

exhaust administrative remedies through any of the “several

procedural paths” available to litigants in a “mixed case.” See Bonds,

629 F.3d at 378; Melendez v. Sirius XM Radio, Inc., 50 F.4th 294, 309 (2d

Cir. 2022) (“[A] plaintiff need not be given leave to amend if he fails

to specify . . . how amendment would cure the pleading deficiencies

in his complaint.” (cleaned up)).

III. CONCLUSION

We have considered Chinniah’s remaining arguments and find

them to be without merit. We accordingly affirm the judgment of

the district court.

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