Opinion

Derick Eshelman v. Department of the Air Force

Court
Merit Systems Protection Board
Filed
Jan 18, 2023
Status
Unpublished
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 22.6%

The opinion

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

DERICK ESHELMAN, DOCKET NUMBER

Appellant, DC-0752-15-0222-I-2

v.

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE, DATE: January 18, 2023

Agency.

THIS FINAL ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1

Ryan Green, Esquire, Washington, D.C., for the appellant.

Sandra Fortson, Joint Base Andrews, Maryland, for the agency.

BEFORE

Cathy A. Harris, Vice Chairman

Raymond A. Limon, Member

Tristan L. Leavitt, Member

Member Leavitt issues a separate concurring opinion.

FINAL ORDER

¶1 The agency has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which

mitigated the appellant’s removal to a 14-day suspension. For the reasons set

forth below, the agency’s petition for review is DISMISSED as untimely filed

without good cause shown. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.114(e), (g).

1

A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add

significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders,

but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not

required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a

precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board

as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c).

2

BACKGROUND

¶2 The following facts are further detailed in the initial decision. The

appellant held the Fire Chief position at Royal Air Force Croughton (RAFC).

Eshelman v. Department of the Air Force, MSPB Docket No. DC-0752-15-0222-

I-1, Initial Appeal File (IAF), Tab 1 at 1; Eshelman v. Department of the Air

Force, MSPB Docket No. DC-0752-15-0222-I-2, Refiled Appeal File (RAF),

Tab 15, Initial Decision (ID) at 2. 2 In 2013, the agency’s Office of Special

Investigations (AFOSI) opened an investigation after receiving a n anonymous tip

that the appellant was committing fraud. ID at 2. The AFOSI later concluded

that the appellant had knowingly scheduled firefighters to an improper work

pattern (embedded schedule) that allowed them to collect a higher rate of pay

from 2010 through 2013, at a cost of approximately $263,000. Id.; IAF, Tab 8

at 95.

¶3 In July 2014, the agency proposed the appellant’s removal based on a single

charge of conduct unbecoming a Federal employee, with three corresponding

specifications. ID at 3; IAF, Tab 1 at 9-11. The deciding official sustained the

removal action, effective November 2014. ID at 3; IAF, Tab 1 at 12 -13. The

appellant challenged his removal in the instant appeal. IAF, Tab 1 at 1 -6.

¶4 After holding the requested hearing, the administrative judge sustained the

lone charge along with each of the underlying specifications and found nexus, ID

at 3-13, but mitigated the removal to a 14-day suspension, ID at 14-19. The

agency has filed a petition for review, arguing that the administrat ive judge erred

in mitigating the penalty. Eshelman v. Department of the Air Force, MSPB

Docket No. DC-0752-15-0222-I-2, Petition for Review (PFR) File, Tab 1. The

appellant has filed a response, and the agency has replied. PFR File, Tabs 3 -5.

2

The administrative judge dismissed the initial appeal without prejudice for automatic

refiling at a later date, resulting in the two docket numbers associated with this one

matter. IAF, Tab 34.

3

ANALYSIS

¶5 A petition for review generally must be filed within 35 days after the date

of the issuance of the initial decision, or if the party filing the petition shows that

the initial decision was received more than 5 days after it was issued, within

30 days after the party received the initial decision. Palermo v. Department of

the Navy, 120 M.S.P.R. 694, ¶ 3 (2014); 5 C.F.R. § 1201.114(e). The Board will

waive the time limit for filing a petition for review only upon a showing of good

cause for the delay in filing. Palermo, 120 M.S.P.R. 694, ¶ 4. The party who

submits an untimely petition for review has the burden of establishing good cause

for the untimely filing by showing that he exercised due diligence or ordinary

prudence under the particular circumstances of the case. Id. To determine

whether a party has shown good cause, the Board will consider the length of the

delay, the reasonableness of his excuse and the party’s showing of due diligence,

whether he is proceeding pro se, and whether he has presented evidence of the

existence of circumstances beyond his control that affected his ability to comply

with the time limits or of unavoidable casualty or misfortune which similarly

shows a causal relationship to his inability to timely file his petition. Id.

¶6 In this case, because the initial decision was issued on July 22, 2016, the

petition for review was due by August 26, 2016. ID at 22; see Palermo,

120 M.S.P.R. 694, ¶ 3; 5 C.F.R. § 1201.114(e). The agency filed its petition

through the Board’s e-Appeal system on August 27, 2016, at approximately

12:13 a.m., several minutes after the deadline for doing so. PFR File, Tab 1.

Because the filing appeared untimely, the Board’s e-Appeal system automatically

generated questions concerning timeliness, to which the agency’s representative

responded as follows:

The PFR was filed prior to the deadline, but did not file. Instead,

when I went to the logged on [sic] to submit the attachments, it had

not been filed. The second attempt to file it with the documents

resulted in the same problem. It appeared that the documents were

being filed, but again, they were not filed. The final attempt resulted

4

in the documents being untimely. A check of [e-Appeal] will verify

that the documents were timely filed.

Id. at 4. 3

¶7 The Clerk of the Board issued an acknowledgment letter, instructing the

agency that an untimely petition for review must be accompanied by a motion to

either accept the filing as timely, and/or waive the time limit for good cause.

PFR File, Tab 2 at 1 (citing 5 C.F.R. § 1201.114(g)). The letter further instructed

the agency that if it wanted to file the aforementioned motion, the agency must

include a statement signed under penalty of perjury or an affidavit showing that

the petition was either timely or good cause existed for the untimeliness. Id.

at 1-2. It also included a form for doing so, and provided a deadline of

September 23, 2016. Id. at 7-8.

¶8 Despite the instructions contained in the acknowledgment letter, the agency

did not submit a separate sworn statement, affidavit, or further explanation for the

untimely filing by the September 23, 2016 deadline. Instead, in its October 1,

2016 reply brief, the agency argued that it had presented good cause. PFR File,

Tab 4 at 4-8. With that reply brief, the agency also submitted a complaint filed

with the Board’s Technical Support Team, where the agency reported attempting

to file the petition at least twice within the 20 minutes leadi ng up to the deadline

for doing so, but having problems doing so. 4 Id. at 18-19.

¶9 A review of the Board’s e-Appeal logs shows that the agency did access the

system to start the process of filing a pleading on August 26, 2016, at 11:38 p.m.

However, they do not reflect any attempt to submit the pleading until August 27,

2016, at 12:13 a.m. The logs reflect one error, but that error occurred after the

3

The agency’s representative answered “yes” to whether she declared, under penalty of

perjury, the facts asserted regarding the timeliness of the petition. PFR File, Tab 1 at 4.

4

The agency described the problem to the Board’s Technical Support Team citing both

August 22, 2016, and August 26, 2016, as the dates of attempted fi ling. PFR File,

Tab 4 at 18. However, it appears that the reference to August 22, 2016, was a

typographical error.

5

filing deadline, and was caused by the agency attempting to submit the petition a

second time within seconds of the 12:13 a.m. submission, while the initial

submission was still processing.

¶10 In considering allegations that an untimely filing was caused by technical

difficulties, the Board has reached differing conclusions based on the particular

circumstances of each case. Compare Boykin v. U.S. Postal Service,

104 M.S.P.R. 460, ¶ 6 (2007) (excusing a 1-day delay in filing when an

appellant’s representative reported making multiple attempts to timely file and

the Board’s records reflected a high incidence of users reporting problems with

the e-Appeal system during the date in question), Wiggins v. Department of the

Air Force, 113 M.S.P.R. 443, ¶¶ 7, 9 (2010) (excusing a petition that was

untimely by 4 minutes when the appellant was pro se and had attempted to create

a new pleading four times in the days leading up to his untimely filing), and

Social Security Administration v. Price, 94 M.S.P.R. 337, ¶ 7 (2003) (finding that

the agency exercised due diligence and showed good cause for filing a petition

for review 34 minutes late when its attorney submitted a sworn statement

indicating that she began sending the petition prior to the filing deadline but had

technical problems with a fax machine), aff’d, 398 F.3d 1322 (Fed. Cir. 2005),

with Palermo, 120 M.S.P.R. 694, ¶¶ 5-10 (declining to excuse a 7-day delay for

claimed difficulties with e-Appeal when, inter alia, the appellant’s representative

was familiar with e-Appeal and failed to submit a motion showing good cause),

and Gaetos v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 121 M.S.P.R. 201, ¶ 6 (2014)

(declining to excuse a petition that was untimely by 3½ hours when the petitioner

failed to establish a good reason for the delay). Under the particular

circumstances of this case, we find that the agency has failed to establish good

cause for its untimely petition.

¶11 Although the agency’s petition for review was untimely by mere minutes,

we are not persuaded by the explanation provided. The agency’s representative is

familiar with the e-Appeal system, having used it throughout this appeal. E.g.,

6

IAF, Tab 3. She is also familiar with the potential consequences of her

untimeliness, having been sanctioned for her untimeliness below. Hearing

Transcript 2 (HT2) at 5-11. 5 Nevertheless, the Board’s e-Appeal logs indicate

that she did not log into the system to begin the process of filing the petition for

review until 11:38 p.m. on the day it was due. See generally Baker v. Department

of Justice, 41 M.S.P.R. 25, 27 (1989) (recognizing that if a party delays the filing

of a petition until the eleventh hour, that party bears the risk that unforeseen

circumstances could prevent the timely filing of that petition). Moreover, as

detailed above, although the agency asserts that there were two failed attempts at

filing the petition before the deadline to do so, the Board’s e -Appeal logs reflect

otherwise. PFR File, Tab 2 at 1-2, 7-8; supra ¶ 9.

¶12 Accordingly, we dismiss the petition for review as untimely filed. T his is

the final decision of the Merit Systems Protection Board regarding the timeliness

of the petition for review. The initial decision remains the final decision of the

Board regarding the agency’s removal action.

5

The agency’s lack of timeliness was a persistent issue below. Among other things, the

agency’s representative failed to submit the agency file until more than 2 weeks after

the deadline for doing so, indicating that it was an unintentional error stemming from a

misplaced email. Compare IAF, Tab 2 at 7, with IAF Tab 5 at 1-2. She also waited

until the afternoon before the original hearing date to reschedule, citing difficulties

obtaining video-teleconference connectivity for certain witnesses, after the appellant

had already travelled from Illinois to Washington, D.C. for the hearing. IAF,

Tabs 25, 29. In another instance, the agency’s representative failed to respond to

emails and motions from opposing counsel in a timel y manner, reporting that technical

problems prevented her from accessing email for a full week. Compare RAF, Tab 1

at 4, 7, Tab 2 at 4, 8, with RAF, Tab 4 at 1. Lastly, she was untimely for each of the

rescheduled hearing days, citing car troubles, traffic, trouble finding parking, and rain,

for which the administrative judge issued sanctions in the form of precluding the

agency from cross examining certain witnesses. HT2 at 5-11.

7

NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS 6

You may obtain review of this final decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(a)(1). By

statute, the nature of your claims determines the time limit for seeking such

review and the appropriate forum with which to file. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b).

Although we offer the following summary of available appeal rights, the Merit

Systems Protection Board does not provide legal advice on which option is most

appropriate for your situation and the rights described below do not represent a

statement of how courts will rule regarding which cases fall within their

jurisdiction. If you wish to seek review of this final decision, you should

immediately review the law applicable to your claims and carefully follow all

filing time limits and requirements. Failure to file within the applicable time

limit may result in the dismissal of your case by your chosen forum.

Please read carefully each of the three main possible choice s of review

below to decide which one applies to your particular case. If you have questions

about whether a particular forum is the appropriate one to review your case, you

should contact that forum for more information.

(1) Judicial review in general. As a general rule, an appellant seeking

judicial review of a final Board order must file a petition for review with the U.S.

Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which must be received by the court

within 60 calendar days of the date of issuance of this decision. 5 U.S.C.

§ 7703(b)(1)(A).

If you submit a petition for review to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the

Federal Circuit, you must submit your petition to the court at the

following address:

6

Since the issuance of the initial decision in this matter, the Board may have updated

the notice of review rights included in final decisions. As indicated in the notice, the

Board cannot advise which option is most appropriate in any matter.

8

U.S. Court of Appeals

for the Federal Circuit

717 Madison Place, N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20439

Additional information about the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal

Circuit is available at the court’s website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov. Of particular

relevance is the court’s “Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants,” which is

contained within the court’s Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6, 10, and 11.

If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for an appeal to

the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you may visit our website at

http://www.mspb.gov/probono for information regarding pro bono representation

for Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the Federal Circuit. The

Board neither endorses the services provided by any attorney nor warrants that

any attorney will accept representation in a given case.

(2) Judicial or EEOC review of cases involving a claim of

discrimination. This option applies to you only if you have claimed that you

were affected by an action that is appealable to the Board and that such action

was based, in whole or in part, on unlawful discrimination. If so, you may obtain

judicial review of this decision—including a disposition of your discrimination

claims—by filing a civil action with an appropriate U.S. district court ( not the

U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit), within 30 calendar days after you

receive this decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(2); see Perry v. Merit Systems

Protection Board, 582 U.S. ____ , 137 S. Ct. 1975 (2017). If you have a

representative in this case, and your representative receives this decision before

you do, then you must file with the district court no later than 30 calendar days

after your representative receives this decision. If the action involves a claim of

discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, national origin, or a disabling

condition, you may be entitled to representation by a court-appointed lawyer and

9

to waiver of any requirement of prepayment of fees, costs, or other security. See

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f) and 29 U.S.C. § 794a.

Contact information for U.S. district courts can be found at their respective

websites, which can be accessed through the link below:

http://www.uscourts.gov/Court_Locator/CourtWebsites.aspx.

Alternatively, you may request review by the Equal Employment

Opportunity Commission (EEOC) of your discrimination claims only, excluding

all other issues. 5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(1). You must file any such request with the

EEOC’s Office of Federal Operations within 30 calendar days after you receive

this decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(1). If you have a representative in this case,

and your representative receives this decision before you do, then you must file

with the EEOC no later than 30 calendar days after your representative receives

this decision.

If you submit a request for review to the EEOC by regular U.S. mail, the

address of the EEOC is:

Office of Federal Operations

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission

P.O. Box 77960

Washington, D.C. 20013

If you submit a request for review to the EEOC via commercial delivery or

by a method requiring a signature, it must be addressed to:

Office of Federal Operations

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission

131 M Street, N.E.

Suite 5SW12G

Washington, D.C. 20507

(3) Judicial review pursuant to the Whistleblower Protection

Enhancement Act of 2012. This option applies to you only if you have raised

claims of reprisal for whistleblowing disclosures under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8) or

other protected activities listed in 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9)(A)(i), (B), (C), or (D).

If so, and your judicial petition for review “raises no challenge to the Board’s

10

disposition of allegations of a prohibited personnel practice described in

section 2302(b) other than practices described in section 2302(b)(8), or

2302(b)(9)(A)(i), (B), (C), or (D),” then you may file a petition for judicial

review either with the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit or any court

of appeals of competent jurisdiction. 7 The court of appeals must receive your

petition for review within 60 days of the date of issuance of this decision.

5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(1)(B).

If you submit a petition for judicial review to the U.S. Court of Appeals for

the Federal Circuit, you must submit your petition to the court at the

following address:

U.S. Court of Appeals

for the Federal Circuit

717 Madison Place, N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20439

Additional information about the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal

Circuit is available at the court’s website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov. Of particular

relevance is the court’s “Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants,” which is

contained within the court’s Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6, 10, and 11.

If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for an appeal to

the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you may visit our website at

http://www.mspb.gov/probono for information regarding pro bono representation

for Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the Federal Circuit. The

Board neither endorses the services provided by any attorney no r warrants that

any attorney will accept representation in a given case.

7

The original statutory provision that provided for judicial review of certain

whistleblower claims by any court of appeals of competent jurisdiction expired on

December 27, 2017. The All Circuit Review Act, signed into law by the President on

July 7, 2018, permanently allows appellants to file petitions for judicial review of

MSPB decisions in certain whistleblower reprisal cases with t he U.S. Court of Appeals

for the Federal Circuit or any other circuit court of appeals of competent jurisdiction.

The All Circuit Review Act is retroactive to November 26, 2017. Pub. L. No. 115 -195,

132 Stat. 1510.

11

Contact information for the courts of appeals can be found at their

respective websites, which can be accessed through the link below:

http://www.uscourts.gov/Court_Locator/CourtWebsites.aspx.

FOR THE BOARD: /s/ for

Jennifer Everling

Acting Clerk of the Board

Washington, D.C.

CONCURRING OPINION OF TRISTAN L. LEAVITT

in

Derick Eshelman v. Department of the Air Force

MSPB Docket No. DC-0752-15-0222-I-2

¶1 I concur in the opinion of the Board that the agency’s petition for review

should be dismissed as untimely filed without good cause shown. Although the

initial decision is therefore the final decision of the Board, see 5 C.F.R.

§ 1201.113(b), I write separately to express my disagreement with the

administrative judge’s determination to mitigate the penalty of removal to a

14-day suspension.

¶2 The agency removed the appellant from his GS-12 Fire Chief position at

Royal Air Force (RAF) Croughton based on a charge of conduct unbecoming a

Federal employee. See MSPB Docket No. DC-0752-15-0222-I-1, Initial Appeal

File (IAF), Tab 1 at 9. In essence, the agency determined that for nearly 3 years,

the appellant worked, and allowed his subordinate empl oyees to work, an

unauthorized schedule that resulted in salary overpayments, even after being told

this schedule was unauthorized. See id. The administrative judge found the

agency proved its charge, including all specifications, by preponderant evidenc e.

Initial Decision (ID) at 3-13. He also found a nexus between the sustained

misconduct and the efficiency of the service. ID at 13-14. I agree with

these findings.

¶3 In mitigating the penalty, the administrative judge relied on several factors.

First, he considered that a Fire Chief at another RAF—RAF Alconbury—“utilized

the embedded schedule for himself, and at least two others, until June 2012,” but

was not disciplined. ID at 15-18. The deciding official testified there were no

comparable cases under his command at RAF Croughton. Hearing Transcript

(June 22, 2016) (HT1) at 45; see also IAF, Tab 8 at 31 (the deciding official

2

stating on his Douglas factors worksheet, “I have no other cases to compare with

this one”). While the deciding official “had heard the rumor . . . that there were

other potential violations of this nature” at other bases, he was “not the

commander at those locations” and was “not familiar with what they would have

or could have done” or “how they handled that discipline.” H T1 at 45; see also

id. at 87 (“I have no understanding of who the other personnel were or who

would’ve been using the schedule. I just heard that Alconbury in general was

using the schedule.”). The relevant inquiry is whether the agency knowingly and

unjustifiably treated employees differently. Singh v. U.S. Postal Service,

2022 MSPB 15, ¶ 14. A person generally does not have a legally protected

interest in the evenness of a misconduct penalty assessed on him as compared to

others, and there is a possible exception to this rule only if employees are

knowingly treated differently. Facer v. Department of the Air Force,

836 F.2d 535, 539 (Fed. Cir. 1988); Rogers v. Department of Defense Dependents

Schools, 814 F.2d 1549, 1555 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (explaining that “[d]isparate

treatment requires that employees knowingly be treated differently” and

considering that even if other employees had performance deficiencies simil ar to

the appellant’s, there was no evidence that the deciding official was aware of

such deficiencies). Given the deciding official’s undisputed lack of knowledge

regarding potential comparator employees outside his authority, 1 I do not believe

it was appropriate for the administrative judge to consider this employee for

mitigation purposes.

¶4 Second, the administrative judge found the agency “failed to show by

preponderant evidence that the appellant deliberately disregarded the rules as he

1

The appellant asserts he was “in the same chain of command” as the RAF Alconbury

comparator because “the 501 Wing and its ultimate commander had responsibilities

over both Croughton and Alconbury.” Petition for Review File, Tab 3 at 14. However,

the deciding official was not the wing commander. Rather, as the group commander, he

was subordinate to the wing commander, and was only responsible for three

installations (RAF Croughton, RAF Fairford, and RAF Welford). HT1 at 11-13, 149.

3

understood them simply to enrich himself and his coworkers.” ID at 18. This

conclusion relied in part on the administrative judge’s demeanor -based credibility

finding concerning the appellant’s testimony on this point. ID at 18-19. The

Board will overturn such determinations only when it has sufficiently sound

reasons to do so. See Haebe v. Department of Justice, 288 F.3d 1288, 1301 (Fed.

Cir. 2002). I would overturn the administrative judge’s credibility finding

because it is wholly inconsistent with the appellant’s own prior admissions. See

Hillen v. Department of the Army, 35 M.S.P.R. 453, 458 (1987). The

administrative judge also found the agency “failed to prove by preponderant

evidence that the appellant’s use of the embedded schedule cost the agency more

money than it would have cost had the appellant used an appropriate schedule.”

ID at 19. Again, this finding is inconsistent with the appellant’s own

prior admissions.

¶5 Specifically, in a signed, sworn statement, the appellant averred:

Although I felt I had good reasons to work the embedded schedule,

the extra money earned from the additional time worked was a

benefit that was part of the decision. The money aspect made it

worth doing all the extra hours and is and was simply the wrong

thing to do. I truely [sic] regret costing the Air Force the additional

money . . . I should have listened to those around me and those

trying to help get me on the right path. 2

IAF, Tab 8 at 148. He acknowledged that by fall 2012, he “understood [the

embedded schedule] was not a schedule desired to be used for Air Force

firefighters,” but “[t]he extra hours and money would be nice.” Id. at 150. In

light of the foregoing admissions, I would find preponderant evidence supports

the deciding official’s conclusion that “the unauthorized schedule was

intentional . . . the decision to repeat the mistake was made over several years,

2

The deciding official testified this statement “definitely impacted” his decision

because it “showed that [the appellant] acknowledged that there was a money impact to

his personal benefit.” HT1 at 42-43.

4

even when others (such as the Air Force Chief or other functional experts)

continued to indicate that this was not right.” Id. at 29-30.

¶6 Third, the administrative judge noted that the appellant “had approximately

20 years of positive service with the agency, having received performance awards

and good performance reviews, and having no prior disciplinary record.” ID

at 19. The deciding official explicitly considered the appellant’s “good work for

over 20 years” and the fact that he had “no documented disciplinary actions ,” but

apparently found those factors insufficient to outweigh the seriousness of the

appellant’s misconduct. IAF, Tab 8 at 31. I discern no error with that approach.

Indeed, the Board has frequently stated that the nature and seriousness of the

offense, and its relation to the employee’s duties, position, and responsibility, is

the most important factor in assessing the reasonableness of a penalty. Singh,

2022 MSPB 15, ¶ 18. The deciding official noted: “The offense of working

longer hours than authorized is a very serious one.” IAF, Tab 8 at 29. He

considered the appellant’s supervisory role, finding “the level of trust required to

be a manager and supervisor of other fire fighters has been tarnished

significantly” and that the appellant “cannot continue to service in the leadership

role because his trustworthiness is in question.” Id. at 31-32; see HT1 at 26

(deciding official testifying, “there is a high degree of seriousness because of how

we manage our fire department, the number of people involved, and the

perspective within the community”); see also Edwards v. U.S. Postal Service,

116 M.S.P.R. 173, ¶ 14 (2010) (stating that agencies are entitled to hold

supervisors to a higher standard because they occupy positions of trust and

responsibility). I would defer to the deciding official’s determination concerning

the seriousness of the sustained misconduct, in relation to the appellant’s

supervisory role.

¶7 Fourth, the administrative judge concluded the appellant demonstrated

rehabilitative potential because he was honest with investigators and expressed

remorse for his actions. ID at 19. This is directly contrary to the deciding

5

official’s determination that the appellant “ha[d] no chance of rehabilitation at

RAF Croughton” because he held such a prominent position, and his offense was

notorious “throughout all the US-led fire departments in the United Kingdom”

and “promulgated a poor reputation for the Croughton fire department.” IAF,

Tab 8 at 32. “[T]he rumor about this was fairly pervasive.” HT1 at 29 (testimony

of the deciding official). The deciding official testified, “[S]ince w e are a small

fire department area, there was zero potential for rehabilitation at this location.

Since we are overseas, then basically the only thing to do was to dismiss him.”

HT1 at 27. The deciding official also found problematic that the appellant did not

apologize for his actions until he was under investigation. HT1 at 135-38; see

Wynne v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 75 M.S.P.R. 127, 137 (1997) (the

appellant’s “belated, lukewarm expression of remorse” was insufficient to show

rehabilitative potential and did not constitute a significant mitigating factor) . He

considered whether the appellant could be demoted to a nonsup ervisory position

and concluded, “When a supervisor makes a mistake, to basically move them

down to a worker bee level . . . that would not be conducive to good order of

discipline and the morale of the fire department that I had here.” HT1 at 27-28,

152, 168-73; see also IAF, Tab 8 at 33 (Douglas factors worksheet indicating the

deciding official “considered potential reduced punishments,” but concluded

these other options “would send an inappropriate signal of the expectation to

maintain high standards”).

¶8 As I noted in my dissent in Chin v. Department of Defense, 2022 MSPB 34,

it is clearly not the Board’s role to decide what penalty we would impose if we

were the deciding officials. “Mitigation of a penalty by the Board is only

appropriate where the agency failed to weigh the relevant factors, or the agency’s

judgment clearly exceeded the limits of reasonableness.” Lopez v. Department of

the Navy, 108 M.S.P.R. 384, ¶ 22 (2008). The letter of decision, as supplemented

by the deciding official’s hearing testimony, demonstrates that he properly

considered the relevant factors, and that removal was within of the tolerable

6

limits of reasonableness in this case. Under these circumstances, the agency’s

penalty determination is entitled to deference. Accordingly, I believe the

agency-imposed penalty should not have been disturbed.

/s/

Tristan L. Leavitt

Member

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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