Opinion

Jerome Mansfield v. Department of Veterans Affairs

Court
Merit Systems Protection Board
Filed
Oct 14, 2022
Status
Unpublished
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 22.6%

The opinion

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

JEROME MANSFIELD, DOCKET NUMBER

Appellant, PH-3330-15-0188-B-1

v.

DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS DATE: October 14, 2022

AFFAIRS,

Agency.

THIS FINAL ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1

Jerome Mansfield, Mount Laurel, New Jersey, pro se.

Donald W. Taylor, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, for the agency.

BEFORE

Cathy A. Harris, Vice Chairman

Raymond A. Limon, Member

Tristan L. Leavitt, Member

FINAL ORDER

¶1 The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which

denied his request for corrective action under the Veterans Employment

Opportunities Act of 1998 (VEOA). Generally, we grant petitions such as this

one only when: the initial decision contains erroneous findings of material fact;

1

A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add

significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders,

but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not

required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a

precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board

as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c).

2

the initial decision is based on an erroneous interpretation of statute or regulation

or the erroneous application of the law to the facts of the case; the administrative

judge’s rulings during either the course of the appeal or the initial decision were

not consistent with required procedures or involved an abuse of discretion, and

the resulting error affected the outcome of the case; or new and material evidence

or legal argument is available that, despite the petitioner’s due diligence, was not

available when the record closed. Title 5 of the Code of Federal Regulations,

section 1201.115 (5 C.F.R. § 1201.115). After fully considering the filings in this

appeal, we conclude that the petitioner has not established any basis under section

1201.115 for granting the petition for review. Therefore, we DENY the petition

for review and AFFIRM the initial decision, which is now the Board’s final

decision. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.113(b).

BACKGROUND

¶2 In this VEOA appeal, the appellant alleged that the agency violated his

veterans’ preference rights when it failed to select him for a Veterans Claims

Examiner Trainee position. Mansfield v. Department of Veterans Affairs, MSPB

Docket No. PH-3330-15-0188-I-1, Initial Appeal File (IAF), Tab 1. He did not

request a hearing. Id. After considering the parties’ responses to several show

cause orders seeking information regarding the appellant’s claim and the agency’s

selection process, IAF, Tabs 3-11, the administrative judge found jurisdiction

over the appeal and granted the appellant’s request for corrective a ction because

she found that the agency had failed to grant the appellant a five -point preference

based on his service in the United States Air Force from October 22, 2001,

through August 18, 2002, IAF, Tab 12, Initial Decision (ID); see IAF, Tab 4 at 3.

She ordered the agency to reconstruct the selection process , taking into account

the appellant’s five-point veterans’ preference. ID at 5.

¶3 In its petition for review of that decision, the agency insisted that any error

it committed was harmless. Mansfield v. Department of Veterans Affairs, MSPB

3

Docket No. PH-3330-15-0188-I-1, Petition for Review (PFR) File, Tab 1. The

agency explained that under such procedures, preference-eligible applicants do

not receive points, but instead are listed ahead or above those who are not eligible

for veterans’ preference within the same quality category to which they were

assigned based on the agency’s job-related assessment tools. Id. Because the

agency had sufficient candidates to choose from in the higher-ranked

best-qualified quality category, it did not reach the well-qualified quality

category into which it placed the appellant based on his self-assessment, and

therefore it did not harm him when it failed to place him at the top of the

well-qualified category. Id. The agency also asserted that the appellant had

failed to establish his preference eligibility and that his résumé did not show that

he held the requisite qualifications for the position. Id.

¶4 Because it was unclear from the record how the agency conducted the

selection process, especially considering the fact that numerous individuals who

had received equal or lower self-assessment scores as compared to the appellant

were nonetheless placed in the best-qualified category, the Board vacated the

initial decision and remanded the appeal to the regional office for further

adjudication. Mansfield v. Department of Veterans Affairs, MSPB Docket

No. PH-3330-15-0188-I-1, Remand Order (Mar. 1, 2016); PFR File, Tab 6. On

remand, the administrative judge issued acknowledgment and close of record

orders and the agency, in response, provided a single submission. Mansfield v.

Department of Veterans Affairs, MSPB Docket No. PH-3330-15-0188-B-1,

Remand File (RF), Tabs 1-4. The appellant did not respond.

¶5 In her remand initial decision, the administrative judge denied the

appellant’s request for corrective action, finding that he failed to establish that

the agency violated his veterans’ preference rights. RF, Tab 5, Remand Initial

Decision (RID). In his petition for review of the remand initial decision and in

his supplemental submissions, the appellant argues that the agency hired two

applicants with lower scores than his and he contends that the agency’s evidence

4

on the selection process was insufficient, in part because it was not sworn.

Remand Petition for Review File, Tabs 1, 3-4. The agency did not respond to the

appellant’s petition for review.

DISCUSSION OF ARGUMENTS ON REVIEW

¶6 To be entitled to relief under VEOA, the appellant must prove by

preponderant evidence that the agency’s selection violated one or more of his

statutory or regulatory veterans’ preference rights. E.g., Dale v. Department of

Veterans Affairs, 102 M.S.P.R. 646, ¶ 10 (2006). In a traditional competitive

examination, preference-eligible veterans have additional points added to their

passing scores. 5 U.S.C. § 3309; 5 C.F.R. § 337.101(b). The names of applicants

are entered onto registers, or “lists of eligibles,” in rank order, with preference

eligibles ranked ahead of others with the same rating. See 5 U.S.C. § 3313;

5 C.F.R. § 332.401. The appointing authority must make a selection from the

highest three eligibles on the list, 5 U.S.C. § 3318(a), and must justify a decision

to pass over a preference eligible in order to select a nonpreference eligible,

5 U.S.C. § 3318(c).

¶7 Under category rating, an examining agency defines two or more quality

categories (such as well-qualified and best qualified); candidates are assessed and

those with similar proficiency are placed in the same category. Within each

quality category, the agency must list preference eligibles ahead of individuals

who are not preference eligibles. See 5 U.S.C. § 3319(b). “For other than

scientific and professional positions at GS–9 of the General Schedule (equivalent

or higher), qualified preference-eligibles who have a compensable

service-connected disability of 10 percent or more shall be listed in the highest

quality category.” Id. An agency may not select a nonpreference eligible ahead

of a preference eligible in the same category unless it seeks and receives appr oval

for a pass over. Launer v. Department of the Air Force, 119 M.S.P.R. 252, ¶ 7

(2013) (citing 5 U.S.C. § 3319). An agency may assign numerical scores for

5

purposes of placing applicants in categories, but veterans’ preference points are

not added to such scores. Launer, 119 M.S.P.R. 252, ¶ 7; see 5 C.F.R.

§ 337.304(b).

¶8 Here, we agree with the administrative judge that the record reflects that the

agency used category rating procedures to fill the position at issue. RID at 3 ; RF,

Tab 3 at 1-3. Further, the record reflects that even if the agency had properly

moved the appellant to the head of the well-qualified category in keeping with his

five-point veterans’ preference, it would not have made a difference because all

the selectees came from the best-qualified category. 2 Regarding the appellant’s

observation that two selectees had lower self-assessment scores than him, the

record indicates that those selectees were entitled to CP or CPS status,

respectively reflecting compensable service-connected disability ratings of either

10% to less than 30% (CP) or over 30% (CPS), entitling them to be listed in the

highest quality category, as opposed to the appellant’s five-point (TP) status,

which would have only moved him to the top of the second, well-qualified,

category and would not have resulted in his selection for the posit ion at issue. RF

at 2-3; Launer, 119 M.S.P.R. 252, ¶ 7.

¶9 Moreover, because the appellant was not in the best-qualified category from

which the agency selected its candidates, the agency’s apparent failure to afford

him five veterans’ preference points and move him to the head of the

well-qualified category would not have changed the result. Thus, the

administrative judge properly found that the appellant was not entitled to

corrective action. RID at 7; see Jones v. Department of Health & Human

Services, 119 M.S.P.R. 355, ¶¶ 14-16 (denying corrective action when any

2

Although the appellant’s résumé states that he is entitled to 10 veterans’ preference

points based on a compensable service-connected disability of at least 10% but less than

30% (CP), the record reflects that he failed to submit any evidence in support of that

assertion, and he claims elsewhere in the record that he is instead entitled to 5 veterans’

preference points. RF, Tab 3 at 2, 4; IAF, Tab 1 at 3, Tabs 4, 7; see Launer,

119 M.S.P.R. 252, ¶ 7.

6

agency’s failure to accord the appellant’s veterans’ preference did not result in

any harm because the vacancy at issue was canceled and, even if not canceled, the

appellant would not have been rated among the best qualified candidates), aff’d

per curiam, 544 F. App’x 976 (Fed. Cir. 2013).

¶10 As for the appellant’s assertion that the agency’s evidence is unsworn, the

administrative judge instructed the parties that while sworn evidence is

potentially entitled to more weight, submissions “need not be in the form of an

affidavit, sworn statement or declaration made under penalty of perjury” to be

admissible. RF, Tab 4 at 2 (citing Scott v. Department of Justice, 69 M.S.P.R.

211, 228 (1995)). Considering the entirety of the record, we concur with the

administrative judge’s conclusions, and we find that the appellant has not shown

error in the administrative judge’s weighing of the evidence . See Crosby v. U.S.

Postal Service, 74 M.S.P.R. 98, 106 (1997) (finding no reason to disturb the

administrative judge’s findings when she considered the evidence as a whole,

drew appropriate inferences, and made reasoned conclusions); Broughton v.

Department of Health & Human Services, 33 M.S.P.R. 357, 359 (1987) (same).

¶11 Lastly, concerning the appellant’s qualifications for the position, pursuant

to 5 U.S.C. § 3311(2) and 5 C.F.R. § 302.302(d), the Board is limited to assessing

whether an agency considered all of an appellant ’s “valuable experience” material

to the position for which he applied. Miller v. Federal Deposit Insurance

Corporation, 121 M.S.P.R. 88, ¶ 7 (2014), aff’d, 818 F.3d 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2016).

The appellant does not assert that the agency failed to consider any particular

portion of his qualifications and experience.

¶12 Accordingly, we affirm the initial decision.

7

NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS 3

You may obtain review of this final decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(a)(1). By

statute, the nature of your claims determines the time limit for seeking such

review and the appropriate forum with which to file. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b).

Although we offer the following summary of available appeal rights, the Merit

Systems Protection Board does not provide legal advice on which option is most

appropriate for your situation and the rights described below do not represent a

statement of how courts will rule regarding which cases fall within their

jurisdiction. If you wish to seek review of this final decision, you should

immediately review the law applicable to your claims and carefully follow all

filing time limits and requirements. Failure to file within the applicable time

limit may result in the dismissal of your case by your chosen forum.

Please read carefully each of the three main possible choices of review

below to decide which one applies to your particular case. If you have questions

about whether a particular forum is the appropriate one to review your case, you

should contact that forum for more information.

(1) Judicial review in general. As a general rule, an appellant seeking

judicial review of a final Board order must file a petition for review with the U.S.

Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which must be received by the court

within 60 calendar days of the date of issuance of this decision. 5 U.S.C.

§ 7703(b)(1)(A).

If you submit a petition for review to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the

Federal Circuit, you must submit your petition to the court at the

following address:

3

Since the issuance of the initial decision in this matter, the Board may have updated

the notice of review rights included in final decisions. As indicated in the notice, the

Board cannot advise which option is most appropriate in any matter.

8

U.S. Court of Appeals

for the Federal Circuit

717 Madison Place, N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20439

Additional information about the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal

Circuit is available at the court’s website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov. Of partic ular

relevance is the court’s “Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants,” which is

contained within the court’s Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6, 10, and 11.

If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for an appeal to

the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you may visit our website at

http://www.mspb.gov/probono for information regarding pro bono representation

for Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the Federal Circuit. The

Board neither endorses the services provided by any attorney nor warrants that

any attorney will accept representation in a given case.

(2) Judicial or EEOC review of cases involving a claim of

discrimination. This option applies to you only if you have claimed that you

were affected by an action that is appealable to the Board and that such action

was based, in whole or in part, on unlawful discrimination. If so, you may obtain

judicial review of this decision—including a disposition of your discrimination

claims—by filing a civil action with an appropriate U.S. district court (not the

U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit), within 30 calendar days after you

receive this decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(2); see Perry v. Merit Systems

Protection Board, 582 U.S. ____ , 137 S. Ct. 1975 (2017). If you have a

representative in this case, and your representative receives this decision before

you do, then you must file with the district court no later than 30 calendar days

after your representative receives this decision. If the action involves a claim of

discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, national origin, or a disabling

condition, you may be entitled to representation by a court-appointed lawyer and

9

to waiver of any requirement of prepayment of fees, costs, or other security. See

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f) and 29 U.S.C. § 794a.

Contact information for U.S. district courts can be found at th eir respective

websites, which can be accessed through the link below:

http://www.uscourts.gov/Court_Locator/CourtWebsites.aspx.

Alternatively, you may request review by the Equal Employment

Opportunity Commission (EEOC) of your discrimination claims only, excluding

all other issues. 5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(1). You must file any such request with the

EEOC’s Office of Federal Operations within 30 calendar days after you receive

this decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(1). If you have a representative in this case,

and your representative receives this decision before you do, then you must file

with the EEOC no later than 30 calendar days after your representative receives

this decision.

If you submit a request for review to the EEOC by regular U.S. mail, the

address of the EEOC is:

Office of Federal Operations

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission

P.O. Box 77960

Washington, D.C. 20013

If you submit a request for review to the EEOC via commercial delivery or

by a method requiring a signature, it must be addressed to:

Office of Federal Operations

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission

131 M Street, N.E.

Suite 5SW12G

Washington, D.C. 20507

(3) Judicial review pursuant to the Whistleblower Protection

Enhancement Act of 2012. This option applies to you only if you have raised

claims of reprisal for whistleblowing disclosures under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8) or

other protected activities listed in 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9)(A)(i), (B), (C), or (D).

If so, and your judicial petition for review “raises no challenge to the Board’s

10

disposition of allegations of a prohibited personnel practice described in

section 2302(b) other than practices described in section 2302(b)(8), or

2302(b)(9)(A)(i), (B), (C), or (D),” then you may file a petition for judicial

review either with the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit or any court

of appeals of competent jurisdiction. 4 The court of appeals must receive your

petition for review within 60 days of the date of issuance of this decision. 5

U.S.C. § 7703(b)(1)(B).

If you submit a petition for judicial review to the U.S. Court of Appeals for

the Federal Circuit, you must submit your petition to the court at the

following address:

U.S. Court of Appeals

for the Federal Circuit

717 Madison Place, N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20439

Additional information about the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal

Circuit is available at the court’s website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov. Of particular

relevance is the court’s “Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants,” which is

contained within the court’s Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6, 10, and 11.

If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for an appeal to

the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you may visit our website at

http://www.mspb.gov/probono for information regarding pro bono representation

for Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the Federal Circuit. The

Board neither endorses the services provided by any attorney nor warrants that

any attorney will accept representation in a given case.

4

The original statutory provision that provided for judicial review of certain

whistleblower claims by any court of appeals of competent jurisdiction expired on

December 27, 2017. The All Circuit Review Act, signed into law by the President on

July 7, 2018, permanently allows appellants to file petitions for judicial review of

MSPB decisions in certain whistleblower reprisal cases with the U.S. Court of Appeals

for the Federal Circuit or any other circuit court of appeals of competent jurisdiction.

The All Circuit Review Act is retroactive to November 26, 2017. Pub. L. No. 115 -195,

132 Stat. 1510.

11

Contact information for the courts of appeals can be found at their

respective websites, which can be accessed through the link below:

http://www.uscourts.gov/Court_Locator/CourtWebsites.aspx.

FOR THE BOARD: /s/ for

Jennifer Everling

Acting Clerk of the Board

Washington, D.C.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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