Opinion

Lewis Moss v. Department of Defense

Court: Merit Systems Protection Board
Filed: Aug 26, 2022
Status: Unpublished
Cited by: 0 cases
Authority: More cited than 22.6%

stating that “even assuming arguendo that Hicks’ claim of reprisal for filing a previous [B]oard appeal falls within the scope of section 2302(b)(9)(A)(i

How later courts described this case

stating that “even assuming arguendo that Hicks’ claim of reprisal for filing a previous [B]oard appeal falls within the scope of section 2302(b)(9)(A)(i

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

LEWIS MOSS, DOCKET NUMBER

Appellant, DC-1221-13-0151-W-2

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, DATE: August 26, 2022

Agency.

THIS FINAL ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1

Lewis Moss, Kaiserslautern, APO/AE, pro se.

Sally R. Bacon, Esquire, Fort Lee, Virginia, for the agency.

BEFORE

Cathy A. Harris, Vice Chairman

Raymond A. Limon, Member

Tristan L. Leavitt, Member

FINAL ORDER

¶1 The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which

dismissed the appeal in part for lack of jurisdiction and in part due to res judicata

and collateral estoppel. Generally, we grant petitions such as this one only in the

following circumstances: the initial decision contains erroneous findings of

A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add

significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders,

but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not

required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a

precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board

as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c).

material fact; the initial decision is based on an erroneous interpretation of statute

or regulation or the erroneous application of the law to the facts of the case; the

administrative judge’s rulings during either the course of the appeal or the initial

decision were not consistent with required procedures or involved an abuse of

discretion, and the resulting error affected the outcome of the case; or new and

material evidence or legal argument is available that, despite the petitioner’s due

diligence, was not available when the record closed. Title 5 of the Code of

Federal Regulations, section 1201.115 (5 C.F.R. § 1201.115). After fully

considering the filings in this appeal, we conclude that the petitioner has not

established any basis under section 1201.115 for granting the petition for review.

Therefore, we DENY the petition for review. We MODIFY the initial decision to

vacate the administrative judge’s analysis of collateral estoppel. We FIND

instead that the appellant has not shown that his June 12, 2008 disclosure was a

contributing factor in the agency’s decision to take a personnel action against

him, and therefore he is not entitled to corrective action. Except as expressly

MODIFIED by this Final Order, we AFFIRM the initial decision.

BACKGROUND

¶2 The relevant background information, as recited in the initial decision, is

generally undisputed. Effective August 1, 2009, the agency removed the

appellant based on a single charge of assault in the workplace. Moss v.

Department of Defense, MSPB Docket No. DC-1221-13-0151-W-2, Appeal File

(W-2 AF), Tab 44, Initial Decision (ID) at 2; see Moss v. Department of Defense,

MSPB Docket No. DC-0752-09-0823-I-1 (0823 removal appeal), Initial Decision

at 3 (Dec. 30, 2009). The appellant filed a Board appeal claiming, among other

things, that the removal was in retaliation for whistleblowing. ID at 2. The

administrative judge in the 0823 removal appeal sustained the misconduct charge,

found that the appellant did not prove any of his affirmative defenses including

reprisal for whistleblowing, and upheld the removal. Id. The Board denied the

appellant’s petition for review. Id.

¶3 The appellant subsequently filed an individual right of action (IRA) appeal

in which he alleged that, in retaliation for his whistleblowing, the agency took

several actions against him, including removal. ID at 2; Moss v. Department of

Defense, MSPB Docket No. DC-1221-12-0192-W-1 (0192 IRA appeal), Initial

Decision at 6 (Jan. 27, 2012). The administrative judge dismissed the 0192 IRA

appeal for lack of jurisdiction finding, among other things, that the appellant

failed to establish that he sought corrective action from the Office of Special

Counsel (OSC) before he appealed to the Board. ID at 2. The Board denied the

appellant’s petition for review and noted that he was precluded by res judicata

from raising claims involving his removal because it already had issued a final

decision in that matter. ID at 2-3.

¶4 The appellant subsequently filed this IRA appeal alleging that his removal

and other personnel actions were taken in retaliation for filing a March 4, 2008

equal employment opportunity (EEO) complaint and for sending a June 12, 2008

email to the agency’s European Region Director. ID at 3. The appeal was

dismissed without prejudice and refiled. Id.; see Moss v. Department of Defense,

MSPB Docket No. DC-1221-13-0151-W-1, Initial Appeal File (IAF), Tab 14;

W-2 AF, Tab 1. The administrative judge found that the appellant exhausted his

administrative remedies with OSC and made nonfrivolous allegations sufficient to

establish jurisdiction regarding the alleged personnel actions except the removal

action, which was barred by res judicata. ID at 9. The appellant withdrew his

hearing request. Id. In the initial decision for the IRA appeal, the administrative

judge made the following findings: (1) the appellant’s retaliation claims

stemming from his March 4, 2008 EEO complaint must be dismissed for lack of

jurisdiction; (2) his claim that the agency removed him in retaliation for his

June 12, 2008 disclosure was barred by res judicata; (3) he was barred by

collateral estoppel from relitigating whether he made a protected disclosure on

June 12, 2008; (4) the Board lacks jurisdiction to adjudicate his claim of harmful

procedural error in an IRA appeal; and (5) the Board cannot issue or compel a

decision on his March 4, 2008 EEO complaint. ID at 4-13.

¶5 The appellant has filed a petition for review and a supplemental petition.

Petition for Review (PFR) File, Tabs 1, 3. The agency has not filed a response.

DISCUSSION OF ARGUMENTS ON REVIEW 2

¶6 The appellant does not appear to challenge the administrative judge’s

conclusion regarding harmful error or the Board’s authority to compel a decision

on his March 2008 EEO complaint, and we affirm these findings. The appellant,

though, appears to challenge all of the administrative judge’s remaining

conclusions. PFR File, Tabs 1, 3.

The administrative judge properly determined that the Board lacks jurisdiction

over his March 4, 2008 EEO complaint.

¶7 The Board’s jurisdiction is limited to those matters over wh ich it has been

given jurisdiction by law, rule, or regulation. Maddox v. Merit Systems

Protection Board, 759 F.2d 9, 10 (Fed. Cir. 1985). As the administrative judge

noted in the initial decision, the Whistleblower Protection Enhancement Act of

2012 (WPEA), Pub. L. No. 112-199, 126 Stat. 1465, expanded the Board’s

jurisdiction in IRA appeals to claims arising under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9)(A)(i)

(which involve remedying a violation of section 2302(b)(8)), but not to those

claims arising under section 2302(b)(9)(A)(ii) (which do not involve remedying a

violation of section 2302(b)(8)). ID at 4-6; see WPEA § 101(b)(1)(A). We

discern no error with the administrative judge’s conclusion that the appellant’s

March 4, 2008 EEO activity was not protected under the law in effect at the time

the alleged personnel actions occurred, and the relevant provision of the WPEA is

not entitled to retroactive effect. ID at 4-5; see Hicks v. Merit Systems Protection

We have reviewed the relevant legislation enacted since the filing of this appeal and

find that it does not impact the outcome.

Board, 819 F.3d 1318, 1320 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (stating that “even assuming

arguendo that Hicks’ claim of reprisal for filing a previous [B]oard appeal falls

within the scope of section 2302(b)(9)(A)(i), the WPEA does not apply

retroactively to provide the [B]oard with authority to review an agency removal

action which occurred more than two decades before its enactment”). Even if the

WPEA provision was somehow entitled to retroactive effect, we agree with the

administrative judge that the appellant has not nonfrivolously alleged that his

March 4, 2008 EEO complaint was intended to remedy a violation of 5 U.S.C.

§ 2302(b)(8). Indeed, other than generic references to a “race discrimination”

complaint, e.g., IAF, Tab 1 at 9, the appellant did not provide any description or

summary of his allegations or any persuasive explanation as to how this

complaint involved remedying a violation of section 2302(b)(8). In the absence

of any such information, we find that the administrative judge properly dismissed

this claim for lack of jurisdiction. See Young v. Merit Systems Protection Board,

961 F.3d 1323, 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2020) (stating that “[s]ection 2302(b)(9)(A)(ii),

which is not included in the list of prohibited personnel practices for which the

Board can issue corrective action, covers retaliation for exercising any appeal,

complaint, or grievance right other than one seeking to remedy a violation of

section 2302(b)(8)[,] [r]etaliation for filing those other types of complaints is

remediable through different mechanisms, and not by an IRA appeal to the

Board”).

The administrative judge properly determined that the appellant is barred by res

judicata from asserting that the removal action was retaliatory.

¶8 Res judicata precludes parties from relitigating issues that were, or could

have been, raised in the prior action and is applicable if: (1) the prior judgment

was rendered by a forum with competent jurisdiction; (2) the prior judgment was

a final judgment on the merits; and (3) the same cause of action and the same

parties or their privies were involved in both cases. Peartree v. U.S. Postal

Service, 66 M.S.P.R. 332, 337 (1995). The appellant argues on review that the

administrative judge’s decision in the 0823 removal appeal was not a final

decision on the merits, PFR File, Tab 1 at 8-16, but this argument is unavailing.

Notably, the Board’s Final Order in the 0823 removal appeal was decided on the

merits, and it specifically stated that the initial decision was the “final” decision

except for minor modifications that were not related to the appellant’s claim of

reprisal for whistleblowing. Moss v. Department of Defense, MSPB Docket

No. DC-0752-09-0823-I-1, Final Order at 2 (Jul. 27, 2010). We agree with the

administrative judge that the elements of res judicata are satisfied, and the

appellant is therefore precluded from challenging the removal action once again

in this IRA appeal. 3

Because the appellant has not proven that his June 12, 2008 disclosure was a

contributing factor in the agency’s decision to take any of the remaining

personnel actions against him, he is not entitled to corrective action.

¶9 After establishing the Board’s jurisdiction in an IRA appeal, the appellant

must establish a prima facie case of whistleblower retaliation by proving by

preponderant evidence that he made a protected disclosure that was a contributing

factor in a personnel action taken against him. 5 U.S.C. § 1221(e)(1); Lu v.

Department of Homeland Security, 122 M.S.P.R. 335, ¶ 7 (2015). If the appellant

makes out a prima facie case, then the agency is given an opportunity to prove, by

clear and convincing evidence, that it would have taken the same personnel action

in the absence of the protected disclosure. 5 U.S.C. § 1221(e)(1)-(2); Lu,

122 M.S.P.R. 335, ¶ 7.

¶10 Although the appellant contends that the administrative judge erred in

applying collateral estoppel to preclude him from asserting that his June 12, 2008

disclosure was a protected disclosure, PFR File, Tab 1 at 17-22, the Board may

analyze the elements of a prima facie case in any order it deems most efficient,

Likewise, to the extent that the appellant challenges any of the other findings in the

0823 removal appeal initial decision, e.g., PFR File, Tab 1 at 6-16, the Board already

has issued a final decision in that matter, and we will not consider such claims in this

IRA appeal.

see Parikh v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 116 M.S.P.R. 197, ¶ 7 (2011). In

this case, we find it most efficient to start with contributing factor. One way of

proving contributing factor is to show that the official(s) taking the personnel

action(s) knew of the disclosure and the personnel action (s) occurred within a

period of time such that a reasonable person could conclude that the disclosure

was a contributing factor in the personnel action(s). 5 U.S.C.

§ 1221(e)(1)(A)-(B). The appellant asserted below that the Operation Support

Chief, who was also his first-line supervisor, the Deputy Chief, and the Chief, had

knowledge of his June 12, 2008 disclosure and were responsible for various

personnel actions. W-2 AF, Tab 1 at 8, Tab 6 at 6, Tab 34 at 12-13. For the

following reasons, we find that he has not satisfied his prima facie burden in this

regard.

¶11 The appellant offers no evidence whatsoever to support his assertion that

his first-line supervisor had actual or constructive knowledge of his June 12, 2008

disclosure. The record further reflects that the Deputy Chief was questioned as

part of an agency investigation relating to the allegations in his June 12, 2008

email. IAF, Tab 6 at 38-39. However, there is no evidence that the Deputy Chief

knew the source of the allegations or even suspected that it was the appellant who

made the initial disclosure that led to the investigation. 4 In fact, in the portion of

her written statement responding to allegations about unauthorized consumption

of alcohol by agency officials, the Deputy Chief explained that she was aware of

such an allegation. IAF, Tab 6 at 38. Indeed, the Deputy Chief identified the

appellant by name and mentioned that he previously had informed her that the

canteen was selling beer, and as a result of learning this information, she briefed

all employees and advised them that they were not to buy or consume any alcohol

In the 0823 removal appeal, the administrative judge noted that the Deputy Chief was

never asked at the hearing if she had any knowledge of the disclosures. Moss v.

Department of Defense, MSPB Docket No. DC-0752-09-0823-I-1, Initial Decision at 20

(Dec. 30, 2009).

purchased from the canteen, and she directed the canteen not to sell any alcoholic

beverages. Id. In the absence of any evidence that the appellant’s first-line

supervisor and/or the Deputy Chief had knowledge of the appellant’s June 12,

2008 email disclosure or the allegations contained therein, we need not consider

the personnel actions in which they were involved.

¶12 By contrast, the Chief was aware of the appellant’s June 12, 2008 email

disclosure. IAF, Tab 6 at 41-43. Based on our review of the record and the

personnel actions identified by the appellant on review, it appears that the Chief

was involved in the decision to relieve the appellant of some of his duties and

responsibilities on June 12, 2008, and the decision to remove him. Id. at 34-35,

41-43. We already have affirmed the administrative judge’s conclusion that the

appellant was precluded by res judicata from challenging his removal in this IRA

appeal, and we need not consider this personnel action further . Moreover, the

appellant is not entitled to corrective action based on the Chief’s decision to

relieve him of some of his duties and responsibilities on June 12, 2008, because

that action was referenced in the email disclosure and could not have occurred as

a result of the disclosure. See Finston v. Health Care Financing Administration,

83 M.S.P.R. 100, ¶ 5 (1999) (finding that if an agency takes an action before the

appellant makes a disclosure, the Board may find that the disclosure was not a

contributing factor in the action). 5

¶13 We have considered the appellant’s remaining arguments on review, but

none persuade us that a different outcome is warranted. For instance, regarding

his assertion that the administrative judge did not consider the entire record, PFR

File, Tab 1 at 21, Tab 3 at 5-6, the administrative judge’s failure to mention all of

In light of this finding, we need not determine whether the administrative judge

properly applied collateral estoppel, and we vacate her analysis of this issue in the

initial decision. It also is unnecessary to determine whether the agency proved by clear

and convincing evidence that it would have taken the actions at issue in the absence of

the disclosure. Scoggins v. Department of the Army, 123 M.S.P.R. 592, ¶ 28

(2016).

the evidence of record does not mean that she did not consider it in reaching her

decision, Marques v. Department of Health & Human Services, 22 M.S.P.R. 129,

132 (1984), aff’d, 776 F.2d 1062 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (Table). Additionally, the

appellant challenges the administrative judge’s statement that he filed an IRA

appeal on April 4, 2014. PFR File, Tab 1 at 23, Tab 3 at 4. Contrary to his

contention, the Board’s record in Moss v. Department of Defense, MSPB Docket

No. DC-1221-14-0567-W-1, reflects that the Washington Regional Office

docketed the appellant’s submission as an IRA appeal, the administrative judge

dismissed the IRA appeal for lack of jurisdiction, and the Board denied the

appellant’s petition for review. Even if we assume for the purpose of our analysis

that the administrative judge erred, the appellant has not explained how he was

prejudiced by any such error. See Panter v. Department of the Air Force,

22 M.S.P.R. 281, 282 (1984) (stating that an adjudicatory error that is not

prejudicial to a party’s substantive rights does not provide a basis for reversal of

the initial decision).

¶14 Accordingly, we affirm the initial decision.

NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS 6

The initial decision, as supplemented by this Final Order, constitutes the

Board’s final decision in this matter. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.113. You may obtain

review of this final decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(a)(1). By statute, the nature of

your claims determines the time limit for seeking such review and the appropriate

forum with which to file. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b). Although we offer the following

summary of available appeal rights, the Merit Systems Protection Board does not

provide legal advice on which option is most appropriate for your situation an d

the rights described below do not represent a statement of how courts will rule

Since the issuance of the initial decision in this matter, the Board may have updated

the notice of review rights included in final decisions. As indicated in the notice, the

Board cannot advise which option is most appropriate in any matter.

regarding which cases fall within their jurisdiction. If you wish to seek review of

this final decision, you should immediately review the law applicable to your

claims and carefully follow all filing time limits and requirements. Failure to file

within the applicable time limit may result in the dismissal of your case by your

chosen forum.

Please read carefully each of the three main possible choices of review

below to decide which one applies to your particular case. If you have questions

about whether a particular forum is the appropriate one to review your case, you

should contact that forum for more information.

(1) Judicial review in general. As a general rule, an appellant seeking

judicial review of a final Board order must file a petition for review with the U.S.

Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which must be received by the court

within 60 calendar days of the date of issuance of this decision. 5 U.S.C.

§ 7703(b)(1)(A).

If you submit a petition for review to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the

Federal Circuit, you must submit your petition to the court at the

following address:

U.S. Court of Appeals

for the Federal Circuit

717 Madison Place, N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20439

Additional information about the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal

Circuit is available at the court’s website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov. Of particular

relevance is the court’s “Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants,” which is

contained within the court’s Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6, 10, and 11.

If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for an appeal to

the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you may visit our website at

http://www.mspb.gov/probono for information regarding pro bono representation

for Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the Federal Circuit. The

Board neither endorses the services provided by any attorney nor warrants that

any attorney will accept representation in a given case.

(2) Judicial or EEOC review of cases involving a claim of

discrimination. This option applies to you only if you have claimed that you

were affected by an action that is appealable to the Board and that such action

was based, in whole or in part, on unlawful discrimination. If so, you may obtain

judicial review of this decision—including a disposition of your discrimination

claims—by filing a civil action with an appropriate U.S . district court (not the

U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit), within 30 calendar days after you

receive this decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(2); see Perry v. Merit Systems

Protection Board, 582 U.S. ____ , 137 S. Ct. 1975 (2017). If you have a

representative in this case, and your representative receives this decision bef ore

you do, then you must file with the district court no later than 30 calendar days

after your representative receives this decision. If the action involves a claim of

discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, national origin, or a disabling

condition, you may be entitled to representation by a court-appointed lawyer and

to waiver of any requirement of prepayment of fees, costs, or other security. See

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f) and 29 U.S.C. § 794a.

Contact information for U.S. district courts can be found at their respective

websites, which can be accessed through the link below:

http://www.uscourts.gov/Court_Locator/CourtWebsites.aspx.

Alternatively, you may request review by the Equal Employment

Opportunity Commission (EEOC) of your discrimination claims only, excluding

all other issues. 5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(1). You must file any such request with the

EEOC’s Office of Federal Operations within 30 calendar days after you receive

this decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(1). If you have a representative in this case,

and your representative receives this decision before you do, then you must file

with the EEOC no later than 30 calendar days after your representative receives

this decision.

If you submit a request for review to the EEOC by regular U.S. mail, th e

address of the EEOC is:

Office of Federal Operations

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission

P.O. Box 77960

Washington, D.C. 20013

If you submit a request for review to the EEOC via commercial delivery or

by a method requiring a signature, it must be addressed to:

Office of Federal Operations

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission

131 M Street, N.E.

Suite 5SW12G

Washington, D.C. 20507

(3) Judicial review pursuant to the Whistleblower Protection

Enhancement Act of 2012. This option applies to you only if you have raised

claims of reprisal for whistleblowing disclosures under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8) or

other protected activities listed in 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9)(A)(i), (B), (C), or (D).

If so, and your judicial petition for review “raises no challenge to the Board’s

disposition of allegations of a prohibited personnel practice described in section

2302(b) other than practices described in section 2302(b)(8), or 2302(b)(9)(A)(i),

(B), (C), or (D),” then you may file a petition for judicial review either with the

U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit or any court of appeals of

competent jurisdiction. 7 The court of appeals must receive your petition for

The original statutory provision that provided for judicial review of certain

whistleblower claims by any court of appeals of competent jurisdiction expire d on

December 27, 2017. The All Circuit Review Act, signed into law by the President on

July 7, 2018, permanently allows appellants to file petitions for judicial review of

MSPB decisions in certain whistleblower reprisal cases with the U.S. Court of Appe als

for the Federal Circuit or any other circuit court of appeals of competent jurisdiction.

The All Circuit Review Act is retroactive to November 26, 2017. Pub. L. No. 115 -195,

132 Stat. 1510.

review within 60 days of the date of issuance of this decision. 5 U.S.C.

§ 7703(b)(1)(B).

If you submit a petition for judicial review to the U.S. Court of Appeals for

the Federal Circuit, you must submit your petition to the court at the