Aneta Hadzi-Tanovic v. Robert Johnson

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

____________________

No. 21-3373

ANETA HADZI-TANOVIC, individually

and as natural mother and next friend

for SP, MP and KP, all minors,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

ROBERT W. JOHNSON,

DAVID PETER PASULKA, and

SLOBODAN M. PAVLOVICH,

Defendants-Appellees.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.

No. 1:20-cv-03460 — John J. Tharp, Jr., Judge.

____________________

ARGUED OCTOBER 26, 2022 — DECIDED MARCH 14, 2023

____________________

Before ROVNER, HAMILTON, and BRENNAN, Circuit Judges.

HAMILTON, Circuit Judge. This case arises out of a custody

dispute between plaintiff Aneta Hadzi-Tanovic and her for-

mer husband, defendant Slobodan Pavlovich, in an Illinois

state court. After the state court issued an order requiring that

2 No. 21-3373

Hadzi-Tanovic’s parenting time with her children be super-

vised, she filed this action in federal court. She brings claims

under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985 against her ex-husband, the

children’s guardian ad litem, and the state court judge. She

alleges the three conspired to violate her and her children’s

rights to family association and her right to a fair and unbi-

ased trier of fact. The district court dismissed her complaint

on abstention grounds. Hadzi-Tanovic v. Johnson, 2021 WL

5505541 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 24, 2021). Hadzi-Tanovic has appealed.

Hadzi-Tanovic’s is the latest case in which a losing party

in a state court divorce proceeding seeks to continue the liti-

gation in federal court. We acknowledge the high stakes in-

volved in divorce and custody disputes. We understand the

natural temptation for losing parties to keep fighting and to

look for new forums. Nevertheless, it is well established that

federal district and circuit courts do not have jurisdiction to

review such state court decisions. This appeal presents two

recurring questions in applying this jurisdictional doctrine,

known as the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, to divorce proceed-

ings. 1

The first concerns the Rooker-Feldman finality requirement

as applied to divorce cases in which a state court provides on-

going supervision of a family, especially concerning child cus-

tody and visitation issues. The second concerns whether

claims that state courts are corrupt can avoid application of

the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. As we explain below, on the first

point, the state court order that Hadzi-Tanovic challenges

1 The doctrine takes its name from Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S.

413 (1923), and District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462

(1983).

No. 21-3373 3

here is final, so the Rooker-Feldman doctrine may apply to her

attempt to have the federal courts review it. On the second

point, we conclude that allegations of state court corruption

are not sufficient to avoid application of the Rooker-Feldman

doctrine. We also expressly overrule holdings in a handful of

our prior cases to the effect that a party who loses in state

court can avoid Rooker-Feldman by alleging that the state

courts who ruled against her were corrupt, or at least suffi-

ciently corrupt. We affirm the dismissal of this action.

I. Factual and Procedural Background

Hadzi-Tanovic’s complaint alleges the following facts,

which we accept as true for purposes of deciding whether we

have subject matter jurisdiction, at least in the absence of de-

bates over facts affecting jurisdiction. E.g., Evers v. Astrue, 536

F.3d 654, 656–57 (7th Cir. 2008); see generally McNutt v. Gen-

eral Motors Acceptance Corp., 298 U.S. 178, 184 (1936); Long v.

Shorebank Development Corp., 182 F.3d 548, 554 (7th Cir. 1999)

(applying Rooker-Feldman doctrine; district court may look be-

yond jurisdictional allegations of complaint and consider ev-

idence and decide factual issues affecting jurisdiction).

A. State Court Proceedings

Defendant Pavlovich filed for divorce in an Illinois state

court in October 2014. Hadzi-Tanovic and Pavlovich each ac-

cused the other of abusing their three minor children. On Au-

gust 29, 2016, the court appointed defendant David Pasulka

as guardian ad litem for the children. The case was assigned

to defendant Judge Robert Johnson on March 15, 2017.

Hadzi-Tanovic and Pavlovich agreed to terms that split

custody fifty-fifty, and on July 25, 2017, Judge Johnson en-

tered a final judgment of dissolution of their marriage. Hadzi-

4 No. 21-3373

Tanovic appealed the judgment of dissolution, and the Illinois

appellate court affirmed. In re Marriage of Pavlovich, 133 N.E.3d

1, 14 (Ill. App. 2019).

That decision did not end the couple’s disagreements.

Hadzi-Tanovic and Pavlovich continued to fight about their

children, including their participation in school band and or-

chestra. Hadzi-Tanovic alleges that Pavlovich abused their

son after he expressed his desire to participate in band. In Jan-

uary 2018, she took her son to the police station to report the

alleged abuse. As required by state law, the police in turn re-

ported the allegations to the Illinois Department of Children

and Family Services, which directed the children’s school not

to release the children to Pavlovich.

In response, on February 13, 2018, Pavlovich filed an emer-

gency motion seeking either to suspend Hadzi-Tanovic’s par-

enting time or to require that her parenting time be super-

vised on the ground that she interfered with his parenting

time. At a hearing the next day, guardian ad litem (and de-

fendant here) Pasulka testified that, in his opinion, Pavlovich

posed no threat to his children. Judge Johnson ordered that

Pavlovich’s parenting time be made up and that Hadzi-Ta-

novic not interfere with his parenting time.

Also on February 14, 2018, Pavlovich sought court relief

for what he alleged had been Hadzi-Tanovic’s interference

with his parenting time. Judge Johnson set a hearing, for

which Pasulka submitted a report. In his report, Pasulka ex-

plained that he believed that Hadzi-Tanovic had pressured

the children to lie about Pavlovich’s supposed abuse. Pasulka

recommended that Judge Johnson revoke Hadzi-Tanovic’s

right to weekday visitation. On May 3, 2018, Judge Johnson

No. 21-3373 5

found Hadzi-Tanovic in indirect civil contempt for interfering

with Pavlovich’s parenting time.

After Hadzi-Tanovic was found in contempt, Pavlovich

filed another petition seeking to restrict Hadzi-Tanovic’s par-

enting time. Judge Johnson held another hearing, and Pasulka

testified that, in his opinion, Hadzi-Tanovic’s parenting time

should be supervised. On June 13, 2018, Judge Johnson or-

dered that all of Hadzi-Tanovic’s parenting time be super-

vised after finding that she had “engaged in conduct that se-

riously endangered the parties’ minor children’s mental and

moral health and significantly impaired the children’s emo-

tional development.” Hadzi-Tanovic filed a notice of appeal,

but after she failed to file an opening brief, the appellate court

dismissed the appeal in January 2020.

In July 2020, the Illinois Attorney Registration and Disci-

plinary Commission (ARDC) filed an ethics complaint against

Pasulka accusing him of sexual abuse, some instances of

which related to his duties as guardian ad litem. Following

these accusations, Hadzi-Tanovic filed a petition in state court

requesting that all orders in her case entered after April 20,

2017 be vacated. She filed her petition under section 2-1401 of

the Illinois Code of Civil Procedure, 735 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/2-

1401, which allows collateral challenges to otherwise final

judgments. See In re Marriage of Labuz, 54 N.E.3d 886, 896 (Ill.

App. 2016). At the time briefs were filed in this court, Hadzi-

Tanovic’s motion to vacate remained pending in state court.

B. Hadzi-Tanovic’s Federal Lawsuit

On June 12, 2020, Hadzi-Tanovic sued Judge Johnson,

guardian ad litem Pasulka, and ex-husband Pavlovich in fed-

eral court. She brought two federal conspiracy claims, under

6 No. 21-3373

42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985(3), as well as state law claims for

abuse of process and intentional infliction of emotional dis-

tress. In her complaint, Hadzi-Tanovic alleged that the de-

fendants conspired to deprive her and her children of their

right to familial association in violation of the Fourteenth

Amendment’s Due Process clause. She also alleged that the

defendants had conspired to corrupt the state court divorce

proceedings, violating her right to a fair tribunal under the

Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantee of due process of law.

She sought compensatory and punitive damages.

All three defendants moved to dismiss for failure to state

a claim pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).

Judge Johnson also moved to dismiss for lack of subject matter

jurisdiction under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1).

The district court declined to exercise jurisdiction on absten-

tion grounds and granted Judge Johnson’s motion.

In his motion to dismiss, Judge Johnson invoked several

doctrines that restrict access to the federal courts: Rooker-Feld-

man, abstention under Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971),

and the domestic-relations exception to federal jurisdiction.

The district court concluded that none of these doctrines was

a “perfect fit for the facts of this case,” but it concluded that

dismissal was warranted on general abstention principles.

Hadzi-Tanovic, 2021 WL 5505541, at *4.

The court reasoned that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine did

not apply for two reasons. First, the court questioned whether

Hadzi-Tanovic’s suit concerned a final order, as Rooker-Feld-

man requires, given both the state court’s ongoing supervision

of custody and child support arrangements and her pending

motion for relief from the June 13, 2018 order. Second, relying

on this court’s decisions in Nesses v. Shepard, 68 F.3d 1003 (7th

No. 21-3373 7

Cir. 1995), and Loubser v. Thacker, 440 F.3d 439 (7th Cir. 2006),

the court concluded that Rooker-Feldman did not bar Hadzi-

Tanovic’s suit because she alleged corruption in the state

court proceedings. The court also concluded that Younger ab-

stention, the domestic-relations exception, and Burford ab-

stention (see Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315 (1943)) did not

apply to the facts of this case. 2021 WL 5505541, at *5.

The district court concluded that abstention was neverthe-

less appropriate. The court wrote that finding in Hadzi-Ta-

novic’s favor would require the federal court to “examine and

criticize” the state court’s application of family law and to find

that official actions of the state court judge and guardian ad

litem were part of a conspiracy. A judgment in Hadzi-Ta-

novic’s favor could then be used to interfere with the state

court proceedings, and that, the court concluded, would be an

“unacceptable intrusion into the domain of the state domestic

relations court.” 2021 WL 5505541, at *6. The court entered a

final judgment dismissing Hadzi-Tanovic’s case without prej-

udice.

II. Analysis

Our analysis begins with appellate jurisdiction. Many dis-

missals of civil cases without prejudice are not appealable, but

the dismissal here was final and appealable because the dis-

trict court entered a final judgment on a basis that “effectively

precludes re-filing” in federal court. Lee v. Cook County, 635

F.3d 969, 972 (7th Cir. 2011); accord, Nuñez v. Indiana Dep’t of

Child Servs., 817 F.3d 1042, 1044 (7th Cir. 2016).

We next focus on subject matter jurisdiction. If the federal

courts lack subject matter jurisdiction, then we can go no fur-

ther and must dismiss the suit. Jakupovic v. Curran, 850 F.3d

8 No. 21-3373

898, 902 (7th Cir. 2017). Under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine,

the federal courts have no jurisdiction over Hadzi-Tanovic’s

claims, so we affirm the district court’s dismissal.

The Rooker-Feldman doctrine is an important foundation

for the division of power between federal and state courts.

The doctrine imposes a “jurisdictional bar” that prohibits fed-

eral courts other than the Supreme Court of the United States

from reviewing final state court judgments. Andrade v. City of

Hammond, 9 F.4th 947, 948 (7th Cir. 2021). The doctrine reflects

the fact that “[l]ower federal courts are not vested with appel-

late authority over state courts.” Sykes v. Cook County Circuit

Court Prob. Div., 837 F.3d 736, 741 (7th Cir. 2016). Conse-

quently, “no matter how wrong a state court judgment may

be under federal law,” Rooker-Feldman acknowledges that

“only the Supreme Court of the United States has jurisdiction

to review it.” Id. at 742.

Rooker-Feldman applies to “cases brought by state-court

losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court judg-

ments rendered before the district court proceedings com-

menced and inviting district court review and rejection of

those judgments.” Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Industries

Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005). The doctrine is limited to fed-

eral claims that “‘directly’ challenge a state court judgment or

are ‘inextricably intertwined with one.’” Andrade, 9 F.4th at

950, quoting Swartz v. Heartland Equine Rescue, 940 F.3d 387,

391 (7th Cir. 2019). To determine whether a plaintiff’s federal

claims are inextricably intertwined with the state court judg-

ment, we ask whether the plaintiff alleges an injury “caused

by the state court judgment.” Sykes, 837 F.3d at 742. Put an-

other way, we ask “whether the district court is essentially be-

ing called upon to review the state court decision.” Jakupovic,

No. 21-3373 9

850 F.3d at 902. If not, and if the plaintiff’s alleged injury is

“independent” of the judgment, then Rooker-Feldman does not

bar federal court jurisdiction. Andrade, 9 F.4th at 950. Finally,

Rooker-Feldman applies only where the federal “plaintiff had a

reasonable opportunity to raise the [federal] issue in state

court proceedings.” Jakupovic, 850 F.3d at 902. We consider

these requirements in turn.

A. Final State Court Judgment

The challenged state court judgment in this case was “ren-

dered before the district court proceedings commenced,” so

that Hadzi-Tanovic was a “state-court loser.” Judge Johnson

issued his order requiring that her parenting time be super-

vised on June 13, 2018. Hadzi-Tanovic filed a notice of appeal,

but the Illinois appellate court dismissed her appeal for want

of prosecution on January 13, 2020. Judge Johnson’s order was

therefore final well before Hadzi-Tanovic filed this federal

lawsuit on June 12, 2020. See Parker v. Lyons, 757 F.3d 701, 705–

06 (7th Cir. 2014) (holding that Rooker-Feldman does not apply

if state court appeal of challenged judgment is pending when

federal suit is filed).

The district court questioned on two grounds whether the

order was final. First, the court noted that the order might not

be final given the state court’s “continuing management” of

child custody issues. We understand the concern, but Hadzi-

Tanovic is challenging an order that was final when she filed

this federal lawsuit. “State law determines the finality of a

state judicial decision.” Mehta v. Attorney Registration & Disci-

plinary Comm’n, 681 F.3d 885, 887 (7th Cir. 2012) (finding that,

because state law so provided, a state court “interim” order

suspending plaintiff’s attorney license was final for purposes

of Rooker-Feldman). Here, the June 13, 2018 order was entered

10 No. 21-3373

pursuant to the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage

Act, 750 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/603.10, and “supersede[d]” the cou-

ple’s prior allocation judgment. As such, the order was a final

judgment immediately appealable under Illinois Supreme

Court Rule 304(b)(6), which permits appeals from a “custody

or allocation of parental responsibilities judgment or modifi-

cation of such judgment” entered pursuant to the Marriage

Act. See Ill. Sup. Ct. R. 304 (“Appeals from Final Judgments

that do not Dispose of an Entire Proceeding”). Judge John-

son’s June 13, 2018 order was therefore final for Rooker-Feld-

man purposes even though the state court may modify the or-

der in the future. 2

2 State courts often enter non-final orders as part of their management

of divorce and custody proceedings. In Illinois, for example, a court may

enter a temporary allocation of parental responsibilities before a final al-

location judgment is entered. 750 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/603.5(a). Such orders

are not final and therefore not automatically appealable, though a party

may petition the appellate court for leave to file an interlocutory appeal.

Ill. Sup. Ct. R. 306(a)(5). Where Rooker-Feldman does not apply because of

a lack of final judgment, other doctrines usually apply to block federal ju-

risdiction to review such orders in divorce cases. Federal jurisdiction will

in some cases be barred by Younger abstention or the domestic-relations

exception. See, e.g., Brunken v. Lance, 807 F.2d 1325, 1330–31 (7th Cir. 1986)

(Younger abstention barred consideration of father’s claims that his due

process rights were violated when he was not given notice of a hearing to

place his daughter in protective custody after he was accused of abusing

her); Allen v. Allen, 48 F.3d 259, 261 (7th Cir. 1995) (domestic-relations ex-

ception barred district court from exercising jurisdiction over husband’s

suit challenging state visitation and custody orders); see generally Younger

v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971). And, in domestic relations cases where no

abstention doctrine fits exactly, we have held that abstention is neverthe-

less appropriate where federal jurisdiction “threaten[s] interference with

and disruption of local family law proceedings.” J.B. v. Woodard, 997 F.3d

714, 723 (7th Cir. 2021).

No. 21-3373 11

Second, the district court also questioned whether the

June 13, 2018 order should be considered final given Hadzi-

Tanovic’s pending motion to vacate in response to the

ARDC’s charges against guardian ad litem Pasulka. The mo-

tion to vacate does not defeat application of Rooker-Feldman.

After the ARDC filed its complaint against Pasulka in July

2020, Hadzi-Tanovic filed a section 2-1401 petition to vacate

the June 13, 2018 order and all other orders entered in her case

after April 20, 2017. See 735 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/2-1401. Section

2-1401 petitions are treated as collateral attacks on final judg-

ments; they are not direct appeals. People v. Mathis, 827 N.E.2d

932, 936 (Ill. App. 2005); 735 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/2-1401(a)

(providing relief “from final orders and judgments”). A peti-

tion under section 2-1401 must be filed “in the same proceed-

ing in which the order or judgment was entered but is not a

continuation thereof.” 735 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/2-1401(b). To the

contrary, a section 2-1401 petition “commences a new and

separate cause of action.” Price v. Philip Morris, Inc., 43 N.E.3d

53, 60 (Ill. 2015). Because Hadzi-Tanovic’s section 2-1401 peti-

tion is a collateral attack and not a direct appeal, it did not

alter the finality of Judge Johnson’s June 13, 2018 order for

purposes of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.

B. Independent Injury

Next, we consider whether Hadzi-Tanovic has alleged an

injury independent of the state court judgment. Her com-

plaint identifies two injuries: the deprivation of her and her

children’s right to familial association and the deprivation of

her right to a fair and unbiased trier of fact.

12 No. 21-3373

1. Familial Association

The plaintiffs’ alleged loss of familial association is not an

injury independent of the state court judgment. The com-

plaint traces plaintiffs’ alleged injury directly to Judge John-

son’s June 13, 2018 order: “By this June 13, 2018 ruling,

[Hadzi-Tanovic] suffered severe damages from the loss of her

parenting time that caused her to lose the companionship,

love and affection of her three minor children and the three

minor children lost their right to be raised by their mother in

a normal family home.” Where, as here, the plaintiff’s injury

is “effectuated” by the state court judgment, the Rooker-Feld-

man doctrine deprives lower federal courts of jurisdiction.

Swartz, 940 F.3d at 391. For a federal court to find that the state

court deprived plaintiffs of their constitutional right to famil-

ial association, the federal court would have to find that the

state court erred in applying state family law. This Rooker-

Feldman forbids. See id. (Rooker-Feldman barred jurisdiction

where finding for plaintiffs, who alleged that their animals

were seized in violation of Fourth and Fourteenth Amend-

ments, would “call into question the state court’s judgment

that there was probable cause the animals were being ne-

glected”).

2. Fair and Unbiased Trier of Fact

Hadzi-Tanovic also argues that she was injured when the

defendants “corruptly conspired” to interfere with her right

to a fair and impartial trier of fact. She alleges that Judge John-

son’s rulings showed “outrageous, unconstitutional, inten-

tional bias.” For example, she complains that Judge Johnson

scheduled immediate hearings for motions filed by Pavlovich,

but scheduled hearings far into the future on motions she

filed, giving her ex-husband an unfair advantage. She also

No. 21-3373 13

criticizes Judge Johnson’s alleged refusal to consider evidence

she offered. In support of her claim that the defendants con-

spired together to corrupt the proceedings, she alleges that

“unlawful extrajudicial and ex parte communications” took

place between Pasulka and Judge Johnson and that Pasulka’s

testimony was “unrealistic, unbelievable and clearly false.”

As noted above, we must treat these allegations as true for

purposes of this appeal.

Hadzi-Tanovic argues that, because she claims to have

been injured by defendants’ corruption of the state court pro-

ceedings, her injury is independent of the state court judg-

ment for purposes of Rooker-Feldman. This theory would seem

to open a large loophole in the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, and it

has not been endorsed by the Supreme Court. Nevertheless,

Hadzi-Tanovic finds some support in several decisions from

this court beginning with Nesses v. Shepard, and these cases

understandably led the district court to decline to rely on the

Rooker-Feldman doctrine. We have reviewed these cases care-

fully and conclude here that the holdings in Nesses and

Loubser, as well as Parker v. Lyons, recognizing a “corruption

exception” to Rooker-Feldman should be overruled.

Starting with Nesses, the plaintiff there lost a breach of con-

tract claim in state court and then sued his opponent’s counsel

in state court twice, alleging abuse of process. He lost both

times. He then sued the same lawyers as well as several state

judges in federal court under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Nesses alleged

“a massive, tentacular conspiracy” by the defendants to “en-

gineer” his defeat in state court. 68 F.3d at 1004. He also

claimed that counsel for his opponent had “used their politi-

cal clout to turn the state judges against him.” Id. The district

court dismissed Nesses’ suit, citing Rooker-Feldman. Id.

14 No. 21-3373

This court affirmed, based on res judicata and judicial im-

munity rather than Rooker-Feldman. We noted that applying

Rooker-Feldman to Nesses’ case posed “a difficult question,”

because he was “in a sense attacking” the state court’s rulings.

68 F.3d at 1004. We also acknowledged that, to show he was

injured by the alleged conspiracy, he would have to show that

the state court decision was erroneous, which Rooker-Feldman

would seem to forbid. Id. at 1005. But we concluded that

Rooker-Feldman was “not that broad.” Id. While the doctrine

would prevent Nesses from having a federal court find that

the state court judgment was merely incorrect, “if [Nesses]

claims, as he does, that people involved in the decision vio-

lated some independent right of his, such as the right (if it is

a right) to be judged by a tribunal that is uncontaminated by

politics,” then Rooker-Feldman did not apply. Id. Otherwise,

we reasoned, “there would be no federal remedy for a viola-

tion of federal rights whenever the violator so far succeeded

in corrupting the state judicial process as to obtain a favorable

judgment,” a conclusion we thought inconsistent with Den-

nis v. Sparks, 449 U.S. 24 (1980), and with § 1983 suits against

police officers who fabricate evidence leading to wrongful

convictions. Id. Nevertheless, we affirmed dismissal of

Nesses’ suit on other grounds, finding that res judicata pre-

vented him from suing the same attorneys for the same al-

leged wrongdoing after he lost in state court, while judicial

immunity barred his claims against the state court judges. Id.

at 1005–06.

We applied this reasoning in Nesses to a divorce case in

Loubser v. Thacker. Loubser sued forty people, including state

court judges and court reporters, whom she accused of con-

spiring to ruin her financially and to corrupt her state court

divorce proceedings in violation of her right to due process of

No. 21-3373 15

law. Some of Loubser’s accusations, we noted, bordered on

the “fantastic.” 440 F.3d at 441. She accused defendants of de-

stroying title documents and other evidence essential to her

divorce proceedings, alleged that court reporters and her own

lawyers altered court transcripts, and charged her counsel

with failing to present critical evidence. She also accused the

presiding judge of “consort[ing] improperly” with her ex-

husband and his witnesses. Id. After the district court dis-

missed her suit as barred by Rooker-Feldman and the domestic-

relations exception, Loubser appealed.

We reversed in part, finding that Rooker-Feldman posed no

obstacle to Loubser’s suit because she had alleged that de-

fendants “so far succeeded in corrupting the state judicial pro-

cess as to obtain a favorable judgment.” 440 F.3d at 441, quot-

ing Nesses, 68 F.3d at 1005. We reasoned that holding other-

wise would leave Loubser with no federal remedy other than

appeal to the Supreme Court of the United States, which

would be “ineffectual because the plaintiff could not present

evidence showing that the judicial proceeding had been a

farce.” Id. at 441–42. We affirmed the district court’s dismissal

of the defendant judges, who were entitled to absolute im-

munity, but we reversed and remanded as to the other de-

fendants. Id. at 442–43. 3

3 On remand, the district court dismissed a defendant employed by

the Indiana House of Representatives as well as several defendants whose

only involvement in the case was serving as witnesses in the state divorce

proceedings, all on immunity grounds. Loubser v. Pala, 497 F. Supp. 2d 934,

939–41 (N.D. Ind. 2007). The court also dismissed the court reporters from

the action because Loubser’s complaint failed to plead adequately that she

was disadvantaged by alleged errors in the transcripts or that the court

reporters were more than negligent. Id. at 940. Claims against the remain-

ing defendants proceeded to discovery, after which all defendants were

16 No. 21-3373

We again relied on the corruption portion of Nesses in Par-

ker v. Lyons. Plaintiff Parker tried to run for a seat on a local

school board, and Lyons, the state’s attorney for the county,

filed suit in state court to block his candidacy on the ground

that a prior felony conviction disqualified him from running.

757 F.3d at 704. The state court enjoined Parker from running.

Id. Parker then sued Lyons and others in federal court. He

challenged the Illinois statute that worked his disqualification

as facially unconstitutional, and he alleged that its enforce-

ment deprived him of equal protection of the law. Id. at 705.

Relevant here, he also accused Lyons of denying him due pro-

cess of law by “arrang[ing] for the case to be heard by [Lyons’]

good friend” and providing Parker with “wholly inadequate

notice.” Id. The district court dismissed his suit on several

grounds, including Rooker-Feldman. Id.

This court ultimately affirmed dismissal of Parker’s suit,

but we found that Rooker-Feldman did not bar his due process

claim for two reasons. 757 F.3d at 705. First, Parker had ap-

pealed the state court’s ruling, and his appeal was pending

when he filed his federal lawsuit. Because the state court pro-

ceedings had not concluded when Parker initiated his federal

lawsuit, Rooker-Feldman did not apply (though in such circum-

stances, federal courts would have powerful reasons to ab-

stain until the state courts resolved the matter). Id. at 706.

Second, Parker accused Lyons of “vitiat[ing] the state-

court process by collaborating with a friendly judge to rush

the case to a foreordained judgment.” 757 F.3d at 706. Under

granted summary judgment. Loubser v. United States, 606 F. Supp. 2d 897,

916 (N.D. Ind. 2009); Loubser v. Indiana Abstract & Title Co., No. 4:04-cv-75-

AS, 2009 WL 1513140, at *4 (N.D. Ind. May 29, 2009).

No. 21-3373 17

the reasoning of Nesses, this alleged corruption of the state ju-

dicial process provided a second reason that Rooker-Feldman

did not bar his suit. Id. Nevertheless, we affirmed dismissal of

Parker’s due process claim against Lyons. The Eleventh

Amendment barred Parker’s suit against Lyons in his official

capacity, while absolute prosecutorial immunity blocked Par-

ker’s suit against Lyons in his individual capacity. Id.

Our more recent decision in Bauer v. Koester, 951 F.3d 863

(7th Cir. 2020), limited the corruption rationale in Nesses. In

Bauer, a state court foreclosure action resulted in the tempo-

rary loss of the Bauers’ property. The Bauers sued, among

others, their state court attorneys, opposing counsel, the state

court clerks, and the presiding state court judge. The Bauers

claimed that they were denied their rights to due process,

equal protection, and an unbiased trier of fact. They alleged

that the defendants, including the state judge, “conspired to

introduce a forged version of the escrow account into evi-

dence during the foreclosure trial” and that the judge and

court clerk “allowed the foreclosure plaintiffs to issue baseless

citations to discover assets.” Id. at 866.

The district court dismissed the case on Rooker-Feldman,

and we affirmed. The source of the Bauers’ alleged injury was

the state court judgment: “were it not for the state court’s fore-

closure order and order awarding additional interest, no in-

jury would have resulted from the allegedly forged escrow

exhibit or the citations to discover assets.” 951 F.3d at 866.

And, because “the defendants needed to prevail in the state

court to effectuate their alleged fraud,” we reasoned that ad-

judicating the Bauers’ claims would require us to evaluate the

state court’s judgments, which is prohibited by Rooker-Feld-

man. Id. We acknowledged that the Bauers had alleged

18 No. 21-3373

corruption in the state court, but we held that Rooker-Feldman

still blocked their federal suit because, unlike in Nesses and

Loubser, the Bauers did not “allege that a widespread conspir-

acy undermined the entirety of the state-court proceedings.”

Id. at 867. Instead, the Bauers “merely challenge[d]” two deci-

sions of the state court. Id.

As Judge Sykes observed in her separate opinion in

Loubser, the Nesses corruption exception “could consume the

Rooker–Feldman rule if interpreted too broadly,” though she

did not disagree with that portion of the majority opinion.

Loubser, 440 F.3d at 444 (Sykes, J., concurring in part and dis-

senting in part). Hadzi-Tanovic’s case provides the oppor-

tunity for us to reconsider the corruption language in Nesses

and to clarify the law in this circuit. For the reasons set out

below, we conclude that Nesses and its progeny were incorrect

in allowing allegations of state court corruption to defeat ap-

plication of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.

First and foremost, the Supreme Court has not even hinted

that Rooker-Feldman is subject to such a corruption exception,

and that exception opens up a sizable loophole in this im-

portant jurisdictional doctrine. Recall that an injury is not in-

dependent for purposes of Rooker-Feldman if it is “effectuated”

by the state court judgment, Swartz, 940 F.3d at 391, or if the

plaintiff’s claim essentially requires the federal court to re-

view the state court’s decision, Jakupovic, 850 F.3d at 902.

When a plaintiff alleges that she was injured by judicial bias

or corruption in state court proceedings, both of those

grounds for the doctrine can apply.

Imagine that Judge Johnson was indeed biased against

Hadzi-Tanovic, but he did not enter any orders against her.

How would she be injured? To be sure, Hadzi-Tanovic has a

No. 21-3373 19

right to a fair and unbiased trier of fact that is independent of

her right to familial association. But Rooker-Feldman looks not

to rights but to injuries. Hadzi-Tanovic was not harmed by al-

leged bias on the part of Judge Johnson until he entered the

June 13, 2018 order mandating that her parenting time be su-

pervised. Because her alleged injury was “effectuated” by the

state court judgment, Rooker-Feldman should still block her

federal suit.

As Judge Tharp observed in the district court, trying

Hadzi-Tanovic’s allegations of corruption would require a

federal court to review the state court’s decisions. Her com-

plaint invites the district court to ferret out the judge’s sup-

posed bias by examining the state court proceedings. She in-

sists that the “post-trial transcripts in this case provide over-

whelming proof that Associate Judge Johnson used the auspi-

ces of his office as judge to aid and abet the civil conspiracy

plan” of Pasulka and Pavlovich. And she alleges that Judge

Johnson’s rulings, including his evidentiary and scheduling

decisions, reveal “outrageous, unconstitutional, intentional

bias.”

We express no views on the merits of those allegations.

The problem here is that the only way a federal court could

determine the merits of those allegations would be to review

the state court’s handling of the case from top to bottom, sub-

stantively and procedurally. If the state court’s decisions ap-

peared to be well-grounded in law and fact and reached

through fair procedures, a federal court would presumably

conclude they were not rooted in bias or corruption. If the fed-

eral court found factual, legal, or procedural errors, the court

would have to consider whether the errors were ordinary er-

rors of a fallible human institution or instead the product of

20 No. 21-3373

corruption. Yet Rooker-Feldman is supposed to prohibit lower

federal courts from engaging in what amounts to appellate

review of state court decisions in this manner. See Sykes, 837

F.3d at 742 (“interlocutory orders entered prior to the final

disposition of state court lawsuits are not immune from the

jurisdiction-stripping powers of Rooker-Feldman”); Harold v.

Steel, 773 F.3d 884, 887 (7th Cir. 2014) (Rooker-Feldman forbids

lower federal courts from reviewing “evidence that state

judges consider” or procedures they “use to reach decisions”).

We are not unsympathetic to the argument, expressed in

Nesses, that our holding here means that “there would be no

federal remedy for a violation of federal rights whenever the

violator so far succeed[s] in corrupting the state judicial pro-

cess as to obtain a favorable judgment.” 68 F.3d at 1005. But

we ultimately think this concern in Nesses was misplaced.

First, the essence of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine is that “no

matter how wrong a state court judgment may be under fed-

eral law,” lower federal courts do not have jurisdiction to re-

view it. Sykes, 837 F.3d at 742. The Supreme Court acknowl-

edged in Rooker itself that state courts will sometimes err

when interpreting federal law. Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263

U.S. 413, 415–16 (1923) (holding that even if state court incor-

rectly decided constitutional issues, “no court of the United

States other than this Court could entertain a proceeding to

reverse or modify the judgment for errors of that character”);

see also District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460

U.S. 462, 486 (1983) (federal district courts do not have juris-

diction “over challenges to state-court decisions in particular

cases arising out of judicial proceedings even if those chal-

lenges allege that the state court’s action was unconstitu-

tional”). Even if important federal rights have been violated,

No. 21-3373 21

that does not give lower federal courts jurisdiction to review

state court judgments where Congress has not provided it.

Second, we are not convinced that overruling this circuit’s

corruption exception to Rooker-Feldman will actually deprive

plaintiffs of a federal remedy they would otherwise have. Our

review of cases in this circuit persuades us that even if Rooker-

Feldman did not bar Hadzi-Tanovic’s suit, claims like hers

would almost certainly founder on other grounds. Plaintiffs

alleging injuries arising from corruption in state court pro-

ceedings face a dense thicket of obstacles that prevent their

claims from proceeding to the merits. See Nesses, 68 F.3d at

1006 (claim dismissed on res judicata and immunity

grounds); Loubser, 440 F.3d at 442–43 (defendant judges dis-

missed on immunity grounds); Parker, 757 F.3d at 706 (claim

dismissed on Eleventh Amendment and immunity grounds).

We have found no cases in this circuit in which a federal court

actually undertook a merits review of a state court divorce

proceeding.

We see similar results in other circuits. Only one circuit,

the Third, has joined us in recognizing a corruption exception

to Rooker-Feldman. But the plaintiff in that case likewise failed

to progress to a review of its claims on the merits. In Great

Western Mining & Mineral Co. v. Fox Rothschild LLP, 615 F.3d

159, 162 (3d Cir. 2010), Great Western tried unsuccessfully to

vacate an arbitration award in state court on grounds of im-

proper failure to disclose potential conflicts of interest. Great

Western then sued in federal court, alleging that its state court

opponents conspired with state court judges to engineer its

loss. Id. at 171. Great Western charged that the state court’s

decisions were predetermined before the hearing, forcing it to

“litigate in a rigged system.” Id. Citing Nesses, the Third

22 No. 21-3373

Circuit held that Great Western alleged an independent injury

for purposes of Rooker-Feldman. Id. at 172–73. After finding ju-

risdiction, however, the Third Circuit affirmed dismissal of

Great Western’s claims after concluding that it had failed to

sufficiently plead a conspiracy among defendants. Id. at 178–

79.

For the reasons outlined above, we respectfully disagree

with Great Western insofar as it recognizes a corruption excep-

tion to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. We must stress, however,

that we expect rejection of that exception to produce little if

any change in the outcomes of cases. In cases where plaintiffs

try to avoid Rooker-Feldman by alleging that corruption in-

fected their state court proceedings, federal courts rarely if

ever reach the merits of the federal claims.

These practical concerns also persuade us that we should

overrule the Nesses corruption exception rather than only try

to limit its reach, as we did in Bauer. In Bauer, we chose not to

follow Nesses and Loubser, distinguishing them on the ground

that the Bauers had not alleged a “widespread conspiracy.”

951 F.3d at 867. Upon further consideration, we think that the

standard provided by Bauer will prove unduly difficult to ap-

ply and does not come to grips with the real tension between

the exception and Rooker-Feldman. District courts will be

called upon, at the pleading stage, to decide whether the

plaintiff has alleged enough of a conspiracy, measuring each

complaint against the allegations in Nesses, Loubser, and Bauer.

The standard would also give plaintiffs incentives to plead

ever more fantastic allegations of state court corruption to es-

cape Rooker-Feldman. Finally, and most important, limiting

Nesses to cases involving widespread corruption in the state

court proceedings would still call on federal courts to review

No. 21-3373 23

and evaluate state court judgments. As discussed above, this

task is inconsistent with the foundation of the Rooker-Feldman

doctrine. We agree with the result in Bauer but do not follow

further the approach taken in that case.

We must note two significant limits of our holding today.

First, we recognize that a handful of decisions from this court

have held that Rooker-Feldman does not apply where plaintiffs

seek damages for injuries caused not by state court corruption

but by the fraudulent conduct of state court opponents. See

Brokaw v. Weaver, 305 F.3d 660, 665 (7th Cir. 2002) (holding

that Rooker-Feldman did not bar plaintiff’s claim that “defend-

ants conspired—prior to any judicial involvement—to cause

false child neglect proceedings to be filed, resulting in her re-

moval from her home”); Johnson v. Pushpin Holdings, LLC, 748

F.3d 769, 773 (7th Cir. 2014) (explaining that Rooker-Feldman

does not bar federal suits seeking damages for fraud or other

unlawful conduct that misled the state court into issuing a

judgment adverse to federal plaintiff); but see Kelley v. Med-1

Solutions, LLC, 548 F.3d 600, 604–05 (7th Cir. 2008) (plaintiffs’

claims that they were injured by defendants’ fraudulent rep-

resentations and requests for attorneys’ fees—but not by the

state court’s order to pay—were barred by Rooker-Feldman; be-

cause defendants needed to prevail in state court to capitalize

on their alleged fraud, adjudicating plaintiffs’ claims would

require federal court to review the state court’s order); Harold,

773 F.3d at 886 (Rooker-Feldman barred plaintiff’s claim that

defendant debt collector violated Fair Debt Collection Prac-

tices Act by making false statements during state garnishment

proceeding; plaintiff was not injured until state court issued

its order).

24 No. 21-3373

These decisions relied on the corruption language in

Nesses, but they presented a different issue than that posed

here. Hadzi-Tanovic alleges that defendants, including Judge

Johnson, conspired to interfere with her right to a fair and un-

biased trier of fact, so we have focused on whether claims

based on alleged judicial corruption or bias can avoid the

Rooker-Feldman doctrine. Because the issue is not before us,

this decision does not speak to whether or under what cir-

cumstances allegations of fraud by state court opponents (act-

ing without the participation of the state court) escape Rooker-

Feldman.

Second, in Nesses, we justified our conclusion that Rooker-

Feldman did not bar plaintiff’s claims of corruption in state

court, in part, by observing that holding otherwise would be

“inconsistent” with cases in which law enforcement officers

are sued under § 1983 for fabricating evidence in state crimi-

nal trials. 68 F.3d at 1005. As we acknowledged in Nesses, how-

ever, individuals seeking damages for constitutional viola-

tions resulting from their state criminal convictions or sen-

tences may sue under § 1983 only after their convictions or

sentences have been set aside. Id., citing Heck v. Humphrey, 512

U.S. 477 (1994). Such cases under § 1983 do not require a fed-

eral court to review a final state court judgment.

Nesses also cited Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U.S. 24 (1980), in sup-

port of its corruption exception to Rooker-Feldman. In Dennis,

the federal plaintiffs sued a state court judge and their state

court opponents under § 1983, alleging that they had cor-

ruptly conspired to obtain and issue a state court order en-

joining plaintiffs from mining minerals in accordance with oil

leases they owned. The question before the Supreme Court

was whether the plaintiffs’ claims against the private parties

No. 21-3373 25

could proceed after the state court judge was dismissed from

the case. 449 U.S. at 26–27. Dennis—in which the Court never

hinted that the district court lacked jurisdiction—would thus

seem at first glance to support Nesses’ conclusion that allega-

tions of state court corruption evade Rooker-Feldman. In Den-

nis, however, the state appellate court had dissolved the in-

junction as illegally issued before plaintiffs filed their suit in

federal court. Id. at 25. As a result, the federal lawsuit did not

call on the federal courts to review and possibly to reverse the

judgment of a state court.

Hadzi-Tanovic’s case does not present—and so we need

not decide—the question whether Rooker-Feldman would bar

her claim if she filed her federal lawsuit after first obtaining

an order setting aside the relevant state court judgment. We

are not at all certain that suits alleging violations of federal

rights arising from state court civil proceedings that have later

been invalidated would call on us to “review and reject[ ]”

final state court judgments. See Exxon Mobil Corp., 544 U.S. at

284. But this case does not present that issue, so we reserve it

for another day. 4

C. Reasonable Opportunity to Raise in State Court

Last, we must assess whether Hadzi-Tanovic had a reason-

able opportunity to raise her federal issues in state court. In

determining whether a plaintiff had a reasonable opportunity

4 Because this opinion overrules portions of Nesses, Loubser, and Par-

ker, we have circulated this opinion among all active circuit judges pursu-

ant to Circuit Rule 40(e). A majority of active circuit judges voted not to

rehear the case en banc. Judges St. Eve and Kirsch voted in favor of rehear-

ing en banc. Judge Pryor did not participate in consideration of the rehear-

ing question.

26 No. 21-3373

to bring her claim, “we focus on difficulties caused not by op-

posing parties, but by state-court rules or procedures.” Beth-

El All Nations Church v. City of Chicago, 486 F.3d 286, 292 (7th

Cir. 2007).

Hadzi-Tanovic has not argued that state law or procedures

prevented her from raising her federal constitutional issues in

state court. Parties may raise procedural and substantive due

process challenges to custody orders in Illinois state court.

E.g., In re Marriage of Bates, 819 N.E.2d 714, 724–25 (Ill. 2004)

(mother appealed from trial court’s order granting father sole

custody on grounds that admitting child representative’s rec-

ommendation without allowing her to cross-examine the rep-

resentative violated her right to procedural due process); In re

Custody of T.W., 851 N.E.2d 881, 882–83 (Ill. App. 2006) (on ap-

peal, father argued that trial court’s order awarding grand-

parents custody violated his constitutional right to parent his

child). Accordingly, all the elements needed for applying

Rooker-Feldman are present here.

Conclusion

Hadzi-Tanovic claims injuries caused by a final state court

judgment, she does not allege injuries independent of the

state court judgment, and she had a reasonable opportunity

to present her claims in state court. For these reasons, Rooker-

Feldman bars her suit.

We understand the high stakes of this case—and of all di-

vorce and custody cases. The serious but as yet unproven al-

legations against guardian ad litem Pasulka remind us of the

potential consequences of genuine corruption in a court sys-

tem. Nevertheless, we may not exercise jurisdiction where

Congress has not provided it. The state courts of Illinois,

No. 21-3373 27

including their attorney disciplinary processes, are capable of

considering and resolving Hadzi-Tanovic’s arguments and

the allegations against Pasulka. 5

The district court’s judgment dismissing the action with-

out prejudice is AFFIRMED.

5 In the disciplinary proceeding, the Supreme Court of Illinois sus-

pended Pasulka from the practice of law as of December 15, 2020, pending

further order of that court. His disciplinary proceeding is still pending. In

re Pasulka, No. 2020PR00052 (Ill. Dec. 15, 2020), available at

http://www.iardc.org (last visited March 14, 2023).

28 No. 21-3373

KIRSCH, Circuit Judge, with whom ST. EVE, Circuit Judge,

joins, dissenting from the denial of rehearing en banc. I disa-

gree with the decision to overrule Nesses v. Shepard, 68 F.3d

1003 (7th Cir. 1995), Loubser v. Thacker, 440 F.3d 439 (7th Cir.

2006), and Parker v. Lyons, 757 F.3d 701 (7th Cir. 2014). Far

from creating any exception to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine,

those cases correctly recognized that Rooker-Feldman is inap-

plicable to federal suits alleging civil rights conspiracies that

result in a state court judgment, so long as the plaintiff does

not seek reversal of that judgment. Today’s decision holds,

however, that Rooker-Feldman applies to such claims if a state

court judgment caused a plaintiff’s injuries, even when the

plaintiff does not seek to overturn the state court judgment.

The effect is to broaden, rather than narrow, Rooker-Feldman’s

application. Because this approach is inconsistent with the

statutory source of the doctrine, 28 U.S.C. § 1257, and Su-

preme Court precedent, I respectfully dissent from the denial

of rehearing en banc.

I

Federal and state courts generally enjoy concurrent juris-

diction. The Rooker-Feldman doctrine is one of the statutory ex-

ceptions to that general rule. Through 28 U.S.C. § 1257, Con-

gress vested the Supreme Court with federal appellate juris-

diction over final state court judgements: “Final judgments or

decrees rendered by the highest court of a State in which a

decision could be had, may be reviewed by the Supreme

Court by writ of certiorari.” By implication, lower federal

courts lack appellate jurisdiction over state court judgments.

Rooker-Feldman simply enforces this statutory rule. In

Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923), after a state

court entered a judgment against him in a contract dispute,

No. 21-3373 29

Rooker asked a federal court to declare that judgment “null

and void.” Id. at 414. The Supreme Court held that § 1257’s

precursor deprived lower federal courts of jurisdiction to “en-

tertain a proceeding to reverse or modify” the state court

judgment because doing so “would be an exercise of appellate

jurisdiction.” Id. at 416.

Many years later, in District of Columbia Court of Appeals v.

Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983), the D.C. Court of Appeals upheld

the denial of Feldman’s bar application, so he sued in federal

district court to overturn that decision. Id. at 466–68. The Su-

preme Court held that the lower federal courts had “no au-

thority to review final judgments of a state court in judicial

proceedings,” so if Feldman challenged the decision in his

particular case, the federal district court lacked jurisdiction.

Id. at 482. But, if Feldman sought to challenge the rules that

the D.C. Court applied in his case, his challenge could go for-

ward because it did “not require review of a final state court

judgment in a particular case.” Id. at 486−87.

After Feldman, the rule was simple, its reach limited. As we

put it in GASH Associates v. Village of Rosemont, 995 F.2d 726

(7th Cir. 1993):

The Rooker-Feldman doctrine asks: is the federal

plaintiff seeking to set aside a state judgment, or

does he present some independent claim, albeit

one that denies a legal conclusion that a state

court has reached in a case to which he was a

party? If the former, then the district court lacks

jurisdiction; if the latter, then there is jurisdic-

tion and state law determines whether the de-

fendant prevails under principles of preclusion.

30 No. 21-3373

Id. at 728 (citing David P. Currie, Res Judicata: The Neglected

Defense, 45 U. Chi. L. Rev. 317, 321–25 (1977)).

Not since Feldman has the Supreme Court applied Rooker-

Feldman to dismiss a suit for lack of subject-matter jurisdic-

tion. Instead, the Court has highlighted its exceedingly lim-

ited application. In Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Industries

Corp., 544 U.S. 280 (2005), the Court held that “Rooker-Feldman

did not prevent the District Court from exercising jurisdic-

tion” when a federal plaintiff “plainly ha[d] not repaired to

federal court to undo the [state court] judgment in its favor.”

Id. at 293−94. The Court also admonished lower courts to stop

enlarging the doctrine: “Variously interpreted in the lower

courts, the doctrine has sometimes been construed to extend

far beyond the contours of the Rooker and Feldman cases, over-

riding Congress’ conferral of federal-court jurisdiction con-

current with jurisdiction exercised by state courts, and super-

seding the ordinary application of preclusion law pursuant to

28 U.S.C. § 1738.” Id. at 283.

The Court further clarified that Rooker-Feldman “is con-

fined to cases of the kind from which the doctrine acquired its

name: cases brought by state-court losers complaining of in-

juries caused by state-court judgments rendered before the

district court proceedings commenced and inviting district

court review and rejection of those judgments.” Id. at 284. At

the same time, § 1257 does not “stop a district court from ex-

ercising subject-matter jurisdiction simply because a party at-

tempts to litigate in federal court a matter previously litigated

in state court. If a federal plaintiff ‘present[s] some independ-

ent claim, albeit one that denies a legal conclusion that a state

court has reached in a case to which he was a party …, then

there is jurisdiction and state law determines whether the

No. 21-3373 31

defendant prevails under principles of preclusion.’” Id. at 293

(quoting GASH, 995 F.2d at 728).

Exxon clarified that Rooker-Feldman is inapplicable—and

thus federal courts retain jurisdiction—unless all four criteria

are met:

1. The federal case is brought by a state-court

loser;

2. The plaintiff complains of an injury caused

by the state court judgment;

3. The state court judgment was rendered be-

fore the federal proceeding began; and

4. The plaintiff is not asking the federal court

to merely disagree with, but to review and

reject—that is, to overturn or undo—the

state court judgment.

II

A

Despite Exxon’s command to rein in Rooker-Feldman, our

circuit’s application of the doctrine has only grown. The

source of this bloat, it seems, has been our singular focus on

whether the plaintiff’s injury was caused by the state court

judgment—step 2 of Exxon. By stopping our inquiry there, we

never get to step 4 and ask whether the relief the plaintiff

seeks would reverse or undo the state court judgment. Exxon

is unambiguous that both steps are necessary for Rooker-Feld-

man to divest a federal court of jurisdiction and eject plaintiffs

from federal court. Yet we regularly treat the former as suffi-

cient. See, e.g., Swartz v. Heartland Equine Rescue, 940 F.3d 387

(7th Cir. 2019); Sykes v. Cook County Court Probate Division, 837

32 No. 21-3373

F.3d 736 (7th Cir. 2016); Kelley v. Med-1 Solutions, LLC, 548 F.3d

600, 607 (7th Cir. 2008). By elevating step 2 and ignoring

step 4, we have turned Rooker-Feldman into a substitute for

preclusion law—the exact thing Exxon told us not to do. See,

e.g., Jakupovic v. Curran, 850 F.3d 898, 903–04 (7th Cir. 2017)

(applying Rooker-Feldman to bar claims that “d[id] not directly

seek to set aside the state trial court’s judgments” because

such claims were “inextricably intertwined with the state

court’s judgments” and plaintiff “had a reasonable oppor-

tunity to present [them] to the state court”).

The black letter law we have crafted now sets forth a two-

part test:

To determine whether the Rooker-Feldman doc-

trine bars jurisdiction, we apply a two-step anal-

ysis. First, we consider whether a plaintiff’s fed-

eral claims are “independent” or, instead,

whether they “either ‘directly’ challenge a state

court judgment or are ‘inextricably intertwined

with one.’” Swartz, 940 F.3d at 391. If they are

“independent” claims, the Rooker-Feldman doc-

trine does not preclude federal courts from ex-

ercising jurisdiction over them. But if they “di-

rectly” challenge or are “inextricably inter-

twined” with a state-court judgment, then we

move on to … determine whether the plaintiff

had a reasonable opportunity to raise the issue

in state court proceedings.

Andrade v. City of Hammond, 9 F.4th 947, 950 (7th Cir. 2021)

(cleaned up). “Inextricably intertwined,” we said, means

“there must be no way for the injury complained of by the

plaintiff to be separated from the state court judgment.” Id.

No. 21-3373 33

(cleaned up); see also Sykes, 837 F.3d at 742 (“[E]ven federal

claims … that do not on their face require review of a state

court’s decision, may still be subject to Rooker-Feldman if those

claims are inextricably intertwined with a state court judg-

ment.”).

By omitting step 4 altogether, we have expanded the scope

of Rooker-Feldman to encompass any claim that alleges an in-

jury that is “inextricably intertwined” with a state court judg-

ment. Missing from all of this is any consideration of Exxon’s

final requirement—whether the federal plaintiff asks us to re-

ject the state court judgment. But that is the sine qua non of

Rooker-Feldman, which applies only to “cases brought by state-

court losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court

judgments rendered before the district court proceedings

commenced and inviting district court review and rejection of

those judgments.” Exxon, 544 U.S. at 284 (emphasis added).

Only by asking us to exercise appellate jurisdiction—to

“undo” or “overturn [the] state-court judgment”—does a

plaintiff collide with § 1257. Id. at 287 n.2, 293.

Rather than dig further in search of daylight, we should

realign our law with Exxon. Only if a plaintiff seeks to vacate

relief awarded or to obtain relief denied by the state court—

to undo or overturn the state court judgment—does Rooker-

Feldman bar her claim. If she seeks another form of relief that

does not ask the district court to overturn a state court judg-

ment, then her claim is well within a district court’s power to

adjudicate.

B

The panel’s opinion takes us further in the wrong direc-

tion. Rather than answer how Aneta Hadzi-Tanovic seeks to

34 No. 21-3373

undo the state court judgment in her federal lawsuit, it asks

only “whether the district court is essentially being called

upon to review the state court decision.” Ante at 8 (quoting

Jakupovic, 850 F.3d at 902, and relying on the Sykes, Swartz, and

Andrade line of cases). But that is not what Exxon requires: a

district court must be asked to both “review and reject” the

state court judgment before Rooker-Feldman applies. 544 U.S.

at 284.

Because Hadzi-Tanovic does not ask the federal court to

undo the state court custody order, Rooker-Feldman does not

bar her claim. The state court judgment will remain secure no

matter the outcome of her federal suit. Even if Hadzi-Tanovic

prevails on her damages claim, a federal judgment in her fa-

vor would have no impact on the validity of the state judg-

ment. Whether Hadzi-Tanovic seeks to relitigate issues de-

cided by the state court is a question of state preclusion law,

but Rooker-Feldman “is not a substitute for claim or issue pre-

clusion.” VanderKodde v. Mary Jane M. Elliott, P.C., 951 F.3d

397, 408 (6th Cir. 2020) (Sutton, J., concurring).

The panel reframes Nesses (and the cases that follow it) as

creating an unfounded “exception” to Rooker-Feldman that

must be overruled. But Nesses created no exception—a term

that appears nowhere in Nesses itself—and overruling it only

widens Rooker-Feldman’s scope. Nesses correctly recognized

that Rooker-Feldman is inapplicable to claims like Hadzi-Ta-

novic’s, where a plaintiff in federal court does not seek to

overturn a state court judgment. Labeling Nesses an exception

suggests that Rooker-Feldman broadly bars federal courts from

hearing federal claims implicating terminated state court pro-

ceedings. But that turns the limited nature of Rooker-Feldman

on its head, and there is no presumption that claims involving

No. 21-3373 35

state court judgments trigger Rooker-Feldman unless some “ex-

ception” applies. To the contrary, the Supreme Court has re-

peatedly reminded us that the doctrine is limited and rarely

applies. See Exxon, 544 U.S. at 287. Exxon therefore validated

Nesses’s reasoning when it told lower courts to stop conflating

Rooker-Feldman with preclusion and reaffirmed that a plaintiff

who “presents some independent claim, albeit one that denies

a legal conclusion that a state court has reached in a case to

which he was a party,” is not barred by Rooker-Feldman. 544

U.S. at 293 (cleaned up) (quoting GASH, 995 F.2d at 728); see

also Target Media Partners v. Specialty Mktg. Corp., 881 F.3d

1279, 1290 (11th Cir. 2018) (Newsom, J., concurring) (Exxon

clarified “that Rooker-Feldman does not bar a federal-court suit

simply because it relitigates a ‘matter’ previously argued—or

even ‘denies a legal conclusion’ previously reached—in a

state-court action.”). Under both Nesses and Exxon, Rooker-

Feldman requires not only a federal plaintiff with an injury

caused by a state court judgment, but also—in every case—

that the plaintiff asks the federal court to “undo” or “over-

turn” that judgment. By overruling Nesses, the panel discards

the key inquiry into the relief a plaintiff seeks from a federal

court.

The panel labels Nesses as out of step with our more recent

caselaw. On this front, I agree. But it is our recent caselaw that

is out of step with Exxon, not Nesses. The last thing we’re sup-

posed to do is broaden the universe of cases kept out of court

by Rooker-Feldman, “a doctrine that has produced nothing but

mischief for [40] years.” Lance v. Dennis, 546 U.S. 459, 468

(2006) (Stevens, J. dissenting); see Skinner v. Switzer, 562 U.S.

521, 531 (2011) (“[T]he Rooker-Feldman doctrine has been ap-

plied by this Court only twice, i.e., only in the two cases from

which the doctrine takes its name.”); VanderKodde, 951 F.3d at

36 No. 21-3373

405 (Sutton, J., concurring) (“One could be forgiven for think-

ing, as I and others did, that, unless your name was Rooker or

Feldman, this supposed limit on the jurisdiction of the federal

courts applied to no one.”). But by discarding Exxon’s (and

Nesses’s) requirement that a plaintiff seek “review and rejec-

tion” of a state court judgment, that is exactly what the panel

does.

III

Today’s decision does not simply bar Hadzi-Tanovic’s suit

and overrule Nesses, Loubser, and Parker. The panel says its de-

cision does not overrule Brokaw v. Weaver, 305 F.3d 660 (7th

Cir. 2002), but that decision has no leg to stand on without

Nesses. Brokaw held that Rooker-Feldman did not bar civil rights

claims alleging that the defendants defrauded a state court

into terminating custody rights. Id. at 663, 668. The panel says

that Brokaw is different because that plaintiff alleged fraud

while Hadzi-Tanovic alleges corruption. But the only distinc-

tion between due process claims that allege fraud in state pro-

ceedings and those that allege corruption is that, in the latter

scenario, the state judge participates in the constitutional vio-

lation. When it comes to federal jurisdiction, that is a distinc-

tion without a difference, so the legal rule of Brokaw—which

relies almost exclusively on Nesses’s reasoning—is now ex-

cised from our law. Any plaintiff who alleges corruption or

fraud during a completed state proceeding is now without a

federal forum.

The panel’s extension of Rooker-Feldman also casts doubt

on other cases that correctly found the doctrine inapplicable.

See, e.g., Milchtein v. Chisholm, 880 F.3d 895, 898 (7th Cir. 2018)

(recognizing that plaintiffs who do not seek “alteration of a

state court’s judgment” are not barred from federal court by

No. 21-3373 37

Rooker-Feldman); Johnson v. Pushpin Holdings, LLC, 748 F.3d

769, 773 (7th Cir. 2014) (holding that Rooker-Feldman “does not

bar a federal suit that seeks damages for a fraud that resulted

in a judgment adverse to the plaintiff. … Such a suit does not

seek to disturb the judgment of the state court, but to obtain

damages for the unlawful conduct that misled the court into

issuing the judgment.”). It is hard to see how any of these

cases remain after today.

There are external consequences as well. To bolster its case

for expanding Rooker-Feldman even further, the panel says

that no one else (save the Third Circuit) recognizes a corrup-

tion exception. Ante at 21−22 (citing Great W. Mining & Min.

Co. v. Fox Rothschild LLP, 615 F.3d 158 (3d Cir. 2010)). I respect-

fully disagree. While other courts may not term the Nesses rule

an “exception”—because it’s not—nomenclature is irrelevant.

What matters is that nearly every other circuit has applied the

rule Nesses lays out. See Dorce v. City of New York, 2 F.4th 82,

107–08 (2d Cir. 2021); Great W. Mining, 615 F.3d at 171–73;

Hulsey v. Cisa, 947 F.3d 246, 250–52 (4th Cir. 2020); Truong v.

Bank of Am., N.A., 717 F.3d 377, 383 (5th Cir. 2013); McCormick

v. Braverman, 451 F.3d 382, 392 (6th Cir. 2006); MSK EyEs Ltd.

v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 546 F.3d 533, 539 (8th Cir. 2008); Be-

navidez v. Cnty. of San Diego, 993 F.3d 1134, 1143 (9th Cir. 2021);

Mayotte v. U.S. Bank N.A., 880 F.3d 1169, 1174–75 (10th Cir.

2018); Behr v. Campbell, 8 F.4th 1206, 1209 (11th Cir. 2021).

Take the Eleventh Circuit’s decision in Behr, for example.

There, a father sued his “ex-wife, her partner, an employee of

Child Protective Services, the principal at [his daughter’s]

school, the Palm Beach County School District, and the Palm

Beach County Department of Children and Families, among

others” alleging that they “conspired to deprive [him] of

38 No. 21-3373

custody through state child custody proceedings.” Behr, 8

F.4th at 1208–09. He alleged that “procedural due process vi-

olations resulted ‘from the use of falsified and/or coerced in-

formation as a basis for the proceedings and decisions’” and

from “the restriction of access to the courts and denial of ade-

quate legal counsel” during a state custody battle over their

children. Id. at 1213. But because the federal plaintiff did not

seek to “undo the state court’s child custody decision” and

sought “money damages for constitutional violations[,]” his

claims fell “outside Rooker-Feldman’s boundaries.” Id. I see no

flaw in Behr’s understanding of Rooker-Feldman, and the panel

points to none.

The panel “expect[s] rejection of [the Nesses] exception to

produce little if any change in the outcomes of cases.” Ante at

22. I agree, but so what? Rooker-Feldman is a jurisdictional doc-

trine. A plaintiff’s prospects for recovery tell us nothing about

a federal court’s power to hear her claim. That other doctrines

might ultimately bar recovery does not mean we can disclaim

federal jurisdiction. And I disagree with the panel’s conclu-

sion that eliminating the so-called exception is necessary to

stop plaintiffs from making “ever more fantastic allegations

of state court corruption”: Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 8

and 11 solve that problem, and cases with state court anteced-

ents enjoy no monopoly on fantastical allegations.

Rather than expand our Rooker-Feldman doctrine and over-

rule good law, we should refocus our inquiry on whether the

plaintiff seeks to “review and reject”—to “undo” or “over-

turn”—a state court judgment. Unless she does, we have a

duty to hear her out.

I respectfully dissent.