Opinion

State v. Haynik

  • 2023 Ohio 717
Court
Ohio Court of Appeals
Filed
Mar 9, 2023
Status
Published
On the bench
Sheehan
Cited by
4 cases
Authority
More cited than 51.6%

The opinion

[Cite as State v. Haynik, 2023-Ohio-717.]

COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA

STATE OF OHIO, :

Plaintiff-Appellee, :

No. 111769

v. :

LARRY HAYNIK, :

Defendant-Appellant. :

JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION

JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED

RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: March 9, 2023

Criminal Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas

Case No. CR-20-648064-A

Appearances:

Michael C. O’Malley, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting

Attorney, and Adrienne E. Linnick and Chauncey Keller,

Assistant Prosecuting Attorneys, for appellee.

Patituce & Associates, LLC and Catherine Meehan, for

appellant.

MICHELLE J. SHEEHAN, J.:

Defendant-appellant Larry Haynik was found guilty of rape after a

bench trial. On appeal, he challenges the sufficiency of the evidence presented by

the state to prove his guilt and also argues his conviction is against the manifest

weight of the evidence. In addition, he claims the state improperly introduced

expert testimony from a police officer who investigated the rape case. After a careful

review of the record and applicable law, we find no merit to Haynik’s claims and

affirm the trial court’s judgment.

Haynik and the victim, A.S., had a tumultuous, off-and-on

relationship. On October 28, 2019, A.S. and a friend spent time together drinking

and working on an art project at A.S.’s new apartment, which she recently moved

into after leaving the residence she and Haynik shared. During the evening, Haynik

repeatedly called and texted A.S. and A.S. eventually gave him her new address.

When Haynik appeared at her apartment later that night, A.S.’s friend let him in

with A.S.’s permission. While her friend was asleep in the living room, A.S. and

Haynik were talking in her bedroom. The conversation turned into an argument,

and as A.S. testified at trial, Haynik raped her and then damaged property in her

apartment before leaving. The next morning, A.S. went to her ex-husband’s home

and told him about the incident and they went to the hospital for a rape kit to be

collected. A.S. also filed a police report. Haynik claimed in a statement to the police

that they engaged in consensual sex twice that evening.

Haynik was subsequently indicted for one count of rape in violation

of R.C. 2907.02(A)(2), a felony of the first degree. He waived his right to a jury trial,

and the rape case was tried to the bench.

Trial Testimony

A.S.’s friend Rhonda M., A.S. herself, her former husband Lonnie S.,

the SANE nurse who examined her at the hospital, and two police officers from the

Westlake Police Department testified for the state.

a. A.S.’s Friend

A.S.’s friend, Rhonda, testified that on the night of the incident, A.S.

invited her to celebrate her breakup from her relationship with Haynik, a new

beginning for her life, and her new apartment in Westlake. Rhonda brought art

supplies and alcohol to the apartment, and they planned to work on an art project

together while consuming alcohol. Later in the evening, they went to a

neighborhood bar and consumed additional alcohol. Throughout the evening, A.S.

received phone calls and text messages from Haynik. She recalled that when they

were back at A.S.’s apartment, she heard a knock at the door and A.S. told her to let

the individual at the door in. She did not know who it was, and after letting him in,

she quickly went to sleep on the floor in the living room.

Rhonda woke up early in the morning because she was sore from

sleeping on the floor and was anxious to go home to sleep on her own bed. She

remembered A.S. helped carry her belongings to her car, but not much else. She did

not remember seeing anyone else in the apartment. Later in the day, she and A.S.

talked over the phone and she found out about the incident. She testified that “I felt

bad, because I was there and I didn’t help her.” She subsequently was interviewed

by the police and provided a statement, stating that she did not hear or see anything

during the night.

b. A.S.

A.S. testified at length about her tumultuous, “on-again, off-again”

relationship with Haynik over the course of two years. She met Haynik in 2017 at

her niece’s wedding. The relationship began as a “one-night stand,” and within a

few months, he moved into her apartment. She stated that “[w]hen things were good

with Larry Haynik, they were amazing. When they weren’t, when he wasn’t happy,

nobody was happy.” She described him as “controlling” and their relationship as

“violent” and filled with drugs and alcohol.

Haynik would call her obsessively — sometimes five, ten, or 20 times

a day — to check on her or to berate her for not doing what he wanted her to do.

When he got upset, he would become abusive, such as pouring alcohol over her head,

spitting on her, and calling her a slut, whore, or bitch. A.S. recounted an incident in

2018 where he became angry because she wanted to go to an event at Edgewater

Park by herself. He threw a fit and, while she was gone, bleached every piece of her

clothing. He also used a knife to carve a word, either “whore” or “slut,” into her

dining room table. She reported the incident to the police. She recalled another

incident where Haynik screamed at her and spit in her face when she told him she

was going to stay with a friend who is gay.

A.S. asked Haynik to move out but he refused, so she moved out and

stayed with her ex-husband. During this time, Haynik would call her ten, 20, or 30

times daily, playing love songs in the background. She eventually gave in and moved

back in with him. She left again, however, and this time she had to call the police

for assistance because Haynik would not let her collect her belongings. A week after

she left, he resumed calling her and playing love songs over the telephone and

promised her that their relationship would get better. After several weeks, she

moved back in with him again.

Over the following four months, she felt like she was walking on

eggshells whenever Haynik did not get his way. They fought physically one day at

the end of summer of 2019. She was cleaning her vehicle and did not answer a phone

call from him. When he came home, she called him “a little bitch” and he hit her.

She hit him back but, as she testified, “the man’s got a hundred pounds on me, so

[she] was on the ground being hit.” Two weeks later, she left him again. She waited

until he went to work and, with a neighbor’s help, packed up as much of her

belongings as possible and went to stay with her ex-husband.

A.S. subsequently moved into an apartment in Westlake. She and

Haynik continued to argue about their relationship by phone calls and text

messages. Several weeks before the incident at issue, she took care of his dog when

he was out of town. When he returned, they had dinner together and engaged in

consensual sex.

On the night of the incident, she was spending time with her friend

Rhonda in her new apartment, doing an art project and drinking. Around nine or

ten p.m., A.S. and Rhonda went to a bar next to her apartment. During the entire

evening, Haynik was constantly calling and sending text messages to her. She

ignored most of them. While at the bar, however, she texted him the address of her

new apartment; as she testified, he kept asking where she was and she thought that

he wanted to know out of concern for her safety because she had been drinking. On

cross-examination, she admitted that Haynik would show up if he knew where she

was, because “that’s just what he does.”

A.S. and Rhonda stayed at the bar until it closed at one a.m. Back at

her apartment, she opened another alcoholic beverage to drink. She admitted she

had consumed more than ten alcoholic beverages by this time. There was a knock

at the door. Rhonda opened the door, and Haynik was there. A.S. gave Rhonda

permission to let Haynik in. Afterward, Rhonda laid on the floor and quickly fell

asleep. A.S. and Haynik then went to her bedroom to talk about their relationship.

He wanted her to come back to live with him. She told him she was with someone

else now, and he must stop pursuing her. As she testified:

And then I’m standing in front of him and he kind of reaches out his

arm and says, “I’m gonna to make love to my woman.” And I have a

onesie on, pajama set onesie, and it rips. And I say, “No, no, you’re

not.” And then he has sex with me. * * * I mean that he put me on my

back and he had sex with me, penetrated. I don’t yell “Help.” I don’t

say “No.” I don’t stop it. I let it run its course, because I just want him

to leave, and I think he’s gonna leave after this.

On cross-examination, A.S. added that after Haynik said he wanted

to “make love to his woman,” she said “no” and pulled way and that was when the

zipper broke.1

After the sexual act, Haynik did not leave immediately. He continued

to talk to A.S., and when he got angry with her again, he put burn holes in the carpet

with his cigarettes and stabbed her air mattress with a knife. He also held her down

1 Regarding whether A.S. said “no,” on cross-examination, the defense questioned

A.S. on her medical records, in which the SANE nurse wrote that A.S. told her she did not

say “no.” The transcript reflects the following testimony by A.S.:

DEFENSE ATTORNEY: Can you read [the medical records] and tell me if

that refreshes your memory?

A.S.: “Patient in for complaint of sexual assault by ex-boyfriend last night.

* * * Patient states she went to her ex-best friend’s house and to his bedroom

where they had sex. She just laid there. Patient states she did not say no,

but “that I just laid there.” * * *

DEFENSE ATTORNEY: That would be incorrect, right?”

A.S.: That is — that’s not correct. I mean, that is correct, but that’s not correct. I

didn’t say anything as I laid there, no. I didn’t.

Pointing to this testimony, Haynik argues that A.S. admitted she did not say “no” before

the sexual act and “just laid there.” Our review, however, reflects that this testimony is

consistent with A.S.’s testimony on direct examination that after she said “no” to Haynik’s

sexual advance, he ripped her pajama and put her on the air mattress, and she did not

continue to verbally or physically resist him. We note, however, that her statement to the

SANE nurse regarding where the incident occurred was inconsistent with her testimony,

but the inconsistency was not further explored by the defense.

with his forearm on the front of her body and “put sucker bites all across [her] neck

to show [her] boyfriend that [she’s] taken.”

Haynik also started to call her a whore and a slut, and she raised her

voice, telling him, “You better get out, you get out, you leave.” After he left, Rhonda

woke up and immediately wanted to go home to sleep on her own bed. After Rhonda

left, A.S. thought to herself, “What just happened?” She kept thinking, “I know I

said no.” She testified she did not tell Rhonda what happened because she was still

in shock; Rhonda left quickly after she awoke, and A.S. did not have time to think

about what to tell her.

After Rhonda left, A.S. went to her ex-husband’s house and told him

what happened. He first dropped off their son at school around 8:30 a.m. and then

took her to the hospital for the collection of a rape kit. She was interviewed by the

police while at the hospital.

During her direct examination, the state introduced several exhibits

consisting of text messages between A.S. and Haynik on that evening. At 11:27 p.m.,

A.S. texted Haynik the address of her new apartment. At 6:19 a.m., she texted him:

“Don’t ever come near me again. I’m filing harassment charges on you today, then

I’m going to file a restraining order. I will never come back to you.” He texted her

at 7:28 a.m.: “Just keep fucking your son’s friend.” At 8:57 a.m., she texted him:

“I’m going to the emergency room. You raped me. I said no.” He responded

immediately: “We made love.” At 8:59 a.m., he texted: “We did it two times” and

then at 10:22 a.m.: “Why would you say such an untrue statement? If you told me

no, we wouldn’t have done it two times. You really are sick and a narcissist.” At

10:23 a.m., he texted: “Just go and keep fucking your son’s friend.” At 12:33 a.m.,

he texted: “Why would you make such a horrible false accusation? All because I

ruined some carpet and I was at your place because you told me to come? We made

love two times. I pulled out and you started kissing it. Get real. The materialistic

things I damaged can be easily replaced. * * *.”

In addition to the text messages, during A.S.’s direct examination, the

state also introduced A.S.’s pajamas as an exhibit. It was a onesie pajama with a zip-

up from the neck to the feet. A.S. testified that Haynik ripped the front zipper of the

pajamas.

On cross-examination, A.S. denied she wanted Haynik to come to her

apartment even though she provided her new address to him in a text message. She

testified that she did it because she felt he needed to know where she was out of

concerns for her safety. When pressed further, however, A.S. admitted that she

knew he would show up at her residence once he knew where she was, but she

vehemently denied she wanted to have sex with him, and she said no when he asked

for it.

c. A.S.’s Ex-Husband

A.S.’s ex-husband Lonnie testified that he was married to A.S. for over

18 years and they have three children together. His wife remained his best friend

even after their divorce, and they would communicate with each other a few times

each week. At the time of the incident, the divorce was not yet finalized.

Lonnie provided a statement to the police regarding the instant

incident. A.S. came to his residence around 7:30 a.m. on October 29, 2022. He

noticed that she pulled her legs up on the chair and cradled herself while rocking

back and forth, which, to him, indicated that something was seriously wrong. She

brushed her hair to show him the hickeys on both sides of her neck. She was very

distraught but tried hard not to cry in front of their youngest son, who was getting

ready to go to school. She briefly told him what happened and, after they took their

son to school, gave him more details about what occurred. He was in shock. They

went back to her apartment to pick up the pajamas and then went to the hospital for

a rape kit.

d. SANE Nurse and Police Officers

The SANE nurse attending to A.S. at the hospital testified that she

performed an examination of A.S. at the hospital after the police made a report of

the incident. She did not observe tears or rips in A.S.’s genitalia but observed hickeys

on her neck.

Officer Paul Hartranft of the Westlake Police Department testified

that he responded to a call from the SANE nurse regarding a rape. He interviewed

A.S. and then received from the SANE nurse the rape kit and the pajamas as

evidence for the case.

Sergeant Nathan Fox, a 15-year veteran with the Westlake Police

Department, testified that he was trained and certified for sexual assault cases and

he had worked on over 60 such cases. He took photographs of A.S.’s bedroom and

collected a comforter for evidence. Later, he was assigned to the case after the prior

detective on the case retired. He had reviewed all the documents and evidence in

the case. He testified that both the DNA buccal swabs from A.S.’s boyfriend and

Haynik were submitted for testing and the DNA located in the rape kit was from the

latter. He also testified that his review of Haynik’s phone records corroborated A.S.’s

testimony regarding his excessive calls to her. His review showed that on one

occasion, Haynik made more than 50 calls to her within two hours.

Sergeant Fox testified that he reviewed A.S.’s medical records

regarding the incident and there were no injuries to A.S.’s genitalia noted in the

records. He testified, however, that “[i]njuries don’t really indicate much other than

sometimes excessive force,” adding that “I’ve had many sexual assault cases where

there’s actually no injuries, and many where there’s devastating injuries.”

Regarding A.S.’s pajamas, Sergeant Fox testified that “significant

tearing and breakage of the zipper was noted in the photographs (of the pajamas),”

consistent with A.S.’s allegation that the pajamas were forcibly removed. The

prosecutor held up the pajamas for Sergeant Fox to show where the tearing was in

the pajamas.

Haynik did not testify, but he provided a statement to the police,

which the defense asked Sergeant Fox to read on cross-examination. In the

statement, Haynik provided a vastly different account of the event. According to his

statement, A.S. moved out of his residence a month before the incident, but they

were working on their relationship. In the month of October 2019, “[they] slept

together three more times, including October 28, 2019.” That evening, he went to

A.S.’s residence at 11:45 p.m. after she texted him her new address. After being let

in the apartment by Rhonda, he went to her bedroom and she began kissing him and

engaged in oral sex with him, and then they had consensual intercourse, with her on

top. They then argued about her new boyfriend, and she promised him not to see

him again. They started making love again, and while engaged in oral sex with him,

his mother called. According to Haynik, A.S. said “Hi Mom” to her. Haynik also

stated that A.S. liked “rough sex”; she was moaning and laughing while he gave her

hickeys, and she never screamed or said “no.” After the sexual conduct, he got mad

again because she refused to move back in with him. He poked a hole in the air

mattress. They argued but made up before he left. She walked him to the door and

hugged him good-bye, which was witnessed by Rhonda.

Haynik stated that he left A.S.’s apartment “feeling love and had hope

for [their] future.” He woke up in the morning to see nasty messages from her, but

it was after he texted “keeping sleeping with your son’s friend” that she accused him

of rape. He denied raping A.S., stating that “[e]verything was totally consented and

loving. She enjoyed it and ‘orgasmed’ twice.”

The defense questioned Sergeant Fox concerning the lack of

investigation regarding Haynik’s claim that his mother called him when he and A.S.

engaged in sexual conduct. Sergeant Fox acknowledged that the prosecutor

interviewed Haynik’s mother several days before the trial and his mother indicated

she talked to A.S. as Haynik alleged. Sergeant Fox, however, testified that nothing

in that interview was relevant to whether a rape occurred or not.

The defense did not call any witnesses to testify and moved for

acquittal pursuant to Crim.R. 29, which the trial court denied. The trial court found

Haynik guilty of rape in violation of R.C. 2907.02(A)(2).

At sentencing, A.S. made a victim impact statement. Haynik and

several family members also addressed the court, all vehemently proclaiming his

innocence. The court stated that, in finding Haynik guilty, it found A.S. credible and

believed her version of the event. Haynik was sentenced to an indefinite sentence of

five to seven-and-a-half years for his offense under the Reagan Tokes Law.

On appeal, Haynik raises the following assignments of error:

I. The state failed to present sufficient evidence to prove each and every

element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt.

II. Appellant’s conviction was against the manifest weight of the

evidence.

III. The State of Ohio improperly introduced expert testimony from

Sergeant Fox to the prejudice of appellant and deprived him of his right

to a fair trial.

IV. The trial court erred in imposing an indefinite term as the Reagan

Tokes Law violated appellant’s constitutional right to due process

under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution

and Article I Section 10 of the Ohio Constitution.

Sufficiency and Manifest Weight of the Evidence

When reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, we

review the evidence admitted at trial and determine whether such evidence, if

believed, would convince the average mind of the defendant’s guilt beyond a

reasonable doubt. State v. Jenks, 61 Ohio St.3d 259, 574 N.E.2d 492 (1991),

paragraph two of the syllabus. “The relevant inquiry is whether, after viewing the

evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could

have found the essential elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt.”

Id. A reviewing court is not to assess “whether the state’s evidence is to be believed,

but whether, if believed, the evidence against a defendant would support a

conviction.” State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 390, 678 N.E.2d 541 (1997).

Haynik was convicted of forcible rape as defined in R.C. 2907.02(A)(2), which states

that “[n]o person shall engage in sexual conduct with another when the offender

purposely compels the other person to submit by force or threat of force.”

The issue presented in this appeal is whether the state proved that

Haynik compelled A.S. to submit to sexual conduct by force or threat of force.

“Force” is statutorily defined as “any violence, compulsion, or constraint physically

exerted by any means upon or against a person or thing.” R.C. 2901.01(A)(1).

We first note that “[t]he force element of R.C. 2907.02(A)(2) is the

extrinsic force used to compel the victim’s submission to sexual conduct; it is not the

sexual conduct itself.” State v. Hartman, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 105159, 2018-

Ohio-2641, ¶ 29 (Stewart, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). See also

State v. Griffith, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 05AP-1042, 2006-Ohio-6983, ¶ 17 (to prove

the force element of a sexual offense, the state must establish force beyond that force

inherent in the crime itself). Force, however, “can be inferred from the

circumstances surrounding sexual conduct * * *.” State v. Schaim, 65 Ohio St.3d 51,

55, 600 N.E.2d 661 (1992). The “force” element of R.C. 2907.02(A)(2) is

demonstrated through the evidence that the force was sufficient to overcome the

victim’s will. State v. Rucker, 2020-Ohio-2715, 154 N.E.3d 350, ¶ 17 (8th Dist.),

citing State v. Wine, 3d Dist. Auglaize No. 2-12-01, 2012-Ohio-2837, ¶ 50, citing

State v. Eskridge, 38 Ohio St.3d 56, 59, 526 N.E.2d 304 (1988).

Here, A.S. testified that Haynik said, “I am going to make love to my

woman” and she said, “no, no you’re not.” He ripped the front zipper of her pajama

while she pulled away. He then put her on her back on the mattress and penetrated

her. This testimony was sufficient evidence to prove that Haynik purposely

compelled A.S. to submit to sexual conduct by force.

Haynik argues that there was insufficient evidence for forcible rape

because A.S. admitted that she did not yell “help,” or say “no” or “stop it” during the

sexual conduct. While A.S. did not continue to protest after the initial “no” or

attempted to fight off Haynik, such testimony from a victim is not required for proof

of rape under R.C. 2907.02(A)(2). “A victim need not prove physical resistance to

the offender in prosecutions under this section.” R.C. 2907.02(C). This court has

also noted that, under Ohio law, there is no requirement that a victim resist in order

to prove the use of force. State v. Poole, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 107829, 2019-Ohio-

3366, ¶ 33, citing State v. Malone, 3d Dist. Marion No. 9-06-43, 2007-Ohio-5484,

¶ 23 (“[W]e are aware of no requirement that the victim verbally resist.”), and State

v. Shannon, 11th Dist. Lake Nos. 2002-L-007 and 2002-L-008, 2004-Ohio-1669, ¶

94 (“[A] victim is not required to prove physical resistance in a rape prosecution.”).

See also Ohio v. Redmond, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 111138, 2022-Ohio-3734, ¶ 25

(no requirement that the victim resist for the defendant’s act to be forceful).

Viewing the evidence presented at trial in a light most favorable to the

prosecution, therefore, we find that any rational trier of fact could have found the

elements of rape defined in R.C. 2907.02(A)(21) proven beyond a reasonable doubt,

specifically, that Haynik compelled A.S. to engage in vaginal intercourse by force

sufficient to overcome her will. The first assignment of error lacks merit.

Manifest Weight of the Evidence

While “sufficiency of the evidence is a test of adequacy as to whether

the evidence is legally sufficient to support a verdict as a matter of law, * * * weight

of the evidence addresses the evidence’s effect of inducing belief.” State v. Wilson,

113 Ohio St.3d 382, 2007-Ohio-2202, 865 N.E.2d 1264, ¶ 25, citing Thompkins, 78

Ohio St.3d at 386-387, 678 N.E.2d 541. The test for sufficiency requires a

determination of whether the state has met its burden of production at trial; a

manifest weight challenge questions whether the state has met its burden of

persuasion. Thompkins. Unlike a claim that the evidence is insufficient to support

a conviction, which raises a question of law, manifest-weight challenges raise factual

issues. “Under the manifest weight-of-the-evidence standard, a reviewing court asks

the following question: whose evidence is more persuasive — the state’s or the

defendant’s?” State v. Williams, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 108275, 2020-Ohio-269,

¶ 86. When a defendant argues his or her conviction is against the manifest weight

of the evidence, the court,

“reviewing the entire record, weighs the evidence and all reasonable

inferences, considers the credibility of witnesses and determines

whether in resolving conflicts in the evidence, the jury clearly lost its

way and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the

conviction must be reversed and a new trial ordered. The discretionary

power to grant a new trial should be exercised only in the exceptional

case in which the evidence weighs heavily against the conviction.”

Thompkins at 387, quoting State v. Martin, 20 Ohio App.3d 172, 175, 485 N.E.2d

717 (1st Dist.1983).

Haynik points to A.S.’s testimony that she provided him with her

address on the night of the incident knowing he would show up and that she

instructed her friend to let him in when he appeared at her apartment. He argues

that these circumstances, coupled with the parties’ relationship — which began with

a one-night stand and included a consensual sexual act just weeks before the

incident — indicate the sexual act on the night of the incident was consensual,

especially in light of the fact that A.S. did not immediately call 911 to report the

incident and did not accuse him of rape immediately in their text messages

exchanged later that morning. As proof of consensual sex, he also points to his text

message in response to her allegation of rape, where he stated “we made love” and

“why would you say such an untrue statement? If you told me no, we wouldn’t have

done it two times.”

A.S. testified at length regarding the incident and was subject to

rigorous cross-examination by the defense. Her testimony indicates that she said

“no” when Haynik said “I’m gonna to make love to my woman.” He ripped the zipper

of her onesie pajama, put her on the mattress, and engaged in vaginal intercourse

with her. After the sexual assault, he put multiple hickeys on her neck against her

will and also put burn holes in the carpet and stabbed the air mattress. The ripped

pajamas, which corroborates A.S.’s testimony, was admitted as evidence at trial.

While Haynik points out certain inconsistencies in A.S.’s testimony

such as her statement to the SANE nurse that the incident occurred in her “ex-best

friend’s” house, we note that, in a bench trial, “the court may take note of any

inconsistencies and resolve them accordingly, ‘believ[ing] all, part, or none of a

witness’s testimony.’” State v. McCall, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 104479, 2017-Ohio-

296, ¶ 14, quoting State v. Raver, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 02AP-604, 2003-Ohio-

958, ¶ 21, citing State v. Antill, 176 Ohio St. 61, 67, 197 N.E.2d 548 (1964).

After reviewing the entire record, weighing the evidence and all

reasonable inferences, and considering the witnesses’ credibility, we are unable to

conclude that the trial court, in resolving conflicts in the evidence, clearly lost its way

and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that a new trial should be ordered.

Our review does not indicate that this is an exceptional case where the evidence

weighs heavily against the conviction. The second assignment of error is without

merit.

Allegation of Improper Expert Testimony

Under the third assignment of error, Haynik argues the trial court

improperly permitted Sergeant Fox to testify as an expert in violation of

Evid.R. 702(A). The trial transcript reflects that, after Sergeant Fox testified that his

review of the medical records did not show injuries to A.S.’s genitalia, the state

elicited the following testimony:

PROSECUTOR: Okay. In your experience in dealing with sexual

assault cases, injuries to genitalia, what, if anything, do you draw from

that in your investigation, injuries or lack therefore?

SERGEANT FOX: In sexual assault cases [it’s] not really atypical for

injuries or lack thereof. I’ve had many sexual assault cases where

there’s actually no injuries, and many where there’s devastating

injuries. So injuries don’t really indicate much other than sometimes

excessive force.

Haynik argues Sergeant Fox’s testimony should not be permitted

under Evid.R. 702, which governs expert testimony, because Sergeant Fox was not

qualified as an expert. We note that Haynik did not object to the testimony he now

challenges on appeal. As such, we review the issue for plain error. As we explain in

the following, Sergeant Fox’s testimony was permissible under Evid.R. 701 as

opinion testimony by a lay witness and, therefore, there was no error in the

admission of his testimony, plain or otherwise.

Evid.R. 701 states:

[I]f the witness is not testifying as an expert, the witness’ testimony in

the form of opinions or inferences is limited to those opinions or

inferences which are (1) rationally based on the perception of the

witness and (2) helpful to a clear understanding of the witness’

testimony or the determination of a fact in issue.

“Under Evid.R. 701, courts have permitted lay witnesses to express

their opinions in areas in which it would ordinarily be expected that an expert must

be qualified under Evid.R. 702.” State v. Primeau, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 97901,

2012-Ohio-5172, ¶ 74. As the Supreme Court of Ohio explained, the propriety of

opinion testimony by a lay witness is based on a layperson’s personal knowledge and

experience, rather than on specialized knowledge contemplated in Evid.R. 702.

State v. McKee, 91 Ohio St.3d 292, 297, 744 N.E.2d 737 (2001).

This court has always recognized that a state’s witness not presented

as an expert can properly testify under Evid.R. 701 when “(1) the testimony is based

on the witness’s training or experience, (2) the testimony relates to the witness’s

personal observations with the investigation, and (3) the testimony is helpful to

determine a fact at issue.” State v. Calhoun, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 105442, 2017-

Ohio-8488, ¶ 34, citing State v. Wilkinson, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 100859, 2014-

Ohio-5791, ¶ 52-53; Primeau at ¶ 75; and State v. Cooper, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga

No. 86437, 2006-Ohio-817, ¶ 18.

Pursuant to Evid.R. 701, “if testimony is based on an officer’s training

and experience, related to the officer’s personal observations during an

investigation, and helpful to determine facts in issue, the testimony is properly

admitted as lay testimony under Evid.R. 701.” State v. Ladson, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga

No. 111211, 2022-Ohio-3670, ¶ 45, quoting State v. Harris, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No.

108624, 2020-Ohio-4461, citing State v. Maust, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 103182,

2016-Ohio-3171, ¶ 18.

Here, Sergeant Fox, a police officer with the Westlake Police

Department for 15 years, first testified regarding the training and certifications he

had received, which included advanced sexual assault training, and that he had

handled over 60 sexual assault cases. He testified that he became the lead detective

in this case when the prior lead detective retired and that he has fully reviewed the

matter. Where a law enforcement officer “testified as a lay witness to opinions based

on his experience as a police officer, his previous investigations, and his perception

of evidence at issue,” the first prong of Evid.R. 701 is satisfied. Harris at ¶ 51, citing

State v. Walker-Curry, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 106228, 2019-Ohio-147, ¶ 12, citing

State v. Grajales, 5th Dist. Delaware No. 17CAC030020, 2018-Ohio-1124, ¶ 64.

Moreover, Sergeant Fox’s testimony based on his knowledge and experience in

sexual assault cases was helpful to determine a fact at issue regarding whether sexual

assault victims always sustain injuries to their genitalia.

“Evid.R. 701 affords the trial court considerable discretion in

controlling the opinion testimony of lay witnesses.” Harris at ¶ 54, quoting Grajales

at ¶ 60. Accordingly, even if the error were properly objected to and preserved for

our review, we would find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in

admitting Sergeant Fox’s testimony under Evid.R. 701. There was no error, plain or

otherwise. The third assignment of error is overruled.

Reagan Tokes Law

Under the fourth assignment of error, Haynik claims the trial court

erred in imposing an indefinite sentence under the Reagan Tokes Law because the

law violates the separation-of-powers doctrine and his right to due process. In State

v. Delvallie, 2022-Ohio-470, 185 N.E.3d 538 (8th Dist.) (en banc), this court

addressed arguments similar to those raised by Haynik in this appeal and found the

Reagan Tokes Law constitutional. The fourth assignment of error is overruled.

Judgment affirmed.

It is ordered that appellee recover from appellant costs herein taxed.

The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.

It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the

common pleas court to carry this judgment into execution. The defendant’s

conviction having been affirmed, any bail pending appeal is terminated. Case

remanded to the trial court for execution of sentence.

A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27

of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.

MICHELLE J. SHEEHAN, JUDGE

FRANK DANIEL CELEBREZZE, III, P.J., and

MICHAEL JOHN RYAN, J., CONCUR

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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