Matt Yamashita v. Lg Chem, Ltd.

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

MATT YAMASHITA, No. 20-17512

Plaintiff-Appellant,

D.C. No. 1:20-cv-

v. 00129-DKW-RT

LG CHEM, LTD.; LG CHEM

AMERICA, INC., OPINION

Defendants-Appellees,

and

COILART; GEARBEST.COM; WA

FA LA INC.; DOES, DOE LG Entities

1-10; John Does 1 - 10; Jane Does 1-

10; Doe Corporations 1-10; Doe

Partnerships 1-10; Doe Limited

Liability Companies 1-10; Doe

Business Entities 1-10; Doe

Governmental Entities 1-10; Doe

Unincorporated Associations 1-10,

Defendants.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Hawaii

Derrick Kahala Watson, District Judge, Presiding

2 YAMASHITA V. LG CHEM, LTD.

Argued and Submitted January 21, 2022

Submission Withdrawn September 8, 2022

Resubmitted February 27, 2023

Honolulu, Hawaii

Filed March 6, 2023

Before: Diarmuid F. O’Scannlain, Eric D. Miller, and

Kenneth K. Lee, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge O’Scannlain

SUMMARY *

Personal Jurisdiction / Jurisdictional Discovery

The panel affirmed the district court’s dismissal for lack

of personal jurisdiction of a products-liability suit brought

by Matt Yamashita against LG Chem, Ltd. (“LGC”) and LG

Chem America, Inc. (“LGCA”), claiming that they

negligently manufactured and distributed a battery which he

used to power an electronic cigarette until the battery and

electronic cigarette both exploded in his mouth.

Yamashita is a resident of Hawaii, and he alleged that he

purchased the battery from an unidentified third party to

whom LGC and LGCA had distributed for resale in

Hawaii. LGC is a South Korean company headquartered in

*

This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

YAMASHITA V. LG CHEM, LTD. 3

Seoul, South Korea. LGCA is a wholly-owned marketing

subsidiary of LGC, and a Delaware corporation with its

principal place of business in Georgia.

After Yamashita appealed, but before he filed his

opening brief, the U.S. Supreme Court issued its decision in

Ford Motor Co. v. Montana Eighth Judicial District Court,

141 S. Ct. 1017 (2021).

Since this case was brought in Hawaii, and Hawaii’s

long-arm statute allows Hawaii courts to invoke personal

jurisdiction to the extent permitted by the due process clause,

a court sitting in Hawaii can exercise jurisdiction over

Yamashita’s claims against LGC and LGCA if doing so is

consistent with the Fourteenth Amendment. Supreme Court

precedents recognize two kinds of personal

jurisdiction: general and specific jurisdiction.

Yamashita argued that LGC and LGCA’s contacts with

Hawaii were sufficient to establish general personal

jurisdiction. The panel held that LGC and LGCA are not “at

home” in Hawaii, and the district court of Hawaii could not

exercise general personal jurisdiction over them.

For an exercise of specific personal jurisdiction, the due

process clause requires that the defendant “take some act by

which it purposefully avails itself of the privilege of

conducting activities within the forum State,” and that the

plaintiff’s claims “arise out of or relate to the defendant’s

contacts with the forum.” Ford, 141 S. Ct. at 1024-25.” The

panel held that Ford modified, but did not abolish, the

requirement that a claim must arise out of or relate to a forum

contact in order for a court to exercise specific personal

jurisdiction.

4 YAMASHITA V. LG CHEM, LTD.

Under Ninth Circuit law, the placement of a product into

the stream of commerce, by itself, is not an act purposefully

directed toward the forum state. The panel held that under

the stream-of-commerce-plus test, only some of the alleged

contacts between LGC and LGCA and Hawaii count as

purposeful availment. First, LGC and LGCA’s shipments to

and through the port of Honolulu qualified as purposeful

availment. Second, LGC’s involvement in the sale of

residential solar batteries in Hawaii qualified as purposeful

availment. Third, the various consumer products sold in

Hawaii containing LGC’s 18650 lithium-ion batteries did

not show purposeful availment, but only a bare stream of

commerce. Fourth, LGC’s introduction of stand-alone

18650 batteries into the stream of commerce through a third-

party website did not amount to purposeful availment

without some indication that LGC was targeting the Hawaii

market. The panel concluded that half of the alleged

contacts were not contacts at all, but for purposeful

availment purposes, a single sufficiently deliberate contact

can suffice.

While LGC and LGCA’s Hawaii contacts clearly

showed that they purposefully availed themselves of Hawaii

law, they can only be subject to specific personal jurisdiction

if Yamashita’s injuries arose out of or relate to those

contacts. The panel held that Yamashita had not shown that

his injuries arose out of any contacts because he had not

shown but-for causation. Of the four types of contacts he

alleged, only two were actually forum contacts within the

meaning of the specific personal jurisdiction test: the use of

the port of Honolulu and the activity in the market for solar

batteries. Neither established but-for causation. The panel

further held that Yamashita had not shown

relatedness. Given that Yamashita could not show that his

YAMASHITA V. LG CHEM, LTD. 5

injury arose out of or related to LGC or LGCA’s Hawaii

contacts, the district court did not err in dismissing for lack

of personal jurisdiction over either firm.

The panel next considered the district court’s denial of

jurisdictional discovery. First, Yamashita sought evidence

that LGC and LGCA had forum contacts related to the use

of lithium-ion batteries, particularly 18650 batteries, in

consumer products. The panel held that such contacts might

satisfy the “relates to” prong of the specific personal

jurisdiction test if causing one’s lithium-ion batteries to be

incorporated into consumer products meant entering the

consumer marker for stand-alone lithium-ion batteries. But

this was implausible. Second, Yamashita sought evidence

that the subject battery was removed from a consumer

product within Hawaii and resold to him as a stand-alone

product. Such evidence, in combination with previously

discussed hypothetical evidence, could satisfy the “arise out

of” prong. The panel held that Yamashita’s theory was too

speculative to ground jurisdictional discovery, and it was not

an abuse of discretion for the district court to reach this

conclusion. Third, Yamashita sought to show that LGC and

LGCA in fact sell 18650 batteries to third-party distributors

intending for them to introduce the batteries to Hawaii as a

stand-alone products, and that Yamashita bought the subject

battery from such a distributor. Declarations denied that

LGC of LGCA authorized any third parties to sell stand-

alone 18650 batteries. The panel held that in the context of

a motion for jurisdictional discovery, Yamashita’s bare

allegations were trumped by the sworn statements to the

contrary. The panel concluded that the district court’s denial

of jurisdictional discovery was not an abuse of discretion.

6 YAMASHITA V. LG CHEM, LTD.

COUNSEL

Jeremy K. O’Steen (argued) and James J. Bickerton,

Bickerton Law Group LLP, Honolulu, Hawaii, for Plaintiff-

Appellant.

Wendy S. Dowse (argued), Lewis Brisbois Bisgaard &

Smith LLP, Indian Wells, California; Stefan M. Reinke,

Lyons Brandt Cook & Hiramatsu, Honolulu, Hawaii; for

Defendants-Appellees.

OPINION

O’SCANNLAIN, Circuit Judge:

We must decide, in light of the Supreme Court’s recent

Ford Motor Company decision, whether a district court can

exercise personal jurisdiction over an out-of-state

manufacturer that has various forum contacts, but does not

sell the allegedly defective product as a stand-alone product

to in-state consumers.

I

Matt Yamashita brought this products-liability suit

against LG Chem, Ltd. (“LGC”) and LG Chem America,

Inc. (“LGCA”), claiming that they negligently manufactured

and distributed a battery which he used to power an

electronic cigarette until the battery and electronic cigarette

both exploded in his mouth.

YAMASHITA V. LG CHEM, LTD. 7

A

Yamashita is a resident of Hawaii. In December 2017,

the subject battery exploded, causing severe and permanent

injury. Yamashita alleges that the subject battery was an

18650 lithium-ion battery—that is, a lithium-ion battery

18mm in diameter, 65mm in length, and cylindrical in

shape—designed, manufactured, and distributed by LGC

and LGCA. Yamashita alleges that he purchased the battery

from an unidentified third party to whom LGC and LGCA

had somehow distributed it for resale in Hawaii.

B

LGC, a South Korean company headquartered in Seoul,

South Korea, produces lithium-ion batteries. LGC sells

18650 lithium-ion batteries to manufacturers for use in

consumer products such as mobile devices, notebook

computers, and power tools. But LGC denies distributing,

advertising, or selling any 18650 lithium-ion batteries

directly to consumers as stand-alone batteries.

LGCA, a wholly-owned marketing subsidiary of LGC,

is a Delaware corporation with its principal place of business

in Georgia that resells and distributes various industrial

products. LGCA does not manufacture any products it

distributes. LGCA has facilitated sales of LGC 18650

batteries between LGC and at least one entity customer in

Texas. But LGCA denies selling to individual consumers.

LGC and LGCA each have various contacts and alleged

contacts with Hawaii. These contacts fall into four broad

categories:

First, both firms have shipped products through the port

of Honolulu. Some of these shipments went to Hawaii-based

companies, and some contained lithium-ion batteries, but the

8 YAMASHITA V. LG CHEM, LTD.

record does not show whether these subsets overlapped, or

whether any shipment contained 18650 batteries. Yamashita

alleges that LGC and LGCA have shipped lithium-ion

batteries into Hawaii.

Second, LGC has significant involvement in the sale of

residential solar batteries in Hawaii. Various LGC

representatives have visited Hawaii for reasons related to

such business.

Third, various consumer products sold in Hawaii contain

LGC-produced lithium-ion batteries, including 18650

batteries. Again, the record does not show whether any of

these batteries are brought into Hawaii by LGC, nor whether,

if third parties acquire the batteries elsewhere for

incorporation into consumer products, LGC and LGCA

nevertheless play some role in directing the batteries toward

Hawaii. Yamashita alleges that LGC and LGCA provide

18650 batteries for products that they expect will be sold in

Hawaii.

Finally, a third-party website sells stand-alone LGC-

produced 18650 lithium-ion batteries. The record does not

reveal how this website obtains the batteries. Yamashita

alleges that LGC and LGCA sell their batteries to the third-

party website knowing that they will be sold into Hawaii as

stand-alone batteries. But declarations from LGC and LGCA

employees deny that either firm has authorized any third-

party retailer or distributor to sell stand-alone 18650

batteries in Hawaii, or anywhere for that matter.

C

Yamashita sued LGC and LGCA in Hawaii state court,

bringing various state-law claims related to the design,

manufacture, labeling, advertising, and distribution of the

YAMASHITA V. LG CHEM, LTD. 9

subject battery. LGC and LGCA timely removed from

Hawaii state court to the District Court for the District of

Hawaii, and then moved to dismiss Yamashita’s complaint

for lack of personal jurisdiction. Yamashita opposed the

motions and moved for jurisdictional discovery.

The district court denied Yamashita’s motion for

jurisdictional discovery. Based on the allegations, as well as

exhibits and declarations submitted by the parties, the

district court granted the motions to dismiss Yamashita’s

claims for lack of personal jurisdiction over LGC and

LGCA. Yamashita timely appealed.

After Yamashita appealed, but before he filed his

opening brief, the Supreme Court issued its decision in Ford

Motor Co. v. Montana Eighth Judicial District Court

(“Ford”), which is the most recent Supreme Court guidance

on personal jurisdiction. 141 S. Ct. 1017 (2021).

II

A

We determine de novo whether Yamashita met his

burden of establishing that jurisdiction is proper.

CollegeSource, Inc. v. AcademyOne, Inc., 653 F.3d 1066,

1073 (9th Cir. 2011). “Where, as here, the defendant’s

motion is based on written materials rather than an

evidentiary hearing, the plaintiff need only make a prima

facie showing of jurisdictional facts to withstand the motion

to dismiss.” Id. at 1073 (cleaned up). Uncontroverted

allegations in the complaint are taken as true, but in the face

of a contradictory affidavit, the “plaintiff cannot simply rest

on the bare allegations of its complaint.” Mavrix Photo, Inc.

v. Brand Techs., Inc., 647 F.3d 1218, 1223 (9th Cir. 2011)

(cleaned up).

10 YAMASHITA V. LG CHEM, LTD.

B

“A federal district court sitting in diversity has in

personam jurisdiction over a defendant to the extent the

forum state’s law constitutionally provides.” Metro. Life Ins.

Co. v. Neaves, 912 F.2d 1062, 1065 (9th Cir. 1990). Since

this case was brought in Hawaii, and “Hawai‘i’s long-arm

statute allows Hawai‘i courts to invoke personal jurisdiction

to the full extent permitted by the due process clause,”

Yamashita v. LG Chem, Ltd., 518 P.3d 1169, 1171 (Haw.

2022), the statutory question here collapses into the

constitutional one: a court sitting in Hawaii can exercise

jurisdiction over Yamashita’s claims against LGC and

LGCA if doing so is consistent with the Fourteenth

Amendment. The Supreme Court’s due process precedents

have “recogniz[ed] two kinds of personal jurisdiction:

general … and specific … jurisdiction.” Ford, 141 S. Ct. at

1024. Yamashita argues that both apply here.

C

General personal jurisdiction permits a court to hear “any

and all claims” brought against a defendant, Goodyear

Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 919

(2011), concerning any of the defendant’s activity

“anywhere in the world,” Ford, 141 S. Ct. at 1024. For a

court to exercise general personal jurisdiction over a

defendant corporation, the defendant’s contacts with the

forum state must be “so continuous and systematic as to

render [it] essentially at home in the forum State.”

Goodyear, 564 U.S. at 919 (cleaned up). A corporation is “at

home” in “its place of incorporation and principal place of

business,” and “in an exceptional case a corporation might

also be ‘at home’ elsewhere.” Ford, 141 S. Ct. at 1024

(cleaned up).

YAMASHITA V. LG CHEM, LTD. 11

Neither LGC nor LGCA has Hawaii as its place of

incorporation or principal place of business. Yamashita

argues that their contacts with Hawaii are sufficient to

establish general personal jurisdiction, but nothing about

these “random, fortuitous, [and] attenuated contacts” merits

an exception to the rule. Core-Vent Corp. v. Nobel Indus.

AB, 11 F.3d 1482, 1490 (9th Cir. 1993) (cleaned up). If they

did, the exceptions would swallow the rule, such that most

international firms selling into the U.S. market would be at

home in most U.S. states, despite being neither incorporated

nor headquartered in any of them. LGC and LGCA are not

at home in Hawaii, and the district court of Hawaii cannot

exercise general personal jurisdiction over them.

D

Even absent general personal jurisdiction, the district

court might be able to exercise specific personal jurisdiction.

For an exercise of specific personal jurisdiction, the due

process clause requires, inter alia, that the defendant “take

some act by which it purposefully avails itself of the

privilege of conducting activities within the forum State,”

and that the plaintiff’s claims “arise out of or relate to the

defendant’s contacts with the forum.” Ford, 141 S. Ct. at

1024-25 (cleaned up).

1

i

For LGC and LGCA to have purposefully availed

themselves of the laws of Hawaii, they must have

“deliberately reached out beyond [their] home[s]—by, for

example, exploiting a market in the forum State or entering

a contractual relationship centered there.” Id. at 1025

(cleaned up). “[U]nilateral activity of another party or a third

12 YAMASHITA V. LG CHEM, LTD.

person” does not suffice. Helicopteros Nacionales de

Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 417 (1984). Under our

circuit’s law, “[t]he placement of a product into the stream

of commerce, without more, is not an act purposefully

directed toward a forum state,” even if the defendant is

“aware[] that the stream of commerce may or will sweep the

product into the forum state.” Holland Am. Line Inc. v.

Wärtsilä N. Am., Inc., 485 F.3d 450, 459 (9th Cir. 2007)

(citing Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Ct., 480 U.S. 102,

112 (1987) (O’Connor, J., plurality opinion) (finding no

purposeful availment in part because defendant “did not

create, control, or employ the distribution system that

brought its [product] to [the forum state]”)). This approach

is referred to as the “stream-of-commerce-plus test.” In re

Chinese Manufactured Drywall Prods. Liab. Litig., 742 F.3d

576, 585 (5th Cir. 2014).

Yamashita argues that the stream-of-commerce-plus test

was abrogated by Justice Breyer’s minority opinion in J.

McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873 (2011).

But this argument is unconvincing. While Justice Breyer did

suggest that the Court might reject purposeful availment in

an appropriate case, he did not find J. McIntyre an

appropriate case for any legal development. Id. at 890

(Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment) (“[O]n the record

present here, resolving this case requires no more than

adhering to our precedents.… I would not go further.”).

Since his opinion did nothing more than adhere to existing

Supreme Court precedents, it could not have abrogated our

circuit’s existing rule, which was based on those same

precedents.

YAMASHITA V. LG CHEM, LTD. 13

ii

Under the stream-of-commerce-plus test, only some of

the alleged contacts between LGC and LGCA and Hawaii

count as purposeful availment:

First, Yamashita points to LGC and LGCA’s shipments

to and through the port of Honolulu. These contacts do

qualify as purposeful availment—LGC and LGCA relied on

the laws of Hawaii to protect their property while it was

located within its jurisdiction.

Second, Yamashita points to LGC’s involvement in the

sale of residential solar batteries in Hawaii. These contacts

also clearly qualify as purposeful availment.

Third, Yamashita points to the various consumer

products sold in Hawaii containing LGC’s 18650 lithium-

ion batteries. On their own, these sales do not show

purposeful availment, but only a bare stream of commerce.

The record does not show that LGC deliberately navigates

the stream of commerce towards Hawaii, either by

introducing these batteries into Hawaii itself, or by

“creat[ing], control[ling], or employ[ing] the distribution

system” which does so. Asahi, 480 U.S. at 112.

Finally, Yamashita alleges that LGC introduced stand-

alone 18650 batteries into the stream of commerce through

a third-party website. But both firms submitted sworn

statements denying these allegations, and Yamashita offers

no evidence to the contrary. And even if LGC did sell its

batteries to a third-party website, that conduct would not

amount to purposeful availment without some indication that

LGC was targeting the Hawaii market.

14 YAMASHITA V. LG CHEM, LTD.

In sum, half of Yamashita’s alleged contacts are not

contacts at all—but for purposeful availment purposes, a

single sufficiently deliberate contact can suffice.

2

While LGC and LGCA’s Hawaii contacts clearly show

that they purposefully availed themselves of Hawaii law,

they cannot be subject to specific personal jurisdiction there

unless Yamashita’s injuries “arise out of or relate to” those

contacts. Ford, 141 S. Ct. at 1025 (cleaned up).

i

We have long understood that for an injury to arise out

of a defendant’s forum contacts required “but for” causation,

in which “a direct nexus exists between [a defendant’s]

contacts [with the forum state] and the cause of action.” In

re W. States Wholesale Nat. Gas Antitrust Litig., 715 F.3d

716, 742 (9th Cir. 2013) (cleaned up), aff’d sub nom. Oneok,

Inc. v. Learjet, Inc., 575 U.S. 373 (2015). The Supreme

Court announced in Ford that ‘arise out of’ and ‘relate to’

are alternatives: for a claim to arise out of a defendant’s

forum contacts requires causation, while a claim can relate

to those contacts, even absent causation, where, for example,

“a company … serves a market for a product in the forum

State and the product malfunctions there.” Ford, 141 S. Ct.

at 1026-27. Specifically, Ford held that Ford Motor

Company was subject to specific personal jurisdiction over

claims of injuries caused by a Ford Explorer in Montana, and

by a Ford Crown Victoria in Minnesota, despite the vehicles

having been sold by Ford out-of-state, because:

By every means imaginable—among them,

billboards, TV and radio spots, print ads, and

direct mail—Ford urges Montanans and

YAMASHITA V. LG CHEM, LTD. 15

Minnesotans to buy its vehicles, including (at

all relevant times) Explorers and Crown

Victorias. Ford cars—again including those

two models—are available for sale, whether

new or used, throughout the States, at 36

dealerships in Montana and 84 in Minnesota.

And apart from sales, Ford works hard to

foster ongoing connections to its cars’

owners. The company’s dealers in Montana

and Minnesota (as elsewhere) regularly

maintain and repair Ford cars, including

those whose warranties have long since

expired. And the company distributes

replacement parts both to its own dealers and

to independent auto shops in the two States.

Those activities, too, make Ford money. And

by making it easier to own a Ford, they

encourage Montanans and Minnesotans to

become lifelong Ford drivers.

Id. at 1028.

Ford explicitly stated that it did “not address” a scenario

in which Ford sold other models in the forum state, but

“marketed the models [in question] in only a different State

or region.” Id. Nor has our circuit addressed a scenario in

which the defendants had extensive forum contacts, and the

main question was whether they sufficiently related to the

plaintiff’s injury. See LNS Enters. LLC v. Cont’l Motors,

Inc., 22 F.4th 852, 864 (9th Cir. 2022) (finding that a

defendant’s sole forum contact, ownership of a service

station, did not relate to the alleged injury). Accordingly, we

look beyond Ford’s holding to its reasoning. Three aspects

of Ford’s reasoning provide guidance on how to determine

16 YAMASHITA V. LG CHEM, LTD.

whether a defendant’s contacts sufficiently relate to a

plaintiff’s injury.

First, the Court emphasized that Ford’s forum contacts

may well have played a causal role in the introduction to the

forum state of the particular vehicle causing the injury: the

owner may have seen “ads for the [model] in local media,”

or “take[n] into account a raft of Ford’s in-state activities

designed to make driving a Ford convenient there.” Ford,

141 S. Ct. at 1029. Given the likelihood of causation, the

Court reasoned, jurisdiction should not “ride on the exact

reasons for an individual plaintiff’s purchase, or on his

ability to present persuasive evidence about them.” Id. In

effect, relatedness proxies for causation, ensuring

jurisdiction over a class of cases for which causation seems

particularly likely but is not always easy to prove. On this

line of reasoning, a plaintiff’s injury relates to a defendant’s

forum contacts if similar injuries will tend to be caused by

those contacts.

Second, the Court emphasized that exercising

jurisdiction was fair to Ford because, by “extensively

market[ing]” the car models at issue in the forum states, Ford

incurred an obligation to ensure that the models were “safe

for their citizens to use there.” Id. at 1030. This reasoning

would not apply if Ford had marketed only other models in

the forum states—otherwise Ford would have to choose

either to leave the forum state’s auto market entirely, or to

expose itself to suits in the forum state based on vehicles of

a type which Ford never sold there, but which were brought

in by third parties. On this line of reasoning, a plaintiff’s

injury relates to a defendant’s forum contacts if the

defendant should have foreseen the risk that its contacts

might cause injuries like that of the plaintiff.

YAMASHITA V. LG CHEM, LTD. 17

Third, Ford makes clear that ‘relate to’ “does not mean

anything goes.” 141 S. Ct. at 1026. To the contrary, to give

‘relate to’ too broad a scope would risk “collaps[ing] the core

distinction between general and specific personal

jurisdiction.” Bernhardt v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 47 F.4th

856, 866 (D.C. Cir. 2022). Other circuits’ applications of

Ford suggest that relatedness requires a close connection

between contacts and injury. See, e.g., NBA Props., Inc. v.

HANWJH, 46 F.4th 614, 625-27 (7th Cir. 2022) (finding

relatedness when a company sold an allegedly trademark-

infringing product online and it was purchased by at least

one resident of the forum state); Hood v. Am. Auto Care,

LLC, 21 F.4th 1216, 1220 (10th Cir. 2021) (finding

relatedness when a telemarketer called a forum resident’s

out-of-state cell phone number because the telemarketer

regularly made similar phone calls to in-state numbers).

ii

Given this understanding of Ford, we must determine

whether Yamashita’s injuries either arose out of or related to

LGC and LGCA’s Hawaii contacts. 1

1

We note considerable confusion among district courts about how to

apply Ford in cases highly similar to those at issue here. See, e.g., Richter

v. LG Chem, Ltd., No. 18 CV 50360, 2022 WL 5240583, at *3 (N.D. Ill.

Sept. 27, 2022) (finding no jurisdiction over LGC); LG Chem, Ltd. v.

Superior Ct., 295 Cal. Rptr. 3d 661, 679 (Ct. App. 2022) (similar),

review denied (Oct. 12, 2022); LG Chem, Ltd. v. Granger, No. 14-19-

00814-CV, 2021 WL 2153761, at *7 (Tex. App. May 27, 2021) (similar).

But see, e.g., Eisenhauer v. LG Chem, Ltd., No. 21-CV-964, 2022 WL

123783, at *4 (E.D. Mo. Jan. 13, 2022) (finding no jurisdiction over

LGCA); id., 2022 WL 2208952, at *6 (E.D. Mo. June 21, 2022) (but

finding jurisdiction over LGC).

18 YAMASHITA V. LG CHEM, LTD.

Yamashita has not shown that his injuries arose out of

any contacts because he has not shown but-for causation. Of

the four types of contacts he alleged, only two were actually

forum contacts within the meaning of the specific personal

jurisdiction test: the use of the port of Honolulu, and the

activity in the market for solar batteries. The former does not

establish but-for causation because Yamashita does not

allege that LGC or LGCA shipped the subject battery into

the port of Honolulu. The latter does not establish but-for

causation because Yamashita does not allege that LGC’s

activity in the solar battery market caused the introduction

of the subject battery to Hawaii.

Yamashita also has not shown relatedness. Again, only

the port and solar contacts count as forum contacts to which

Yamashita’s injury could relate. Regarding the port contacts,

Yamashita suggests that his injury related to various

shipments—shipments of batteries in that Yamashita was

injured by a battery, and shipments of raw materials “to the

extent these types of products go into lithium-ion battery

production.” This is implausible. Ford found specific

jurisdiction because Ford sold the relevant models to

consumers in the forum states, not because it shipped raw

materials, or even completed cars, through those states.

Regarding the solar contacts, Yamashita suggests that his

injury related to LGC’s sale of solar batteries because his

injury was allegedly caused by an LGC-manufactured

battery. But the large batteries installed in stationary solar-

power systems and the small portable stand-alone battery at

issue here are as different as sedans and 18-wheelers. There

is little reason to believe that either firm’s port contacts or

LGC’s solar contacts have anything to do with Hawaii

residents’ acquisition of 18650 lithium-ion batteries.

YAMASHITA V. LG CHEM, LTD. 19

Given that Yamashita cannot show that his injury arose

out of or related to LGC or LGCA’s Hawaii contacts, the

district court did not err in dismissing for lack of personal

jurisdiction over either firm.

III

Since Yamashita had not pled facts sufficient to establish

personal jurisdiction, we consider the district court’s denial

of jurisdictional discovery.

A

We review denials of jurisdictional discovery for abuse

of discretion. Laub v. U.S. Dept. of Int., 342 F.3d 1080, 1093

(9th Cir. 2003). Jurisdictional discovery “should ordinarily

be granted where pertinent facts bearing on the question of

jurisdiction are controverted or where a more satisfactory

showing of the facts is necessary.” Id. (cleaned up). But “a

mere hunch that discovery might yield jurisdictionally

relevant facts, or bare allegations in the face of specific

denials, are insufficient reasons for a court to grant

jurisdictional discovery.” LNS Enters., 22 F.4th at 864-65

(cleaned up). “The district court’s refusal to provide such

discovery will not be reversed except upon the clearest

showing that denial of discovery results in actual and

substantial prejudice to the complaining litigant.” Boschetto

v. Hansing, 539 F.3d 1011, 1020 (9th Cir. 2008) (cleaned

up).

B

Yamashita sought jurisdictional discovery on various

issues. Given our analysis of specific personal jurisdiction,

most of the information he seeks is clearly irrelevant—the

jurisdictional analysis would not be affected by the details of

LGC or LGCA’s use of the port of Honolulu, or the extent

20 YAMASHITA V. LG CHEM, LTD.

to which either firm sells or authorizes the sale in Hawaii of

products containing 18650 batteries, or the precise

relationship between the two entities. But Yamashita does

seek three pieces of information whose irrelevance to the

jurisdictional determination is less obvious.

1

First, Yamashita seeks evidence that LGC and LGCA

have forum contacts related to the use of lithium-ion

batteries, and particularly 18650 batteries, in consumer

products. Yamashita hypothesizes that these firms either are

directly responsible for shipping such batteries into Hawaii,

or that they purposefully avail themselves of the laws of

Hawaii through contractual agreements requiring

manufacturers of battery-containing products to market their

products in Hawaii.

Such contacts might satisfy the ‘relates to’ prong of the

specific personal jurisdiction test if causing one’s lithium-

ion batteries to be incorporated into consumer products

meant entering the consumer market for stand-alone lithium-

ion batteries. But this is implausible. Whether the relevant

market is that for lithium-ion batteries generally or that for

18650 batteries specifically, the relevant market is the

consumer market. The logic of Ford did not turn on the mere

fact that Ford had introduced some Explorers and Crown

Victorias into Montana and Minnesota, but on the fact that it

marketed these models to consumers, sold them to

consumers, and serviced them for consumers. Ford gives

little reason to think that the relatedness prong would have

been satisfied if, for example, Ford had sold Crown Victorias

only to police departments in Minnesota, had not marketed

them to consumers, and had not serviced them at all. Such

contacts would not typically cause, and could not be foreseen

YAMASHITA V. LG CHEM, LTD. 21

to cause, injuries resulting from consumer ownership of

Crown Victorias, especially if most consumer-owned Crown

Victorias were acquired out-of-state. Similarly, even if LGC

or LGCA sells 18650 batteries to manufacturers for

incorporation in consumer products sold in Hawaii, these

sales would not be related to purchases of stand-alone

batteries by Hawaii consumers.

2

Yamashita also seeks evidence that the subject battery

itself was removed from a consumer product within Hawaii

and resold to him as a stand-alone product. Such evidence,

in combination with the hypothetical evidence discussed

above, could satisfy the ‘arises out of’ prong. After all, if

LGC and LGCA purposefully availed themselves of the laws

of Hawaii by causing 18650 batteries to be incorporated into

consumer products sold in Hawaii, and then such a battery

were removed from such a device and sold to Yamashita,

their contacts would be a but-for cause of Yamashita’s

injury.

But Yamashita has given no reason to think that the

battery came from such a device—he only says that it cannot

be ruled out. As evidence, he cites three YouTube how-to

videos explaining how to remove 18650 batteries from

various consumer products. He offers no evidence that

batteries removed in this manner are ever resold

commercially. This theory seems too speculative to ground

jurisdictional discovery, and it certainly was not an abuse of

discretion for the district court to reach this conclusion.

22 YAMASHITA V. LG CHEM, LTD.

3

Finally, Yamashita seeks to show that LGC and LGCA

in fact sell 18650 batteries to third-party distributors

intending for them to introduce the batteries to Hawaii as

stand-alone products, and that Yamashita bought the subject

battery from such a distributor. Such evidence would show

that LGC and LGCA purposefully availed themselves of the

market for stand-alone 18650 batteries in Hawaii. Moreover,

such evidence would establish relatedness, and likely also

that Yamashita’s injury arose out of the firms’ Hawaii

contacts.

But—again—declarations deny that LGC or LGCA have

authorized any third parties to sell stand-alone 18650

batteries. In the context of a motion for jurisdictional

discovery, just as in the context of a motion to dismiss for

lack of jurisdiction, bare allegations are trumped by sworn

statements to the contrary. LNS Enters., 22 F.4th at 864-65.

In sum, Yamashita has no viable route to establish

personal jurisdiction. Jurisdictional discovery would be little

more than a fishing expedition seeking support for

jurisdictional theories one of which is farfetched, and the

other of which LGC and LGCA have specifically denied via

sworn statements. The district court’s denial of jurisdictional

discovery was not an abuse of its discretion.

IV

Ford modified but did not abolish the requirement that a

claim must arise out of or relate to a forum contact in order

for a court to exercise specific personal jurisdiction.

Yamashita has not met his burden to show that either prong

is satisfied here, and he has only a mere hunch that

jurisdictional discovery will allow him to meet his burden.

YAMASHITA V. LG CHEM, LTD. 23

The district court did not err in dismissing for lack of

personal jurisdiction. Neither did it abuse its discretion in

denying jurisdictional discovery.

AFFIRMED.