James Parker v. Office of Personnel Management

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

JAMES C. PARKER, DOCKET NUMBER

Appellant, DC-0842-15-0928-I-1

v.

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL DATE: September 8, 2022

MANAGEMENT,

Agency.

THIS FINAL ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1

James C. Parker, Woodbridge, Virginia, pro se.

Jane Bancroft, Washington, D.C., for the agency.

BEFORE

Cathy A. Harris, Vice Chairman

Raymond A. Limon, Member

Tristan L. Leavitt, Member

FINAL ORDER

¶1 The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which

affirmed the denial of his application by the Office of Personnel Management

(OPM) for Federal Employee Retirement System (FERS) law enforcement officer

(LEO) retirement benefits. Generally, we grant petitions such as this one only in

1

A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add

significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders,

but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not

required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a

precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board

as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c).

2

the following circumstances: the initial decision contains erroneous findings of

material fact; the initial decision is based on an erroneous interpretation of statute

or regulation or the erroneous application of the law to the facts of the case; the

administrative judge’s rulings during either the course of the appeal or the initial

decision were not consistent with required procedures or involved an abuse of

discretion, and the resulting error affected the outcome of the case; or new and

material evidence or legal argument is available that, despite the petitioner’s due

diligence, was not available when the record closed. Title 5 of the Code of

Federal Regulations, section 1201.115 (5 C.F.R. § 1201.115). After fully

considering the filings in this appeal, we conclude that the petitioner has not

established any basis under section 1201.115 for granting the petition for review.

Therefore, we DENY the petition for review. Except as expressly MODIFIED to

address the appellant’s arguments regarding his service with the Department of

the Treasury, Bureau of Engraving and Printing (BEP) and his military service

deposit, we AFFIRM the initial decision.

BACKGROUND

¶2 The appellant’s former employing agency, the Transportation Security

Agency (TSA), removed him from his position as a Federal Air Marshal (FAM)

on May 12, 2014, for failure to follow policy and leave procedures. Initial

Appeal File (IAF), Tab 11 at 24, Tab 16, Initial Decision (ID) at 2 n.1. The

appellant, who was 51 years old at the time of his separation from employment,

filed an application for immediate retirement with OPM. IAF, Tab 7 at 6, 17,

30-33, 35.

¶3 OPM issued a decision on October 31, 2014, denying the appellant’s

retirement application. Id. at 17. The appellant filed a Board appeal of that

decision, which the administrative judge vacated and remanded to OPM for

further consideration of the appellant’s claims and proper notice of his

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reconsideration rights. Parker v. Office of Personnel Management, MSPB Docket

No. DC-0842-15-0230-I-1, Initial Decision at 1-2, 8-10 (Apr. 14, 2015).

¶4 In a new June 1, 2015 reconsideration decision, OPM denied the appellant’s

retirement application, finding that he lacked the necessary creditable LEO

service for LEO retirement, that he was ineligible for a deferred retirement

because he had not yet reached age 62, and that his military service was not

creditable towards his deferred annuity calculation because he had not paid his

military deposit in full. IAF, Tab 7 at 6-8. Specifically, OPM determined that

the appellant was ineligible for LEO retirement under 5 U.S.C. § 8412(d)

because, while he had a total of 19 years and 12 days of creditable Federal

service, he had earned only 11 years, 9 months, and 22 days of creditable LEO

service, from July 21, 2002, to May 12, 2014, through his LEO-designated

positions with the Department of Transportation, Federal Aviation

Administration, and TSA. Id. at 6-7. OPM found that the remaining 7 years,

2 months, and 20 days of Federal service did not count as LEO service because he

had earned it while in a non-LEO position with the Department of the Treasury,

BEP, from May 1, 1995, to July 20, 2002. Id. OPM also did not credit his

military service as LEO service. Id. at 6, 22. OPM then apprised him of his

appeal rights. Id. at 8.

¶5 The appellant filed this appeal, alleging that OPM committed harmful error

by denying him his requested LEO retirement benefits . IAF, Tab 1 at 2. He

claimed that he was entitled to retire under 5 U.S.C. § 8412(d) because his prior

service in the military, from November 1981 to June 1992, may be tacked onto

his civilian LEO service. IAF, Tab 1 at 2, Tab 10 at 1-2, ID at 2-5. In support,

he first argued that his Individual Retirement Record (IRR), which “certified” his

service computation date (SCD) as October 18, 1984, conclusively proved that his

military service and all of his civilian Federal employment was creditable LEO

service. IAF, Tab 1 at 2, Tab 11 at 8-9, 11. Second, he claimed that while on

active duty with the Department of the Air Force, he was a qualifying Federal

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employee because he was working for a Federal agency within the Executive

Branch performing LEO duties. IAF, Tab 11 at 6-7, 10. Finally, he claimed that

his military service was creditable because any failure to pay his deposit in full

was attributable to agency misrepresentations and, alternatively, that he was not

required to pay a military deposit under the Civil Service Retirement System

(CSRS) provisions in effect at the time that he served. Id. at 7-9. He therefore

claimed that he had 29 years, 6 months, and 24 days of creditable LEO service

and was eligible for LEO retirement benefits. Id. at 8. He asserted that by again

denying his LEO retirement application, OPM failed to correct the administrative

errors present in the October 31, 2014 reconsideration decision and was violating

his rights under the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights

Act of 1994 (USERRA) (codified as amended at 38 U.S.C. §§ 4301-4335). IAF,

Tab 1 at 2, Tab 11 at 10.

¶6 After considering the pleadings and holding a status conference, the

administrative judge determined that the appellant was only raising claims in

connection with his denial of LEO retirement benefits under 5 U.S.C. § 8412(d)

and restricted the issues on appeal to those claims. IAF, Tab 10 at 1, Tab 15,

Hearing Compact Disc, 19:45-20:53 (statements made by the administrative

judge); ID at 4 n.3. He further concluded that there were no material facts in

dispute as to those claims. IAF, Tab 13 at 2. He therefore limited the hearing to

the presentation of oral argument and did not allow the parties an opportunity to

present evidence. Id. The administrative judge also noted that, although it

appeared that the appellant may not be eligible for an LEO retirement benefit

because he was removed from his FAM position “for cause,” see 5 U.S.C.

§ 8412(d), he did not need to address that issue, IAF, Tab 10 at 2 n.2.

¶7 After holding oral arguments, the administrative judge issued an initial

decision, affirming OPM’s June 1, 2015 reconsideration decision. IAF, Tab 15;

ID at 1, 8. He concluded that the appellant was not an “employee ,” as required

by 5 U.S.C. § 8412(d), while performing his military service because uniformed

5

service is expressly excluded from the definition of employee for the purposes of

FERS retirement. ID at 7. He found that the appellant’s military service was not

creditable LEO service as a result, regardless of the duties performed. ID at 6-8.

He further found that OPM had not violated the appellant’s USERRA rights by

denying his application because OPM was precluded as a matter of law from

crediting his military service as LEO service. ID at 7-8. He did not address the

appellant’s claims in connection with his military deposit, as he determined that

the appellant failed to raise an objection to his order limiting the issues on appeal

only to the appellant’s entitlement to LEO retirement benefits under 5 U.S.C.

§ 8412(d). ID at 4 n.3.

¶8 The appellant has filed a petition for review, claiming that TSA, OPM, and

the administrative judge wrongfully denied his request for FERS LEO retirement

because he earned enough LEO service credit from his military service and two

civilian positions to qualify for LEO retirement under 5 U.S.C. § 8412(d).

Petition for Review (PFR) File, Tab 1 at 5-9. The appellant also argues that OPM

and the administrative judge improperly questioned the accuracy of his IRR and

reasserts his military deposit claims. 2 Id. at 6, 8-16. The agency has filed a pro

forma reply. PFR File, Tab 4.

2

The appellant does not challenge the administrative judge’s denial of his request for

corrective action under USERRA or his decision to cancel the evidentiary hearing. We

nonetheless discern no error with the administrative judge’s determinations on those

issues. See Jezouit v. Office of Personnel Management, 97 M.S.P.R. 48, ¶ 13 (2004)

(finding that the administrative judge had the authority to cancel the evidentiary hearing

and to hold oral arguments instead because the appeal solely presented issues of law) ,

aff’d, 121 F. App’x 865 (Fed. Cir. 2005); Crawford v. Department of Transportation,

95 M.S.P.R. 44, ¶¶ 8, 15 (2003) (finding that the agency did not violate the appellant’s

USERRA rights because it did not deny him a benefit of employment) , aff’d, 373 F.3d

1155 (Fed. Cir. 2004).

6

DISCUSSION OF ARGUMENTS ON REVIEW

The appellant earned less than 20 years of creditable LEO service.

¶9 As correctly articulated by the administrative judge, under the relevant parts

of 5 U.S.C. § 8412(d), an “employee” is entitled to an immediate FERS LEO

retirement annuity if at the time of his separation he is at least 50 years of age

with 20 years of creditable LEO service or has at least 25 years of creditable LEO

service, regardless of his age. The term “law enforcement officer” is defined, for

the purposes of this appeal, as an “employee” with certain types of duties.

5 U.S.C. § 8401(17)(A). Thus, to meet the years of creditable LEO service

requirement, at a minimum, the appellant must have been an “employee,” as

defined by statute, while performing the service. For the purposes of FERS

retirement provisions, an “employee” is defined by 5 U.S.C. § 2105 and other

provisions not relevant to this appeal. See 5 U.S.C. § 8331(1)(A); 5 U.S.C.

§ 8401(11). Section 2105 mandates that the appellant be “appointed in the civil

service” to qualify as an “employee.” 5 U.S.C. § 2105(a). The term “civil

service” does not include positions in the uniformed service s, such as the

appellant’s active duty service with the Department of the Air Force. 5 U.S.C.

§ 2101.

¶10 As these provisions indicate, as a matter of law, the appellant was not an

“employee” while performing his military service. He therefore was not an LEO

while serving in the military, and his military service was not creditable LEO

service for the purposes of FERS LEO retirement, even though his later service as

a FAM was creditable and regardless of whether he paid his military deposit in

full. See Bell v. Office of Personnel Management, 22 M.S.P.R. 43, 44-45 (1984)

(determining that the appellant’s military service as a law enforcement officer

could not be credited toward the minimum service requirements of 5 U.S.C.

§ 8336(c)(1)); see also Bronger v. Office of Personnel Management,

769 F.2d 756, 758-60 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (finding that the appellant’s military

7

service could not be tacked on to his 23 years of creditable service as a civilian

air traffic controller for purposes of early retirement under 5 U.S.C. § 8336(e)). 3

¶11 Moreover, even if the appellant’s 7 years, 2 months, and 20 days of service

as a BEP Police Officer were creditable LEO service, as the appellant appears to

argue, he still would have fewer than 20 years of creditable LEO service earned

from his two civilian positions. PFR File, Tab 1 at 10. We therefore agree with

the administrative judge that the appellant lacks the 20 years of LEO service

required by 5 U.S.C. § 8412(d) to be eligible for LEO retirement. 4 ID at 6; see

Bell, 22 M.S.P.R. at 44-45.

The appellant’s IRR does not prove that he is entitled to have his military service

credited as LEO service.

¶12 As alleged, the appellant’s IRR shows that his SCD is October 18, 19 84.

IAF, Tab 7 at 39. In addition, the appellant’s FERS personal benefits statement

3

The Board may rely on CSRS case law in analyzing FERS determinations, as the

statutes, regulations, and case law generally are parallel. See Bingaman v. Department

of the Treasury, 127 F.3d 1431, 1433-34 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (noting the similarities

between the LEO requirements under CSRS and FERS). Compare 5 U.S.C. §§ 8331(1),

(20), 8336(c)(1), (e), with 5 U.S.C. §§ 8401(11), (17), 8412(d).

4

Thus, we modify the initial decision to find that we need not resolve the appellant’s

apparent claims that his BEP service was creditable LEO service because , as set forth

above, it does not affect the outcome of the instant appeal. However, the record reflects

that BEP did not designate his position as an LEO position. IAF, Tab 11 at 18, 26.

Should the appellant wish to challenge the designation or apply for LEO credit based on

the actual duties performed in that position, he may pursue such a challenge through

BEP’s administrative process. See Hamilton v. Department of Defense, 80 M.S.P.R.

636, ¶¶ 5-6 (1999) (stating that an employee may qualify for LEO retirement credit

either by serving in a position that has been approved as such or by applying for LEO

credit and proving to his employing agency that he is entitled to LEO retirement credit );

5 C.F.R. §§ 842.801(b) (setting forth OPM’s delegation of authority to agency heads to

designate positions as LEO positions), 842.803(a)-(b) (indicating that the employing

agency determines whether a position is an LEO position), 842.804(c) (listing the

requirements for challenging an agency’s LEO designation). The Board has the

authority to review the agency’s determination. Hamilton, 80 M.S.P.R. 636, ¶ 4.

However, if an employee in a non-LEO designated position does not seek such a

determination within 6 months after entering the position or after any significant change

in duties, the agency’s determination that the service is not so covered is presumed to

be correct. Id., ¶ 6; 5 C.F.R. § 842.804(c).

8

from January 3, 2010, identifies an SCD of October 18, 1984, for “6C/ECBPO

Retirement” and “FERS LEO/FF (Code M)” retirement coverage, and his removal

Standard Form 50 lists the same SCD. IAF, Tab 7 at 35, Tab 11 at 27. We

nonetheless disagree with his claims that OPM and the administrative judge must

accept these documents as conclusive evidence of his prior LEO service,

especially because the personal benefits statement was certified by the agency in

his IRR. PFR File, Tab 1 at 9-16.

¶13 Under U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit and Board case law,

OPM and the Board may review the accuracy and completeness of the

determinations and certifications made by the employing agency in an appellant’s

IRR. Lisanti v. Office of Personnel Management, 573 F.3d 1334, 1338-40 (Fed.

Cir. 2009); Conner v. Office of Personnel Management, 120 M.S.P.R. 670, ¶ 6

(2014), aff’d, 620 F. App’x 892 (Fed. Cir. 2015). The Board and nonprecedential

Federal Circuit case law finding to the contrary, and on which the appellant

relies, is not the prevailing law. PFR File, Tab 1 at 9-10; see Lisanti, 573 F.3d

at 1339-40 (overruling Board and nonprecedential Federal Circuit decisions

establishing that an employing agency’s certified IRR is binding); Conner,

120 M.S.P.R. 670, ¶¶ 5-6 (expressly overruling the Board case law relied on by

the appellant). Moreover, the Board cannot order the payment of an LEO

retirement annuity based on that SCD because, for the reasons explained above,

crediting the appellant’s military service would contravene FERS retirement law.

See Office of Personnel Management v. Richmond, 496 U.S. 414, 416, 424,

434 (1990) (holding that the Board cannot order the payment of Federal

retirement benefits when the statutory conditions for entitlement to those benefits

are not met). Therefore, we find no error with the administrative judge’s decision

not to rely on the SCD listed in the appellant’s IRR as th e date from which to

compute his LEO service credit.

9

The appellant has shown no reversible error in the administrative judge’s decision

not to adjudicate his claims relating to his military deposit.

¶14 In his response to the administrative judge’s order limit ing the issues on

appeal to the appellant’s entitlement to LEO retirement benefits, the appellant

requested that the administrative judge adjudicate his claims as to his military

deposit. IAF, Tab 11 at 9. Although the administrative judge found otherwis e,

ID at 4 n.3, when construed liberally, we consider this pro se appellant’s response

to be an objection to the decision to exclude those arguments. See Jordan v.

Office of Personnel Management, 108 M.S.P.R. 119, ¶ 19 (2008) (explaining that

the Board construes pro se pleadings liberally). The appellant reasserts on review

his claims concerning his military deposit. PFR File, Tab 1 at 6, 8-9. Thus, we

modify the initial decision to address the issue of his military service deposit.

¶15 As explained above, the appellant’s military service is not relevant for

determining his entitlement to LEO retirement benefits. His military service may

be credited towards his length of regular service and annuity computation for

deferred retirement, as noted by OPM in its reconsideration decision, if a deposit

is made for that service. 5 IAF, Tab 7 at 7-8; see Bronger, 769 F.2d at 760 (noting

that, although the appellant’s military service could not be tacked on to his

civilian air traffic controller service for purposes of early retirement, it may be

used to calculate his length of regular service and annuity amount). Under those

circumstances, payment of his military deposit in full may be relevant. IAF,

Tab 7 at 7-8; see 5 U.S.C. § 8411(c)(1)(B) (providing that, for the purpose of a

FERS basic annuity, creditable service includes post-1956 military service if an

5

The appellant’s military deposit also may be relevant for the purposes of determining

his eligibility for an immediate retirement annuity under 5 U.S.C. § 8412(a). See

5 U.S.C. § 8411(c)(1)(B). However, we need not consider that issue because OPM did

not address it in its reconsideration decision, and the appellant has not claimed that he

is entitled to benefits under that provision. IAF, Tab 7 at 6-8; Poole v. Department of

the Army, 117 M.S.P.R. 516, ¶ 10 (2012) (observing that the scope of an appeal

involving Federal retirement benefits generally is limited to those matters addressed in

OPM’s reconsideration decision).

10

appropriate deposit is made). The appellant, however, is ineligible for a deferred

retirement because he has not reached age 62. See 5 U.S.C. § 8413(a)

(establishing that an employee with at least 5 years of service at the time of his

separation is entitled to an annuity beginning at age 62). Thus, he has not shown

that the administrative judge’s decision to exclude his military deposit claims

from consideration, despite his objection, constitutes reversible error. Panter v.

Department of the Air Force, 22 M.S.P.R. 281, 282 (1984) (finding that an

adjudicatory error that is not prejudicial to a party’s substantive rights provides

no basis for reversal of an initial decision).

¶16 Accordingly, we deny the appellant’s petition for review and affirm the

initial decision, as modified, which affirmed OPM’s denial of the appellant’s

application for LEO retirement benefits under 5 U.S.C. § 8412(d).

NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS 6

The initial decision, as supplemented by this Final Order, constitutes the

Board’s final decision in this matter. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.113. You may obtain

review of this final decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(a)(1). By statute, the nature of

your claims determines the time limit for seeking such review and the appropriate

forum with which to file. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b). Although we offer the following

summary of available appeal rights, the Merit Systems Protection Board does not

provide legal advice on which option is most appropriate for your situation and

the rights described below do not represent a statement of how courts will rule

regarding which cases fall within their jurisdiction. If you wish to seek review of

this final decision, you should immediately review the law applicable to your

claims and carefully follow all filing time limits and requiremen ts. Failure to file

6

Since the issuance of the initial decision in this matter, the Board may have updated

the notice of review rights included in final decisions. As indicated in the notice, the

Board cannot advise which option is most appropriate in any matter.

11

within the applicable time limit may result in the dismissal of your case by your

chosen forum.

Please read carefully each of the three main possible choices of review

below to decide which one applies to your particular case. If you have questions

about whether a particular forum is the appropriate one to review your case, you

should contact that forum for more information.

(1) Judicial review in general. As a general rule, an appellant seeking

judicial review of a final Board order must file a petition for review with the U.S.

Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which must be received by the court

within 60 calendar days of the date of issuance of this decision. 5 U.S.C.

§ 7703(b)(1)(A).

If you submit a petition for review to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the

Federal Circuit, you must submit your petition to the court at the

following address:

U.S. Court of Appeals

for the Federal Circuit

717 Madison Place, N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20439

Additional information about the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal

Circuit is available at the court’s website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov. Of particular

relevance is the court’s “Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants,” which is

contained within the court’s Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6, 10, and 11.

If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for an appeal to

the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you may visit our website at

http://www.mspb.gov/probono for information regarding pro bono representation

for Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the Federal Circuit. The

Board neither endorses the services provided by any attorney nor warrants that

any attorney will accept representation in a given case.

12

(2) Judicial or EEOC review of cases involving a claim of

discrimination. This option applies to you only if you have claimed that you

were affected by an action that is appealable to the Board and that such action

was based, in whole or in part, on unlawful discrimination. If so, you may obtain

judicial review of this decision—including a disposition of your discrimination

claims—by filing a civil action with an appropriate U.S. district court ( not the

U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit), within 30 calendar days after you

receive this decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(2); see Perry v. Merit Systems

Protection Board, 582 U.S. ____ , 137 S. Ct. 1975 (2017). If you have a

representative in this case, and your representative receives this decision before

you do, then you must file with the district court no later than 30 calendar days

after your representative receives this decision. If the action involves a claim of

discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, national origin, or a disabling

condition, you may be entitled to representation by a court-appointed lawyer and

to waiver of any requirement of prepayment of fees, costs, or other security. See

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f) and 29 U.S.C. § 794a.

Contact information for U.S. district courts can be found at their respective

websites, which can be accessed through the link below:

http://www.uscourts.gov/Court_Locator/CourtWebsites.aspx.

Alternatively, you may request review by the Equal Employment

Opportunity Commission (EEOC) of your discrimination claims only, excluding

all other issues. 5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(1). You must file any such request with the

EEOC’s Office of Federal Operations within 30 calendar days after you receive

this decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(1). If you have a representative in this case,

and your representative receives this decision before you do, then you must file

with the EEOC no later than 30 calendar days after your representative receives

this decision.

If you submit a request for review to the EEOC by regular U.S. mail, the

address of the EEOC is:

13

Office of Federal Operations

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission

P.O. Box 77960

Washington, D.C. 20013

If you submit a request for review to the EEOC via commercial delivery or

by a method requiring a signature, it must be addressed to:

Office of Federal Operations

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission

131 M Street, N.E.

Suite 5SW12G

Washington, D.C. 20507

(3) Judicial review pursuant to the Whistleblower Protection

Enhancement Act of 2012. This option applies to you only if you have raised

claims of reprisal for whistleblowing disclosures under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8) or

other protected activities listed in 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9)(A)(i), (B), (C), or (D).

If so, and your judicial petition for review “raises no challenge to the Board’s

disposition of allegations of a prohibited personnel practice described in section

2302(b) other than practices described in section 2302(b)(8), or 2302(b)(9)(A)(i),

(B), (C), or (D),” then you may file a petition for judicial review either with the

U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit or any court of appeals of

competent jurisdiction. 7 The court of appeals must receive your petition for

review within 60 days of the date of issuance of this decision. 5 U.S.C.

§ 7703(b)(1)(B).

7

The original statutory provision that provided for judicial review of certain

whistleblower claims by any court of appeals of competent jurisdiction expired on

December 27, 2017. The All Circuit Review Act, signed into la w by the President on

July 7, 2018, permanently allows appellants to file petitions for judicial review of

MSPB decisions in certain whistleblower reprisal cases with the U.S. Court of Appeals

for the Federal Circuit or any other circuit court of appeals o f competent jurisdiction.

The All Circuit Review Act is retroactive to November 26, 2017. Pub. L. No. 115-195,

132 Stat. 1510.

14

If you submit a petition for judicial review to the U.S. Court of Appeals for

the Federal Circuit, you must submit your petition to the court at the

following address:

U.S. Court of Appeals

for the Federal Circuit

717 Madison Place, N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20439

Additional information about the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal

Circuit is available at the court’s website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov. Of particular

relevance is the court’s “Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants,” which is

contained within the court’s Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6 , 10, and 11.

If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for an appeal to

the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you may visit our website at

http://www.mspb.gov/probono for information regarding pro bono representation

for Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the Federal Circuit. The

Board neither endorses the services provided by any attorney nor warrants that

any attorney will accept representation in a given case.

Contact information for the courts of appeals can be found at their

respective websites, which can be accessed through the link below:

http://www.uscourts.gov/Court_Locator/CourtWebsites.aspx.

FOR THE BOARD: /s/ for

Jennifer Everling

Acting Clerk of the Board

Washington, D.C.